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Environmental Law
Of Armed Conflict
Introduction

“Modern armaments can dissipate their destructive energy or
introduce their destructive agents on the land or in the sea, in the
air or in the space above it. The ecosystems at risk may be either
terrestrial or oceanic and either arctic, temperate or tropical. The
terrestrial ones may be continental or insular, either forest,
grassland or desert, the oceanic ones may be estuarine, littoral
(near shore), over the continental shelves or within ocean basins.
Damage may be inflicted either directly or indirectly and range
from subtle to dramatic.” 1

There is renewed evidence that warfare involves conflicts not only between the
combatants, but also between man and nature. The ability of modern warfare to devastate
the natural environment has become ever more obvious: animal species become extinct,
forests become deserts, fertile farmland becomes a minefield, water becomes
contaminated and native vegetation disappears.
Attacks on the environment become more savage as technology develops.
Environmental destruction has become an inevitable result of modern warfare and
military tactics. The nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that emerged during the
late twentieth century present threats to life itself; but short of that apocalypse, modern
weapons can cause or hasten a host of environmental disasters, such as deforestation and
erosion, global warming, desertification, or holes in the ozone layer. The devastating
effects of military weapons on the environment is reflected throughout the history of the

1

Westing and Lumsden (1979:8), quoted in Cassady B. Craft & Suzette R. Grillot, Conventional Arms
Control and the Environment: Mitigating the Effects of War, paper prepared for the Symposium: Arms
and the Environment: Preventing the Perils of Disarmament 4 (Dec. 9-10, 1999)
Tulsa, Oklahoma [hereinafter Craft & Grillot].
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twentieth century, in World War I, World War II, the Korean and Vietnam wars, the
Cambodian civil war, Gulf wars I and II, the Afghan civil war, and the Kosovo conflict.
The Science for Peace Institute at the University of Toronto estimates that 10 to
30 percent of all environmental degradation in the world is a direct result of the various
militaries. 2 Military operations can affect land, air, wildlife, and water resources. A
German report concluded that six to ten percent of the world’s air pollution is a result of
military activity, and that the world’s military is also responsible for the emission of
approximately two-thirds of all chlorofluorocarbon-113 released into the atmosphere. 3 In
modern warfare, environmental destruction can be a primary means of threatening or
defeating one’s enemies. War itself can, and often does, mean war against the natural
environment.
During Gulf War II, which was the most toxic war in history, Saddam Hussein
threatened to pollute the Gulf with oil, and burn oil wells if other nations attempted to
liberate Kuwait. 4 He carried out his threats after the beginning of the United Nations
coalition 5 air raids. Iraq pumped crude oil into the Gulf, and set fire to Kuwaiti oil fields.
Iraqi troops destroyed eighty to eighty five percent of Kuwait’s 950 oil wells. 6 The daily
release of heat from these wells was estimated to be about eighty six billion watts,
equivalent to that of a five hundred-acre forest fire. 7 The fires burned about 4,600,000
barrels of oil daily. Smoke spread as far as 800 miles south of Kuwait. 8 The Iraqi military

2

Suzan D. Lanier-Graham, The Ecology of War: Environmental Impacts of
Weaponry and Warfare xxix (Walker & Company, 1993) [hereinafter Lanier-Graham].
3
Id., at xxx.
4
Stephen Dycus, National Defense and the Environment 138 (University Press of New
England, 1996) [hereinafter Dycus].
5
The International Coalition Member States in the United Nations Authorized Action Against Iraq in the
Gulf War II are: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, United
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and United States. In addition, Japan participated by sending medical
assistance to Saudi Arabia. And Turkey allowed coalition air forces to take off from air bases on its land.
See John North Moore, Crisis in the Gulf: Enforcing the Rules of Law 399 (Oceana
Publication, Inc., 1992).
6
Donatella Lorch, Burning Wells Turns Kuwait into Land of Oily Blackness, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1991, at
A1, A15.
7
Mark J.T. Caggiano, Comment, The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modern Warfare:
Customary Substance Over Conventional Form, 20 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 479, 480-481 (1993)
[hereinafter Caggiano].
8
Bob Davis, U.S. Scientists Play Down Effect of Fires in Kuwait, Angering Environmentalists, Wall St.
J., June 25, 1991, at A3.
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created what has been called “the worst man-made environmental disaster in history.” 9
The Kuwaiti government estimated the value of the lost oil at $12 billion. 10 Some reports
stated that at least 30,000 marine birds perished as a result of exposure to oil, and about
50% of the coral reefs on the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia was damaged or destroyed.
Some of the annual flora in the region failed to set seeds because of the exposure to soot
and oil mist. 11
Moreover, massive environmental destruction was caused not only by deliberate
military tactics, but by other activities related to war efforts. The United States military
produced approximately 6 million used plastic bags weekly, from their “Meals Ready to
Eat.” Soft drink cans and junk food cardboards were also disposed of in the desert. 12
About 40,000 km² areas of Kuwait, northeastern Saudi Arabia, and Southern Iraq were
littered with solid waste from Gulf War II.13 Solid wastes were generated mainly from
destroyed military hardware (over 5000 Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles, over one
million mines in Kuwait), residue of explosives and ammunitions (over 80,000 tons of
bombs were dropped and about 120,000 tons of ammunition used), and sanitary residues
(over 4 million tons of wastes from humans). 14 Solid wastes generated during Gulf War
II still pose a serious threat to land resources in the war zone.
Depleted Uranium (DU) was used in weapon ammunition for the first time by the
coalition during Gulf War II in 1991. It is estimated that the United States Army fired
about 14,000 high-caliber shells containing DU during the war. 15 According to the
British Atomic Energy Authority, about “forty tons of this type of projectile are scattered
near the Iraqi-Kuwaiti borders, and no more than ten percent of these ammunitions have

9

Michael Ross, Experts Blame Saudis, Kuwaitis as Spell, Oil Fires Go Unchecked, L.A. Times, Apr. 12,
1991, at A10 [hereinafter Ross, Experts Blame].
10
Caggiano, supra note (7) at 480-481.
11
Makram A. Gerges, On the Impacts of the 1991 Gulf War on the Environment of the Region: General
Observations, 27 Marine Pollution Bull. 305, 306 (1993).
12
Lanier-Graham, supra note (2) at 66.
13
Mohammad Sadiq, John C. Mc Cain Eds., The Gulf War Aftermath: An
Environmental Tragedy 183 (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993) [hereinafter Sadiq &
McCain].
14
Id., at 183.
15
Dr. Siegwart-Horst Guenther, How D.U. Shell Residues Poison Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, in
Metal of Dishonor: Depleted Uranium, How the Pentagon Radiates Soldiers &
Civilians with depleted uranium Weapons 168 (Rosalie Bertell et al. eds., 1997)
[hereinafter Guenther].
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yet been detected.” 16 An American lieutenant colonel was quoted in an official report as
saying: “[t]he explosions spread DU penetrators […] throughout the north compound.
The fires produced billowing black and white clouds of smoke that … drifted … towards
Kuwait City … I personally handled over two dozen rods or pieces of rods [of DU]. Most
of them had a black sooty or powdery coating over them…there would be as many as 50
soldiers ‘on line’ sweeping down a cleared area of very small debris, sand and dust
[…]” 17 DU is used to strengthen weapons because it is sixty five percent denser than
lead. 18 It is flammable and can penetrate even “steel-armored tanks.” 19 However, DU is a
real threat to human health and the environment. For example, since uranium is a heavy
metal it can be toxic if it enters the body and lodges in the kidney. 20 Studies have shown
that contact with DU projectiles leads to leukemia, anemia, birth defects, and other
serious maladies. 21 One British company refused a contractual project to remove
poisonous uranium from the Kuwaiti region because of the fear that its staff would be
exposed to great risk. 22 Land resources of the war region were adversely affected.
However, because Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq lack the technology and expertise to
fully determine the environmental impact of the war, and because it is difficult, if not
impossible, to accurately assess the harm to the natural environment, damage to the land
resources may not be repaired for several decades, if indeed at all.
Similarly, in the Kosovo conflict, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) 23 also used depleted uranium as a component in ammunition. NATO said that
the United States A-10 aircraft fired 31,000 rounds of ammunition containing DU during
the 1999 air strikes against Serbia, 24 creating a danger not only to the people, but also to
16

Eric Hoskins, Depleted Uranium Shells Make the Desert Glow, in Metal of Dishonor:
Depleted Uranium, How the Pentagon Radiates Soldiers & Civilians with
depleted uranium Weapons 164 (Rosalie Bertell et al. eds., 1997).
17
Alexander Nicoll, Pressure Mounts for Broader Studies into Effects on Health, Fin. Times, Jan. 18,
2001, at 2 [hereinafter Nicoll].
18
Gina Kolata, Fray in Europe Over Uranium Draws Doubters, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 2001, A6
[hereinafter Kolata, Fray in Europe].
19
Id., at A6.
20
Id., at A1, A6.
21
Guenther, supra note (15) at 167.
22
Id., at 168.
23
NATO is a regional military alliance created in 1949 for the collective defense of North America and
Western Europe.
24
James Blitz & Alexander Nicoll, Italy Calls For NATO Probe into Uranium Rounds, Fin. Times, Jan.
4, 2001, 2 [hereinafter Blitz & Nicoll].
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the environment of the entire Balkans. “A-10s were the anti-tank weapon of choice in the
1991 Gulf War, because they carry a GAU-8/A Avenger 30 millimeter seven-barrel
cannon capable of firing 4,200 rounds of ammunition per minute.” 25 John Catalinotto, a
spokesperson from the Depleted Uranium Education Project of the International Action
Center, said “DU is used in alloy form in shells to [enable them to] penetrate targets. As
the shell hits its target, it burns and releases uranium oxide into the air. The poisonous
and radioactive uranium is most dangerous when inhaled, [because it will continue to]
release radiation [throughout] the life of the [exposed] person.” 26 Moreover, inhaling
uranium 238 27 can cause lung cancer, or lymphoma. 28 In 1999, six Italian soldiers died
after serving in Kosovo and Bosnia. 29 As a consequence, Italian Prime Minister Giuliano
Amato declared that his government will call for NATO to investigate “the Balkans
syndrome” and assume responsibility for its actions. 30 Moreover, in France, four soldiers
who served in the Balkans are being treated for leukemia. 31 Paul Lannoye, the leader of
the parliament’s Green Group, said: “EU governments and NATO must be
accountable…It is not acceptable to say that we should wait and establish a link between
the weapons and illnesses before action is taken.” 32 Consequently, the European
parliamentarians called for “a moratorium on the use of DU weapons until the health
risks are clearer.” 33
Even more significant is the fact that NATO forces bombed petrochemical and
other chemical plants and factories, thus releasing tons of toxic substances such as

25

A statement by the International Action Center, a group that opposes the use of (DU) weapons.
Radioactive Weapons Used by U.S./NATO in Kosovo, available at <http://www.iacenter.org/duyug.htm>,
(last visit Apr. 1, 1999).
26
Id.
27
Dr. Frank von Hippel, a physicist who is a professor of public and international affairs at Princeton
University said that depleted uranium is left “when the more highly radioactive uranium 235 has been
removed from its more abundant atomic cousin, uranium 238 [which] is very weakly radioactive.” See
Kolata, Fray in Europe, supra note (18) at A1.
28
Id., at A6.
29
Italy was the largest participant in the peace-keeping operations in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Albania in the
1990s after the U.S. See Blitz & Nicoll, supra note (24) at 2.
30
Id., at 2.
31
Ralph Atkins & Dan Bilefsky, U.S. Envoy Called in Over Uranium Weapons, Fin. Times, Jan. 18,
2001, at 2.
32
Id., at 2.
33
Id., at 2.
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chlorine, ethylene dichloride, and vinyl chloride into the air, water, and ground. 34
According to information received by the Balkans Task Force in August of 1991, some
93 bombs had been located and exploded by NATO. Some number of unexploded bombs
remain in the deep waters of the Adriatic Sea, 35 and perhaps elsewhere as well.
Similarly, the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which began in April 1992 and
ended in November 1995, caused environmental damage estimated at twenty to seventy
billion US dollars. 36 An estimated 300,000 hectares of land sustained environmental
degradation, raw sewage flowed into surface waters because of the destruction of waste
collection equipment during the war, 37 and water sanitation services deteriorated to the
point where chemical, bacteriological, and biological surface water contamination can be
observed in both urban and rural areas. 38
Even without armed conflict, military bases often generate considerable amounts
of hazardous wastes, such as explosives, solvents, acids, and spent fuel that can
contaminate the surrounding soil, water, and air. For example, at several bases in
Germany, underground sources of drinking water have been contaminated with “spilled
jet fuel and trichloroethylene from U.S. military operations.” 39
In the Philippines, the departure of the American military exposed the extent of
hazardous waste contamination at the U.S. bases there. The U.S. General Accounting
Office reported in January 1992 40 that untreated chemical and heavy metal wastes had
been discharged into the air, the ground, and into Subic Bay from Subic Bay Naval and
Clark Air Force Bases. 41 A report by the World Health Organization in May 1993 found

34

Kenneth Friedman, War Effects on the Environment, 1999, available at
<http://www.suite101.com/article.cfm/environment/19141>, (last visit Oct. 10, 1999).
35
The Kosovo Conflict: Consequences for the Environment and Human Settlements 8 (United Nations
Environment Programme and United Nations Center for Human Settlements, 1999) [hereinafter The
Kosovo Conflict: Consequences for the Environment].
36
Stuart Thompson, Status of the Environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Current Assessment, 12
Geo. Int’l. Envt’l. L. Rev. 247, 256 (1999) [hereinafter Thompson].
37
Federal Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina, State of the
Environment Report: Bosnia and Herzegovina: Soil: Causes of Soil Destruction, (1998), available at
<http://www.grida.no/prog/cee/enrin/htmls/bosnia/soe/soil/presure.htm>, (last visit Nov. 10, 2000).
38
Thompson, supra note (36) at 257.
39
John M. Broder, Pollution “Hot Spots” Taint Water Sources, L.A. Times, June 18, 1990, at 16.
40
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-92-51 Military Base Closures: U.S. Financial Obligation in
the Philippines (1992)[hereinafter Gen. Accounting Office].
41
Id.
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a potential risk of pollution at Subic Bay. 42 Similarly, local citizens complain that U.S.
military operations “monopolize fertile farmlands in Guam, threaten bird sanctuaries in
Japan, and fill the air with jet noise in Germany.” 43
Serious environmental and health effects can result from non-hostile military
operations, even by accident. Three American soldiers died and fifty were wounded in an
accidental explosion near the U.S. military camp at Doha, Kuwait on July 11, 1991, when
some of the ammunition detonated. 44 A statement from the Joint Information Bureau in
Dahran, Saudi Arabia reported that “we know it was not due to hostile action or
sabotage.” 45 The explosion resulted in the release of radioactive and toxic dust which
might cause cancer, or respiratory, kidney and skin disorders. 46 Further, Dr. Charles
Phelps, the provost at the University of Rochester and a member of an Institute of
Medicine Committee, reported that uranium-238 was leaching into the soldiers’ kidneys,
and “they had very high levels of uranium salts in their urine.” 47
Some political and military leaders have already recognized the threat to the
environment from war and other military operations. For example, Colonel Ken
Cornelius, an Air Force officer on the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for the
Environment, asserted: “If we’re going to break things and kill people, and that’s what
war’s about, if push comes to shove, that’s what we’re there to do. I can’t think of too
much that’s more damaging to the environment than the war.” 48 Kofi Annan, Secretary
General of the United Nations, stated that “Peace is understood not just as the absence of
conflict, but as a phenomenon encompassing economic development, social justice,
environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human

42

See, M. Victoria Bayoneto, Note, The Former U.S. Bases in the Philippines: An Argument for the
Application of U.S. Environmental Standards to Overseas Military Bases, 6 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 111,
112 (1994) [hereinafter Bayoneto].
43
Dycus, supra note (4) at 73.
44
Three G.I.’s Killed in Explosion Near A U.S. Camp in Kuwait, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1991, § A, at 7, ¶ 1,
Foreign Desk, Available in LEXIS, News Group File, Beyond Two Years, [hereinafter Three G.I.’s Killed].
45
Id.
46
Edward Ericson, Recycling the Army Way: The Pentagon Uses Radioactive Waste as Armor and Bullets,
E/The Environmental Magazine, (Mar., Apr. 1997) available at <http://www.emagazine.com/marchapril_1997/0397curr_army.html>, (last visit Dec. 12, 1999), see also, Kathleen Sulivan, Troops Exposed to
Toxic Depleted Uranium in Gulf War Weapons, The Austin-American Statesman, Jan. 10, 1998,
News, at A3, Available at LEXIS, News Group File, Beyond Tow Years.
47
Kolata, Fray in Europe, supra note (18) at A6.
48
Lanier-Graham, supra note (2) at 12.
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rights.” 49 The countries of the world must recognize that peace has many pillars in
addition to the mere prevention of conflicts. One of these pillars is environmental
protection, so that people can live without the threat of contaminated water, polluted air,
or toxin-laden soil.
There is often no way to measure environmental loss in dollar amounts, and the
loss is often irreversible. Even though experts have found methods to calculate the
monetary costs of environmental destruction, money alone cannot return the original
animal or plant life, clean water, or remove all the traces of pollutants. In ecological
terms, reparations are inadequate after armed conflict has already caused that kind of
damage. Thus, the focus of world leaders must be on preventing environmental
destruction before, or even during, armed conflict.
This study is not the first and, it is hoped, not the last on this controversial issue.
The purpose of this study is to provide an overarching analysis of the legal aspects of
warfare in which the environment is a direct or indirect victim of the armed conflict. This
thesis evaluates the impact of armed conflict on civilians as well as the environment, and
classifies environmental harm into three distinct phases: harm caused during preparation
for armed conflict, harm caused during armed conflict, and harm caused following armed
conflict. The study will examine applicable international humanitarian rules which
encompass elements of environmental protection, classify those rules, identify aspects of
the law of war relevant to environmental concerns, and examine national and
international environmental rules that deal with this subject.
This thesis explains the law of the environment during armed conflicts in five
parts:
* Part One, “General Background of Armed Conflict,” focuses on the nature of
armed conflict, including international and national disputes, civil war, and the problem
of applying international legal duties to internal belligerents, the impact of armed conflict
on civilians, and the environmental impact of preparing for, engaging in, and recovering
from armed conflict.
49

Kristi L. Bergemann, Nuclear Weapons and International Environmental Law: Peace Through
Responsibility, The International Environmental Law of War and Peace, “Kofi Annan, Secretary General
of the United Nations, in the opening of The International Day of Peace, 1997” available at
<http://www.eckerd.edu/academics/intlaw/warandpeace99.html>, (last visit Feb. 10, 2000).
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* Part Two, “Environmental Protection in International Humanitarian Law,”
examines the definition of international humanitarian law (IHL), focusing particularly on
the environmental protection provisions in the IHL and its current inadequacy as a tool to
protect the natural environment.
* Part Three, “The Environmental Law Rules,” will examine relevant provisions
of environmental law, and investigate environmental law rules relevant to armed conflicts
in the national, comparative, and international levels.
* Part Four deals with “Enviro-Humanitarian Rules,” and explores the Articles of
Armament Conventions, a main source of enviro-humanitarian rules. This section
examines the deficiencies of those rules in the environmental protection framework.
*Part Five, “The Responsibility of Warfare Environmental Damage,” will
examine the system of responsibility for environmental damage resulted from military
activities in peacetime and in times of armed conflicts. This part explores two levels of
responsibility in the international and internal systems.
*Part Six, “The Recommendations” in which some recommendations and
proposals will be presented to better advance the environmental protection and to reduce
warfare environmental damage. The recommendations are grouped according to the
concerned party. Some recommendations are directed to the international community,
others are directed to national societies and the last group of recommendation is directed
to non-governmental organizations.

9

Part I:
General Background of Armed Conflict

A-The Nature of Armed Conflict

Conflict is a congenital characteristic of mankind and a notable aspect of
international relations. There is no specific definition of armed conflict acceptable to all
international experts. As a result, most of the argument about armed conflict focuses on
moralistic or pragmatic explanations of human nature. 50 For example, Forest L. Grieves,
an international theorist, identifies four characteristics of the nature of conflict: “First,
human conflict is a fact of modern social life and is likely to remain so for the indefinite
future. Second, the abolition of war is a dream. Third, theories of Armageddon are likely
to be not only empty but even dangerous, and fourth, wars may be inevitable but nuclear
war is unthinkable.” 51 On the other hand, John Spanier, a political scientist, observes that
“human beings may well be alike, in spite of their different languages, clothing, and
manner. But politics starts where the commonalities of humanity stop, and it starts here
because of the different interests, values, ideologies, and histories of the many nationstates. All want peace-but only on their terms.” 52
An armed conflict can be defined, very simply, as any disagreement involving the
use of weapons between two or more, national such as civil wars, or international parties
such as international armed conflicts. A weapon, in turn, can be defined as an “instrument
used or designed to be used to injure or kill someone.” 53 The International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia defined armed conflict as follows:

50

Jeffrey M. Elliot & Robert Reginald, The Arms Control, Disarmament, and
Military Security Dictionary 14 (Clio Press Ltd., 1989).
51
Forest L. Grieves, Conflict and Order: An Introduction to International
Relation 92-95 (Houghton Mifflin, 1977)[hereinafter Grieves].
52
John Spanier, Games Nations Play 568 (Congressional Quarterly Press, 1987) [hereinafter
Spanier].
53
Bryan A. Garner ed. Black’s Law Dictionary 1587 (7th ed, 1999).
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[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed
force between States or protracted armed violence between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between
such groups within a State. 54

The Permanent Court of International Justice was the first to use the expression in
the SS. Wimbledon Case, when it referred to “the rights consequent upon neutrality in an
armed conflict.” 55
Later, in 1949, the four Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims,
declared that the scope of the Conventions extended to “all cases of declared war or of
any other armed conflict […]” 56 Those definitions suggest that parties can engage in
armed conflicts even without declaring war on each other.
One expert on the laws of war has observed that “human beings fight to the death.
They kill members of their own species, where wolves do not. It is not our lack of
humanity, but our lack of animality that causes our troubles.” 57 There are various causes
of war. The 1925 Conference on the Cause and Cure of War identified over 250 sources
of war, classified as political, economic, social, and psychological. 58
Those causes certainly include:
1- a nation’s belief that war will achieve some kind of national victory,
2- intolerance of differences in religious or other belief systems,
3- military capability, particularly the possession of weapons of mass destruction, 59
54

The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Oct. 2, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 32, para. 70
[hereinafter Prosecutor v. Tadic].
55
S.S. Wimbledon (Brit., Fr., It., Jap., v. Ger.,) 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.1, at 24.
56
Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (I)]; Geneva Convention
(II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Member of Armed Forces at
Sea, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (II)]; Geneva Convention (III)
Relative to the Treatment of the Prisoners of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention (III)]; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
art. 2, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.[hereinafter Geneva Convention (IV)].
57
David W. Ziegler, War, Peace, and International Politics 114 (Little, Brown, 1987).
58
In 1925, Carrie Chapman Catt organized the National Conference on the Cause and Cure of War. See,
Nancy F. Cott, The Grounding of Modern Feminism, 94-95, 258 (1987); see also,
Grieves, supra note (51) at 101.
59
Despite the disastrous effects of the mass destruction weapons, such as the nuclear weapons, they may
deter war. French President Jacques Chirac stated that nuclear weapons are not combat weapons and that
France will coordinate in a nuclear deterrence policy with its European neighbors. Further, during the Gulf
War II, the U.S. government deterred Iraq from using its mass destruction weapons by threatening to use its
nuclear weapons. However, the U.S. continues to hold nuclear weapons for deterrence and self-defense.
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4- the absence of peaceful mechanisms to settle conflicts, and
5- chaos, disorder, or other emergencies within a given nation.
Although the history of war is as old as the history of humanity, since the middle
of the 20th century, war has carried with it the possibility of apocalypse. Winston S.
Churchill, the former British Prime Minister, at the end of World War I, even before the
development of nuclear arms, said that: “mankind has got into its hands for the first time
the tools by which it can unfailingly accomplish its own extermination.” 60
Modern warfare also presents unprecedented threats to the environment. A
significant example of using the environment as a weapon in armed conflict occurred in
the Gulf War II, 1990-1991, when Iraqi President Saddam Hussein ordered his troops to
invade Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Hussein claimed that Kuwait overproduction of oil in
violation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quotas, and the
removal of $ 2.4 billion worth of Iraqi crude oil by “slant drilling” into the Rumaila oil
field, in addition to the long-running historical dispute over the dependency of Kuwait to
Iraq were the reasons for the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait. 61 The Iraqi armed forces
deliberately released crude oil into the Gulf, and set fire to Kuwaiti oil fields. 62 As a
consequence, the Gulf War II was termed an “eco-war” 63 and Iraq’s actions described as
“environmental terrorism.” 64

See, Jill M. Sheldon, Nuclear Weapons and the Laws of War: Does Customary International Law Prohibit
the Use of Nuclear Weapons in all Circumstances? 20 Fordham Int’l. L.J. 181, 193, 195-96 (1996)
[hereinafter Sheldon].; see also, William M. Arkin, Calculated Ambiguity: Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf
War, Wash. Q. 3, 5 (Autumn 1996).
60
Spanier, supra note (52) at 34.
61
The United Nations and The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-1996 at 14, U.N. Doc. DPI/1770,
U.N. Sales No. E.96.I.3 (1996).
62
Shilpi Gupta, Note, Iraq’s Environmental Warfare in the Persian Gulf, 6 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev.
251, 252 (1993)[hereinafter Gupta].
63
Richard Lacayo, A War Against the Earth, Time, Feb. 4, 1991, at 28 [hereinafter lacayo].
64
Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Calls Gulf Oil Spill A “Sick” Act by Hussein, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1991, L5.
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B- Civil War and the Problem of Applying International Legal Duties to Internal
Belligerents

Traditional International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) classifies civil wars into
three categories: “rebellion, insurgency, and belligerency.” 65 Rebellions are “small-scale,
localized conflicts which are usually solved with police measures.” 66 An insurgency “is a
conflict that lies somewhere between a rebellion and a state of belligerency.” 67 On the
other hand, a state of belligerency may be declared when four conditions are met: “first,
there must exist within the State an armed conflict of a general (as distinguished from a
purely local) character; secondly, the insurgents must occupy and administer a substantial
portion of national territory; thirdly, they must conduct the hostilities in accordance with
the rules of war and through organized armed forces acting under a responsible authority;
fourthly, there must exist circumstances which make it necessary for outside States to
define their attitude by means of recognition of belligerency.” 68
Most of the armed conflicts in the world are internal. Since 1945 internal armed
conflicts (civil wars) have been more numerous than international wars, and even many
international wars had their roots in civil wars. For example, the wars involving Israel
and Arabic nations developed out of hostilities between the Jewish and Arab people
living in Palestine during the last years of the British mandate. 69 International law has
historically treated internal armed conflict as a matter of national jurisdiction, to be
determined by the people of the concerned State. 70 Generally, international law simply
does not address civil wars and revolutions, and thus has no rules to prohibit or restrain
such internal conflicts. Significantly, the United Nations Charter Article 2 (4) prohibits
the use of force in international relations, but says nothing about the use of force in civil
65
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wars. Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter states that “[a]ll Members shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations.” 71 Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War it
appears that customary international law has softened its prohibition against intervention
in internal armed conflict, and has started to acknowledge the necessity of humanitarian
intervention in such conflicts. 72 That recognition is reflected in the Statutes of the ICRC,
which require the ICRC 73 to help the victims of armed conflicts, regardless of whether
they are victims of international or internal armed conflicts.74 Further, Boutros Boutros
Ghali, Secretary General of the U.N., suggested that civil wars “are no longer inherently
domestic in scope. They disrupt stable international order and peaceful global existence
because nations are generally too interdependent and prefer egocentric isolationism.” 75
International humanitarian law defines civil war as a non-international armed
conflict occurring in the territory of a nation, involving the armed forces of that nation
and dissident or other organized armed groups which exercise control over part of the
territory. 76 However, in recent years, internal armed conflicts have broken out with
increasing frequency. Internal conflicts, often threaten the environment even more than
international armed conflict, because they often last for long periods and the armed forces
of the involved parties often deplete natural resources in order to continue their fight.
70
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Despite the obvious threat posed by situations of civil war, none of the IHL rules
explicitly provide for prevention of their environmental effects. Nevertheless, since the
adoption of the Additional Protocol II, 77 civil wars have been subject to IHL rules. The
1977 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions specifically provides some
environmental protection during internal armed conflicts, 78 although less than during
international conflicts. As Additional Protocol II lacks provisions comparable to Article
35 (3), 79 and Article 55 80 of Additional Protocol I, which deal with the environmental
protection in international armed conflicts, a proposal was made at the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
applicable in Armed Conflicts (CDDH) to introduce into Protocol II a provision
analogous to Articles 35, and 55 of Protocol I, but the idea was rejected. 81
In international armed conflicts, the rules of neutrality 82 provide a clear criterion
for distinguishing between lawful and unlawful help given to a belligerent State by a
neutral State; yet such rules are not as clear with regard to internal conflicts. 83 However,
it is sometimes hard to distinguish between international and internal armed conflict. For
example, when foreign armed forces intervene in a conflict at the request of a
government or rebel forces, and become involved in internal armed conflict, both internal
77

Id.
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and international factors are involved. This intervention is known as “internationalized
internal conflict,” and has occurred in places such as the Bosnian and Angolan armed
conflicts. 84 As a rule, in a civil war, foreign States possess not only the right, but also the
duty, to recognize the ‘belligerency’ of forces occupying a substantial part of a nation’s
territory. 85
However, according to the U.N. General Assembly’s Friendly Relations
Resolution adopted on October 24, 1970, 86 “[e]very State has the duty to refrain from
organizing, instigating or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another
State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the
commission of such acts, when [such] acts involve a threat or use of force,” and that “no
State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or
armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or
interfere in civil strife in another State.” 87 Nonetheless, according to the right of counterintervention, 88 rebels may receive foreign help from sympathetic States when the
government is itself receiving international assistance. 89 For example, in 1979, following
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia gave money to the rebels, and Egypt
declared that she would provide military training for the Muslim rebels. 90 Moreover,
according to the decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
84
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Yugoslavia (ICTY), in the Dusko Tadic Case, 91 international humanitarian law rules and
principles apply to both international and internal armed conflicts. 92 The tribunal held
that: “it had jurisdiction, regardless of the nature of the conflict, and that it need not
determine whether the conflict is internal or international.” 93 Based on that conclusion,
the tribunal has competence to apply IHL rules whenever there are severe violations of
human rights in armed conflicts. Further, the status of the 1990 San Remo Declaration on
the Rules of International Humanitarian Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities in
Non-International Armed Conflicts 94 attempts to impose humanitarian restrictions even
on internal conflicts, in order to protect non-combatant civilian populations, 95 to avoid
unnecessary suffering or injury, 96 to protect medical and religious personnel and medical
units and transports, 97 to prohibit attacks on dwellings, 98 and to protect resources
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. 99 This Declaration, if applied
rigorously, would extend to internal conflicts the humanitarian safeguards already
imposed on international warfare. Moreover, even though the Declaration does not
specifically address environmental damage, some of its language could apply to that
issue. This is the case even though IHL principles are not applied word-for-word to
internal armed hostilities. 100
The United Nations, however, has been very hesitant to intervene in internal
conflicts. The U.N. Charter asserts the principle of the sovereign equality of all the U.N.
91
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members, 101 and therefore, that principle protects State sovereignty from external
intervention. Nevertheless, the international community has accepted humanitarian
intervention in cases of flagrant violation of human rights. According to customary
international law, there are four exceptions to the principle of State sovereignty and nonintervention in a State’s national affairs: “1) when a de jure government requests or
consents to intervention, 2) when a group of States or a regional actor invokes a right to
humanitarian intervention, 3) when a State acts in self-defense, and 4) when counterintervention by a State offsets an illegal prior intervention by another state.” 102 In these
circumstances, the international community supports humanitarian intervention. 103
According to the U.N. Charter, Chapter VII, the Security Council, which is charged with
the maintenance of the international peace and security, may ask all member states to
apply sanctions against an aggressor. 104 Although the General Assembly can authorize
such collective action, 105 any of the five Security Council members 106 can veto 107 such a
resolution. Therefore, collective security cannot succeed unless the five major powers
cooperate in action against aggressor States. With that cooperation, the U.N. Security
Council has intervened in internal conflicts. It “has authorized military intervention to
end repression of the Kurds in Iraq, famine in Somalia, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, and
genocide in Rwanda…” 108 On the other hand, the Security Council did not authorize
military intervention to end ethnic cleansing in Chechnya, or to cease human rights
violation in Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Jerusalem. 109 The Security Council did not
101
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deem these situations a threat to international peace and security, even though they
caused thousands of casualties, and devastated the natural environment.
Thus, the U.N.’s participation in internal peacekeeping operations has been
uneven. However, the U.N. Charter does provide a legal basis for humanitarian
intervention in internal conflicts. The Charter gives regional organizations the first
responsibility for resolving disputes, 110 as with the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and
Sierra Leone, 111 and the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the
Bangui Agreements (MISAB) in the Central African Republic.” 112 Similarly, the
European Community has played a significant role in the Bosnia-Herzegovina
mediation, 113 and the U.N. Secretary General has requested the assistance of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in resolving the conflict in Somalia. 114 Based on
these precedents, the U.N. could take a more active role with regard to internal conflicts.
There is ample reason for the U.N. to do so. Recent history abounds with bloody
and destructive conflicts within States. For example, in the Rwandan civil war of 19901994, between Rwanda’s two main ethnic groups, the Tutsi and Hutu, 115 more than
850,000 Rwandans were killed from April to July 1994 in Rwanda (formerly Ruanda) in
east central Africa. 116 Similarly, in the Bosnian Civil War of 1992-1995, the
predominantly Serbian federal army, shelled Croats and Muslims and carried out ethnic
cleansing 117 and genocide in Sarajevo, the Capital of Bosnia. However, on December 14,
1995, the leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia signed the “Dayton Peace Accords,”
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which ended the civil war in Bosnia and Croatia only after about 250,000 people died and
more than 3 million others became refugees. 118
An internal armed conflict lasted for nine years following the Sierra Leone civil
war of 1991. A rebel movement known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) sought
to overthrow the republican government of Sierra Leone, and this civil war left 75,000
people killed and over a million others homeless. 119 The U.N. Security Council took
action by adopting Resolution 1132 to ban the sale or supply of all petroleum, arms, and
other ammunition to Sierra Leone in order to prevent the importing of arms into the
war. 120 However, the RUF financed its military operations through the illegal trade of
diamonds, so the U.N.’s intervention failed to stop the internal conflict. Internal conflict
in Colombia resulted in particularly dramatic environmental damage. During the civil war
there, dating back to the mid-1960s, 121 anti-government rebels exploded petroleum
pipelines, spilled millions of barrels of crude oil into rivers, and contaminated drinking
water supplies. Consequently, hundreds of aquatic fish were poisoned, forest fires caused
severe air pollution, soil was sterilized, and riverside inhabitants were severely harmed.
Moreover, even though the conflict itself took place within Colombia’s borders, the
environmental impact extended far beyond the Colombian borders to Venezuela. 122
These examples demonstrate that the legal guidelines that apply to international
wars should also apply to internal conflicts, since “internal” conflicts can cause as much
destruction within a nation, or even across national borders, as warfare between States.
Guerrillas, 123 irregular forces “who use unconventional methods of warfare, such as
sabotage, ambushes, and sniping,” 124 and headed by dissidents who use arms to seek to
118
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win power in order to change the political, social, and economic structure of a nation,
must be bound by regular armed forces rules. Some legal guidelines already recognize the
significance of such internal conflicts, and recognize the status of combatants in such
conflicts.
The ICRC, for example, recognizes that “[t]he word guerrilla is not intended to
signify a category of conflict, but a particular method of waging war which may be used
in international or internal conflict by persons who in general do not fulfill the conditions
required of combatants under the Geneva Conventions to qualify for prisoner of war
status but who have at their command a logistic and political infrastructure supported by
some or all of the population.” 125 Similarly, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, extends
certain protections to any guerrilla fighter who
1-is commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, 126
2-wears a distinctive sign or article of clothing visible at a
distance, 127
3-carries his weapon openly, 128 and
4-observes the laws and customs of war. 129

Guerrillas involved in internal armed conflicts are specifically covered by Article
3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. 130 Article 3 is the only part of the
Conventions that applies explicitly to internal armed conflicts, and sets forth limits on the
behavior of both regular armed forces and dissident ranks:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,
the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and
125
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those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or
any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,
without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion
or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this
end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any
time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovementioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b)
taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An
impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee
of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the
conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into
force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other
provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict. 131
In sum, and as examined thoroughly in Part II “Environmental Protection in the
International Humanitarian Law,” until 1977, dating back to the adoption of the
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the law of war excluded civil
war from the rules that govern international armed conflicts, including environmental
protection rules. Nevertheless, the protection offered by the Additional Protocol II of
1977 was not adequate to achieve the necessary environmental protection. In contrast, the
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions offers a great deal of environmental
protection during international armed conflicts.
C- The Impact of Armed Conflict on Civilian Populations

Modern nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare seriously harm both humans
and the natural environment. For example, the intentional destruction of developed areas
deprives local citizens of shelter. The destruction of sewage treatment facilities, the ruin
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of dams that flow to agricultural areas, and the detonation of power plants to release
poisonous emissions in times of armed conflicts, result in damage not only to the
environment, but to the civilian population as well. Therefore, any study of an
environmental law of armed conflict must address the impact of armed conflict on
civilian populations who interact with and are dependent on, environmental systems.
As a fact, civilian deaths and injuries have been high in recent armed conflicts.
“In World War I, thirty percent of wartime casualties were civilians. During World War
II, civilian casualties increased to sixty percent. Significantly, wartime civilian casualties
increased to ninety percent in the Rwanda civil war.” 132 Most international law experts
believe that there is a substantial relationship between armed conflict and civilian
causalities during or after the conflict, and the infringement of international humanitarian
law. Furthermore, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) surgical
database reported that in 1991, 17, 086 people treated by ICRC personnel for weapon
injuries, “thirty five percent were females, males under sixteen, or males aged fifty and
over.” 133 Thus, examining the impact of armed conflict on civilian populations is the
legal bench mark against which law must be evaluated. International humanitarian law
has defined the problem and provided some controls, however, environmental law will
need to learn from this if it is to do better. In addition, as it will be discussed in the ecorefugees section, the war refugees can harm the environment by depleting nature and
natural resources.
This section will highlight civilian deterioration from death, chronic diseases and
paralysis, persecution of ethnic minorities, rape and torture, violence and drug abuse
induced by armed conflict experiences, and refugees as the result of armed conflicts.
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1. Death
Regrettably, thousands of civilians are killed every year as a direct result of
fighting, and many more die from malnutrition and disease caused by armed conflicts.
About 8.5 million soldiers and 1.5 million civilians were killed during the four years of
World War I. 134 For example, the French lost “955,000 men in five months of 1914; in
1915, 1,430,000 men; and in 1916, 900,000 men [including civilians].” 135 Some 50
million people were killed during the six years of World War II. 136 In El Salvador,
between 1980 and 1992, 1.5 percent of the Salvadoran population, about 70,000 persons,
including many civilian non-combatants, were killed by the government’s armed
forces. 137 Further, during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in1990, mortalities reported
from Kuwaiti sources were 1,061. 138 Comparing this figure with the total Kuwaiti
population of 700,000 shows the dimension of this occupation. As a result of the same
war, between 5,000 and 15,000 Iraqi civilians died in coalition attacks. 139
Additionally, the International Human Rights Law Institute of DePaul University
in Chicago estimated that of 140,000 to 150,000 casualties in the former Yugoslavia, fifty
percent were civilians. One-third of those were women and children. 140 In Croatia, one
study found that of the 4,339 casualties studied, sixty four percent were civilians. 141 And
during the siege of the eastern Croatia city of Vukover in November 1991, Serbian troops
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removed hundreds of patients and staff from the municipal hospital, executed them and
buried them in a mass grave on the Ovcara collective farm. 142
NATO air strikes also caused civilian casualties in the former Yugoslavia. Human
Rights Watch reported “[ninety] confirmed incidents in which civilians died from NATO
bombing,” 143 and estimated that “as few as 489 and as many as 529 Yugoslav civilians
were killed in these incidents.” 144 That group also reported that “between 279 and 318 of
the dead, --between [fifty six] and [sixty] percent of the total number of deaths—were in
Kosovo. In Serbia 201 civilians were killed and eight died in Montenegro.” 145
On January 6, 1999, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone,
occupied the capital Freetown. According to the July 1999 Human Rights Watch Report,
“Sierra Leone: Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape,” “the rebel RUF
occupation of Freetown was characterized by the systematic and wide spread perpetration
of all classes of gross human rights abuses against the civilian population. Civilians were
gunned down within their houses, rounded up and massacred on the streets, thrown from
the upper flours of buildings, used as human shields and burned alive in cars and
houses.” 146
Even after war ceases, its effects often continue to cause civilian deaths. In the
Kandahar region of Afghanistan, where there was an extended conflict between rival
combatant groups, mortality rates increased from 2.5% to 6.1% during the post conflict
period. 147 Since the 1991 cease fire in the Gulf War II, a study carried out in 1993 by
three American scientists showed that about 50,000 Iraqi children died during the first
eight months after the war from the effects of depleted uranium. 148 Similarly, Beth O.
Daponte, an analyst from the U.S. Census Bureau, estimated that Iraqi deaths in the war
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totaled 86,194 men, 39,612 women, and 32,195 children, 149 many of them civilians. In
another estimation, the DoD reported that up to six million Iraqi could have been killed
from the dispersion of anthrax and botulism viruses caused by a single attack on
biological weapons facility. 150 Furthermore, in May 1992, Harvard Study Group
published a study estimating that 170,000 Iraqi children under the age of five would die
from “delayed effects of the Gulf Crisis.” The major cause of such death would be water
borne diseases, hunger, and malnutrition. 151
Today, children in at least sixty-eight countries live amid the threat of more than
110 million hidden mines. 152 Many of the explosives look like toys, and children may
pick up or step on the devices which will result in death or paralysis. The United Nations
head of Humanitarian Assistance in Kosovo, Dennis McNamara, confirmed that “kids are
picking up the cluster bombs and getting blown up because the cluster bombs have bright
canisters which are very attractive.” 153 A blatant example could be found in Afghanistan
during the war against terrorism, when the U.S. military used cluster bombs. The cluster
bombs have the same color, yellow, as the humanitarian supplies that U.S. planes were
dropping to the Afghan people. 154 Number of casualties among civilians resulted from
people mistakenly picking up an unexploded cluster bomb. 155 Accordingly, General
Richard Myers, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced that “the color of
future food packets will be changed to blue.” 156
Armed conflicts can have devastating effects on civilian populations. In general,
the high percentage of civilian casualties results from the fact that they are not physically
prepared to engage in warfare. In addition, although some modern arms are “smart,” and
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can destroy a specific target, distinguish between combatants and civilians. 157 More
significant, however, is the fact that the armed forces of the involved parties, focused on
achieving their military goals, often intentionally or unintentionally cause civilian deaths.
In internal armed conflicts, civilian deaths are often dramatically increased, because the
armed forces seek to dominate their own populations, including both combatants and
civilians.

2. Chronic Diseases
Even aside from civilian deaths that result from armed combat, warfare’s
lingering effects on civilians include a legacy of chronic diseases. For example, nuclear
weapons may cause eye damage. Anyone looking at a nuclear fireball could be blinded
for a period of a few minutes to some hours (called flash blindness) or could sustain
permanent eye damage (retinal burns.) 158 Radiation emitted by nuclear weapons, even
when it does not kill, can cause leukemia, birth defects, and other diseases. 159 Neutron
bomb technology is designed to kill people by radiation that “causes ionization, or static
electricity, among the atoms of any material it passes through. This happens when
electrons are torn away from their positions surrounding atoms. Atoms consist of a
nucleus charged with positive electricity surrounded by electrons charged with negative
electricity. When the ionizing radiation separates these charges by removing electrons,
atoms and free electrons react swiftly with other atoms or collections of atoms
(molecules.)” 160 This reaction can seriously damage living tissue.
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Studies of the effects of the atomic bombs at Nagasaki and Hiroshima have shown
that “leukemia is the most radiogenic of the cancers following exposure to ionizing
radiation. The leukemia excess is the first to appear [among civilians] (with a latency
period of three to seven years), and it appears in the greatest excess among the cancer
excesses 40 years after exposure. In other words, the Japanese studies show other cancer
excesses occurring in smaller, yet observable, amounts.” 161
Other kinds of cancers reported among the victims of Nagasaki and Hiroshima,
included “thyroid cancer, breast cancer, lung cancer, and cancer of the salivary gland.” 162
Other evidence from Japan showed that infections of nausea, vomit, diarrhea, fever, and
delirium, were rife among bomb victims. 163 Affected people died instantly. However,
those who survived would recover very slowly, and even after recovery, they might die
suddenly from an infection that would cause only a minor disease in a healthy person. 164
During the Gulf War II, 1990-1991, a considerable number of Allied soldiers
were diagnosed with symptoms including “damage to organs, genetic manifestation,
chronic fatigue, loss of endurance, frequent infections, sore throat, coughing, skin rashes,
night sweats, nausea and vomiting, diarrhea, dizziness, headaches, memory loss,
confusion, vision problems, muscle spasms and cramps, joint pain and loss of mobility,
aching muscles, swollen glands, dental problems and malformation of newborns.” 165
According to the National Gulf War Resources Center, such symptoms were known as
“Gulf War Syndrome.” Of the 695,000 U.S. troops who served during Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, more than 45,000 said that they have health concerns. 166 Some
American combatants died as a result of infections. 167
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In Great Britain 3,500 soldiers are reported to be suffering from Gulf War
Syndrome. 168 Australian, Canadian, and French soldiers are said to be suffering too. 169 In
1994, reports on 251 families of veterans of the Gulf War living in Mississippi, showed
that sixty seven percent of the children of these families were born with “congenital
deformities: their eyes, ears or fingers are missing, or they are suffering from severe
blood diseases and respiratory problems.” 170 In 1996, the United States Presidential
Advisory Committee on War Veterans’ Illnesses admitted that neurotoxic chemical
warfare agents, especially sarin, had been released in certain areas of the Gulf during the
destruction of the Iraqi ammunition depot, and caused critical health problems in the
region, 171 to both soldiers and civilians.
Additionally, in Kuwait, thousands of people still suffer deep psychological
disorders including “Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.” 172 Indeed, the environmental
impact of air pollution fallout, and fumes may have long-term health consequences on the
whole Kuwaiti people through accumulation in the food chain. Similarly, in November
1996, following the warfare in the former Yugoslavia, reports showed that about 1000
children were suffering from headaches, aching muscles, abdominal pain, dizziness,
respiratory problems, 173 and other symptoms similar to those described in the Gulf War
Syndrome.

3. Persecution of Ethnic Minorities
Civilian populations can also be affected by persecution, or “ethnic cleansing,”
that often accompanies armed conflicts. Ethnic cleansing is “the use of force or
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intimidation to remove people of a certain ethnic or religious group from an area.” 174 The
United Nations Commission of Experts, in a January 1993 report to the Security Council,
defined ethnic cleansing as “rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or
intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.” 175
As one example, between 1959 and 1961, the Hutu majority in Rwanda revolted
against the Tutsi rulers, and began a widespread ethnic cleansing. 176 In 1963, Hutus
killed an estimated 10,000 Tutsis, largely with Rwandan government complicity and even
encouragement. 177 In 1994, another massive killing of Tutsis 178 and there Hutu
sympathizers was inspired by members of the predominantly Hutu government. 179
Another particularly blatant example of ethnic cleansing occurred during the
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which began in April 1992 and ended in November
1995. More than 700,000 Muslims were eliminated by Serbs from an area covering 70%
of Bosnia, between April and August 1992. 180 In Vlasenica, a city in Bosnia, there were
18,699 Muslims before the war, but now there are none, as a result of ethnic cleansing. 181
One of the Serbian guards at the Susica camp in Vlasenica, Pero Popovic, admitted that
“our aim was simply to get rid of the Muslims.” 182 The United Nations Commission of
Experts, in its January 1993 report to the Security Council, clarified that the ethnic
cleansing in former Yugoslavia included all sorts of murder, rape, sexual assault,
executions, and destruction of public and private property. 183 The Commission’s final
report in May 1994 identified these crimes of war: “mass murder, mistreatment of
civilian prisoners of war, use of civilians as human shields, destruction of cultural
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property, robbery of personal property, and attacks on hospitals, medical personnel, and
locations with the Red Cross/Red Crescent emblem.” 184
This ethnic or religious persecution can have devastating consequences to civilian
populations even if those populations are not the stated “enemy,” and even when there
has been no formal declaration of war.
Because of the death and destruction that can be caused by such ethnic
persecution, international law should be available to stop or to punish such activity. Some
provisions of international law do apply to such situations, even when they occur within a
nation’s border.
Under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, persecution of ethnic
minorities is considered a war crime. According to Article 49, only the security of
civilians or “imperative military reasons” justify the temporary evacuation of civilian
population in occupied territory. 185 Even then, Article 49 requires that they must be
returned to their homes when the crisis is settled. 186 The 1977 Additional Protocol II to
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 extends that principle to civilians in internal armed
conflicts. 187

4. Rape and Torture
Rape, and particularly the rape of civilians, has become all too familiar as a
consequence, and even as a tactic, of armed conflict. Wartime rape often has a tragic
effect that extends far beyond the physical and psychological pain. Victims of rape are
themselves often stigmatized by their own cultures. Rape victims who become pregnant
are often ostracized by their families and abandon their babies. Some may even commit
suicide.
Rape can be seen as a crime against humanity, and various provisions of
international law are available to prosecute those responsible for wartime rapes. The four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide that “women shall be treated with all the regard due
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to their sex.” 188 The fourth Geneva Convention, in Article 27, also provides that women
be protected against “rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.” 189
Under a statute of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “persons
responsible for […] rape committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in
character, and directed against any civilian population” 190 shall be prosecuted before the
tribunal. Furthermore, a commander can be prosecuted for rapes committed by his
subordinates if he ordered or aided and abetted the rapes, or if he “knew or had reason to
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so, and the superior
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the
perpetrators thereof.” 191 On the other hand, that statute does not expressly mention rape
as a war crime.
The 1998 Rome Statute for the establishment of a permanent International
Criminal Court identifies rape, sexual slavery, and enforced prostitution as crimes against
humanity, 192 and as grave violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 193
During the Gulf War II, Iraqi soldiers raped an estimated 500 Kuwaiti women,
according to the 1992 report of members of an American health assistance team. 194 Rape
in Kuwait is not reported, because Kuwait is an Islamic country, where a woman’s sexual
purity is a crucial prerequisite for marriage, and severe punishment can be aimed at
woman who is proven not to be maiden. After the war, numerous people were treated in
the Al-Riggae Specialized Center for War Victims, among them women and men who
had been sexually abused during the Iraqi invasion. 195
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In Bosnia-Herzegovina, women were raped systematically as part of the ethnic
cleansing against Muslims. 196 In 1993, a European Community Commission estimated
the number of rape victims in Bosnia-Herzegovina at 20,000, while the Muslim
authorities placed the number at 50,000. 197 Boutros Boutros Ghali, Secretary General of
the U.N. writes: “the practice of so-called ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and rape and sexual assault
in particular, have been carried out by some of the parties so systematically that they
strongly appear to be the product of a policy, which may also be inferred from the
consistent failure to prevent the commission of such crimes and to prosecute and punish
their perpetrators.” 198 In response, in June 1996, the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia issued indictments against eight Bosnian Serb soldiers for the rape
of Muslim women in the Eastern Bosnian town of Foca during 1992 and 1993. 199
Members of the Serb military police were charged with repeatedly torturing and raping a
fifteen-year old girl over the course of eight months, while she served in a Serb military
brothel as a servant and a sex slave. 200 Similarly, in Rwanda, the Ministry of Family and
Women Affairs statistics showed that from July 1994 to April 1995, about 15,700 women
of the age of thirteen to thirty five were raped. 201
Although torture is universally prohibited in armed conflict, 202 whether
international or internal, it is commonly used against combatants who have laid down
their arms, and against civilians. Many provisions of international law are available to
prosecute those responsible for torture, but enforcing a prohibition of torture is at best a
daunting task.
196

Alexandra Stiglmayer, Civil War, in Crimes of War: “What the Public Should Know,”
327 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff Eds., 1999).
197
Id., at 327.
198
Gunby P., Varied Health Risks Confront Physicians in Former Yugoslavia’s Embattled Areas, 27
JAMA 272, 337-40 (1994).
199
Anne M. Hoefgen, There Will Be no Justice Unless Women are Part of that Justice, 14 Wis.
Women’s L.J. 155, 157 (1999).
200
George Rodrigue, Civil War, in Crimes of War: “What the Public Should Know,” 328
(Roy Gutman & David Rieff Eds., 1999).
201
Badria Al-Awady, The Protection of Women During Armed Conflicts, a paper prepared for the Kuwaiti
Red Crescent Society in the occasion of the International Women Day 1 (Mar. 10, 1998).
202
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, Dec. 9, 1975, G.A. Res. 34/52, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess.,
Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/10408 (1976); European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, E.T.S. 126, (Feb. 1, 1989); Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, G.A. res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)
[hereinafter Torture Convention].

33

The 1984 Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession.” 203 The Convention
focuses on the principle that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state
of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may
be invoked as a justification of torture.” 204 Torture has been prohibited by international
law as early as in The Hague Convention of 1907 on Customs of War. Article 44 of that
Convention states that “a belligerent is forbidden to force the inhabitants of territory
occupied by it to furnish information about the army of the other belligerent, or about its
means of defense.” 205 Similarly, Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions
makes it clear that “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture,” 206 as well as “outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment,” 207 are strictly forbidden under any
circumstances. Moreover, Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also
forbids torture by declaring that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.” 208 According to the Statute of the former
Yugoslavia Tribunal, torture is prohibited and personnel responsible for that crime shall
be tried before the tribunal. 209
Despite those legal provisions, however, torture of civilians continues to
accompany almost all warfare, whether internal or international. One notorious example
of torture that accompanied armed conflict was during the Algerian War of 1954-1962,
when Algerian Muslims of the National Liberation Front (NLF) began open warfare
against French rule in Algeria. 210 The French government refused to grant Algeria
independence, and sent thousands of French troops to crush Algerian rebels. Among the
203
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despicable practices of the French soldiers, torture was often used during investigations
of Algerian suspects. 211 In 1960, the French newspaper Le Monde published the text of
the report of ICRC mission to Algeria, which contained evidence of the use of the torture
against Algerian prisoners of war, and civilians in internment camps. 212
Another example of torture in armed conflict occurred during the Gulf War II,
where the investigation of 108 persons executed in Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation
showed that they had been severely tortured before they were killed. 213 And in the AlRiggae Specialized Center for War Victims, two thirds of the 250 victims were survivors
of physical torture, most of them men between twenty-one and forty years. 214

5. Violence and Drug Abuse, Induces by Armed Conflict Experiences

Every gun that is fired…is in the final sense, a theft from those
who hunger and are not fed, those who are called and not clothed.
This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending
the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of
its children. 215

War consists of violence and destruction not only during armed conflict itself; it
leaves its imprint even after the battles cease. Violence and drug abuse rates increase
remarkably in its aftermath, particularly among children and adolescents. Arms are often
readily available for anyone to acquire without restrictions. Therefore, crimes such as
murder, burglary, and rape, as well as a profusion of such ills as drug abuse, revenge, and
prostitution, are prevalent.
An example of such violence was found in Kuwait, where it was reported that
violence and drug abuse increased dramatically after the war of 1990-1991. 216 In Africa,
similarly, violence flared during the influx of Rwandan refugees into Congo-Zaïre, where
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guns were distributed by the former Rwandan soldiers and militias. 217 Some of the
inhabitants were given guns and ordered to hunt elephants for the ivory trade. 218 The
most dramatic effects of war can often be found in children who witnessed filthy events
in times of war, and who then become depressed, hopeless, or develop aggressive
behavior. Those children are more likely themselves to become soldiers and engage in
future combat. In recent years, it is estimated, around 300,000 children were serving
either in government armies or in irregular armed forces. 219 And to date no peace treaty
has formally recognized the existence of child combatants. 220 Nevertheless, the
Additional Protocols I and II of 1977 impose an obligation on the parties to a conflict “to
take all feasible measures in order that children who have not attained the age of fifteen
years do not take a direct part in hostilities,” 221 and to “refrain from recruiting them into
their armed forces.” 222 Further, the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child (UNCRC) declares fifteen as a minimum age for going to war. 223 Significantly, a
number of governments and NGO’s propose to attach an Optional Protocol to the
UNCRC in order to raise the minimum age for recruitment into armed forces to fifteen. 224
However, despite such provisions, the legal and psychological protection offered to
children in times of armed conflicts is inadequate. Consider these disturbing findings:
•
•

A 1991 study of Iraqi children revealed that 62 percent
worried that they may not live to become adults.
A study of 50 displaced children in Mozambique found that
42 had lost a father or mother by violence, 29 had witnessed a
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•

murder, 16 had been kidnapped, and all had been threatened,
beaten, or starved.
A study conducted in September 1994 by [the United Nations
Children’s Fund] (UNICEF) found that 50 percent of the
Rwandan children interviewed had witnessed the killing of
family members, and more than 75 percent had seen people
murdered. More than 50 percent had witnessed mass killings
in churches and schools; 75 percent had had their own lives
threatened. UNICEF is helping to bury those killed in
massacres in Rwanda because of the effect of the profusion of
human remains on young children. The decision was reached
after a Rwandan child pointed to a skull and said, “This is my
mother.” 225

Scenes of violence during armed conflicts affect the morality of the population,
especially the children. For example, children who lose their parents during armed
conflict will often become involved in illegal activities such as prostitution and drug
abuse. Children used as combatants may be particularly at risk for such behavior.
Moreover, that behavior is likely to continue long after the end of the war. Indeed, the
population as a whole is more likely to engage in violet and lawless behavior after a war,
perhaps because of the availability of weapons, and almost certainly because of chaos,
dislocation, the breakdown of governmental and social institutions, and the desire for
revenge.

6. Refugees
Armed conflict often results in thousands of refugees who have been forced to
abandon their lands and homes, and who then cause intense pressure on natural resources,
especially water supplies, electric services, and forests in the over occupied refugee
camps which are unprepared for receiving them. One commentator has identifies a class
of “environmental or eco-refugees,” an expression used to describe “people displaced as
a result of the effects of armed conflicts on their natural environment.” 226 For instance,
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towns in Somalia and refugee camps in Thailand, Pakistan, and other countries are
surrounded by ever-growing areas of deforestation and desertification. 227
During the Former Soviet Union invasion followed by the civil war in
Afghanistan, refugees began to flow over the border into Iran and Pakistan in 1978. 228 It
was estimated that more than 300 camps in Pakistan held 3.3 million Afghan refugees. 229
The costs of caring for the refugees were evaluated at $ 500 million per year. The Afghan
refugees have deforested timber lands for firewood, and destroyed some grazing lands. 230
The 1982 report of the United States Committee for Refugees suggested that depletion of
these green areas will be one of the most long-term environmental impacts of the war,
lasting long after the war itself has ceased. 231 On October 7, 2001, Another wave of
approximately 1.3 million refugees left Afghanistan after the U.S. war against terrorist
group of AlQaeda. 232 Again, the wave of refugees entered into Pakistan and Iran caused a
substantial humanitarian crisis, where providing all the needs to the refugees was not an
easy task, especially during wintertime, where these areas are usually covered with snow.
However, although the United States declared the war on terrorism and led the coalition
attacks against terrorists’ groups in Afghanistan, they provided around $300 million as a
financial aid to better life conditions for the Afghan refugees. 233
Another example was after the Gulf War II, when a United Nations inspection
team found that 9,000 Iraqi homes were destroyed, leaving 72,000 civilian homeless, 234
which means broken families, lost livelihoods, and shattered hope.
During the Rwandan Civil War of 1994, over one million Rwandese fled into
Zaire, fearing the conflict between the government forces and the Tutsi forces, as well as
the unknown consequences of the genocide that had spurred the revolt, most of them
traveled with cattle, which had a severe impact on the forest as well as public health, as
227
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many infectious materials were disposed of inside national parks in Zaïre. 235 Moreover,
large parts of the forests were systematically destroyed for firewood, cooking, and for
commercial purposes. Destruction was particularly severe in the Nyamulagira sector of
the Virunga National Park (PNVI) which was created in 1925, and is considered the first
national park in Africa. 236 According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) the PNVI was declared a “World Heritage Site” in
1979, and a “World Heritage Site in danger” in 1994. 237 ICRC has urged development
agencies in Rwanda to create programs for reforestation and to make repairs to water
reservoirs damaged during the conflict. 238
In Kosovo, similarly, Serbian forces destroyed many towns and villages, not only
displacing the resident population, but also destroying much of the documentation that
established ownership rights in land and property. 239 Thus, in Albania and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where huge numbers of refugees fled from Kosovo,
their return to their homes was complicated as a result of the loss of their ownership
documentation. 240
In sum, in an attempt to protect their lives, civilians abandon their homes to seek
the protection of a neighboring State or international organization. Despite the miserable
situations in refugees’ camps, civilians prefer to stay there rather than return home and
risk being killed, raped, or tortured. Environmental damage can result from the conditions
in refugees’ camps. Unfortunately, as of the date of this study, most of the refugees’
camps do not meet the minimum standards necessary to protect human health and the
environment. When the war ends, and the refugees return home, the environment can be
left destroyed with no party taking the responsibility to rehabilitate it.
D- Environmental Impact of Preparing for Armed Conflict
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There is no doubt that the activities of armed forces during and following
hostilities can have devastating environmental impacts. However, military buildup for
future warfare can also cause environmental harm.

1. Storage and Disposal of Hazardous Wastes
The most critical menace to the environment is the military’s storage and disposal
of hazardous wastes, such as obsolete mustard gas, nerve gas, lead, arsenic, solvents,
acids, and pesticides, among other toxic contaminants.241 These substances persist in the
environment and because they do not decompose are destructive to human health, plants,
soil, wildlife, air, and drinking water. In the United States, for instance, more than 20,000
government land sites are contaminated with toxic substances, even though no war has
been fought on U.S. soil for over a century. 242 The Denver Rocky Mountain Arsenal, a
disposal site for military wastes, for example, has been described by the media as “the
most toxic square mile on earth.” 243 Another example is Aberdeen Proving Grounds, in
Maryland, one of the largest federal firing ranges in the United States, where military
personnel have disposed of toxic substances such as cyanide, napalm, and lead in the
soil. 244 Aberdeen is of particular importance because it is near a national wildlife refuge
and the Chesapeake Bay. 245
In the U.S., the danger presented by military disposal sites and the transportation
of hazardous military wastes has given rise to citizen awareness and concern. Thus, the
Military Toxic Project, a coalition of citizen groups formed to address military pollution,
and to safeguard the transportation of hazardous materials, brought a suit in federal court
challenging the Environmental Protection Agency’s promulgation of the Military
Munitions Rule. That Rule exempts from RCRA munitions and solid wastes that are
transported or stored in accordance with the Department of Defense (DoD) standards. 246
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The plaintiffs alleged that the Rule violated the Federal Facility Compliance Act
(FFCA). 247 FFCA was passed by the Congress in 1992. It amended RCRA to explain that
“DoD and all other federal agencies are subject to penalties, fines, permit fees, reviews of
plans or studies, and inspection” under RCRA. 248 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the Rule, thus allowing the military to ignore
the safety restrictions applicable to hazardous material generated by other sources.
According to Lanier-Graham, in a Congressional Review in February 1991 on the
Defense Department’s Installation Restoration Program, 249 many military sites are
contaminated with toxic residues. 250 Among the contaminated sites are:

Anniston Army Depot, Alabama:
Volatile organic compounds, heavy metals, paints, acids,
solvents, degreasers, oil, and grease contaminate surface and
groundwater.
Hill Air Force Base, Utah:
More than fourteen volatile organic chemicals such as benzene,
methyl ethyl ketone, and ethanes, along with other hazardous and
municipal wastes, have contaminated groundwater.
Treasure Island Naval Station, Hunters’ Point Annex, San Francisco,
California:
Tests in 1987 detected benzene, PCBs, toluene, and phenols in
the water, which is used for recreational activities, commercial
navigation, and fishing.
Twin Cities Air Force Reserve Base (Small Arms Range Landfill),
Minneapolis, Minnesota:
Ten sites have been contaminated. The largest area is the actual
landfill, which is adjacent to the Minnesota River, and is located
within the 100-year flood plain. Only 500 feet from the
Minnesota Valley National Wildlife Refuge, it contains paint
thinners and removers, paint, primers, and leaded fuel sludge. 251
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Cleaning up these hazardous toxic sites will take time and money. Estimates are
that it will take at least thirty years and $ 400 billion to clean up the pollution caused by
U.S. military activities in these areas. 252 Nevertheless, U.S. environmental laws require
the cleanup of these sites, as will be discussed later in Part Three.
The problem of military wastes is not limited to the U.S. The former Soviet
Union’s military-industrial complex, much of which is still in the Russian Federation,
also generated hazardous toxic sites. One of these complexes is the Lenin Steelworks,
which has enough pollutants to cover 4,000 square miles. 253 Furthermore, in 1992, when
the Soviet military withdrew from the former East Germany, about 1.5 million tons of
ammunitions were destroyed, by burning in the open air, and highly toxic contaminants
were released into the atmosphere. 254

2. Military Training Areas
Another environmental threat arises from military training areas, used by armed
forces as bombing targets, weapons testing grounds, and training facilities. The United
States Colorado Air National Guard, for instance, has moved to install a military
operations area (MOA) in the Great Sand Dunes National Monument. The National
Guard estimates that, “fifty fighters, two to six bombers, and ten support aircraft would
use the MOA twenty-four times a year.” 255 However, the forest service rejected the
project, as it would impact water quality, wildlife, and the migratory herds of bighorn
sheep and elk in the area. 256 Therefore, the project was suspended to avoid environmental
damage.
However, the prospect of environmental damage did not prevent military training
operations in Reid State Park in Maine. There a citizen group sued the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, for
violating the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, in connection with Operation
Snowy Beach. That exercise consisted of the landing of about 900 marines, who would
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bivouac in the park over 3 or 4 days, and cause potential environmental damage by
moving over rocky outcroppings in the wooded upland area of the park. 257 However, the
court found that “a limited maneuver or training exercise by small elements of a military
department would not be a major action nor would it normally affect the environment
significantly.” 258
Potential environmental damage has long been an issue with regard to the U.S.
military’s use of the island of Vieques, an offshore island of Puerto Rico, as an operations
site. The United States Navy has used Vieques since 1941 as a maneuver area for its
Atlantic Fleet. Inspections made by the Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board (EQB)
found evidence of environmental destruction to land, coastal waters, flora and fauna from
the detonation of bombs and other armaments. 259 Deforestation was so severe that
tropical lagoons and wetlands dried up and their beds were filled with bomb craters.
Furthermore, the land was covered with “fragments of bombs, and projectiles,
unexploded bombs, charred junk, military debris, discarded parachutes, and other
wastes.” 260 The island residents were left with a wasteland. 261
As a result, in 1979, an action was brought by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
to enjoin the U.S. Navy from using Vieques and the water surrounding it as a maneuver
area. The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico 262 rejected the
Commonwealth’s request for a comprehensive injunction, holding that the Navy’s
violations were not causing any “appreciable harm” to the environment, 263 and that
because of the importance of the island as a maneuver area “the granting of the injunctive
relief sought would cause grievous, and perhaps irreparable harm, not only to defendant
Navy, but to the general welfare of this Nation.” 264 However, on appeal, the First
Circuit 265 vacated the District Court’s order and ordered the Navy to cease any activities
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in violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), until it obtained a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. 266 While that
decision required the Navy to adhere to one specific water-pollution statute, other kinds
of environmentally damaging activity continued. In 1999, a 500-pound bomb dropped
from a United States Navy F-18 airplane and struck an observation platform on
Vieques. 267 Another lawsuit was filled in May 10, 2000 by Puerto Rican environmental
organizations 268 seeking to prevent the Navy from continuing operation on Vieques.
However, the District Court rejected the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining
order, because they failed to establish irreparable injury. 269 In June 2000, the Navy
concluded training operations that included five ships firing 600 five-inch rounds into the
Live Impact Area located on the eastern part of the island. 270
On January 31, 2000, the Puerto Rican Governor Pedro Rosselló-González
announced an agreement with the former American President Bill Clinton to issue a
Presidential Directive that could dramatically alter U.S. military operations on Vieques,
although not solely on environmental grounds. 271 The Directive states that “the future of
Navy training on Vieques will be determined by a referendum of the registered voters of
Vieques,” 272 and that the referendum “will present two alternatives. The first is that the
Navy will cease all training no later than May 1, 2003. The second will permit continued
training, including live fire training, on terms proposed by the Navy.” 273 Remarkably, in
2001, because of the widespread protests against Vieques bombing exercises, President
George W. Bush declared that the U.S. military will end bombing exercises on the Puerto
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Rican island of Vieques. 274 He said “[t]here’s been some harm done to people in the past.
These are our friends and neighbors, and they don’t want us there.” 275
Thus, the environmental damage to Vieques may be halted. If so, it will be as the
result of many complicated political factors, not solely because of concerns about the
environment. It should also be noted that the referendum resulted from the political
agreement between two leaders, not from any requirement of international law.
In sum, military training areas present a great threat to human lives. For example,
on October 4, 2001, seventy-eight passengers and crew-members of the Sibir Tu-154
airplane killed when a Ukrainian missile launched during military exercises. The Tu-154
crashed into the Black Sea while en route from Tel-Aviv, Israel, to Siberia. 276
Another example is the death of five U.S. citizens and one New Zealander
observers, when an U.S. warplane accidentally bombed them during their observance to
the U.S. Kuwaiti military exercises, in Kuwait. 277

3. Nuclear Weapons
A nuclear weapon is: “any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in
an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for
use for warlike purposes.” 278
The effect of nuclear weapons on the natural environment is still beyond our
calculation. A nuclear explosion includes “blast effects, thermal radiation, initial nuclear
radiation, electromagnetic pulse, and radioactive fallout.” 279 The nuclear bomb that
destroyed Hiroshima in 1945 was a modest nuclear weapon in comparison to today’s
standards. “It was rated as a 12.5 kilotons weapon, equivalent to 12,500 tons of high
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explosive. 280 The nuclear fireball was as hot as the sun, when detonated; in less than a
thousandth of a second the fireball grew to more than 300 feet (100 meters) wide, and
6,000 feet (2 kilometers) wide after ten seconds. At the same time, it rose like a hot air
balloon, at about 300 feet every second.” 281 The International Atomic Energy Agency
declared, “The nuclear weapons legacy comprises two components: their actual use,
twice fifty years ago in August 1945, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and their potential use,
in the form of nuclear weapons testing and environmental releases of radioactive
materials from the nuclear weapons fuel cycle.” 282 The International Atomic Energy
Agency estimates that 520 atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons were conducted between
1945 and 1980, which caused “substantial emission of radionucleides” and “worldwide
environmental contamination.” 283
The United States arsenal contains some of the most complicated nuclear
weapons in the world. Each one has thousands of parts. Some of their materials, “like
plutonium, uranium, and tritium, are radioactive materials that decay.” 284 America’s
nuclear weapons program, which consists of designing, producing and testing nuclear
weapons, involves waste storage at 280 facilities at twenty sites across the United
States. 285 These facilities have released huge amounts of hazardous waste into the
environment. For example, at Hanford Nuclear Reservation in southeastern Washington,
44,000 workers were exposed to radiation that might have caused an increase in multiple
myeloma, a bone marrow cancer, among them, according to Dr. Ethel S. Gilbert, a
biostatistician at Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories. 286 Radioactive particles have
been also found in frogs, ducks, rabbits and turtles. 287 Other contaminated sites include
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the Pantex plant in Texas, Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado, and Portsmouth Uranium
Enrichment Complex at Piketon, Ohio. 288
In a 1955 naval manual, the U.S. Government declared that “the use of nuclear
weapons against enemy combatants and military objects is legally permissible until an
express rule of international law prohibits their use.” 289 Significantly, after about four
decades, the U.S. Senate, on October 13, 1999, rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), which was signed by President Clinton in 1996, on the ground that would
jeopardize the safety and security of the United States nuclear arsenal. James Woolsey,
one of the CTBT opponents, said: “We have slain a large dragon [the Soviet Union], but
we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes.” 290 That
statement, while understandable in the context of military defense, is unacceptable from
the view of the environmental security. If the U.S., as the unchallenged superpower, fails
to lead the international community towards disarmament, then the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction will continue to threaten human lives and the environment,
even if no nuclear war taken place. With regard to the testing of nuclear weapons, the
U.S. already has in place the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), a series of
experiments and computer simulations that allow testing of weapons systems without
actually detonating them. The Department of Energy hopes that by 2010, the SSP will
have the “capabilities that are necessary to provide continuing high confidence in the
annual certification of the stockpile without the necessity for nuclear testing.” 291 Perhaps
other countries with nuclear weapons will follow the American program, and thereby
reduce the environmental threat posed by nuclear weapons programs.
However, Russia retains a significant military capacity, including over 6000
nuclear warheads. 292 In 1953, the former Soviet Union established reprocessing plants
and began storing highly radioactive wastes in steel tanks. 293 In 1957, the cooling system
failed at the Chelyabinsk site, and the subsequent heating of radioactive materials led to
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an explosion that emitted huge amounts of radiation into the air. An estimated 500,000
people were exposed to radiation, and surrounding land and water were contaminated. 294
And by analogy, even the use of nuclear power in peacetime could harm the
environment. For example, in 1986 at the Chernobyl nuclear power station, 295 tons of
radioactive uranium and graphite were released into the atmosphere. 296 Seventy percent
of these emissions descended on the people, animals and crops of Belarus. 297 Thirty-one
people working at or in the immediate vicinity of the plant died, twenty-nine of them
from radiation sickness. 298 According to researchers reports “levels of thyroid cancer
among children in the vicinity of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor had risen to eighty times
higher than the normal rate.” 299 More than 30,000 acres of farmland in Russia, Ukraine,
and Belarus have been abandoned and 70,000 square kilometers are radioactive. 300 The
Belarussian National Science and Research Institute of Agricultural Radiobiology
estimated that it would take six hundred years before the cropland can be rehabilitated. 301
Even today, in Russia, about 600 million curies of high level nuclear wastes are
stored in liquid form along with about 500,000 tons solid waste. Studies have shown
radioactive leakage into the groundwater. 302 The northern coastal zone of Russia contains
radioactive contamination, from nuclear weapons testing at Novaya Zemlya, dumping of
nuclear materials from submarines and surface ships in the Kara Sea, and dumping of
high-level radioactive wastes into the Kara, Barents, and White Seas. 303
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A great deal of high-level nuclear waste comes from nuclear reactors operated for
military purposes. 304 Reactor accidents have occurred on military naval vessels, wastes
produced by the extraction of weapons-grade plutonium into rivers have been dumped,
and discarded nuclear reactors have been stored improperly.
An example of dramatic accident occurred on April 7, 1989, when the Russian
nuclear sub Komsomolets sank 1700 meters below the surface of the Barents Sea off the
Norwegian coast. Evidence has shown radioactive plutonium leakage into the sea, one of
the richest fishing areas in the world. 305 Potentially disastrous accidents have occurred
since the end of the Soviet era. For instance, on October 17, 1993, a Russian Navy tanker
opened an undersea valve and released over 200,000 gallons of radioactive waste into the
waters of the Sea of Japan, ninety miles from the Japanese city of Nakhodka. That release
impacted the oceanic food chain negatively. 306 Most recently, on August 12, 2000, the
Russian nuclear submarine Kursk, sank to the bottom of the Barents Sea with nuclear
reactor, bombs, and missiles. All 118 men on board died.307 A Norwegian environmental
group said the Kursk’s reactor could explode on the seabed, spreading radiation
throughout the region. 308 Yet another environmental hazard exists in the storage facility
of the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant (LNPP), where in 1996 cracks in the walls and
carrying structures of the storage building allowed radioactive water to leak from the
cooling pool into the soil. 309 The storage facility is just 90 meters from the shore of the
Baltic Sea. According to Sergey Kharitonov, an LNPP employee and member of the
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Green World Association (GWA), about 360 liters of radioactive water leaked from the
storage pool into the soil daily. 310
Interestingly, despite this history of Russian and Soviet nuclear hazards, in 2000,
the Russian Goskomekologia (State Committee on Environment) stopped the
construction of a U.S. funded plutonium storage site in Mayak due to violation of Russian
environmental laws. 311 The storage site was intended to be an interim storage facility for
plutonium from nuclear warheads. The U.S. Department of Defense provided $55 million
of the total construction cost of $250 million. The first stage was expected to be complete
by the end of 2000. 312 However, the Goskomekologia stopped construction after it found
an ecological risk in the leakage of radioactive elements into the groundwater. 313
The United States and the former Soviet Union do not stand alone. The
environment of other nations has also felt the devastation of nuclear weapons. France, for
instance, conducted 193 nuclear test explosions at Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls, part of
French Polynesia, 46 above the ground and 147 below. These tests in the South Pacific
polluted lagoons and atolls with plutonium, tritium, cesium, and strontium. During the
nuclear testing, the rate of fish poisoning rose from 200 cases per 100,000 in 1960 to
20,700 cases per 100,000 in 1970s. 314 In 1973, New Zealand filed an application in the
Registry of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), to sue France for damage caused by
radioactive fall-out from the South Pacific tests alleging that it had caused severe
environmental harm to the New Zealand ecosystem. The ICJ declared that the French
Atmospheric nuclear tests carried “a particularly serious risk of environmental pollution,
and are considered a source of acute anxiety for present day mankind.” 315 The ICJ also
invited the international community to undertake serious efforts in order to prevent future
atmospheric tests. 316 However, the court took no action against France, holding that New
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Zealand’s claim had become moot 317 when France announced (while the case was
pending) that it would cease atmospheric nuclear testing. However, on August 21, 1995,
New Zealand instituted proceedings against France in the ICJ after France announced on
June 13, 1995, that it would conduct a final series of eight underground nuclear weapons
tests at the atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufu in September 1995. 318 New Zealand asked
the Court to declare that French underground nuclear tests in French Polynesia
constituted a violation of New Zealand’s rights under international law, and that such
testing was unlawful because France did not prepare an environmental impact
assessment. 319 However, the Court dismissed New Zealand’s claim, on September 22,
1995, holding that it was not authorized by the earlier case because that case dealt only
with atmospheric testing. 320

4. Storage, Testing, and Disposal of Chemical and Biological Weapons
The storage, testing, and disposal of chemical and biological weapons also raise
the issue of environmental devastation when preparing for armed conflict. The longer the
chemical and biological agents are stored, the greater the chance of leakage.
First, it is necessary to distinguish between chemical and biological weapons.
Chemical weapons are synthesized in laboratories, and are designed to affect human
health and the environment. 321 Biological agents, on the other hand, are living creatures,
or are derived from living creatures, that cause diseases in man, plants, or animals. 322
There are six categories of biological weapons: bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, chlamydia,
fungi, and toxins. 323 These kinds of biological agents can spread across hundreds of
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thousands of square miles, and can be obtained inexpensively. 324 Their effectiveness as
weapons has been increased as a result of scientific progress in the field of microbial
genetics and virology. 325 For instance, scientists at the Australian National University in
Canberra found a way to make viruses more lethal by developing “a biological
contraceptive to fight plagues of mice and rats, [through] immunizing the animals against
their own sperm and eggs.” 326 Accordingly, they injected a specific gene into mousepox
in order to weaken the immunity system, and turned the harmless virus into a rodent
killer. 327 Similar techniques may be used by researchers to strengthen biological agents
based on “human viruses such as smallpox.”328 Given the availability of this
biotechnology, efforts should be taken to prevent such inventions from falling into the
hands of madmen or terrorists, and to strengthen the Convention of Biological Weapons.
The United Nations classifies chemical weapons into seven categories: nerve
agents, 329 blister agents, choking agents, blood agents, tear and harassing agents,
psychochemicals, and herbicides. These agents can cover tens of square miles, 330 and
once released into the environment, some can persist for years. Although recent
developments in technology have produced even more sophisticated chemical weapons,
chemical warfare is not new. In ancient times, chemicals were added to fire to cause more
destruction. And drinking water supplies were contaminated by chemicals. Mustard gas
was used extensively in World War II in order to exterminate civilians. In addition, in
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1935, during the Italian-Ethiopian War, Italy used mustard gas on unarmed civilians
causing thousands of deaths. 331
Chemical and biological weapons can have devastating effects even when not
actually used as weapons. For example, in the United States, where 40,000 tons of nerve
gas and mustard gas are stored, 332 one of the oldest stockpiling facilities of chemical
weapons is the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, where nerve gas has been stored since 1950.
Inspections have detected that underground water was contaminated with chemical agents
from Arsenal, causing the deaths of animals and about 2000 ducks and wildfowl every
year. 333
In Utah, on March 13, 1968, as part of an over flight spray test, an Air Force F-4E
aircraft released 2500 pounds of VX nerve gas over the Dugway Proving Grounds, near
Salt Lake City, and Skull Valley. Reports showed that about 6400 sheep that had been
grazing in the area were killed, and news articles voiced suspicion that the chemical agent
was the cause of the death. 334 In 1969 and 1970, the Journal of American Veterinary
Medical Association published articles on the sheep deaths, and reported that sheep were
poisoned from eating VX- contaminated forage…” 335
In 1996, the environmental groups Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc.,
Sierra Club, and Vietnam Veterans of America filed suit, challenging the operation of the
Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (TOCDF) 336 by the U.S. Department of the
Army to incinerate chemical agents. The plaintiffs claimed that the Army had violated the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to prepare a supplemental
environmental impact statement on the basis of significant new information relevant to
environmental issues, and various environmental statutes such as Clean Water Act
(CWA), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the 1986 Department of
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Defense Authorization Act (DAA), and sought injunctive relief, 337 on the grounds that
the Army’s continued operations presented an imminent and substantial endangerment to
human health and the environment. 338 According to plaintiffs’ allegations, the court had
no legal basis to interfere with the Army’s operation of TOCDF based on federal and
State regulatory procedures established to permit the Army to incinerate chemical
weapons in Utah. 339 The court held that: “(1) evidence supported that balance of human
weighed in favor of incineration as opposed to continued storage; (2) CWA did not apply
to stack emission from incineration facility; (3) [plaintiff’s] imminent hazard claim
constituted impermissible collateral attack on Utah’s decision to issue a RCRA permit;
and (4) Defense Authorization Act did not provide implied private right of action for
maximum protection claim.” 340
The American stockpile of chemical weapons is housed at the following eight
locations around the United States:
1- Tooele Depot, Utah (42.3 percent)
2- Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas (12 percent)
3- Umatella Depot, Oregon (11.6 percent)
4- Pueblo Depot, Colorado (9.9 percent)
5- Anniston Depot, Alabama (7.1 percent)
6- Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland (5 percent)
7- Newport Ammunition Plant, Indiana (3.9 percent), and
8- Lexington Depot, Kentucky (1.6 percent). 341

All these locations are subject to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Section
102 (2) (C) of that statute specifically includes Department of Defense and military sites
within its jurisdiction. 342
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Unfortunately, dumping these agents at sea is the easiest method to dispose of
them. However, doing so results in the contamination of water, fish, and plants. The
United States dumped 1,706 concrete containers, each filled with thirty rockets
containing nerve agents, into the Atlantic Ocean during 1967 and 1968. 343 Unsafe
haphazard disposal of chemical agents has not been limited to the U.S., or to that time
period. At the end of World War I, the Germans army dumped 20,000 tons of stockpiled
chemical weapons into the Baltic Sea, which has since then continued to poison Danish
fish and fishermen. 344 Sunken ships and aircraft shot down during armed conflict rest at
the bottom of many rivers, seas, and oceans, and cause a serious threat to marine life
from the toxic and hazard substances found on them. An important example is found in
the Skagerrak seabed between Norway, Sweden, and Denmark where it is estimated that
21 ships loaded with German chemical weapons were sunk during World War II. 345 The
Danish Ministry of the Environment claimed in 1984 that between 36,000 and 50,000
tons of chemical ammunition had been dumped in the Baltic Sea by Soviet forces
following World War II. The Danish report documented that 5,000 tons of nerve gas had
been sunk off the Denmark coast, and 34 ships and 151,425 tons of ammunition had been
sunk in the Skagerrak Sea immediately following the war. 346 Another location that has
been affected by the World War II sunken ships is the Solomon Islands, in the South
Pacific. 347
The Solomon Islands became the eventual burial site of countless
sailors and marines from the United States, Australia, and Japan
who were lost with the sinking of fifty warships. This obscure
graveyard, quiet and unobtrusive for over fifty years except for
the occasional relic or munitions that washed ashore, has begun
to seep oil. Oil from theses ships, possibly bunkers (heavy fuel
oil) or highly toxic lubricating oil, is believed to be destroying the
Solomon Islands’ fragile coral reef ecosystem. 348
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These chemical agents are insidious and extremely toxic. Nerve agents (VX,
designated GA or Tabun, and GB or Sarin) are odorless, colorless, and tasteless
organophosphorus esters which attack the human nervous system directly, in both liquid
and vapor forms. 349 They can cause an enormous range of symptoms, including runny
nose, tightness in the chest, dimming of vision, pinpointing of the pupils, drooling,
excessive sweating, involuntary urination or defecation, twitching, jerking, and
staggering, headache, drowsiness, coma and convulsion, finally, cessation of breathing
and death. 350 Nerve agents also present a tremendous risk to the environment. For
example, at Fort Greely, Alaska, in 1966, 200 canisters of nerve gas which had been
accumulated on the surface of a frozen lake sank through the ice. 351 Six years later fiftythree nearby caribou died, and the Army refused to investigate the site. 352 Herbicides and
agricultural chemicals can poison or desiccate the leaves of plants, causing them to lose
their leaves or die. 353 Some herbicides, particularly those containing organic arsenic, are
also toxic for man and animals. 354 Chemical and nerve agents manufactured and
stockpiled by the U.S. Army at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and used by the Army during
and after World War II, polluted the groundwater and the soil, killing birds exposed to
toxic wastes, and damaging crops and livestock from contaminated well water at adjacent
farms. 355
In 1972, Congress enacted the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries
Act, 356 in an attempt to regulate the dumping of all toxic material into the ocean waters,
and to limit dumping of substances hazardous to human health and the environment. The
need for ocean dumping legislation is reflected in the findings and recommendations of
the Council on Environmental Quality: “Ocean dumped wastes are heavily concentrated
and contain materials that have a number of adverse effects. Many are toxic to human and
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marine life, deplete oxygen necessary to maintain the marine ecosystem, reduce fish
population and other economic resources, and damage aesthetic values…” 357 Section 101
(a) of the Act prohibits the transportation from the United States for the purpose of
dumping of any radiological, chemical, or biological warfare agents and high-level
radioactive wastes beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. That statute
thus prohibits the dumping of herbicide compounds intended for use in warfare activities,
and bars the dumping of nerve gases as well.358 Section 101 (c) prohibits the
transportation of any radiological, chemical, or biological warfare agent or high-level
radioactive waste by any Federal employee or agency from a source outside the United
States for dumping into the ocean, coastal, and other waters. 359
Appropriate technology exists to make the disposal of these agents less hazardous.
In the early 1980s, about thirty-eight tons of GB (Sarin) and eight tons of VX were
destroyed by incineration at the Army’s Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System
(CAMDS), the Army’s pilot demilitarization plant, located at Tooele Army Depot,
Utah. 360 In 1988, the U.S. Army completed construction of the Johnston Atoll Chemical
Agent Disposal System, a large incinerator in the South Pacific Islands used to destroy
chemical agents. 361 The U.S. Army spent more than $340 million studying the safety of
incineration, considering alternatives, conducting environmental studies, and holding
public hearings. 362 The Army funded a $400,000 study conducted by the National
Research Council, a part of the National Academy of Sciences, which concluded that
incineration was the best way to eliminate the chemical weapons. 363 Moreover, the
independent group Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (SANA) asserted that “leakage
would endanger the environment much more seriously than any pollution produced by
burning the weapons in the incinerator on the island.” 364
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Disposal of these substances can create hazards not only to water, but to land and
soil resources as well. When the United Kingdom tested the military potential of Bacillus
anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax, in Gruinard, a Scottish island, between 1941
and 1942, the testing contaminated the island seriously. 365 Millions of anthrax spores
became buried in the soil of the island, which remains uninhabitable to this day. 366
Unfortunately, the storage, testing, and disposal of chemical and biological
weapons hold terrifying prospects for humanity and natural environment by upsetting the
balance of nature. Nevertheless, these weapons are increasingly used among nations
despite the existence of the international conventions that regulate and prohibit, to some
extents, their use, possession, and sale.

E- Environmental Damage during Armed Conflict
The possible destruction of the environment during wartime has become a threat
to every human, not just those in the armed forces of belligerent nations. Technology
makes that threat even more serious than ever before. By examining the impacts of war
historically, perhaps it is possible to gain a better understanding of today’s environmental
concerns. Although the causes of environmental damage during warfare have remained
largely the same throughout history, the consequences are changing. Large populations
and advanced technology have made the effects of environmental damage even more
catastrophic. “Greater destruction is now possible in a single day than in months of
warfare two thousand years ago, even if nuclear weapons are not used.” 367
During Gulf War II, in 1991, the world witnessed millions of gallons of oil
pouring into the gulf waters. Television viewers around the world saw horror stories
about Iraqi destruction of the Kuwaiti environment. Middle Eastern residents looked on
helplessly as the midday skies turned black with smoke, and an oily rain covered the
countryside. The beaches in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were coated with crude oil and
littered with dead marine life and birds. 368 Tens of thousands of birds and untold numbers
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of fish died. 369 Crude oil damaged sea grass beds, algae, coral reefs, and nesting areas. 370
These effects on the Gulf ecosystem will continue to damage the food chain and marine
life for many years. 371 The United States Environmental Protection Agency conducted a
study that showed, for short periods of time, the pollution levels of small particles in the
air in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were up to 400 times higher than permissible United
States air quality standards, 372 as a direct result of the burning oil and oil fields.
Yet the experience in 1991 was not the first, nor will it be the last, that the
environment has suffered at the hands of warring forces. 373 Warfare has had a dramatic
impact on biodiversity, the lithosphere, the hydrosphere, and the atmosphere. This section
will examine the impact on each of these portions of the earth’s natural systems.

1. Biodiversity
Biological diversity, as defined by Article 2 of the Rio de Janeiro Convention on
Biological Diversity, is:

the variability among living organisms from all sources
including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic
ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part.
This includes diversity within species, between species and of
ecosystems. 374

The earlier discussion in section (C) examined the impact of armed conflict
impacts on civilian populations. This section will examine some of its effects on domestic
and wild animals, agricultural crops, forests, and other ecological areas. Although
civilians rely on these natural resources, it is important to consider their intrinsic
ecological value, quite apart from their immediate utilitarian value.
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a. Animals and Wildlife
Warfare has always taken its toll on animals 375 and wildlife. 376 During World
War I, animal populations were severely impacted by the widespread fighting. 377 For
example, the European buffalo, or wisent, was endangered prior to the start of the war
and had been reduced to a small population in Eastern Europe. The wisent’s habitat was
virtually destroyed by the German occupation forces, which cut down the Polish forest to
obtain lumber needed for military operations. The wisents had no place left to hide and
were easy prey for the German forces. 378
During World War II, wildlife in the South Pacific was severely impacted. 379 Of
particular significance was the damage to the bird population when nesting places were
destroyed by bombing and other military operations, and patterns of migration were
interrupted because of the war. 380 Birds in the South Pacific were killed and their eggs
smashed by the thousands. There were other reported accidental killings of animals
throughout World War II. 381 A large number of whales were killed during the war by oil
spills due to the sinking of oil tankers. 382 Furthermore, when Germans occupied Norway
from 1940 to 1945, they were fearful of their position in Norway, expecting a Soviet
attack, so they destroyed everything in an area of 15 million acres, including property,
crops, and wildlife. The reindeer population of 95,000 was reduced by half during that
period. 383
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During the Vietnam War, wildlife in South East Asia was severely impacted,
particularly by the widespread use of airborne chemical defoliants. 384 Loss of animal
habitats was caused by bombs, defoliants, land clearing, and fires. Four of the eleven rare
species of mammals became extinct because of the war, and several others were
threatened. For example, the red-shanked douc langur, a small monkey not found
anywhere else in the world, is facing extinction. 385 In addition, thousands of dead cattle
and river fish where killed by herbicides dumped by U.S. military in South Vietnam. 386
Since most spraying was aerial, not only agricultural lands but also humans, animals and
marine life were all affected. Cattle were killed as a result of eating contaminated grass.
The dead animals, in turn, concentrated pollution in the waterways, threatening those
vital ecosystems and the life that depended on them.
Prior to Gulf War II, in 1991, Kuwait had a camel population of 10,000. That
population is now estimated at 2,000 camels. 387 Desert warfare at night was often most
dangerous for the camels. By night, the troops saw only blips on a radar screen.
Assuming an approaching Iraqi enemy, the tank troops fired at and destroyed whatever
caused the blips on screen. Too often the following morning they found the desert
covered with dead camels. 388 Saving the endangered Arabian oryx populations in Kuwait
was an ongoing project prior to the war; it has come to an end as a result of the war. 389
Moreover, Iraqi soldiers destroyed the Kuwait City Zoo, killing and maiming the zoo
animals. Fewer than twenty-four animals could be found after the Iraqi departure, from
over four hundred prior to the invasion. 390 A United States Army veterinarian, Colonel
Philip Alm, began caring for the wounded animals, finding food and water for them, and
removing bullets from some victims at the zoo. 391 Examinations made by an American
veterinarian showed that many animals had died neither from bullets nor from diseases,
384
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but apparently from ingesting the toxic chemicals produced by Gulf War II and the
Kuwaiti oil fires. 392 Wildlife in the Gulf region was affected due to damage to food
sources, military vehicles running over animals and their burrows, noise and air pollution,
oil lakes and trenches, and heat generated by the Kuwaiti oil fires.393 Many of the animals
(gazelle, camel, Arabian hare, wild ass, porcupines, Syrian hyena, Asiatic jackal, Persian
and Arabian wolves, and wildcats) that resided there before the troop deployment
probably migrated to less disturbed areas. 394 Rodents such as jerboa, mice, snakes, and
lizards were not able to leave the area of deployment, and many of them were crushed by
military vehicles. 395 A Kuwaiti scientist reported that many sheep in Kuwait City died
due to inhalation of smoke and other pollutants. 396 Other reports from Kuwait stated that
many rodents, snakes, and birds fell into the oil lakes and died. Animals were also killed
by the intense heat when they tried to leave their burrows, or were forced to remain
underground and starve to death. 397
Warfare in Rwanda had a similarly devastating effect on animal life and the
environment. The Government of Rwanda has reported, to the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the degradation of two protected areas, Akagera
National Park and the hunting reserve, Mutara. 398 It accused a rebel group, the Front
Patriotique Rwandais (FPR), of participating in the systematic massacre of animals,
“lions, leopards, buffalo, antelope, zebras, giraffes, rhinos, and elephants,” and in the
destruction of their habitats. 399 Moreover, in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(formerly Zaire), civil war stopped efforts to protect the last habitat of the pygmy
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chimpanzee, a species endemic to the country. 400 Local people are forced to depend on
the forest for survival, and about 15,000 of the apes are threatened by those people. 401

b. Agricultural Crops, Forests, and Other Ecological Areas
The destruction of agricultural crops for military purposes is probably as old as
war itself. As recorded in the Old Testament, Philistine crops -corn, grapes, and oliveswere destroyed by Israelite resistants as long ago as the twelfth century BC. 402 One
forester who witnessed the impact of World War I on agriculture crops and forests
commented:

[o]f all the injuries that are inflicted upon nature by war, forest
destruction is one of the heaviest and most worthy of
complaints…In any case, destroyed forests…must be tended with
total effort for many years, often decades, until you can halfway
celebrate their recovery and until you have completely healed the
damage and devastation. 403

In the 1950s, the British carried out chemical attacks by air and from the ground
on crops in Malaya, in an attempt to suppress an insurgency. 404
The use of herbicides by the U.S. in South Vietnam caused enormous damage to
crop lands during the 1960s and 1970s. 405 Operation Ranch Hand was the most infamous
of the United States government’s spraying operations. According to an Agent Orange
Brief published in 1991 by the Department of Veterans Affairs, over twenty million
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gallons of herbicides were employed on more than six million acres of land in Southeast
Asia. 406
The routine military policy of systematic, large-scale, and indiscriminate crop
destruction 407 destroyed an estimated 108.9 million kilograms of food during 1967
alone. 408 Of this total, seventy five million kilograms was classified as rice, and the
remaining 33.9 million kilograms was classified as dicotyledonous food crops. 409 The
same scientific advisory group concluded that crop destruction operations were “an
integral, essential, and effective part of the total U.S. war effort in Indochina.” 410
It has been estimated that more than 300,000 acres of mangrove forests were lost
through the use of defoliants and napalm during the Vietnam War, severely stressing the
area’s mangrove ecosystem. 411 Even today, nearly twenty percent of the tidal mangroves
and 30 percent of the rare mangroves have not recovered. Areas of wasteland have been
named “Agent Orange Museums.” 412
The U.S. military also used fire as a weapon of war in Vietnam. One particularly
destructive fire was set in the U Minh area in Southwest Vietnam. The Advanced
Research Projects Agency reported, as the result of that fire,

* 75 to 85 percent of the true forest destroyed
* 50 percent of various outlying swamps destroyed
* Hundreds of tons of ammunition, rice, and petroleum products
destroyed
* The probable dislocation of large quantities of supplies and
ammunition and the relocation of several major Viet Cong
headquarters and service areas
* The increased opportunity for aerial reconnaissance of the area
* The lack of lumber and possible food shortage for the local
populace
406
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* The increased danger of floods in areas adjacent to the forest
since there were no longer trees or underbrush to provide watershed. 413

The United States developed chemical weapons including agents “white, purple,
blue, green, pink, and orange” to destroy the vegetation in South Vietnam. 414 Over a
period of ten years, 19.4 million gallons of herbicide were spread over the land, sixty
percent of which was Agent Orange.415 The use of Agent Orange 416 had been shown to
cause birth defects in laboratory animals. 417 The Herbicide Assessment Commission of
the American Academy for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) reported in 1970 that
twenty to fifty percent of the South Vietnam’s mangrove forests had been destroyed, and
half of the hard wood and rubber trees had been killed, 418 as a result of the use of Agent
Orange and other herbicides.
The vegetation in a war zone can suffer direct damage in hostile action, or various
forms of indirect damage. 419 For instance, Germany ruthlessly exploited the timber
resources during World War II in those portions of Europe that it occupied, including
France, Poland, and Netherlands, 420 by chopping down the trees to build military
structures. During World War I, the occupied zones of France were estimated to have
included about 600 thousand hectares of forest, about five percent of the total French
forest lands. Of this area, some 200 thousand hectares were damaged sufficiently to
require artificial reforestation. 421 Moreover, agricultural lands were destroyed in the U.S.
to support military operations during World War I, even though the war was half a world
away. The Americans believed that “while Europe fought the battles on their lands, the
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United States grew the food needed to feed the Allied world,”422 so the battlefields
“spread to the cotton fields of the South, the cornfields of the Middle West, and the wheat
fields of the Great Plains.” 423 During World War I, 40 million new acres of land were
cultivated. Land that was not fit for growing crops was forced into production. 424 Natural
wetlands were destroyed in the Northwest to make room for wheat crops. Native grasses
were plowed under in the Southwest to make new wheat farms. Cotton was overplanted
in the South, depleting the soil of nutrients. Timber forests in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and
Michigan were destroyed to meet wartime needs. 425
More recently, NATO carried out intensive war operations, including bombing, in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, causing damage to the national parks Kopaonik,
Fruska Gora, and Lake Skadar. 426 According to the Balkans Task Force mission, three
sites in Serbia were adversely impacted:

* Hotel Baciste: coniferous forest with crater damage and many
uncleared, unexploded cluster bombs. The craters will be filled
and the area rehabilitated, using local trees.
* Velika Gobelja: sub-alpine meadow; damaged by 11 craters.
Some of the craters on a steep hillside should be filled to prevent
erosion.
* Djuricka Ravan: 150 trees, covering an area of about 0.5 ha,
were damaged. Rehabilitation and monitoring programs are
planned. 427

National parks in other countries have also been damaged by warfare:

* In Burundi, Kibira and Ruvubu National Parks were used as
sanctuaries and entry points for guerrillas fighting the
government. They became operational areas for government
troops.
422
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* In Sri Lanka, Wilpattu National Park was attacked by Tamil
rebels in 1989, who killed over a dozen guards and destroyed
facilities, causing a withdrawal of conservation staff. 428

In Kuwait, the Gulf War II caused extensive damage to the fragile plant and
animal life of the desert. Desert plants are an integral part of the desert ecosystem. These
plants provide shelter for small desert creatures, secure the desert soil, prevent erosion,
and provide food for grazing domestic and wild animals. 429 Some 400 species of desert
plants and flowers growing in Kuwait, such as arfaj, with its salty taste, and al-awsaj, a
strong thorny plant with small leaves and raspberry shaped red flowers. Both plants are
eaten by camels. In addition, several common plants grow in the desert. Of these plants,
the Anogllis femina with the blue-crimson flower and the Senecio desfontainei with its
golden yellow flowers are most frequently found. 430 However, most of these plants were
destroyed during the Iraqi invasion in 1991. 431 Moreover, agricultural facilities, including
greenhouses, livestock farms, and most major poultry farms were destroyed. A United
Nations mission in 1991 found abandoned farms and damage to greenhouses and
irrigation systems. Perennial plants and date palms were destroyed in the Al-Wafra and
Al-Abdaly areas. 432 Although desert plants tend to be quite resilient, the massive troop
movements and the extensive use of landmines dramatically affected soil composition.
This change in soil composition may affect the ability of desert plants to recover quickly,
if at all.
While examining environmental damage during armed conflict and under the
category of agricultural crops and forests, it is necessary to mention the war on narcotraffic as a separate category. The narco-traffic war is widespread during insurgencies as
a result of the absence of government.
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Thus, the “war” on drug producers constitutes another threat to the
environment. 433 In Peru, the world’s largest coca leaf producer, with about 121,000
hectares under cultivation, 434 the government of Peru engaged in an eradication effort
that included the extensive use of herbicides. 435 According to Article 14(2) of the 1988
United Nations Convention on Illicit Drug Trafficking and Psychotropic Substances
(CIDT), eradication measures must take the protection of the environment into
consideration. 436 Peru has made efforts to utilize safe and effective herbicides in its coca
eradication initiatives, and has analyzed soil, air, and water for herbicidal effects. 437 On
the other hand, in Columbia, glyphosate,438 the main chemical weapon used to fight the
war against coca and other illicit crops, threatens the destruction of agricultural crops and
forests in a fragile ecosystem. 439

2. Lithosphere
Land covers almost “fifteen billion hectares (twenty nine percent) of the earth’s
surface.” 440 Almost “1.6 billion hectares of the land (eleven percent of the total land area)
is ice-covered, much of it in Antarctica.” 441 As much as “1800 million hectares (twelve
percent) is desert. About 800 million hectares (five percent) of at least some strata of the
soil remains frozen the year round, and 200 million hectares or more (1.5 percent) is
433

M. Cherif Bassiouni, Critical Reflections on International Control of Drugs, 18 Denv. J. Int’l L. &
Pol’y 311, 326(1990), see also, Sharon A. Gardner, A Global Initiative to Deter Drug Trafficking: Will
Internationalizing the Drug War Work? 7 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 287, 288 (1993).
434
World Factbook, The Aim of the Andean Group is to promote Harmonious Development through
Economic Integration, 249 (1991).
435
Global Narcotics Cooperation and Presidential Certification: Statement Before the Subcomm. On
Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Comm. Of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dep’t St.
Bull. 49, 50 (Oct. 1989) (Statement of Ann B. Wrobleski, Asst. Sec. For Int’l Narcotics Matters)
[hereinafter Global Narcotics].
436
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec.
19, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 4, 101 st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989).
437
Global Narcotics, supra note (435) at 50.
438
Glyphosate-based herbicide is used in agricultural markets to control growing weeds. It can inhibit the
production of EPSP enzyme when sprayed on a plant, and as it moves throughout the plant protein
production stops and the plant dies. See, Victor M. Tafur, Application of Glyphosate to Narcotics Crops:
The Chemical War on the Environment, A Paper presented for the Science for Environmental Lawyers
Class 4 (Pace University School of Law, 1999).
439
Id., at 19.
440
Arthur H. Westing ed., Environmental Warfare: A technical, Legal, and
Policy Appraisal 5 (Taylor & Francis, 1984) [hereinafter Westing, Environmental
Warfare].

68

accounted for by rugged mountain terrain.” 442 Most of the world’s population lives on the
remaining 10,500 million hectares and most of that land is in the Northern
hemisphere.” 443
Soil, the top layer of the earth beneath us, supports almost all of the plant life on
our planet. It is composed of gravel, sand, silt, clay, and organic matter, and is very
heterogeneous. 444 It is also subject to damage and destruction by warfare. Soil destruction
by weapons employment may stress an ecosystem in two ways: “physical displacement
of soil and alterations in soil structure and composition.” 445 For centuries, the ground has
been used for the storage and disposal of chemical wastes. Pesticides and fertilizers are
applied to soil, and chemicals reach the soil from the atmosphere and from human
activities in peacetime as well as in times of armed conflicts. 446
Like the rest of the ecosystem, the Persian Gulf lithosphere was a victim of the
“oil war.” An estimated sixty million barrels of crude oil released from gushing oil wells
created some 246 oil lakes in Kuwait. The oil lakes were formed in adjoining depressions
or low-lying land and covered forty-nine square kilometers of desert. 447 The depth of oil
lakes ranged from 10 to 150 cm. 448 Several holes were dug in the desert land of Kuwait,
crude oil poured in and torched by Iraqi troops. Oil seeped deep into the beaches, sand,
and gravel as a result of tides lifting oil onto the Gulf beach. 449
Furthermore, the surface of the desert was severely affected by construction of
bunkers, installation and removal of land mines, and the oil, oil mist, and soot from the
fires. 450 Troop movement added to the compacting of the desert soil. 451 Some areas of the
desert were salinated from the firefighting efforts. The oil mist and other fallout from the
fires, along with the mechanical disruption of the desert, caused tremendous damage to
vegetation. The oil-contaminated sites contain high levels of hydrocarbons, vanadium,
441

Id.
Id.
443
Id.
444
Donald G. Crosly, Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 56 (Oxford
University Press, 1998) [hereinafter Crosly].
445
J. P. Robinson, The Effects of Weapons on Ecosystems 47 (Pergamon Press, 1979).
446
Crosly, supra note (444) at 23.
447
KFAS, supra note (138) at 46.
448
Id., at 46.
449
Okordudu-Fubara, supra note (331) at 136.
450
KFAS, supra note (138) at 55.
451
Id., at 55.
442

69

chloride, sodium, sulfate and calcium. 452 The oil-logged soil layer is considered to be
dead as a natural habitat of plant growth and production. 453
The Gulf War II was not the only instance in which oil was used as a weapon.
During the first Russian revolution in 1905, when the Tatars revolted in Baku, they
destroyed Armenian property including oil derricks. One witness described this disaster
by declaring that: “I realized for the first time in my life all that can possibly be meant by
words. Hell let loose.” 454 Other examples occurred in World Wars I and II, when the
Allies bombed and burned Romanian oilfields and facilities, seriously harming the
surrounding environment. 455
Damage to the lithosphere is not limited to the effects of oil. In 1937-1945, during
the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese dynamited the Huayuankow dike on the
Yellow River near Chengchow to halt the Japanese advance. 456 The floodwaters
destroyed major parts of Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu provinces, ravaging millions of
hectares of farmlands, and about 4,000 villages. 457
During the Vietnam War, the United States sprayed huge forest areas with
herbicides, particularly Agent Orange, that leading to soil erosion and degradation of
trees. 458 Additionally, the use of high-explosive ammunitions rendered large areas of land
unusable. Consequently, in a country comprised largely of an agrarian people, the effects
were, and continue to be, devastating. 459 Undetected landmines and unexploded
munitions are still a major threat to both human and natural ecologies.
Another example of land depletion is in Central America, where contra guerrillas
in Nicaragua seriously damaged forests in Southern Honduras near the Nicaraguan
border. Contras forced hundreds of peasant coffee growers from their native landholdings
in the 1980s. And about 20,000 Nicaraguan refugees in Honduran camps caused
452
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extensive environmental degradation, such as deforestation, land clearing, illegal trade of
valuable species including “cedar, mahogany, and pine,” and forest fires which destroyed
an estimated 110 square miles. 460

3. Hydrosphere
The oceans of the world cover 71 percent of the earth’s surface, 461 and are
threatened by the release of chemical agents and other forms of pollution. During World
War II, in late 1943, the Germans bombed Allied ships anchored at Bari Harbor, Italy, 462
causing 220,500 pounds of mustard gas to leak into the Adriatic Sea. Mustard gas is toxic
to ocean mammals and humans. According to Swedish experts, the released mustard gas
forms a protective layer underwater, which helps the chemical agent retain its
effectiveness for many years. 463 Byproducts created from the breakdown of the mustard
gas are toxic to humans, land animals, and aquatic species. Scientists estimate that the
byproducts will remain dangerous for the next 400 years.464
The Persian Gulf is one of the most polluted bodies of water in the world, and was
so even before Gulf War II. In 1983, during the Iran-Iraq War, three oil wells were
attacked in the Nowruz oil field off the coast of Iran, spilling 1.9 million barrels of oil
into the Gulf’s waters. One report documented that “the oil slick released from the
Nowruz platform ended up in deep water in the central Gulf. But its ecological impact is
still largely unknown.” 465 In 1991, Iraqi troops caused the spill of millions of gallons of
oil into shallow Gulf waters. They also destroyed four sewage-treatment facilities, at Al-
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Riggae, Al-Jahra, Al-Rigga, and Failaka, 466 causing 330,000 cubic meters of raw sewage
per day to spill into the Gulf, polluting it with microbes, viruses, and harmful bacteria. 467
The Gulf ecosystem is particularly fragile because of its unusually shallow water
and the unusual conditions of the area. The Gulf is a basin with only one outlet to the sea,
at the Strait of Hormuz. The Gulf is thirty-five miles long and hundred and ten feet deep.
It takes an average of two hundred years to flush out. 468 The Gulf ecosystem includes sea
grasses, coral reefs, mud flats, and salt marshes. 469 A National Geographic study by Dr.
Sylvia Earle 470 shows that the sea grasses deep in the Gulf are coated with oil. Mollusks
and crabs were found dead and oil coated. 471 In 1992, a Greenpeace study showed that
the full negative impact of oil contamination on coral reefs in the Gulf is still unknown to
today. 472 In addition, severe oil impacts were found in salt marshes, 473 and in populations
of shore birds. 474 Significantly, drinking water supplies in Kuwait are still contaminated.
However, experts from Green Cross International found that one fresh groundwater
aquifer, producing forty percent of the freshwater reserves of Kuwait, is heavily polluted.
The remaining freshwater reserves provide Kuwait with “less than a two-months supply
for the entire population.” 475
The impact of oil on marine life during times of war can also be seen in
Yugoslavia, where considerable environmental destruction resulted from the NATO
bombing of the chemical factory complex at Pancevo, about 12 miles from Belgrade.476
According to Pancevo’s Mayor, Srdjan Mikovic, NATO aircraft struck the complex with
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at least 56 missiles between March 24 and June 8, 1999. 477 Chemicals released into the
water on April 18 alone included “15,000 tons of ammonia, 1,800 tons of ethylene
dichloride, 1,500 tons of vinyl-chloride monomer, and 250 tons of chlorine.” 478 On April
21, 1,400 tons of ethylene dichloride poured into the Danube. 479 Workers at the complex
dumped 9,500 tons of ammonia into the river, in order to prevent harm from attack on the
ammonia storage tanks. 480 Oil could be seen flowing down the Danube like a massive
spill 15 kilometers long and about 400 meters wide. 481
The history of armed conflict includes other kinds of environmental manipulation,
such as the destruction of a water system to cause flooding. In June 1672, during the
Franco-Dutch War of 1672-78, the Dutch were able to stop the French army by damaging
dikes and causing the release of water. This interception, dubbed the Holland Water Line,
to some extent prevented the French army from gaining control of the Netherlands.482
In the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45, the Chinese dynamited the
Huayuankow dike of the Yellow River (Huang He) near Chengchow to halt the
advancing Japanese troops. This massive flooding ravaged eleven Chinese cities and
more than 4,000 Chinese villages, destroying millions of hectares of farmland, crops, and
top soil. 483
In May 1943, during World War II, the British destroyed two major dams in the
Ruhr Valley in Germany, in an attempt to ravage Germany’s industrial economic base.
The British action released 34.3 billion gallons of water from the Möhne Dam and
another 52.8 billion gallons from the Eder Dam, 484 and caused serious damage to 125
factories, forty-six bridges, power stations, numerous coal mines, and railway lines. Some
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6,500 cattle and pigs were lost and 3,000 hectares of arable land were ruined. 485 In 1944,
during World War II, German forces intentionally flooded some 30,000 hectares of
agricultural lands in the Netherlands with saltwater, 486 making them unusable for
crops. 487 The land was reclaimed only after a massive rehabilitation program. 488
Water resources are also affected by unexploded ordnance and munitions lying at
the bottom of seas, ports, rivers, and oceans throughout the world. Sea mines from World
War II have been found at the entrance to the port of Le Havre, France, in the waterways
of Berlin, in the Thames estuary in the United Kingdom, and even sixty miles off the
coast of North Carolina, U.S.A. 489 Since the end of World War II, 16 million artillery
shells, 490,000 bombs, and 600,000 underwater mines have been found in France. 490
Sunken ships lying at the bottom of the world’s oceans slowly leak oil and other
contaminants into the ocean, 491 damaging or destroying animal life, coral reefs, and
seagrass beds. 492 Such contaminants can also affect the marine ecosystem severely by
damaging marine historical sites, 493 and threatening endangered marine species.
World War II saw 674 large U.S. merchant ships sunk by hostile actions, 152 of
them oil tankers. 494 An estimated 300 tankers released approximately 5.5 million cubic
meters of oil into the ocean during World War II alone. 495

4. Atmosphere
The earth’s atmosphere acts as both the receiver and transporter of pollutants.
Many pollutants do not stay in the atmosphere, but settle on living systems on land and
water. The atmosphere extends hundreds of kilometers upward, but becomes
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extraordinarily thin above 150 kilometers. 496 The lower atmosphere extends upward fiftyfive kilometers, and consists of the troposphere and the stratosphere. 497 The troposphere
contains dust, wind and clouds, whereas the higher stratosphere is cloudless. 498
Air pollution is not a new topic. In 1600, an English treatise complained of “th[e]
horrid Smoke which obscures our Church and makes our Palaces look old, which fouls
our Cloth and corrupts our Waters, so as the very Rain […]” 499 In modern times, the
problem of air pollution has only become more complicated. Military operations have
played a major role here too. Modern military tactics include direct attempts to interfere
with the atmosphere in various ways. Military forces have attempted to gain control over
winds, clouds and precipitation. Climate modification, release of substances to affect the
electrical properties of the atmosphere, rainfall enhancement, and injection of
electromagnetic fields in the atmosphere 500 have all resulted directly from military
manipulation of the atmosphere for hostile purposes. During World War I, the German
Army lined up canisters along a four-mile front, and released a cloud of chlorine gas
toward the French troops. 501
During World War II, the Germans bombed a ship laden with 100 tons of mustard
gas, at Bari Harbor, Italy, which resulted in the release of a poisonous clouds that drifted
over the port town of Bari, killing more than 1,000 civilians. 502
A much more ambitious example is the release of materials by the U.S. into the
troposphere over enemy territory to incapacitate radar during the Vietnam War. 503
In 1990, during Gulf War II, atmospheric pollution resulted from burning oil
wells, which fouled the air and sent vast clouds of dense smoke that darkened the skies as
far east as Afghanistan and Northern India. 504 The sulfur dioxide emitted from the
burning oil wells can return to the ground, combining with water vapor to form sulfuric
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acid (acid rain) 505 which damages crops, forests, vegetation, buildings, and water
resources. 506
According to one source, smoke can also affect climate:

[t]he greatest threat is that airborne soot from petro blazes might
cancel springtime in the northern Hemisphere and stifle the Asian
monsoons on which millions of people depend for their lives.
This would happen if the soot rose high enough to alter the way
the sun’s energy is absorbed. Usually the ground soaks up heat,
creating warm air whose rise creates the turbulence that drives
weather. The height of the soot cloud depends on the fire’s
temperature and size, as well as on how much fuel combusts. 507

It was estimated that the oil well fires in Kuwait emitted, over the course of nine
months,
•1-2 milion tons/day of carbon dioxide (CO²);
•5,500-65,000 tons/day of sulfur dioxide (SO²);
•500-3,000 ton/day of nitrogen oxides (NOx);
•250 tons/day of carbon monoxide (CO);
•5,000 tons/day of soot or particulate matter. 508

These pollutants raise concerns in three respects: the presence of carcinogens in
the atmosphere; the reduction in sunshine and possible deficiencies in vitamins D and E;
and the introduction of air pollutants into the milk of sheep and cattle. 509 George D.
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Thurston of the Institute of Environmental Medicine at New York University estimated
that the air pollution levels in Kuwait could cause 1,000 excess deaths annually. 510
The oil well fires were one of world’s gravest air pollution disasters. 511 Two days
after the Gulf War fires, Iran reported that “black rain” had fallen on its lands. 512
Rainstorms and hurricanes as far away as Bangladesh have been attributed to these
fires. 513 Moreover, during the seven months’ occupation of Kuwait, all trash disposal
services were rendered inoperable, forcing the population of Kuwait to burn its trash.
That circumstance only added to the oil-related pollution; moreover, the trash released
dioxins from the incomplete burning of plastics. 514
In the former Yugoslavia, the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that
the most serious environmental consequences of the attack of April 17 and 18, 1999, 515
were the release of toxic substances from the burning oil products at a refinery and the
burning of vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) at a petrochemical plant. 516 An estimated
80,000 tons of oil products were burned, leading to the release of noxious substances into
the air, including sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, polyaromatic
hydrocarbons (PAHs) and lead. 517
The foregoing discussion shows that a number of techniques are available to
modify the atmosphere for hostile purposes, and that many have been used. However, the
future may bring even more sophisticated techniques for the hostile manipulation of the
atmosphere, such as the modification of clouds to bring about hail storms or lightning
discharges in enemy territory, or the reduction of the stratospheric ozone layer over
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enemy territory. Even more drastically, nuclear war would have an unthinkable impact on
the atmosphere, weather, and climate. 518
Damage to the ozone has become a widely recognized problem. In recent years,
increasing quantities of Chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) have been released into the
atmosphere and slowly drifted into the stratosphere, 519 seriously threatening to deplete
the stratospheric ozone layer and foster global climate changes. In particular, damage to
the ozone may result in a warming of the Earth’s surface, and thus “cause migration of
food-growing belts, change monsoon patterns, turn farmlands into deserts, cause sharp
rises in sea and ocean levels due to melting of polar ice caps, which would result in
flooding many coastal areas, increasing hurricane activity and storms, salt water intrusion
into supplies of fresh water, destruction of wildlife habitats, and the impairment of port
facilities.” 520 In 1974, two American scientists determined that CFCs do not break down
in the lower atmosphere because of their “inherent stability.” 521 Instead, CFC molecules
rise to the stratospheric ozone, where “ultraviolet radiation from the sun breaks them
down into chlorine fragments, which destroy ozone molecules.” 522
The depletion of the ozone layer is dangerous because “ozone absorbs solar
ultraviolet radiation, preventing it from reaching the earth’s surface.” 523 Ultraviolet
radiation in turn “damages crops and aquatic organisms, and causes skin cancers,
cataracts, and suppression of the human immune system.” 524 CFCs are used for civilian
as well as military purposes. For example, they are used in hairdressing salons, car seat
cushions, refrigerators, air conditions, and hospital equipment. 525 The military uses of
CFCs include the production of solvents and of a wide array of machine and weapons
518
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parts. 526 The dangers posed by the continued use of CFCs should prompt world leaders to
take further action both within their own countries and internationally to reduce CFC use
and production. Some action has already been taken to protect the ozone. In 1987, the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal
Protocol) 527 was introduced to address the international control of CFC emissions. On
January 1st, 1988, the Montreal Protocol entered into force.
This brief survey makes clear the extent and the variety of dangers to the air, soil,
water, and biota caused by armed conflict, both directly and indirectly. Pollution of these
crucial resources appears certain to have long-term effects on the ecosystem, not just
within the borders of specific counties, but internationally as well. 528

F: Environmental Harm Following Armed Conflict
Avoiding environmental harm before it occurs is easier, cheaper, and safer than
attempting to remedy the harm after it has taken place. Throughout history, wars have
caused environmental damage; recovering from that damage has often proven to be very
slow, very costly, and in some cases impossible. Modern weapons, particularly chemical
and nuclear weapons, present a whole new order of threat, and are even more likely to
result in long-term irreversible environmental effects.529
Typically, combatants are more concerned with immediate military advantage
than with the long-term environmental effects of their warfare. However, the more
extended and intensive the war, the more destruction will be left behind. A major concern
following war is unexploded ammunition and ordnance, which act as “hidden killers.”
Discarded materials including debris, trash, and explosives can present environmental
hazards long after the battles have ceased. Further devastation to the environment can
result from the destruction of endangered species, poisoned water supplies, soil pollution,
deforestation, and desertification.

526

Hannah, supra note (519) at 92.
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 30 I.L.M. 539 (1987)
[hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
528
NATO Aggression on Yugoslavia’s Environment, supra note (426).
529
Dunkley, supra note (314).
527

79

Examples of long-term environmental damage are, unfortunately, not difficult to
find. Many of the battlefields of World War I and II, for instance, are still unfit for
cultivation today, and are still dangerous to people and animals due to unexploded
devices and projectiles embedded in the soil. 530 French and Belgian farmers still find
unexploded ordnance from World War I.531 Modern weapons also can leave poisonous
residue.

1. Unexploded Ammunition and Abandoned Materials
Unexploded ammunition can include anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, bombs,
artillery and mortar shells, and cluster bombs. 532 Their failure to explode can be the result
of a variety of circumstances, including defective fuses, improper congregation, or
smashing into a flexible surface. 533 Unexploded ordnance can last for many years
undetected.
Mines have been used routinely in wars for nearly two centuries, as explosive
devices for the purpose of killing, destroying, or otherwise incapacitating enemy
personnel and/or equipment. They can be employed in any quantity within a specific
area to form a minefield, or they can be used individually to reinforce non-explosive
obstacles. 534
Landmines not only cause death and destruction of soldiers and military objects.
Once in the ground, they can kill civilians, farm animals, or any other moving being. 535
Yet landmines can, and do, also cause dramatic harm to the environment, in terms of the
pollution of air and water, loss of agricultural lands and fields, and impairment of
economic growth and land use development. For example, sand and soil are damaged
530
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when landmines are laid, exploded, and cleared. The nature of the soil can be changed
after the explosion of landmines.

Explosives commonly used in landmines, such as trinitrotoluene
(TNT), seep into the soil. The decomposition of these substances
can cause many environmental problems because they are often
water soluble, carcinogenic, toxic, and long lasting. Landmines
also harm the environment when they explode, scattering debris,
destroying surrounding vegetation, and disrupting soil
composition. This substantially decreases the productivity of
agricultural land and increases an area’s vulnerability to water
and wind erosion, which in turn can add sediment into drainage
systems, adversely affecting water habitats. Unexploded
ordnance (UXO) detonations have similar results. One study has
shown that the detonation of UXO in the Vietnamese province of
Quang Tri has drastically reduced soil productivity. According to
estimates, rice production per hectare has decreased 50 percent in
this area. The slow degradation of landmines and their
devastating impact on surrounding land can render resources
unusable for many generations. The environmental impact of
landmines is particularly pronounced when viewed in
conjunction with socioeconomic factors and other consequences
of landmine contamination. 536

Moreover, farmers will of course avoid using lands due to the presence, or
suspected presence, of landmines, thus leading to underproduction of food, scarcity, and
hence, malnutrition. 537 Many areas where minefields exist should be kept out of
cultivation for people’s safety. However, under economic pressure, some farmers may
venture into such areas to earn their livelihood, despite the presence of mines, thus
risking horrific injuries or deaths. For example, in Angola, in 1998, a pregnant mother
who had gone into the brushwood to collect some firewood, lost her pregnancy and one
of her legs. Later, a landmine killed her husband when he ventured into the same
brush. 538 The presence of minefields can prevent access to safe drinking water, causing
536
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in turn intestinal diseases, especially diarrhea. 539 Laying and removing landmines can
degrade the soil and can cause evaporation of water from sand and soil. 540 Furthermore,
the animals and plants killed by landmines can pollute waters where they were killed. 541
The devastating effect of unexploded ammunition was reported in 1985 to the
United Nations Environmental Program by Dr. Arthur Westing, who documented that
unexploded ammunition during World War II led to soil disturbance and destruction of
vegetation and animal life. 542 And in the wake of the Gulf War II, thousands of tons of
unexploded ordnance and landmines lie under the soft surface of desert soil. An estimated
33,000 unexploded mines remain in the desert. 543 A study by the U.S. Government
estimated that seventy percent of the conventional bombs dropped over Iraq missed their
target, and that of the 88,500 tons of bombs dropped on Iraq, 17,700 tons never
exploded. 544 In addition, some of the ordnance used by the U.S. contained depleted
uranium in order to enhance penetration capability. After the war, many rounds of this
ammunition remained in the ground causing radiological contamination. 545 Moreover,
uranium can become airborne and may be inhaled or ingested. 546 Casualties resulted from
these ammunition and landmines are still reported. Thus, the public should be informed
about such dangerous areas, and how to deal with suspicious objects.
Coastal life can also be affected by mines. Explosions can kill coral reefs, sea
turtles, seaweeds, and algae, threatening the extinction of these species. For example,
during the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran War, mines were used extensively on the high sea,
involving even non-belligerent ships such as the U.S. flag supertanker Bridgeton. 547
Iran dispersed mines in the path of neutral shipping in the Gulf water. Another example
539
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was during the Gulf War II, when Iraq planted more than half a million mines in Kuwait
in order to seal off Kuwait’s coastline. 548 The Iraqis also mined the Gulf with thousands
of explosive devices that had to be detonated by allied naval forces in order to permit
them to maneuver. 549 The presence of those explosives posed, and continue to pose, a
threat to the marine ecosystem of all Gulf waters. When mines explode, the damage
they cause to the fragile Gulf marine resources is often irreversible.
Moreover, battlefields left dead bodies of men and animals. Bodies were dumped
in creeks, polluting the downstream water supply. 550 Debris and equipment were left
abandoned on battlefields. 551 For example, in 1991, during the Gulf War II, the Allied
Forces bombarded Iraqi military strategic locations. It was reported that the Allied Forces
destroyed about seventy percent of the Iraqi tank force (more than 3000) and artillery
power (more than 2100 pieces). 552 In Kuwait, the “death road” 553 was covered with
thousands of cans, tanks, damaged military hardware as well as dead bodies. 554 In
addition, sanitary waste, including leftover food for more than half a million troops,
littered the Northern Saudi desert. 555 It was estimated that 10 million gallons of human
fecal waste were produced per day, 556 and about 4 million tons of human fecal waste
produced during December 1990 through February 1991 alone. 557 In addition to these
organic wastes, large quantities of barbed wire and material used to maintain military
vehicles were dumped in battlefield areas. Spent lubricating oil was collected and burned
and its residue was buried, 558 resulting in soil contamination.
This environmental threat led the United Nations, for the first time, to recognize
environmental harm as a compensable injury. In 1991, the U.N. Security Council issued
548
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Resolution 687, stating in Paragraph 16 that it “Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to
the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed
through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss,
damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or
injury to foreign governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful
invasion and occupation of Kuwait...” 559 Resolution 687 provided for the creation of a
fund “to pay compensation for claims” arising from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the
establishment of a Commission to administer the fund. The Resolution addressed
liability for environmental damage as one category of compensable direct loss, 560 the
first time “environmental claims had been recognized explicitly in an institutional claim
context.” 561 Resolution 692 established the United Nations Compensation Commission
(UNCC), 562 to administer a system to provide compensation for damage arising from
the Gulf War II. The UNCC, located in Geneva, Switzerland, is divided into three parts:
the Governing Council which is comprised of the fifteen members of the U.N. Security
Council, 563 Commissioners who are experts in law, finance, insurance, and
environmental damage assessment, 564 and a Secretariat which handles the
administrative work of the UNCC. 565

2. Destruction of Endangered Species and their Habitats
Yet another environmental consequence of war is the danger to, or destruction of,
endangered animal species. Species extinction is a side effect of deforestation as it
destroys their habitats. 566 For example, during the civil war in Rwanda, bamboo forests
were damaged, leading to a decrease in the populations of elephants, buffalo, and
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hippopotamus. 567 In the Gulf region, specifically Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, there
are more than 3,650 animal species. About fifty species are recognized internationally as
being threatened with extinction. 568 The Gulf has four vulnerable marine habitats:
“coastal marches and mudflats, coral reefs, seagrass beds, and mangroves.” 569 In 1991,
during Gulf War II, these ecological sites faced the worst marine disasters from the
spilling of oil by Iraqi Forces. Seven years later, traces of spilled oil were still present on
the southern beaches of Al-Khiran. 570 The intertidal areas of the marine environment
have been most severely affected. Notwithstanding all of these environmental effects
from the Gulf wars, there are few monitoring programs in Kuwait specifically
documenting the long term environmental impacts. Without that information it is difficult
to establish precisely what damage resulted from precisely which source. This is
particular so because the many possible sources of environmental damage include the
Gulf War oil spill, oil releases from tanker traffic, discharges from industrial areas,
human activities in the coastal areas, 571 dredging and landfilling for the building of a
bridge across Kuwait Bay, and the development on Bubiyan Island. 572

3. Deforestation and Erosion
Deforestation occurs not only during armed conflict, but following warfare as
well. The complete recovery of forest ecosystems may take several centuries. After
World War II, “about 500 million board feet of lumber and 100 million square feet of
plywood were needed for occupation troops and family housing. Another five billion
board feet of lumber would be required each year for five years to rebuild homes and
businesses destroyed during the war.” 573 In Vietnam, approximately “5.5 million acres of
forest and one-fifth of the agricultural land were destroyed by bombings, land clearing,
567
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defoliating, and napalming during the war.” 574 Vietnam has over half a million acres of
coastal swampland, much of it concentrated in the south in the Mekong delta and Cape of
Camau regions. Much of this swampland was covered with mangroves, which formed a
natural hide-out for the guerrillas, and was thus subjected to intense chemical attack by
the Americans. 575 The consequences of this environmental disaster have lasted far longer
than the war itself.
Similarly, both eastern and western Rwanda were affected by the 1990 civil war.
In the west, in 1991 the Rwandan army cut a swathe of vegetation about 10 meters wide
north-south across the forest to allow the staff of the Virunga Volcanoes park to patrol
this line and prevent any Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) soldiers from moving across the
park. 576 Further, the use of the park as a refugee camp, after the mass killing in 1994,
resulted in the clearing of a large area of forest for firewood. 577 Moreover, the eastern
side, where Akagera National Park is located, was also deforested during the war. The
Park contained 2,800 km² of savanna and wetlands. 578 The park was attacked by the
RPF, 579 and many animals were killed between 1990 and 1993. After the change of the
government in 1994, the RPF settled many of the returning Tutsis, 580 along with their
cattle, in large portions of the park. 581
During Cambodia’s long-running civil war, its forest cover dwindled from
seventy percent of land area in the 1970s, to about thirty percent today 582 as the sale of
the timber funded the war. In 1991, Pol Pot, the former head of the Khmer Rouge, said
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“[o]ur state does not have sufficient capital either to expand its strength or enlarge the
army. The resources in our liberated and semi-liberated zones absolutely must be utilized
as assets.” 583 Similarly, during the Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
sizable tracts of timber from the Azikh cave in the Fizuli region, one of the first places in
the world where evidence of Neanderthal man was discovered, has been cut in the
occupied forests of Azerbaijan and exported to Armenia. 584
Other military governments, such as that of the former Burma, have engaged in
armed confrontations with the tribal groups who live in the forested mountain areas along
the borders with India, Bangladesh, China, Laos, and Thailand. 585 These tribal groups
have over-exploited the forest to fund their war effort. In 1996, the Kibira and Ruvubu
National Parks in Burundi were used as sanctuaries and entry points for guerrillas
fighting the government. As a result, the Parks also became operational areas for
government troops, with both sides heavily involved in poaching. 586
In sum, after assessing the massive impacts of armed conflicts, it is clear that the
cost of armed conflict is paid by both the civilian population and the environment.
However, protection of people takes precedence over protection of the environment.
Because international law and the law of war must be concerned first with direct harm to
humans, environmental concerns have always received less attention. However, as
environmental awareness is increased among nations, it is becoming clear that wanton
environmental destruction has had a severe impact on humankind. Not only are people
immediately affected by pollution, the release of toxic chemicals, and other
environmental insults, many of the “substances mobilized during environmental warfare
are mutagenic or teratogenic,” 587 impacting both present and future generations.
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Part II:
Environmental Protection in
International Humanitarian Law
It is necessary to survey the history of International Humanitarian Law in order to
understand its connection with environmental protection. A number of initiatives to
prevent the use of force 588 as a method of settling international conflicts have been
identified throughout history. Notable among these initiatives are The Hague
Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1907, the Pact of the
League of Nations of 1919, 589 the Pact of Paris of 1928 and the United Nations Charter of
1945. All these initiatives failed to prevent the use of force completely, since wars are
seen everywhere, in the Middle East, South and North America, Asia, Africa, and
Europe. As a result, pressure on the international community has grown to “humanize”
wars, and reduce their effects on mankind, especially non-combatants.
Consequently, a new field of international law appeared, International
Humanitarian Law (IHL), applicable in times of armed conflict.
The codification of this law proceeded cautiously because it dealt with human
beings, who are not considered subjects of international law. States, the subject of
international law, resisted the internationalization of rules for human protection.
Nevertheless, this resistance did not prevent the emergence of IHL, and it came to
provide a degree of human protection. While IHL provisions cannot protect human life,
health, and the environment completely, traditional IHL is also limited because it deals
only with protection of persons, even though natural systems also need to be protected.
For example, if wartime harm or injury can be repaired or restored, the IHL rules usually
focus on the compensation. However, most environmental harm is a kind of irreparable
harm, not measured easily by monetary compensation. For example, the destruction of
cultural or historical sites, the pollution of water bodies, the degradation of national
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forests, or threats to endangered species cannot easily be measured in solely economic
terms. Thus, IHL has to be supplemented by reference to environmental or envirohumanitarian law rules. The environmental law deals with the protection of nature,
recognizes that ecological harm is immitigable and cannot be evaluated by money, 590 and
therefore focuses to prevent rather than repair environmental damage.
Nonetheless, IHL plays a considerable role in imposing restrictions on combatants
in times of armed conflicts, and has achieved some success in the protection of human
rights. Moreover, environment concerns have been recognized in IHL provisions, a
number of instruments which seek to prevent, directly or indirectly, environmental
destruction. 591 Recently, for instance, a provision adding more protection of the
environment was adopted at the Second World Conservation Congress, held in Amman,
Jordan, 4-11 October, 2000, as is discussed below in the context of examining the
specific provisions of the IHL.
However, despite the development of IHL, its success is far from complete. A
number of legal lacunas preclude human protection, and combatants do not always
comply with their obligations. Moreover, a number of States have not yet signed, or
ratified some of the IHL instruments.
Since our subject focuses on times of armed conflict, it is necessary to examine
the humanitarian laws of war, as classified under The Hague Law, and the Geneva Law:
[O]ne is the law of warfare proper, otherwise known as the
Hague law, which defines the rights and duties of belligerents in
the course of military operations and restricts the parties in their
choice of the means of injuring the adversary. The body of this
law is made up of the conventions adopted at The Hague Peace
Conference of 1899 and 1907, excluding the rules which in 1929
and 1949 were taken over into the Geneva conventions, such as
the provisions on prisoners of war and the civilian population of
the occupied territories, but including the St. Petersburg
Declaration of 1868 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The other
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part of the laws of war is international humanitarian law taken in
the narrow sense, known otherwise the Geneva law, which is
concerned with the protection of soldiers rendered hors de
combat and [keeping civilians] out of hostilities. 592

However, while the Geneva laws are characterized by strict, nonderogable
prohibitions, 593 The Hague laws are vaguely worded and permissive, enabling powerful
States to use advanced military technology with no regard to humanitarian
consequences. 594
Some international law experts use the narrow term Geneva Law as a synonym
for IHL rules. 595 Armed conflict may have been, to some degree, humanized, by the
adoption of these rules. IHL offers an advanced humanitarian protection, and a basic
environmental protection. Human protection is the main focus of the IHL provisions.
They also seek to protect hospitals, schools, and places of worship as necessary to human
welfare. But the environment as an indivisible element of human life needs to be
protected also, because people have the right to live in a clean and safe environment. For
example, during the Gulf War II, IHL provisions were applied vigorously in order to
protect the lives of the civilian population. But the environment was completely ignored
from such protection. As a result, the Kuwaiti environment was and is still highly
polluted with variety of known and unknown hazardous materials such as DU. 596
According to Britain’s Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) secret report, the allies had
left at least forty tons of DU, enough to cause “500,000 potential deaths.” 597 DU was
created severe health problems as a result of its presence in the food chain and water
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supplies. 598 Despite this serious threat to the environment and to human health, IHL
offered no platform to deal with, or even recognize, this hazard.
Humanitarian protection should not be limited to the direct effects of armed
conflict on civilian population, it should be extended to the indirect impacts of armed
conflict on them too, to offer a real and a powerful protection to both civilians and
combatants in times of armed conflicts. Both humanitarian organizations and
environmental organizations seek to prevent armed conflict from affecting humans as a
primary objective, and the environment only as a secondary objective. Closer harmony
and more collaboration between these organizations is necessary to ameliorate the
situation, as we will examine in the final part of this thesis.

A- Definition of International Humanitarian Law, and its Relationship to
Environmental Protection
It is difficult to distinguish between IHL and other fields of law that have similar
characters, such as the international law of human rights that protects human rights in
peacetime. IHL is defined “as being that considerable section of international law which
is pervaded by the feeling of humanity and is aimed at the protection of the person.” 599
According to this definition, IHL has a broad sweep. 600 Humanitarian law in the broad
sense “divides into two branches. It comprises, on one hand, the laws of war (Jus in
bello) and, on the other, human rights (Jus contra bellum.)” 601 Further, IHL applies “from
the initiation of […] armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until
a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful
settlement is achieved. Until that moment [of peace] international humanitarian law
continues to apply [to all the] warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, in the
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[entire] territory under the control of a party, whether an actual [war] take place there or
not.” 602
International humanitarian law focuses primarily on the protection of people in
times of armed conflicts. But, protecting people’s lives only and leaving them in a
polluted environment, as a result of armed conflict, is not adequate. While armed conflict
may directly kill civilians, a polluted environment will directly harm civilians and
indirectly kill them.
In times of armed conflict, humanitarian organizations work hard to prevent
human casualties. Recently, these organizations have discovered also that environmental
protection is necessary to achieve real humanitarian protection. Therefore, part of their
efforts has been directed at the environmental protection. This protection “could
substantially limit environmental damage.” 603 For example, in the aftermath of the 1991
war in Somalia, large areas of Mogadishu were deprived of “a single drop of water.” 604
Therefore, ICRC adopted a program to drill and rehabilitate boreholes to increase the
water supply to most of the city. Between 1995 and 1997, “six new boreholes were
drilled, tested, and equipped with a submersible pump, four boreholes were cleaned and
equipped, and twelve hand-dug wells were equipped with submersible pumps powered by
diesel generators.” 605 Thus, the ICRC recognized that environmental concerns were
crucial to meeting their humanitarian objectives. Other humanitarian organizations have
adopted similar programs. 606
However, most of these organizations do not have the technical or scientific
expertise to address environmental concerns, they are poorly equipped to make “a
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scientific assessment of the environmental damage caused by modern warfare and a
thorough analysis of the content and limitations of the rules in force.” 607 Environmental
organizations, however, do have that expertise, and therefore should be considered to be
the most capable body to protect the environment, even in times of armed conflict.
Entry into the battlefield is not easy even for the purpose of providing
humanitarian or environmental relief to civilians. For military and security reasons,
belligerents do not allow any third party to access to the battlefield. Communications
between civilians and aid organizations are often difficult. However, a neutral person,
state, or organization may play the role of mediator between the involved parties.
Usually, the ICRC has a special position that allows its agents to enter the battlefield
under international treaties such as Articles 10 paragraphs 3 of the Geneva Conventions I,
II, and III 608 and Article 11 paragraph 3 of the Geneva Convention IV, 609 which states
that

If protection cannot be arranged accordingly, the Detaining
Power shall request or shall accept, subject to the provisions of
this Article, the offer of the services of a humanitarian
organization, such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions performed by
Protecting Powers under the present Convention.”
And Article 5 (4) of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 610 states
that
If, despite the foregoing, there is no Protecting Power, the Parties
to the conflict shall accept without delay an offer which may be
made by the International Committee of the Red Cross or by any
other organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and
efficacy, after due consultations with the said Parties and taking
into account the result of these consultations, to act as a
substitute. The functioning of such a substitute is subject to the
consent of the Parties to the conflict; every effort shall be made
by the Parties to the conflict to facilitate the operations of the
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substitute in the performance of its tasks under the Conventions
and this Protocol.

Additionally, ICRC can enter a battlefield under formal agreements with
belligerents, or because of the decades-old custom that permits it to intervene as an
“impartial humanitarian body” 611 in order to ease the plight of civilian populations by
protecting their lives and health, and insuring respect for their dignity.
Usually, the ICRC plays a remarkable role in both internal and international armed
conflicts by calling the warring parties to adhere to IHL principles. Such efforts start with
contacts between ICRC delegates and representatives of the involved parties. Later, these
contacts are summed up in a public statement. The public statement could be “a press
release, as in the Greek Civil War (February 26, 1947) or to the Jewish and Arab
populations of Palestine (March 12, 1948), or a radio announcement, as in Guatemala
(1954), Hungary (1956), and Cuba (1958).” 612 Further, ICRC appeals can take the form
of “an extensive campaign of dissemination by the press and the radio, and the
distribution of booklets and posters as in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe or with the armed forces of
the government in El Salvador.” 613 For instance, a group of Peruvian rebels broke into
the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima, Peru in December 1996, and took some
diplomats, Peruvian government officials, and members of the press as hostages.
Thereafter, the ICRC played a significant role by entering the Ambassador’s residency to
verify the condition of the hostages. 614 Moreover, it played the role of a negotiator and
handed the Peruvian government a statement from the rebels. 615 Further, the ICRC
supplied various items to alleviate the hostages’ conditions, such as “canned meats,
greens, fruit, toilet paper, disinfectant, cards, chess sets, dominoes and portable
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toilets,” 616 as well as blankets, pillows, daily clothing, bottled water and food. 617 The Red
Cross also delivers messages from hostages’ families. 618 The ICRC undertakes “the bulk
of protective activities conducted under humanitarian law,” 619 and has a general right of
humanitarian intervention. This right is subject to the consent of the parties concerned. 620
The statute of the ICRC provides in Article 4 (2) that ICRC “may take any humanitarian
initiative which comes within its role as a specifically neutral 621 and independent
institution and intermediary, and may consider any question requiring examination by
such an institution.” 622
Since the ICRC has been mandated by the international community “to work for
the understanding and dissemination of knowledge of international humanitarian law
applicable in armed conflicts and to prepare any development thereof,” 623 it is naturally
directly concerned by the problem of the protection of the environment in time of armed
conflict. 624 The ICRC has a vital role to play, in cooperation with other bodies expert in
environmental matters, in taking the initiative to fight environmental hazards in
wartime. 625 However, ICRC cannot replace environmental organizations such as the
IUCN, in its task of safeguarding nature and the environment, and by analogy, the IUCN
cannot replace the ICRC in its task of protecting people in times of armed conflicts. But
both can be unified in the task of environmental protection, for the ICRC as a necessary
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element of humanitarian protection, and for the environmental organization because of its
specific mandate.
A number of environmental organizations, such as the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), may play a consultative role to
ICRC agents during both peacetime and times of armed conflicts. For example, a neutral
body could act as a representative of the environment, and be involved with establishing
and supervising environmental sanctuaries, rendering advisory opinions as to whether
regarding weather certain military activities are permissibly ‘proportional,’ and
supervising or assisting with cleanup or remediation actions conducted in the zone of
military operations. 626
Consequently, humanitarian organizations and environmental organizations
should maintain a kind of cooperation, in order to introduce environmental agents into
humanitarian missions. Environmental agents could report any situations related to their
competence regarding environmental matters, while humanitarian agent report violations
of civilians’ and/or combatants’ rights. Therefore, it is important that ICRC establish a
sort of cooperation with environmental organizations. Such cooperation will make
possible an enviro-humanitarian mission, composed of both environmental agents and
humanitarian agents, to prevent, control, and treat any humanitarian or environmental
violations.

B-The Environmental Protection Provisions in the IHL
The laws of war focus on the treatment of civilians and prisoners of war, and the
use of weapons of mass destruction, but neglect environmental protection. However, IHL
does not ignore environmental protection completely. Its modest environmental concerns
related to the human protection. As long as environmental degradation does not affect
human health and welfare, IHL does not formally encompass it. 627 For example, IHL
does not condemn desertification, or deforestation of unoccupied areas, because such
626

Michael D. Diederich, Law of War and Ecology, A Proposal for a Workable Approach to Protecting the
Environment through the Law of War, 136 Mil. L. Rev. 137, 160 (1992) [hereinafter Diederich].
627
GÉZA HERCZEGH, La Protection de l’Environnement Naturel et le Droit Humanitaire, in Studies
and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles 732
(Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984).

96

events do not affect human health or welfare directly. Therefore, in spite of the inclusion
of some environmental protection provisions in the IHL, the environment is still subject
to flagrant abuses, and the actual mechanism of environmental protection in the IHL is
defective.
The environmental protection provisions that adopted by the IHL might be
divided into general provisions and specific provisions as follows:

1. General Provisions
For the purpose of this thesis, general provisions will be identified in IHL
instruments that can be read broadly to include both humanitarian protection and
environmental protection. The goal of these provisions is to limit the ability of
belligerents to choose methods and means of warfare that might affect the environment.

a. The Choice of Methods or Means of Warfare or Injuring the Enemy is not
Unlimited
The U.N. Charter prohibits war and most armed conflicts. Nevertheless, the use of
force is justified if used in self-defense, as authorized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 628
However, when war occurs, combatants should seek specifically to neutralize the other
party’s armed forces, and not to cause unnecessary harm to civilian population or the
natural environment. Therefore, environmental warfare should be prohibited completely.
The limit on belligerents’ choice of methods of warfare was set forth in the Declaration
of St. Petersburg of 1868 as follows:

[T]he only legitimate object which States should endeavor to
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the
enemy; that for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest
possible number of men; that this object would be exceeded by
the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings
of disabled men, or render their death inevitable; that the
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employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the
laws of humanity. 629

This rule, established 132 years ago, condemns the use of arms that exceed the
goal of war, which is to weaken the military forces of the enemy. This limit might be
extended to protect the environment, since the use of weapons in a way that affected the
environment is also likely to “aggravate” the suffering of disabled men, or render their
death inevitable.”
Thirty one years later, this limit was confirmed in Article 22 of the Regulations
Annexed to The Hague Conventions Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
of 1899 and 1907. Article 22 states that “the right of belligerents to adopt means of
injuring the enemy is not unlimited.” 630 Unlike the terms used by the St. Petersburg
Declaration, the language of The Hague Conventions was quite broad. That language
may be interpreted to protect both civilian populations and the environment as well
enemy combatants. Humanitarian harm may be inflicted through environmental
destruction. For example, polluting drinking water supplies, destroying chemical or
nuclear complexes and releasing toxic emissions in the air, and destroying sewage
treatment facilities and dumping raw materials in water bodies, will affect the
environment primarily and the people secondarily.
Seventy years later, Article 35 (1) of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, iterates The Hague Convention’s terms, except that the limit
imposed on belligerents was extended to apply also to internal armed conflict. Article 35
(1) states that “in any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose
methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.” 631
Unlike The Hague Conventions, the Additional Protocol I does not limit the
means of injuring the enemy, but it does limit the choice of methods or means of warfare.
The technological development of modern armaments evoked the adoption of the new
term; high-tech means of warfare do not necessarily injure people despite their ability to
629
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devastate the environment. Therefore, the term used by Article 35 (1) of Additional
Protocol I as a general provision is the most advanced and effective regarding the
environmental protection.

b. Principle of Discrimination

To be lawful, weapons and tactics must clearly discriminate
between military and non-military targets, and be confined in
their application to military targets. Indiscriminate warfare is
illegal per se, although indirect damage to civilians and civilian
targets is not necessarily illegal. 632

The term ‘discriminate’ is a purely military term, under which the combatant
“must always distinguish between civilians and civilian objects on the one hand, and
combatants and military targets on the other.” 633 During armed conflict, harm should be
limited to the combatants and military targets only. Civilians or civilian objects should be
immunized from being attacked by the involved parties. For example, schools, hospitals,
worship places, parks, bridges and dams should be excluded from military operations.
Therefore, indiscriminate warfare including the carpet-bombing 634 or an attack likely to
cause collateral damage to civilian population or objects “which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated,” 635 is considered illegal
per se.
Practically, the application of this principle is not easy, especially when military
commanders protect their combatants and targets by placing them under the cover of
civilian objects. For example, during World War I the “Germans were using a particular
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church belfry as a sniper’s post in a town in the Rhineland, making it a legitimate military
target for the Allies.” 636 Similarly, during Gulf War II, the Iraqi President, Saddam
Hussein, in order to protect some strategic sites from the coalition’s attack, recurred to
this illegal method of warfare. He placed some Western citizens, which he described as
‘Iraq’s guests,’ as a human shell around these sites. Later he placed a civilian shelter on
top of a military communication center in Ameriyya, which thus became a legitimate
military target, even though attacks on it caused “an estimated 200-300 causalities.” 637
Moreover, the massacre occurred in Ghana, Lebanon, in April 11, 1995, Israel, under the
pretext of striking back over Hizballah Guerrillas targeting Israeli cities, attacked
civilians sheltered in a United Nations installation, in Ghana, Lebanon. 638 Around 100
civilian casualties resulted directly from this attack. 639 This attack also destroyed the
United Nations building that sheltered the victims. Therefore, under the means of
attacking military targets or combatants, the environment will be frequently subject to
military atrocities.
This rule was created to restrict warfare operations to military objects and
combatants. However, armed forces may go beyond this rule, to the minimum extent
possible, in order to eliminate an enemy’s force, especially when the enemy uses civilian
populations as a cover for military targets and personnel.

c. Principle of Proportionality

To be lawful, weapons and tactics must be proportional to their
military objective. Disproportionate weaponry and tactics are
excessive, and as such, illegal. 640
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The proportionality principle places limits on belligerents in choosing methods
and tactics of warfare. The proportionality principle requires the comparison between two
elements, the military target and the environmental effects. Prior to destroying a natural
resource site by military activity, the military authority should balance the expected
environmental harm vis-à-vis the military benefits expected to be gained. 641 Whenever
the environmental damage outweighs the military advantage, the military operation
should be avoided. Even when the enemy misuses the civilians, the “attacking forces are
still obliged to meet the test of whether predictable harm would be proportional to the
military advantage.” 642 If the harm is “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated,” it is considered a war crime. 643 Similarly, military
operations that cause environmental damage are illegal if they are disproportional to the
military advantage. For example, destroying a protected area of endangered species, and
nay be judged as a ‘war crime’ 644 if that destruction outweighs any military benefit.
According to Article 57 (2) (b) of the Additional Protocol I, “an attack shall be suspended
if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special
protection […] which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.”
For example, the direct environmental assault during the Vietnam war - when the
United States sought to subdue its guerrilla enemy using among other things herbicides,
high explosive ammunitions, and mechanical land clearing to effectuate large-scale
deforestation and crop destruction- was disproportional, because the environmental loss
clearly outweighed the realized military objectives. 645 Another example is the oil well
fires by Iraqi troops in Kuwait, in 1991. To decide whether a military action is
proportional or not is a commander’s responsibility. Even though such decision may be
“performed under condition of imperfect information,”646 military commanders should be
held responsible before the competent international court, or tribunal.
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The proportionality principle may be particularly relevant when a more
sophisticated army is involved in a war with a developing force that lacks equally
advanced weaponry. The advanced force “should employ only weapons similar to those
in the possession of its weaker opponent” 647 or the war, in such case, will be deemed an
unjust war.
The proportionality principle is set forth in Articles 35 (2), 51 (5)(b), and 57
(2)(a)&(b) of the Additional Protocol I of Geneva conventions as follows:

It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering, 648 […or to engage in a]n attack which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated 649 […w]ith respect to attacks, the
following precautions shall be taken: (a) those who plan or decide
upon an attack shall: (i) do everything feasible to verify that the
objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects
and are not subject to special protection but are military
objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and
that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol to attack
them; (ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to
minimizing, incidental loss or civilian life, injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects; (iii)refrain from deciding to launch
any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; (b) an attack
shall be canceled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the
objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection
or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” 650
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The Additional Protocol I offers great protection to civilians and civilian objects.
This protection can be extended to apply to the environment. However, that will create
two dilemmas, First, such protection does not prohibit environmental damage that may be
considered proportional, from a military point of view. Second, it does not offer a criteria
or a standard upon which military commanders can determine whether a particular
operation is or is not proportional to a legitimate military objective.
Moreover, it is obvious that military targets are always placed in the environment,
whether on the ground, water, or the air. Consequently, any attack would necessarily
affect the environment or at least one of its elements. Therefore, the need to minimize
unnecessary environmental harm suggests that a new provision should be created to
strictly prevent any attack directed to civilians, civilian objects, military personnel, or
military targets, that may cause environmental harm disproportional to the military
advantage. Accordingly, combatants will avoid any use of force that may cause excessive
environmental harm.

d. Principle of Humanity

To be lawful no weapon or tactic can be validly employed if it
causes unnecessary suffering to its victims, whether this is by
way of prolonged or painful death or is in a form calculated to
cause severe fright or terror. Accordingly, weapons and tactics
that spread poison or disease or do genetic damage are generally
illegal per se, as they inflict unacceptable forms of pain, damage,
death and fear; all forms of deliberate ecological disruption
would appear to fall within the sway of this overall prohibition. 651

The duty to refrain from targeting civilian populations was iterated in the U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 2444, “Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict”
adopted on December 18, 1969. 652 The Resolution states that “a) the right of parties to a
conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited; b) it is prohibited to
launch attacks against the civilian population as such; c) a distinction must be made at all
651
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times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian
population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible…” 653 Accordingly,
IHL attempts to humanize war to the extent possible, by preventing the unnecessary
suffering of victims. Therefore, a number of tactics and methods of warfare were
prohibited, such as spreading poisons, diseases, or doing genetic damage.
Modern arms technology make possible both adherence to, and violation of, this
Principle. First, technology makes it possible to electronically direct ammunitions to
destroy the intended military target without causing non-military damage. However, the
second, the negative side of this technology, allows combatants to affect both military
and civilian population by threatening very wide-scale damage. The second face of the
technology should be eliminated and prohibited. For example, despite the use of the
United States Army to the most modern arms technology, in 2001 a number of civilian
objects, such as the Red Cross installation, mosques, and hospital were mistakenly
targeted in Afghanistan. 654 Another casualties occurred in 1991 in Ameriyya Shelter,
Iraq. 655
Despite international efforts to eliminate and prohibit such tactics and methods of
warfare, a number of states are still offering fortunes to get this fatal technology, and use
them against their enemies and their own population too. A significant example was
when Iraq used chemical agents against Kurds in Halabjah, located in the Sulaimaniya
province near the Iraq-Iran border, in 1988. 656 Iraqi forces dropped cluster bombs,
containing a combination of mustard gas, nerve gas and cyanide on Halabjah. 657 Within a
few hours approximately 5,000 people were dead, the majority children, women, and
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elderly. 658 Mustard gas is one of the fatal chemical agents that is long-lived in the
environment, which means that long-term environmental effects will occur. 659 Similarly,
in World War I, mustard gas was used in some battlefields; however, in 1997 there is still
some exposure from mustard gas to underwater disposal areas. 660 However, despite the
Halabjah massacre that impacted people and the environment, the international
community did not respond. Even countries in the Middle East did not monitor such
atrocity, nor condemn the act. Further, there are a number of signs that Iraq also used
chemical weapons, including mustard gas and the nerve agent known as Tabun, against
Iran in 1984, 661 and against the coalition during the Gulf War II. 662 The massacre, and the
absence of response to it, should be a call to the United Nations Environment Program
(UNEP) and other humanitarian and environmental organizations to cooperate to prevent
such actions in order to save the globe.
The use of such methods and tactics of warfare will certainly affect the
environment, and its prohibition will ameliorate the actual environmental situations. In
the case of Halabjah, for example, the city was clean and healthy before the chemical
attack, and after the attack, corpses lay undisturbed for months, seeping deadly toxins
into the earth, and reportedly contaminating the soil and the water. 663 Furthermore,
“agricultural output has dropped dramatically, pomegranate orchards have dried out, and
other fruit trees have become unproductive.” 664 Chemical agents had a direct impact on
reptiles, so that “snakes and scorpions have become more poisonous since the attack.” 665
In fact, war to some extent has been humanized. But always there are outlaw
states, which do not care about their international obligations, and violate the minimum
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standards of humanitarian principles. They should be subject to international liability, as
the final part of this thesis will discuss.

e. Principle of Necessity

To be lawful, weapons and tactics involving the use of force must
be reasonably necessary to the attainment of their military
objective. No superfluous or excessive application of force is
lawful, even if the damage done is confined to the environment,
thereby sparing people and property. 666

As a rule, the use of force is prohibited, except in the case of self or collective
defense 667 according to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which states that “nothing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” 668
Any other use of force will be considered illegal.
In both legal and illegal wars belligerents should be restricted by the principle of
necessity, which means that the use of tactics and methods of war should be limited to the
minimum extent possible. For example, the use of gases by the Iraqi army against the
Kurd population in Halabjah was not necessary to repress their resistance, because the
Iraqi regime could have used other methods of warfare against them, such as air force
attacks, terrestrial attacks, or even by siege. Moreover, the level of arms and ammunitions
used by the coalition during the Gulf War II exceeded any necessity. Weapons of mass
destruction were used for the first time in the Gulf, and they impacted the environment
severely. Recurring to the use of force to settle any international or national matter is a
declaration of a failure of diplomacy. By successfully using diplomacy, a country can
666
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realize its goal without using any arms or ammunitions, and without causing any
humanitarian or environmental harm.
The observance of this principle will assure the minimization of humanitarian and
environmental loss, especially when armed conflict is taking place between a developed
armed force and developing one, such as the war against terrorist in Afghanistan occurred
between the U.S. Army with the most universal sophisticated arms and the Taliban armed
forces on the horses back.

f. Principle of Neutrality

To be lawful, no weapon or tactic can be relied upon if it seems
likely that it will do harm to human beings, property, or the
natural environment of neutral or non-participating countries. A
country is neutral or non-participating if its government declares
its neutrality and acts in a neutral manner, pursuing in relation
to the armed conflict a policy that can be assessed to be impartial
in view of its behaviour and situation. 669

The law of neutrality is codified in The Hague Convention V in the Case of War
on Land 670 and The Hague Convention XIII in the Case of Naval War. 671 Moreover, The
Hague Convention V provides that “the territory of neutral powers is inviolable.” 672 The
inviolability concept includes transboundary damage, along with environmental
damage. 673
Armed conflict involves the parties directly concerned. Any other parties will be
considered neutral. A country can demonstrate its neutrality by avoiding making any
statement, or casting any vote in international organizations, to condemn one party
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against the other. This act will protect the neutral state’s population and environment 674
against any attack from the parties in conflict. Any attack directed against a neutral
power, its population, or its environment, will be considered as an act of aggression. For
instance, during World War II, “[c]ompensation was paid to Switzerland [a neutral State]
in cases where collateral damage was caused in Swiss territory from attacks on targets in
neighboring areas of Germany […]” 675
During the Gulf War II, neutral powers were harmed by Iraq. For example, Iraq
required the closing of all the foreign embassies in Kuwait, claiming that because Kuwait
is its nineteenth Province there should be no embassies in Kuwait. Further, the Iraqi
armed forces threatened that after a specific period of time, refusal to close an embassy
could result in the loss of diplomatic immunity. 676 Another example is the pollution
caused to the air, land, and water pollution in the Gulf region during the Gulf War II,
which affected Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and Iran, most of which are neutral
States. Last but not least, on January 18, 1991, Iraq “launched 39 ground-to-ground
ballistic missiles into Israel,” 677 which was not involved in the war, killing a total of
thirteen people. 678
In any armed conflict, the environment of a neutral and non-participating country
should be protected from any violation. Otherwise, environmental harm should be
considered as an aggression, as the environmental impact has a transboundary effect and
it is not limited to the first place of the incident.
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g. Principle of Intergenerational Equity
No weapon or tactic can be employed if it inflicts pain, risk of
harm and damage, or if it can be reasonably apprehended to do so
upon those unborn. 679

In biology, a species that does not care for future generations will be replaced by
another that does. However, humans comparatively do care for their future
generations. 680 The term “intergenerational equity” term was used nationally for the first
time in 1993, when the Philippines Supreme Court referred to intergenerational
responsibility in a case involving a group of children as representatives of themselves and
future generations to protect their rights to a healthy environment.681 The Court held that
“their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned.” 682
Moreover, Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration of 1992 on Environment and
Development recognizes the intergenerational equity principle when stating that: “[T]he
right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and
environmental needs of present and future generations.” 683 The term was used
internationally for the first time in the 1993 case of Denmark v. Norway, a maritime
boundary delimitation case, 684 where the Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry
declared that “[r]espect for these elemental constituents of the inheritance of succeeding
generations dictated rules and attitudes based upon a concept of an equitable sharing
which was both horizontal in regard to the present generation and vertical for the benefit
of generations yet to come.” 685
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The intergenerational equity principle also arose in 1995, when New Zealand
challenge the proposed French underground tests in the Pacific before the ICJ, as
discussed earlier. Judge Weeramantry declared in his dissenting opinion that the
intergenerational equity principle is “an important and rapidly developing principle of
contemporary environmental law […] which must inevitably be a concern of this
Court.” 686
Further, the Preamble of the 1997 Resolution of the Institut de Droit International
on Responsibility and Liability under International Law for Environmental Damage
recognized that “international environmental law is developing significant new links with
the concept of intergenerational equity [which is] influencing the issues relating to
responsibility and liability.” 687
Accordingly, the wrongful act of a generation should never affect the future
generations. When an armed conflict occurred, combatants should keep future
generations in their consideration. No methods of warfare or tactics should be used if
they might affect future generations. The effects of warfare, if they cannot be completely
eliminated, should be limited to the generation who decided to recur to the force, or who
cannot prevent the war from occurring.
For instance, the effect of atomic radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki surpassed
the 1945 generation, to affect the future generations. 688 Similarly, the American veterans
who returned from the Gulf were contaminated with D.U., and many of their babies were
born with different kinds of defects, such as “missing eyes, missing ears, blood
infections, respiratory problems and fused fingers.” 689 The intergenerational equity
principle was confirmed after the Vietnam war, 690 by the conclusion of the Convention
on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques (ENMOD), of 1976, which uses the term ‘long-lasting’ and the Additional
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Protocol I to the Geneva conventions, which uses the term ‘long-term’. 691 Thus, both
ENMOD and the Additional Protocol I realized that environmental effects cannot be
limited to the present generation only, and can impact future generations also.

2. Specific Provisions
A number of IHL instruments include a kind of environmental protection during
armed conflict. Some of these instruments refer to the protection of one environmental
element or more, without addressing the environmental protection in general. Examples
include the protection of private and public properties, and the protection of cultural
heritage. Some other instruments address environmental protection more broadly.
Here, we will examine these instruments, classified according to their date of
conclusion, starting from The Hague Conventions, the fourth Geneva Convention of
1949, the Additional Protocol I of 1977, the Additional Protocol II of 1977, and the
Marten’s Clause.

a. The Hague Conventions Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of
1899 and 1907

The Hague Conventions are part of The Hague law, which

consists of the treaties adopted by the two Hague conferences.
The first Hague Peace Conference in 1899, which was a step
towards international disarmament, resulted in three conventions:
for the peaceful adjustment of international differences; regarding
the laws and customs of war on land; and for the adaptation of
maritime warfare of the 1864 Geneva Convention. There were
also three declarations: to prohibit the launching of projectiles
and explosives from balloons or by other similar new methods; to
prohibit the use of projectiles, the only object of which is the
diffusion of the asphyxiating or deleterious gases; and to prohibit
the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human
body (‘dum-dum’ bullets). A second Hague Peace Conference
was held in 1907. This conference revised the three 1899
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conventions and adopted ten new conventions: respecting the
limitation of the employment of force for the recovery of contract
debts; relative to the opening of hostilities; relative to the status
of enemy merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities; respecting
the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war
on land; relative to the conversion of merchant ships into
warships; relative to the laying of automatic submarine contact
mines; respecting bombardment by naval force in time of war;
relative to the creation of an International prize Court; and
concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war.
Also the 1899 declaration prohibiting the discharge of projectiles
and explosives from balloons was revised. 692

The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, which are considered authoritative
sources of customary international law, provide that “the right of belligerents to adopt
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.” 693 The laws of war were comprehensively
codified in the 1907 Hague Convention, which presents a degree of protection to the
environment. Article 23 (g) of the 1907 Hague Convention proscribed the destruction or
seizure of the enemy’s property, “unless imperatively demanded by the necessities of
war.” 694 That provision does not offer real protection to the environment because it
justified the wanton destruction of the environment, when military necessity arises.
For example, in World War II, the German General Lothar Rendulic ordered the
evacuation of all the inhabitants in Finmark province, Norway, and destroyed all
villages. 695 Although the Nuremberg Military Tribunal later accused General Rendulic of
wanton property destruction, the tribunal excuplated him on the basis that military
necessity justified his actions at that time. 696 On the other hand, some scholars consider
Article 23 (g) of the 1907 Hague Convention, an adequate protection of the environment,
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since the environmental resources of a country are the property of a state or of its
citizens, which the Article seeks to protect. 697
In addition, Article 23 (a) of the 1907 Hague Convention forbids the use of
poisonous weapons, stating that it is “especially forbidden to employ poison or poisoned
weapons,” and 23 (b) prevents the unnecessary suffering of civilians and combatants. 698
Poison gas had been used in World War I in violation of the Convention.
Additionally, both instruments, the 1899 and the 1907 Hague Conventions, put
the invaders in the position of “administrator and usufructuary of the public buildings,
real property, forests and agricultural works belonging to the hostile state, and situated in
the occupied country” 699 and require the invaders to “protect the capital of these
properties.” 700 These elements are not classified as spoils of war, and the invaders are
prohibited from treating them as such. The destruction of public buildings may affects the
cultural heritage, especially when such buildings deemed a history for the nation.
Therefore, for example, destroying the Seif Palace in Kuwait, the Satellite Station of
Omm Eleish, and Kuwait University, by the Iraqi troops should be considered a violation
of Article 23 of the Annexed Regulations of The Hague Conventions II and IV.
The Annexed Regulations of the 1899 Hague Convention II and the Annexed
Regulations of the 1907 Hague Convention IV further enumerate more prohibited
actions, including actions that cause unnecessary suffering or destroy the enemy’s
property, towns and cultural artifacts. Under those provisions, it is forbidden to “destroy
or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively
demanded by the necessity of war.” 701 Further, Article 27 of the Annexed Regulations of
the 1899 Hague Convention II and the Annexed Regulations of the1907 Hague
Conventions IV protect cultural monuments and charitable enterprises, 702 as a part of
697
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cultural heritage. 703 In fact, cultural artifacts, monuments, and historical sites are of a
great value and may take a long time to be rebuilt with the risk of the loss of their
historical value. However, harm to nature often cannot be restored or repaired, and even
if it can be restored it may take decades if not centuries. Thus, these provisions can be
read to prohibit environmental damage as well.
Article 53 of the Annexed Regulations to the Hague Convention IV provides that
[a]n army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds,
and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the
State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies,
and, generally, all movable property belonging to the State which
may be used for military operations. All appliances, whether on
land, at sea, or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news, or
for the transport of persons or things, exclusive of cases governed
by naval law, depots of arms, and, generally, all kinds of
munitions of war, may be seized, even if they belong to private
individuals, but must be restored and compensation fixed when
peace is made. 704

Some scholars interpret this article to include rubber, timber, and cotton, as
munitions, thus justifying their destruction in their natural environment. 705 However, this
interpretation of Article 53 confuses the natural environment with the tools of war. The
natural environment, like civilian populations, is not created for military purposes or to
be used as a weapon. For example, if combatants target civilian populations during armed
conflicts, this does not legitimize the destruction of civil populations. And in the worst
case, civilian objects can be destroyed only under the precautionary and proportionality
principles. Similarly, destroying the environment, including rubber, timber, and cotton, is
always illegal, but when the environment is targeted precautionary and proportionality
principles should be considered.
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In order to update the humanitarian provisions, forty-two years later, the Geneva
law appeared. It included much more specific environmental protection and became the
source for more effective humanitarian protection.

b. The Geneva Convention Relevant to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War (Fourth Convention of 12 August 1949)
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 replaced the two Geneva Conventions of
1929. 706 They were created in response to the World War II, 707 to be applied in armed
conflict to provide special protections for ‘protected persons.’ 708 The Geneva law is
composed of four conventions and two protocols. The four conventions are the Geneva
Convention I Relevant to the Wounded and Sick in the Field; II Relevant to the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked at Sea; III Relevant to the Prisoners of War; IV
Relevant to Civilians. In addition, Geneva IHL includes the Additional Protocol I
Relevant to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, and the
Additional Protocol II Relevant to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts. Of the four Geneva Conventions, the fourth one is the only one that protects
both civilians and elements of the environment. 709 Several non-combatant provisions of
the Geneva Convention IV cover some aspects of environmental harm. 710
Article 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention 711 prohibits the destruction of real or
personal property, by articulating that:

Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal
property belonging individually or collectively to private persons,
or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or
cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such
destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military
operations. 712
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In all cases, this rule protects State, co-operative, and individual property. It is
notable that Article 53 protects one environmental element, which is property.713
However, this limitation is unsuitable for indigenous people, many of whom do not
recognize or follow “western” concepts of property or property law. 714 However, some
legal systems identify all valuable things, including the environment, as the property of
the state if it has no owner. For example, the Kuwaiti legal system grants the government
the ownership of all properties that have no owner, along with all the territories situated
beyond the municipality line. 715 Thus, any violation of such properties will be considered
as destruction of co-operative, private, or state’s property.
Furthermore, Article 55 of the fourth Geneva Convention ensures maintenance of
food and medical supplies of the population. 716 Article 55 fails to protect the environment
per se or the many other things the environment contribute to human survival and
fulfillment. 717
Finally, Article 56 of the Convention provides for maintenance of medical
facilities and services. 718 Article 56 also indirectly provides protection for the
environment, through measures to control diseases.

c. Additional Protocol I Relevant to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts

The 1949 Geneva Conventions do not address environmental warfare expressly.
However, in 1977, in light of the Vietnam War, the United Nations added Protocol I to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
Relevant to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict 719 was drafted by
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the ICRC between 1974 and 1977. 720 The United States signed the Protocol in 1978, but
has not yet ratified it. Nevertheless, the United States considers Protocol I as international
customary law and thus binding. 721
Protocol I represents a considerable development of the IHL regarding
environmental protection in times of armed conflict. It contains the most explicit
environmental protection provisions of humanitarian law, aimed at limiting ecological
destruction during armed conflicts. 722 This protocol recognizes that environmental
protection is necessary to human health and survival. Protocol I thus makes explicit the
environmental protection requirements its predecessors only imply. 723
Article 35 establishes the basic rules regarding environmental protection. It
forbids the use of weapons and methods of warfare that may cause unnecessary injury to
humans or the environment. Article 35 states that
1. In any armed conflict, the right of the parties to the conflict to
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited…3. It is
prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term
and severe damage to the natural environment. 724
However, despite the great environmental protection offered by Protocol I, 725 it
does not govern all environmental destruction. It affects only the destruction intended or
reasonably expected to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the
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environment. 726 It would seem that all three elements must be met for the prohibition to
apply, 727 a very stringent standard. Arguably, environmental damage that meets any of
the three elements is more than the international community should tolerate, even in
wartimes. 728 Therefore, some experts do not consider the environmental damage caused
by the Iraqi Army from the oil well fires in Kuwait, and the oil spill in the Gulf water, to
be violations of Additional Protocol I. 729
Further, Article 55 provides that:
1) Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural
environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage.
This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or
means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause
such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice
the health or survival of the population. 2) Attacks against the
natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited. 730

Here, similarly, the environmental protection of Article 55 requires the presence
of the three elements together. Additionally, Protocol I contains further provisions, in
Article 54 and 56, which contribute indirectly to environmental protection in times of
armed conflict.
Article 54 (2) prohibits the destruction of the means of survival of the civilian
population:
It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,
such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies
and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for
their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse
Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out
civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive. 731
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And Article 56 (1) protects works and installations, whose destruction would
endanger the civilian population:

Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely
dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not
be made the object of attack, even where these objects are
military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of
dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian
population. Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity
of these works or installations shall not be made the object of
attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces
from the works or installations and consequent severe losses
among the civilian population. 732

Thus, these provisions do provide significant and explicit protection of the
environment and natural resources. On the other hand, Article 85 (3) of the Additional
Protocol I requires “human injury” for a violation to be considered a grave breach. It does
not mention the environment in the provisions on grave breaches. However, the
environment is included in the prohibition of “extensive destruction of property”
contained in the definition of grave breaches in the relevant articles common to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949. 733
Moreover, the failure of many major powers, including the U.S., 734 to ratify
Protocol I limits the environmental protection of such instrument. At the time of signature
of the Additional Protocol I, the United States delegation formally requested the
exclusion of environmental damage resulting from using nuclear weapons from the scope
of Articles 35 (3) and 55. 735 In addition, it appears that Articles 35 (3) and 55 of the
Additional Protocol I need to be reformulated to include the precautionary principle as “a
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limit on military activities,” since Additional Protocol I appeared at a time when that
principle had not yet taken its position in international law. 736
Further, the prohibition of Protocol I applies only when environmental damage is
“widespread, long-term, and severe,” thus limiting the effectiveness of that provision. 737
Moreover, Additional Protocol I applies only to the situations of international armed
conflicts, not to civil wars. Provisions related to internal armed conflicts are set forth in
the Additional Protocol II Relevant to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts.

d. Additional Protocol II Relevant to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts

The Additional Protocol II Relevant to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts 738 specifically addresses internal conflicts, but it is less
accepted among States than the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Additional Protocol II
does not mention environmental protection. However, its Article 14 states, “[s]tarvation
of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack,
destroy, remove or render useless for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival
of the civilian population such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of
food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation
works.” Article 14 is parallel to Protocol I’s Articles 54 (protection of objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population) and 56 (prohibition of attacks on
environmental-related targets.) 739 Moreover, Article 16 of the Additional Protocol II
provides considerable protection for monuments, works of art, and places of worship,
because they are part of the human environment. Article 16 states that “without prejudice
to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, it is prohibited to commit any acts of hostility
directed against historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute
736
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the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples, and to use them in support of the military
effort.” 740
It appears that Protocol II provides indirect protection for the environment. And to
apply Protocol II, one of the involved parties to the conflict must be a government, that
is, a recognized regime that has a right and duty to practice its authority over a population
whenever a violation of Protocol II is committed. 741

e. The Marten’s Clause
The Marten’s Clause, one of the IHL’s landmarks, was originally designed to
provide supplementary humanitarian rules for the protection of all persons in times of
armed conflict. 742 The Marten’s Clause was drafted originally in 1899, when there were
relatively few agreed laws about armed conflict. It provided that unforeseen situations
should not be left to the arbitrary and capricious judgment of military commanders, but
should be governed by articulated rules. 743
The Marten’s Clause inspired a comparable further action by the international
environmental law community, in 2000, a century later, when the IUCN Amman Clause
was adopted to govern environmental matters. 744
The “Amman Clause” Resolution states that

“RECALLING that Recommendation 1.75 (Armed Conflict and
the Environment), which was adopted by the 1st Session of the
World Conservation Congress, endorsed the promotion of the
Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Hostile Military Activities
in Internationally Protected Areas;
REAFFIRMING the awareness expressed in the World Charter
for Nature that mankind is a part of nature and life depends on
the uninterrupted functioning of natural system;
740
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ALSO REAFFIRMING that every form of lifes is unique,
warranting respect regardless of its apparent worth to man;
CONSIDERING the adoption of the 8th Preambular paragraph in
the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land (18 October 1907), which is also known as the
Marten’s Clause, and which is reiterated in Article 1 (2) of the
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts;
RECOGNISING the fundamental importance of The Marten’s
Clause in providing a judicial standard governing the conduct of
all persons in times of armed conflict in the absence of
conventional law;
REAFFIRMING the need for appropriate measures to protect the
environment at the national and international, individual and
collective, private and public levels;
The World Conservation Congress at its 2nd Session in Amman,
Jordan, 4-11 October 2000:
URGES all United Nations Members States to endorse the
following policy:
Until a more complete international code of environmental
protection has been adopted, in cases not covered by
international agreements and regulations, the biosphere and all
its constituent elements and processes remain under the
protection and authority of the principles of international law
derived from established customs, from dictates of the public
conscience, and from the principles and fundamental values of
humanity acting as steward for present and future
generations.” 745

This clause was adopted unanimously by the seventy-two States in the IUCN
World Conservation Congress in Amman, Jordan, 4-11 October, 2000. That action was
one of the most fruitful efforts of the Amman Congress. 746 The Marten’s Clause provides
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a foundation for all contemporary IHL, from its adoption for the first time in the 1899
Hague Convention, its iteration in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, its reiteration in
the 1977 Additional Protocol I and II to the Geneva Conventions, its inclusion in
Resolution XXIII of the 1968 U.N. Conference on Human Rights, its revision in the 1980
Convention on the Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons, and recently, its adoption by the IUCN Second World Conservation Congress,
in Amman. This background is also important to understand the potential future scope of
the IUCN Amman Clause which will be discussed in section 4. In order to discuss IUCN
Amman Clause, it is necessary to address the origin and the application of The Marten’s
Clause, the dictates of public conscience, and the adoption of the IUCN Amman Clause.

1) The Origin and the Application of The Marten’s Clause
The Marten’s Clause is “based on paragraph 3 of the Declaration of June 20,
1899, read by Friedrich von Marten’s, the Russian delegate who chaired the 11th meeting
of the Second Committee of the Second Commission on the occasion of the First Hague
Peace Conference of 1899.” 747 Later, The Hague Convention of 1899 with Respect to the
Laws and Customs of War on Land and its revision of 1907 adopted the following text of
The Marten’s Clause, 748 and it has been included in the Preambular paragraph nine of the
1899 Hague Convention as follows:

Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued,
the high contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in
cases not included in the regulations adopted by them, the
North America, Central Africa, East Africa, West Africa, Northern Africa, South and South East Asia, and
West Asia. See Statutes of 5 October 1948, revised 22 October 1996 (Including Rules of Procedures of the
World Conservation Congress), and Regulations revised 22 October 1996 (ISBN2-8317-0410-3)(published
for IUCN by Imprimerie SADAG, Belgrade, France 1997), at 2, see also, Nicholas A. Robinson, Note on
the Legal Status of IUCN, Opinion of the Legal Advisor of IUCN 1-2 (Gland, Switzerland,
1998)[hereinafter Robinson, Note on the Legal Status of IUCN]. See in general Martin Holdgate,
The Green Web: A Union for World Conservation (Earthscan Publications Ltd, 1999)
[hereinafter Holdgate].
747
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inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and
the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from
the usage established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience. 749

The revised Hague Convention IV of 1907 also includes The Marten’s Clause in
the Preambular Paragraph eight. 750 The preamble of the 1899 and the 1907 Hague
Conventions is considered a significant part of these conventions, and showed the real
will of the contracting parties to be bound by The Marten’s Clause. 751
The Marten’s Clause of the 1899 and the 1907 Hague Conventions was adopted
to protect two categories of persons: inhabitants and belligerents. It does not cover the
environment. However, it is hard to separate people from their environment, since any
harm that may affect the environment will reflect on the people, as they need to live in a
clean and healthy environment. Thus, the protection offered to inhabitants and
belligerents by The Marten’s Clause will primarily safeguard their lives, and secondarily
secure the environment where they live. The inclusion of The Marten’s Clause in the
Preamble of the 1899 and the 1907 Hague Conventions provided a foundation for
protecting inhabitants and belligerents directly, and in maintaining the environment
indirectly. The Marten’s Clause reflects a basic principle of law, and as discussed earlier,
since it is included in the preamble of an international treaty, The Clause binds to the
contracting parties. 752
Further, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, in order to restrict the impact of
denouncing the Conventions states that:
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[T]he denunciation [of the convention] shall have effect only in
respect of the denouncing Power. It shall in no way impair the
obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to
fulfill by virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they
result from the usage established among civilized peoples, from
the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience. 753

The denouncing party remains bound to fulfill obligations arising from the
principles of the law of nations. Thus, the Marten’s Clause still binds even a country that
denounces the Convention generally. Moreover, unlike The Hague Conventions, the
Geneva Conventions apply the protection of The Marten’s Clause generally, without any
limitation to inhabitants and belligerents. This generality could offer the protection to the
environment along with the protection of inhabitants and belligerents.
In 1968, the Tehran Conference on Human Rights 754 paraphrased The Marten’s
Clause in Resolution XXIII, which stated that “inhabitants and belligerents are protected
in accordance with the principles of law of nations derived from the usages established
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of the public
conscience.” 755 That text is similar to the text of the Geneva Conventions, except that it
delimited, again, the protection of The Marten’s Clause to inhabitants and belligerents. In
order to protect the environment, this delimitation requires a nexus between belligerents
or inhabitants and the environment, otherwise The Marten’s Clause will be incompetent
to protect the environment. Thus its reach under this Resolution is more limited and less
effective than it could be. Significantly, according to Marten’s Clause, the protection of
inhabitants and belligerents will be seen as a short-term goal, while the environmental
protection will be considered as a long term objective.
Furthermore, the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 756 included
The Marten’s Clause in Article 1 (2), which states that “in cases not covered by the
Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the
protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established
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custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience.” 757 A
remarkable shift in The Marten’s Clause text was witnessed during the adoption of the
1977 Additional Protocol I, when the negotiators of this instrument replaced the term
“usages” with “established custom,” which according to some international humanitarian
experts may have deprived The Marten’s Clause of its coherence and legal logic. 758 By
such replacement, “the protocol conflates the emerging product (principles of
international law) with one of its component factors (established custom) and raises
questions about the function, role, and necessity of the uncodified principles of humanity
and dictates of public conscience.” 759 However, it is not clear that such conclusion was
intended by the protocol’s negotiators.
On the other hand, the Additional Protocol II of 1977 adopted The Marten’s
Clause in its Preamble, which states that “in cases not covered by the law in force, the
human person remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates
of the public conscience.” 760 Protocol II did not distinguish between combatants and
civilians, and offers its protection for all human persons. Unlike all other documents,
Protocol II did not point to the international law, or the law of nations, as a source of The
Marten’s Clause rules, which might be attributed to the fact that it deals with noninternational armed conflicts. In extending its protection to internal armed conflicts, the
Clause of Additional Protocol II guarantees basic rights to all people, regardless of the
nature of the combat. It also extends protection against environmental damage regardless
of the nature of the combat. Thus, it seeks to focus on protection, rather than on the
source of damage.
Moreover, in 1980, The Marten’s Clause was been adopted by the Preambular
paragraph five of the Convention on the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons. 761 That paragraph declares that “the civilian population and the
combatants shall at all times remain under the protection and authority of the principles
of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity
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and from the dictates of public conscience.”762 The inclusion of The Marten’s Clause in
that document affirmed its importance again in protecting civilian populations and
combatants as they consider substantial part of the environment.
This review of The Marten’s Clause makes clear that the evolution of the Clause
has excluded large areas of environmental issues. For example, The Marten’s Clause just
covers civilians and belligerents without any explicit reference to the environment or its
components such as biodiversity, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere which need
to be protected in times of armed conflict as well. However, environmental protection
principles may be derived from The Marten’s Clause indirectly, since protection of
civilians seems necessarily to include protection of their environment. The Amman
Clause reaches that conclusion, and explicitly excludes the Marten’s Clause to include
environmental safeguards. The environment should be protected from war and any other
hostilities.

2) The Dictates of Public Conscience
It is necessary to analyze the dictates of public conscience to address the
following issues: the origins of general principles of international law, whether The
Marten’s Clause is a general principle of international law, or is only soft international
law, or only binding if in a treaty, and the same questions about the nature of The IUCN
Amman Clause.

a) The Origins of General Principles of International Law
General principles of the international law, known as jus cogens, present a
common foundation for the international legal system. 763 Jus cogens norms are
peremptory 764 and have a magnificent status within international law. 765
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Jus cogens norms were defined by Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties of 1969 as the “norms recognized by the international community of
states as a whole as norms from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.” 766 The Vienna Convention did not list specific jus cogens norms, because of
the absence of an agreement on the content of these norms. 767 Nevertheless, the
International Court of Justice can determine whether a norm is considered a jus cogen or
not, 768 since according to Article 9 of the Court Statute it is the sole international court
that has judges elected to represent all countries. 769 Thus, their decisions regarding the
creation of general principles of international law will be recognized by all civilized
nations. 770
Moreover, jus cogens norms may not derive from the international legal system
solely. National legal systems may serve as a rich source of these general principles of
international law. 771 Some international law experts believe that only the international
legal system is a valid source of the general principles. 772 Others believe that the general
principles of international law should include general principles derived from national
legal systems 773 along with those of the international legal system in order to enrich the
international law sources and treat all its lacunas. 774 Further, Article 38 (1)(c) of the ICJ
Statute states that general principles are those “recognized by civilized nations.” 775 This
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Article sets forth the importance of national legal systems in providing general principles
of international law. For instance, some juridical substantive principles such as the “pacta
sunt servanda,” acquisition of rights, abuse of rights, and good faith, in addition to some
juridical procedural principles such as res judicata, and the equality of parties before the
law that apply to the ICJ legal system were inspired by national legal systems. 776
The jus cogens norms hold the highest hierarchical position in international
law. 777 As a consequence, jus cogens norms are deemed to be peremptory and nonderogable. 778 However, subsequent to the definition of the general principles of
international law, it is necessary to clarify why are they binding.
There exist two theories in which the jus cogens norms may find their foundation.
The first theory is derived from the law of nature. The law of nature, natural law, is not a
system of legal norms, but a system of ethical principles. 779 According to this theory, the
jus cogens norms find their power in the nature of their original source whether from
international custom, from moral or religious principles, or from some combination of
such factors. 780 It may be believed that the traditional Marten’s Clause of 1899 emerged
from the natural law, because it “recognized the existence of absolute ideals or principles
higher than positive law.” 781 Jus cogens norms, thus, may derive from moral or religious
concepts prohibiting causing harm to people, and counseling peace, since man is an
essential part of the universe, and has a special position among its other parts. For
example, in Sharia, the Islamic law, the duty “of care and nurture for man’s good works
are not limited to the benefit of the human species, but rather extend to the benefit of all
created beings; and (there is a reward in doing good to every living thing).” 782 Moreover,
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Islamic rules and principles prohibit torture and killing whether in times of armed
conflicts or in peacetime. Such acts interfere with the mercy principle that Islam based
on, 783 as shown by the Prophetic Speech that “God will curse those who torture
people.” 784
Another such principle can be derived from ancient Hindu India, where wars were
to be fought according to “Dharma Yuddha, the rules of righteousness in war.” 785
Civilian populations ( non combatants) such as “those who look on without taking part in
the fight, those afflicted with grief, those who have set their hearts on emancipation,
those who are asleep, thirsty or fatigued, or are walking along the road, or have a task on
hand unfinished, or are proficient in fine art,” 786 were exempted from warfare atrocities.
Significantly, the protection extended to include even combatants, who “should not be
killed, including a warrior whose armour has fallen off, who has laid down his weapon, is
mortally wounded, who is weak with wounds, or is fighting with another.” 787
These religious principles offer great protection to human life whether in times of
armed conflicts or peacetime, combatant or civilian, and these same principles are
reflected in the traditional Marten’s Clause. Natural law pre-exists treaties, and under the
theory of natural law, thus gives the jus cogens norms power, even if they are not written
in an international agreement.
The power of jus cogens depends on the number of States that recognize a norm
as a jus cogen. For example, to consider a norm as a jus cogens the consent of a large
majority of States, reflecting the essential components of the international community, is
required 788 A state or a small group of states cannot veto the formation of jus cogens
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norms. 789 Nonetheless, both the majority that consider them as jus cogens norms, and the
minority that did not, are bound by the jus cogens norms. 790
However, the second theory is derived from the positive law. One of the
positivists, Lassa Oppenheim, wrote in 1905 that “we know nowadays that a Law of
Nature does not exist. The philosophy of the positive law has overcome the fanciful rules
of the so-called Law of Nature.” 791 According to this theory, jus cogens norms find their
power in existing treaties, i.e. written law. Thus, party states are bound by the jus cogens
norms integrated in the international conventions. However, such norms are applicable
even against those states that have not accepted them. 792

b) Is The Marten’s Clause a General Principle of International Law?
To define whether The Marten’s Clause is a general principle of international law,
and therefore a jus cogens, it is necessary to refer to the United Nations International Law
Commission Report, which states that “there is no simple criterion to identify a general
rule of international law as having the character of jus cogens.” 793 Nonetheless, in order
to develop a means of identifying jus cogen norms, Uhlmann, an international law expert,
created four criteria 794 : the norm should aim to protect the state community interests, it
must have a foundation in morality, it must be of an absolute nature, and vast majority of
states should accept it as a jus cogens. 795 By applying these criteria to Marten’s Clause, it
will appear that The Marten’s Clause is a well accepted general principle of international
law.
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The Marten’s Clause and the Protection of the State Community Interests
The Marten’s Clause does aim to protect state community interests, by seeking
the protection of individuals or groups of individuals, 796 specifically the belligerents or
combatants and civilian populations. The protection of these groups serves the benefit of
the community, 797 by seeking to prevent harm to large segments of the population.
Moreover, the ultimate purpose of the international legal order is to guarantee respect for
human beings, 798 which The Marten’s Clause seeks directly to promote.

The Marten’s Clause and its Foundation in Morality
A moral norm generates obedience not because of a juridical incentive, but
because of an internal incentive. 799 A moral obligation forces the application of the jus
cogens norms, even if they were not adopted by an international convention.
Consequently, the derogation of such moral obligation, even if it is not legally
enforceable, is internationally condemned. This was the situation prior to 1899, date of
the first legal adoption of Marten’s Clause, when the combatants and the populations
were not covered by any kind of legal protection, and morality was the only basis for
humanitarian protection.
At that time, the protection of civilians “can partly be explained by fear that the
gods or the spirits of victims might wreak vengeance, or by a desire to restore normal
relations with a neighboring tribe.” 800 Other instances of humanitarian treatments were
based on “justice and integrity,” 801 or on a religion requirement, such as passages in the
Bible. 802 The Judeo-Christian tradition proclaimed that all men are created in the image
of God, that all were children of the same father and all were offered eternal life. 803 If all
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men were brothers then to kill was a crime, and there would be no more slaves. 804
Nations follow this guidance by adoption of criminal laws establishing the act of killing
as the crime of murder. In peacetime, the killer is put in prison or even put to death
sometimes. On the other hand, in wartime, a person who kills enemies on behalf of his
country is considered a hero granted medals, and may be “immortalized in a statue or on
a postage stamp.” 805 Additionally, other religions had a great influence in the
development of international law at the time of the first adoption of The Marten’s Clause
(1899) as we discussed earlier.

The Marten’s Clause as an Absolute
A norm is absolute if it applies to all situations, international and internal, against
member States that approved it and those who contest it, and is not be limited to the law
of treaties but is also applicable to unilateral acts. 806 A norm can be considered absolute
if it applies at all times, in all places, and under all circumstances. 807 This is the case with
The Marten’s Clause, which is applicable in international conflicts governed by The
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, 808 the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, 809 the
Additional Protocol I of 1977, 810 and the Convention on the Prohibition or Restriction on
the Use of Certain Conventional weapons of 1980. 811 Moreover, The Marten’s Clause is
applicable in situations of internal armed conflicts that governed by the Additional
Protocol II of 1977. 812 Thus, the clause applies both to internal and to international
conflicts. The Clause applies both to actions by nations and by individuals. Moreover, the
United Nations International Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility
maintained, in Articles 18, 29, and 33, a close relation between the concept of
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international crime in Article 19 and the violation of jus cogens norm. 813 Thus, the
Clause can be considered to have universal, or absolute, application.

The Vast Majority of States Have Accepted The Marten’s Clause
The vast majority of the States have accepted the Marten’s Clause throughout its
historical development. For instance, The Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs
of War of 1899 has been accepted by forty-nine states, 814 The Hague Convention on the
Laws and Customs of War of 1907 has been accepted by thirty-five states, 815 the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 were being accepted by 186 states, 816 the Additional
Protocol I of 1977 has been accepted by 157 states, 817 the Additional Protocol II of 1977
has been accepted by 150 states, 818 and the Convention on the Prohibition or Restriction
on the Use of Certain Conventional weapons of 1980 has been accepted by eighty four
states. 819
Thus, it can be concluded that the Marten’s Clause meets all four criteria, and
therefore, it should be classified as a general principle of international law that has a jus
cogen character.

c) Soft International Law
Soft law is refers to “(1) treaty provisions, capable of entailing legally-binding
obligations, that are drafted in weak substantive terms, and (2) declarations, guidelines,
standards, and other international materials adopted by States, intergovernmental
organizations, or their organs that are not normative in character but which have some
pre-or subnormative effect, usually on the immediate behavior of States or on the future
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formation of principles of customary international law.” 820 However, traditionally, treaty
law (hard international law,) is the primary source of binding international law.
Nonetheless, soft law provides a form of international law that usually obtains more
readily than in the case of treaties. Moreover, when a principle expressed in a soft law
instrument, its character may not be exclusively “soft”. A soft law instrument can refer to
a treaty or a general principle of law which is re-affirmed in a hard law instrument. For
example, the Tehran Conference on Human Rights imported much of The Marten’s
Clause in Resolution XXIII, 821 as mentioned earlier.
Further, some international environmental law experts note that soft international
law can be a reflection of a vary well-accepted general principle of international law
arising from the dictate of public conscience, and therefore a principle may be binding
even though it is not in a treaty, such as the Stockholm Conference’s Principle 21,822 and
The Marten’s Clause as well. Soft international law can also be a reflection of the duty
that positivists would say is only advisory for the States, such as “the duty to restrain
consumption of resources through avoiding waste.” 823 Thus, IUCN’s Commission on
Environmental Law found that as States debated the Draft Covenant on Environment and
Development, 824 the well accepted general principles of international law would be
considered as “hard law,” while the reflection of the duty remains “soft law.” 825 On the
other hand, the draft Covenant contains three types of provisions: “(a) those which
consolidate existing principles of international law, including those ‘soft-law’ principles
which were considered ripe for ‘hardening’; (b) those which contain very modest
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progressive developments; and (c) those which are more progressive than in (b) which we
felt were absolutely necessary.” 826
The international community often turns to soft law in order to develop
international environmental law. For instance, Charles Di Leva, an international
environmental specialist, provides a significant example when stating that when “a native
Indian tribe filed a civil action in a Nicaraguan court, they claimed that the World Bank’s
policy, [which reflects soft international law], on the territorial rights of indigenous
people supported their request that the court require government action on their
behalf.” 827
Such reliance on soft law within a national jurisdiction may help in recognizing
soft law in state practice, and therefore, it may become binding international law. 828
However, even documents approved at the highest level of the United Nations
acknowledge that “the boundaries of positive law (or between ‘law’ ‘and pre-law’ or ‘soft
law’) cannot always be clearly defined.” 829
In sum, it can be argued that The Marten’s Clause is a reflection of a very wellaccepted general principle of international law arising from the dictates of public
conscience, and therefore The Marten’s Clause itself is binding even though it is not in a
treaty. Moreover, since the traditional Marten’s Clause and its iteration were included in
international treaties, as discussed earlier, its binding character as a jus cogen norm
should be respected by the international community.

d) The Nature of the IUCN Amman Clause
Like the traditional Marten’s Clause adopted in the 1899 Hague Convention, the
IUCN Amman Clause is a general principle of international law that has jus cogens
character. The IUCN Amman Clause has a duplicate nature. On one hand, it was adopted
by the IUCN, an intergovernmental organization, as a resolution that was not included in
an international treaty. In addition, the IUCN Amman Clause is a reflection of a genuine
826
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well-accepted general principle of international law arising from the dictates of public
conscience, and therefore it is binding by itself even though it is not included in a treaty.
No single treaty includes The IUCN Amman Clause. Some aspects of the principle are
found in treaties, such as ENMOD and the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, but not expressed as fully or completely as in Amman. Both ENMOD and
the Additional Protocol I are applicable in wartime exclusively, while The IUCN Amman
Clause can be applied both in times of armed conflicts and peacetime as well. Thus, the
IUCN Resolution is in its form considered a soft international law. On the other hand, the
IUCN Amman Clause arises from a general environmental law principle, which is the
right to a clean and healthy environment for present and future generations, as expressed
in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. The
inclusion of that right in these declarations reflect that it is a well accepted general
principle of international environmental law, which is the responsibility of not to harm
other States environment. For instance, Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration has
been relied upon “by governments to justify their legal rights and duties.” 830 Similarly,
the Philippines Supreme Court in Minors Oposa v. Secretary Of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources 831 found that the Philippines Constitution, and
natural law, required the government to preserve a balanced and healthful environment
for children and future generations. 832 Remarkably, the Court stated that although the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology

is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies [in the Constitution of the Philippines] and not under the
Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any
other of the civil and political rights enumerated in the letter.
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether
for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and selfperpetuation – aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners – the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all
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governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of mankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of
the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost
not only for the present generations, but also for those to come –
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life. 833

That decision affirms that the right to live in a healthy environment is a basic right
and pre-exists any constitution. Thus, the environmental protection is confirmed by
natural law prior to any positive law.
In sum, the IUCN Amman Clause is binding from two sides, first as a soft
international law that reflects a well-accepted general principle of international law
arising from the dictates of public conscience, and second as general environmental law
principle which has existed the inception of mankind, however, both mankind. Therefore,
humanitarian protection cannot be brought into fruition without real environmental
protection.

e) The Adoption of the IUCN Amman Clause
Recently a clause inspired by The Marten’s Clause was adopted unanimously by
seventy-two States, ministries, and NGO’s assembled in the Second World Conservation
Congress held in Amman, Jordan, 8-11 October 2000 to govern armed conflict and
environmental matters. The IUCN Amman Clause states that:

Until a more complete international code of environmental
protection has been adopted, in cases not covered by international
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agreements and regulations, the biosphere and all its constituent
elements and processes remain under the protection and authority
of the principles of international law derived from established
customs, from dictates of the public conscience, and from the
principles and fundamental values of humanity acting as steward
for present and future generations. 834

The IUCN Amman Clause was drafted by the Commission on Environmental
Law 835 (CEL) members, Dinah Shelton, Professor of Law, Notre Dame University and
Alexander Kiss, President of the IUCN Scientific Committee (CIEL). The IUCN Amman
Clause was sponsored by:
-The International Commission for the Protection of Alpine Regions,
Liechtenstein.
-Schutzgemeinschaft Deutscher Wald Bundesverband, Germany.
-Vereiningung Deutscher Gewässerschutz (VDG), Germany.
-Berhm Fonds Für Internationalen Vogelschutz, Germany.
-Verband Deutscher Sportfisher, Germany.
Te draft resolution of the IUCN Amman Clause was forwarded to the
representatives of the Amman Congress, in order to have their opinions and comments.
For example, in the case of the U.S.A., it was forwarded to Washington D.C. for review
by several agencies, headed by the Department of State, which had no objection on it.
Later, the resolution was presented to the plenary meeting of the IUCN Congress which
was headed by the IUCN President, the IUCN Director General, and the IUCN Legal
Advisor, and was adopted by consensus.
The IUCN Amman Clause is unlike the traditional Marten’s Clause because The
Marten’s Clause focused on environmental protection only during wartime. The Amman
Clause, in contrast, applies in times of armed conflicts as well as peacetime. The text of
The Marten’s Clause specifically noted that it was intended to apply “until a more
complete code of the laws of war has been issued.” Thus, it was designed as part of a
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wartime code, and meant to apply only in times of armed conflict. On the other hand, the
IUCN Amman Clause text articulated that it was intended to apply “until a more
complete international code of environmental protection has been adopted,” which
reflects the drafters’ intention to promote environmental protection, both in peacetime
and times of armed conflicts as well. The Amman Clause reflects the fact that
environmental destruction may result from military activities in peacetime. For example,
military sites and bases generate huge amount of toxic and hazardous wastes; military
testing, storage, and stockpile of ammunitions, and military maneuvers can result severe
environmental impacts even during peacetime. Consequently, the Amman Clause sought
to guarantee the same environmental standards under all conditions.
Further, civilian activities may be considered a real threat to the environment.
Particularly in developing countries, environmental concerns may attract little attention,
and many activities may degrade the environment, e.g., deforestation, desertification, the
increasing use of greenhouse gases which deplete the Ozone Layer, disposing of raw
sewage or industrial waste in water bodies, and the overuse of farmlands which may
affect the topsoil.
All the above activities can affect environmental resources even when they are not
owned by a specific nation or country, and what affects one country can affect others as
well. Accordingly, it was important to adopt the IUCN Amman Clause to provide both
peacetime and wartime environmental protection.
Further, the IUCN Amman Clause urges the U.N. member states to adopt a
comprehensive international code of environmental protection. 836 Such a code would
address environmental matters not governed by existing international environmental
laws, or by laws that do not provide real environmental protection. For example, the
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques does not include peacetime environmental modification
techniques. However, military activities and operations even in peacetime may cause
long-lasting, widespread, or severe environmental effects, and these operations are not
covered by the Convention. The Amman Clause would seek the provide protection in
those circumstances, although it does not set forth specific criteria for doing so. In
836
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attempting to begin the formulation of a comprehensive code of environmental protection
the Amman Clause goes far beyond the Marten’s Clause from which it sprang. While the
Marten’s Clause mentioned environmental concerns only as a small part of its focus on
the regulation of war, the Amman Clause focuses directly on the environment. That fact
certainly reflects the increased global awareness of the importance of environmental
concerns.
Last but not least, Amman Clause does not consider the present generation only,
but future generations as well. The Clause specifically refers to the “…fundamental
values of humanity acting as steward for present and future generations.” 837 That
language reflects the fact that environmental harm may take decades to be repaired, and
even if it is repaired, the natural resources may lose their original values. As a result,
humans will suffer and bear the burden of such degradation. Not only will the present
generation suffer, but future generations as well.
Significantly, the IUCN Amman Clause was adopted by both environmental
ministries and NGO’s, 838 and its hybrid status is considered unique among international
instruments. Moreover, according to the United Nations General Assembly resolution
50/195 of 17 December, 1999, the IUCN is participating in the work of the U.N. General
Assembly as an observer. The consensus needed for the IUCN Amman Clause is
somewhat limited. The IUCN Amman Clause is “soft international law,” if it is viewed as
merely a declaration, and is not binding. However, if it is a general principle of law
arising from the “dictates of public conscience,” then it is binding.
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The effect of the IUCN Amman Clause depends on each state separately. For
example, an the national level, most of the representatives have to engineer a long chain
of initiatives to convince their national governments about the importance and the
necessity of adopting the IUCN Amman Clause. Some of the NGO’s delegations can
bring great pressure on their governments, which may result in a national adoption of the
IUCN Amman Clause. However, non-members now need to press their defense
ministries to honor the IUCN Amman Clause.
In sum, for all the above mentioned reasons, the international community,
represented by the seventy two States that attended the IUCN Congress, adopted the
IUCN Amman Clause, which will offer great environmental protection by itself and will
pave the way for additional environmental protection. Under the Clause, States are
required to apply the international minimum standard of environmental protection
derived from principles of international law, the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public conscience in peacetime and during armed conflicts as well.

C-The Shortcomings of IHL in Protecting the Natural Environment
Most jurists admit the shortcomings of the IHL regarding the environmental
protection. 839 They attribute this lacuna to the fact that the environmental law is a new
field that appeared only in the 1970s. Therefore, IHL texts adopted before then made no
reference to the environment as such, because the concept did not even exist at the
time. 840
Moreover, even after the 1970s, two famous documents-the Additional Protocols I
and II to Geneva Conventions- were introduced as IHL without offering a real and direct
environmental protection. They were designed to ameliorate human suffering, and any
environmental benefit was merely secondary. 841 The priority given to human suffering
vis-à-vis environmental harm necessarily reflected on the level of environmental
protection, especially when there is interference between these two interests.
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Even when the ICRC itself condemned the use of weapons of mass destruction 842
in 1973, in the introduction to the draft Protocol I, it affirmed that ICRC would not
address environmental problems when declaring that:

[P]roblems relating to atomic, bacteriological, and chemical
warfare, including the environmental effects, are subjects of
international agreements or negotiations by governments, and in
submitting these draft Protocols the ICRC does not intend to
broach these problems. 843

That provision shows that ICRC had no intention of getting involved in
environmental protection in times of armed conflict. Even if it works on this issue
occasionally, it is not considered a significant goal of the ICRC.

[T]he IHL, including its environmental protection, is dependent
on the application of customary principles and on the sweeping
generalization of Article 35 (3) of the Geneva Protocol I. Such a
dependency is a major deficiency, as considerations of military
expediency are specially difficult to constrain in the absence of
treaty norms, and even allegations about enemy conduct tend to
sound propagandistic if based purely upon such general, vague,
prescriptive principles. 844

The legal norms embodied in IHL are very general, vague, and subject to
‘military necessity’ exceptions, and are not directed to stop belligerent practices of the
sort most likely to generate environmental harm. 845 Unfortunately, the effect of IHL is
limited by the ‘military necessity’ concept; most IHL provisions are subject to that
constraint, such as the ‘necessity of war’ term used in article 23 (1)(g) of the 1907 Hague
Convention IV 846 or the ‘necessary by military operations’ term used by article 53 of the
fourth Geneva Convention.
842
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Military necessity is a “legal concept used as a part of the legal justification for
attacks on legitimate military targets that may have adverse, even terrible, consequences
for civilians and civilian objects.” 847 A great deal environmental destruction has taken
place during armed conflict under the pretext of military necessity. For example, during
the Vietnam War, the United States considered environmental modification techniques
necessary to interfere with the guerrilla tactics of North Vietnam. 848
Even under the Additional Protocol I, action is limited to preventing only
“widespread, long-term, and severe” environmental damage, thus weakening the
environmental protection offered by the IHL. 849 The Additional Protocol I does place
some limit on the mindless mayhem which normally accompanies war. However,
precisely what limit is as yet unclear. 850
Punishment plays a great role in assuring the respect and the applicability of law.
Therefore, IHL considers ‘the grave breach’ of its rules and principles as a war crime. 851
Some experts affirmed this idea by saying that:

[t]he use of napalm in Vietnam and the deliberate burning of oil
in the Persian Gulf probably qualify as grave breach. The
perpetrators should therefore be subject to criminal prosecution
and the other Geneva law parties should be required to bring the
perpetrators to justice. 852

IHL criteria as to whether a breach is grave depends on its effects on civilian
populations. Thus, if civilian populations are directly and considerably affected by the
environmental breach, the act then it will be considered a ‘grave breach’ of IHL
principles.
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However, to address the problems of the IHL in protecting the natural
environment, it would be necessary to cover the IHL enforcement, the difficulty of public
access to information, the inapplicability of the IHL on revolutions and disorders, and
finally, the failure of IHL in controlling terrorism.

1. The Enforcement of IHL
IHL rules applicable to international armed conflicts are largely unenforceable
and often disregarded. 853 However, even where IHL might apply to environmental effects
of armed conflict, limitations in application and enforcement mechanisms hinder the
effectiveness of its provisions. 854
Theoretically, IHL provisions apply not only to the contracting parties, but also
the non-contracting States, because they “are so broadly accepted as to be considered
customary law.” 855 Practically, however, a number of violations of these provisions have
been detected in times of armed conflicts. The IHL provide a number of rules to backup
the States fulfillment to their obligation. For example, Article 80 of the Additional
Protocol I requires the parties to take all necessary measures for the execution of their
obligations. 856 And Article 81 requires that parties accommodate the needs of ICRC to
carry out its appointed mission. 857 Article 82 calls on making legal advisors available to
their armed forces. 858 Further, Article 83 demands the application of the Conventions and
this Protocol in both peace and times of armed conflicts.859 Article 84 calls on the
engagement in interstate communication of implementation measures. 860 Article 87
instructs the parties “to require military commanders, with respect to members of the
armed forces under their control, to prevent and where necessary, to suppress and report
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to competent authorities breaches of the Convention and of this Protocol.” 861 But if the
local authorities are ignorant of a breach, this provision provides little help. 862
The ICRC is supposed to act as a tool to enforce IHL rules. For example, when a
violation of an IHL rules or principle detected by the ICRC, a confidential report will be
sent to the responsible authority urging it to comply with the applicable norms. However,
the ICRC only rarely will issue a public statement of the violations. For example, the
ICRC issued a statement to express its concern about the Iraqi resort to illegal chemical
warfare, during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, 863 which is a rare occurrence.

2. The Difficulty of Public Access to Information
It is necessary to provide public access to information, about environmental
damage, particularly in cases like the destruction of a nuclear facility or the
contamination of a drinking water supply, where the harm may affect human life, health,
and the environment on a broad scale. 864 The duty to inform concept appeared in the
Stockholm Declaration of 1972 865 by a proposed Principle 20 that would have imposed a
duty to inform, by providing that “[r]elevant information must be supplied by States on
activities or developments within their jurisdiction or under their control whenever they
believe, or have reason to believe, that such information is needed to avoid the risk of
significant adverse effects on the environment in areas beyond their national
jurisdiction.” 866 The Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, of 1998 Åarhus,
Denmark, 867 affirms the right of every person of present and future generation to live in a
healthy and balanced environment through guaranteeing the right to access to
information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in
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environmental matters. Article 4 (1) of the Convention states that “Each Party shall
ensure that [p]ublic authorities, in response to a request for environmental information,
make such information available to the public [i]ncluding copies of the actual
documentation containing or comprising such information.” 868 Such a duty would
enhance the quality and the implementation of decisions, public awareness of
environmental matters, public expression of its concerns, and therefore, would enable
responsible officials to respond to such concerns.
However, the IHL does not consistently guarantee public access to information.
Often information about environmental or humanitarian damage is not made known until
decades after the fact, or perhaps not at all. Article 90 of the Additional Protocol I, 869
created a fact-finding commission, but provides that it “shall not report its findings
publicly, unless all parties to the conflict have requested the commission to do so.” 870 For
example, throughout the Russian-Chechen armed conflict no independent human rights
monitors have been allowed to enter Chechnya by Russian authorities, and so could not
obtain information. Nevertheless, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human
Rights was authorized to enter the Republic at the end of February 2000, 871 which gives
the perpetrators enough time after the armed conflict to cleanup the scene of their crimes.
Public access to information under the IHL may be achieved in three ways. First, military
commands should inform civilians about any prospective attack, its time, and the nature
of the weapons that will be used in the attack so the civilian population can abandon their
homes and lands in order to protect their lives from the military attack. Second, once an
attack takes place, there should be a kind of initial assessment of the civilian casualties
and the environmental damage in order to inform people as to what exactly happened.
Finally, after the military attack there should be a full ecological evaluation and a
systematic survey of the direct and indirect effects of war on public health, in order to
take the necessary and immediate measures to rehabilitate both the affected population
and the impacted environment. For example, following the death of an Italian soldier who
868
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served in the peace-keeping troops in Kosovo and Bosnia, the Italian Prime Minister said
that Italy would seek a probe regarding the use and effects of uranium at the next meeting
of NATO’s Atlantic Council in Brussels, as the uranium may be the cause of cancer
among soldiers and civilians. 872 An Italian foreign ministry official added: “[w]e are
looking to get the maximum exchange of information about the issue between NATO
countries and the alliance’s headquarters.” 873

3. The Difficulty of Applying IHL to Revolutions and Disorders
The IHL rules are applicable in times of armed conflict. Armed Conflicts may be
internal or international. But if the conflict does not meet the criteria set out by either
common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or the 1977 Additional Protocol II,
then the situation cannot be described as an armed conflict 874 and it will not be subject to
IHL enforcement. 875 Thus, in situations of revolutions and disorders, the environmental
protection provisions in IHL will be inoperative, and the environment will be subject to
severe abuse. This inadequacy is a direct result of the fact that the environment is not
protected per se in the IHL.
Further, ICRC humanitarian intervention will be greatly restricted in times of
revolutions and disorders. ICRC intervention depends on the consent of the concerned
State. For example, ICRC can visit places of internment or detention in order to urge
humanitarian observance. 876 An ongoing disorder, started in September 29th, 2000, in
Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Jerusalem, clearly affects both human life and the
environment. However, because it is not deemed to be an “armed conflict,” IHL can play
no effective role. IHL provisions should be amended to include revolutions and disorders,
so that humanitarian violations and the environmental damage caused by these events can
also be addressed.
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4. The Inadequacy of IHL in Controlling Terrorism
Incidents of terrorism can have a major effect on the environment as well as on
civilians and soldiers, even if no governmental military operations are involved.
Terrorism is violence, or a threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere
of fear and alarm. 877 According to Article 1 (2) of the Convention of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism of 1999, 878 terrorism
means “any act of violence or threat thereof not withstanding its motives or intentions
perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of
terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honor, freedoms,
security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property
to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or
international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or
sovereignty of independent States.”
During the last decade, terrorists became increasingly interested in mass
destruction, 879 which is a real threat to human life and the environment. A number of
incidents, such as the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, 880 the Tokyo Subway Sarin gas
attack in 1995, 881 the detonation of the American Navy Warship in Yemen in October 12,
2000, the terrorist attacks of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York and the
Pentagon in Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001, underscore this trend.
The environmental terrorism can cause the same kind of environmental damage as
conventional warfare. Terrorists can use destructive ammunitions and arms in their
attacks nowadays, such as poisonous gases and high capacity explosions. Moreover, the
environmental effects resulting from terrorist acts are similar to those resulting from
877
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armed conflicts. Both involve the utilization of the environment as a weapon. The sole
difference between environmental warfare and environmental terrorism is that the first is
committed publicly under the cloak of international disagreement between two nations or
more, whereas terrorism is committed as an act of reprisal or revenge. This difference
raises the danger of the environmental terrorism vis-à-vis environmental warfare.
Additionally, environmental warfare is controlled by the law of war. However,
environmental terrorism is subject to the national laws of each State, and each State
applies its own rules. An act of environmental destruction might be classified as an act of
terrorism in one State, but not in another State.
Examples of the environmental terrorism can be highlighted through the terrorist
attacks committed against the United States establishments, interests, citizens, and
environment by a group terrorist called “AlQaeda,” that takes from Afghanistan a
location to plan their activities and train their personnel. AlQaeda is a group of
fundamental Muslims, leaded by militant, exiled Saudi millionaire Osama Bin Laden, 882
interpret the humanitarian Principles of Islam in a wrongful way to serve their goals.
This group was behind the explosion of an American establishment located in
Alkobar, Saudi Arabia, in 1996. A powerful truck bomb tore through apartment buildings
at U.S. Air Force complex in Saudi Arabia killed at least 23 Americans and injured more
than 300. 883 The explosion was so powerful, it blasted a crater 35 feet deep and 85 feet
across, hit an U.S. military housing area at the edge of a Saudi base near Dhahran in
eastern Saudi Arabia. British, French and Saudi troops were there too. Officials said that
the Saudis also might have suffered casualties. 884
Furthermore, AlQaeda was behind the car bomb explosion that took place outside
the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar El Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7,
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1998, 885 which wounded 4,500 people, and killed twelve Americans and 200 or more
Kenyans and Tanzanians. 886 This group of terrorists acts in a dramatical way against
human health and the environment. For example, their attack against the American
Navy’s Warship U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, took place in the Gulf of Aden, and caused
various causalities, as well as environmental harm to the Gulf itself. Nevertheless, the
environmental damage was largely ignored by the involved countries in particular, and
the international community in general.
The forecited attacks were committed against the United States, but outside its
territory. However, the most recent, blatant and devastate acts of terrorism were
committed by AlQaida in the United States mainland. 887 On September 11, 2001,
terrorists committed the most active attacks in New York and Washington (D.C.), when
four planes hijacked, two of them smashed into New York’s World Trade Center (WTC),
and the third one rammed into the Pentagon. However, the fourth hijacked plane crashed
south of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 888
The twin towers of the WTC is considered a historical architectural site in New
York City, each contains 110 stories. However, the American Airlines Flight 11, carrying
92 people from Boston to Los Angeles, crashed into the first tower. Eighteen minutes
later, the United Airlines Flight 175, carrying 65 people on the same Boston to Los
Angeles route, tore through the South Tower with an even larger explosion. 889 Both
crashes killed all passengers and crew members. The unprecedented attacks sent a huge
fireball into the air and spread debris over the city. 890 According to the latest information,
human casualties in the WTC are 276 dead, 2,250 wounded and 6,453 missing and
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presumed dead. 891 Almost 300 emergency personnel in New York -- 78 missing police
officers and 200 firefighters -- are presumed dead. 892
Debris from the collapse of concrete from the twin towers had damaged the
surrounding buildings. Gas lines in the areas were affected as well. 893 Flames shrouded
the south side of the structure for 30 minutes before it fell.894 About “2,000 rescue
workers have been moving debris at a rate of 3,000 cubic yards a day, but estimated 2
million cubic yards remains.” When they tunnel into “the pile,” as the wreckage has
become known, “it lets in more air and often has the effect of feeding oxygen to the
smoldering fires and hot debris.” 895
Additionally, further massive environmental impacts resulted from such violent
attacks. For instance, the asbestos, pulverized concrete dust, burning plastic, sediment,
glass, and the chemical products of combustion, including materials such as rubber, and
paper are sprayed after the attacks in the surrounded environment, 896 and washed into the
Hudson River surrounding New York during the heavy precipitation. Moreover,
according to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Reports, toxic chemicals such
as dioxins, PCBs, benzene, lead and chromium have been detected in the soil and air
around the rubble of the WTC at levels exceeding federal safety standards. 897 These
substances can irritate the lungs, trigger asthma attacks and otherwise aggravate lung
conditions, as well as irritate the eyes, nasal passages and throat. 898 Allergists do not
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believe asbestos is a significant health hazard beyond the very immediate center of the
recovery effort. 899 The irritants in the dust can combine with other allergens in the air to
make patients with lung conditions and allergies especially sick, allergists warned. 900
They also urged those with asthma or other chronic lung diseases to wear good quality
masks and consult with their physicians quickly if they experience new or worsening
respiratory symptoms. 901 It has been also reported by the CNN that the reported cases of
West Nile Virus victims were increased fifty percents since September 11 attacks. Future
assessments will necessarily show that even surrounded environment has been also
harmed, some species may die or immigrate.
Flight 77 from Dulles to Los Angeles, a Boeing 757 slammed into the West Side
of the Pentagon, killing all 64 passengers and crew members. 902 The five-sided building
suffered heavy damage, with a portion of the structure collapsing. 903 Inside the Pentagon,
125 were dead, and 76 were wounded. 904 Witnesses reported that smoke could be seen
miles away. 905 The fourth plane United Airlines Flight 93, carrying 45 people from
Newark to San Francisco, 906 which crashed south of Pittsburgh, 907 left no one alive.
In fact, it should be noted that if killing innocent people considered one of the
horrid pictures of terrorism, environmental destruction is considered another malicious
picture of terrorism. Admittedly, September 11 terrorist attacks violated international law
principles such as the laws of humanity, dictates of public conscience, and principles of
law resulted from the usages established among civilized nations, which is what Marten’s
Clause about. 908
The environment can be victimized by acts of terrorism, especially when terrorists
use modern techniques of armament that cause indiscriminate harm. Nowadays,
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"terrorist weaponry has not been limited merely to guns and explosive devices.” 909 The
hand of terrorists reaches modern technology, such as D.U., chemical and biological
devices. “[T]he House of Representatives Internal Security Subcommittee investigated
the DoD’s policy of surplus explosives, and found that 26 million pounds have been sold
to commercial applicants with almost no controls exerted over the sale. Apparently, some
of these explosives have already found their way into the hands of the U.S. domestic
terrorists.” 910 American authorities believe that AlQaeda possesses chemical and
biological weapons that may be used in future terrorist attacks. 911
Two attacks by the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, also involved weapons of
modern technology. The first was in 1994, in Matsumoto, in the central highlands of
Honshu, Japan, where nerve gas was used in a terrorist attack causing the death of seven
civilians and injuring dozens more. 912 The second attack was in 1995 in the Tokyo
subway, 913 caused twelve deaths 914 and approximately 5,000 injured. 915 Moreover, a
Chechen guerrilla leader, Shamyl Bassayev, informed a Russian television network that
four cases of radioactive cesium had been hidden around Moscow. 916 The network
discovered thirty-two kilograms of explosives placed in Moscow's Ismailovo Park. 917
Just as terrorist attacks can cause environmental damage, so too can acts of
reprisal committed by the offended State. For instance, in 1998, the Americans attacked
Afghani 918 sites classified as Bin Laden training camps. 919 They also attacked El Shifa
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Pharmaceutical Factory, in Sudan, 920 which was also suspected as a source of production
or transfer of gas chemical weapons and their precursors. 921 The United States knew that
the site was used for producing chemical gases and weapons, from the soil sample taken
from the factory’s ground by an agent. 922 Thus, the attack clearly risked great
environmental damage, and could result in the release of a deadly cloud of gas. 923
Similarly, the strike against Taliban and AlQaeda terrorist group in Afghanistan, on
October 7, 2001, used several kind of military techniques, including P 52 bombers, which
would necessarily cause collateral damage of humans and to the environment as well.
Despite the great believes that Bin Laden possess weapons of mass destruction, the
American troops bombed the training camps of the terrorist groups in Afghanistan,
which, if these believes were facts, present a great threat to the environment.
Reprisal actions through military forces should not be considered as a primary
choice. The United States of America adopted the principle of fighting terror through
long and safe battle. In stead of recurring to massive military attacks that may cause
another humanitarian and environmental losses. The U.S. adopted developed measures to
eliminate any terrorist activities in the future, or at least make them almost impossible.
The United States declared that States have two choices only, whether to support the U.S.
in it war against terror, or support the terror itself. 924 The American President Bush
signed an executive order to freeze the assets of suspected terrorists. 925 Such procedure
would be able to weaken the terrorist groups and eliminate their activities without
causing any harm to innocent people or the environment.
When an act of terrorism is committed, both humans and the environment are
direct victims. But when there is only a threat of a terrorist act, while the civilian
population will be affected by the fear and horror, there will be no actual harm to the
environment. An example of a threat of terrorism was "in mid-November, 1977, when the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) confirmed an extortionist threat to place a deadly
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botulism poison in the Miami, Florida, water supply unless a demand for a 1.6 million
dollar payment was met.” 926
The IHL “cannot provide direct answers to most questions raised by terrorism,” 927
because IHL is applicable only to armed conflict as defined in IHL documents.
Moreover, acts of terrorism are usually committed in times of peace, when IHL is
inapplicable. Nevertheless, IHL prohibits terrorist acts and provides for their repression.
In accordance with IHL principles, States can cooperate in prosecuting terrorists, or
extraditing them to the competent State to prosecute them. The international community
is united to face states that support terrorism. Under such pressure and according to the
U.N. Security Council’s Resolution 731/1992 928 Libya handed over the two Libyan
nationals 929 suspected of conducting the 1988 bombing of Pan American Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, 930 to be prosecuted in the Netherlands, a neutral country, under the
jurisdiction of the Scotch law. Recently, the three Scottish judges voted unanimously to
find Al-Megrahi guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 931 However, the second
Libyan, Fhimah, was acquitted. 932 Here, the same attitude should be taken by
Afghanistan by handing over Osama Bin Laden to the United States to stand before the
justice for terrorist attacks committed against the Unites States interests, citizens, and
environment. Facing the Afghani refusal to bring Bin Laden to the American justice, the
United States should consider the Afghani proposal to hand over Bin Laden to a third
neutral State, and The Hague, Netherlands, would be the best State to bring him to justice
according to the American or the international laws.
Significantly, the Arab States signed the Arab Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism 933 at Cairo, Egypt on April 22, 1998. This Convention considers
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environmental protection in its provisions while stating that terrorism is any act or threat
of violence that aims “to cause damage to the environment or to public or private
installations or property or to occupy or seize them, or [aim] to jeopardize a national
resource.” 934 The Convention excludes the destruction of public property and public
services from being considered as political crimes. 935 Therefore, any environmental
destruction, even if committed for political motives, is subject to this Convention’s
provisions and considered a terrorist offense. 936
Furthermore, Article 2 (a) of the Convention states that “[a]ll cases of struggle by
whatever means, including armed struggle, against foreign occupation and aggression for
liberation and self-determination, in accordance with the principles of international law,
shall not be regarded as an offense[…].” According to international law rules, nations
have rights to liberation and self-determination even though they recur to force. Here,
however, environmental protection has no priority. Thus, the environment will be
exposed to all forms of damage and destruction as an unprotected victim.
Additionally, the member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC) adopted the Convention on Combating International Terrorism 937 at Ouagadougou,
Burkina Faso, on 1 July 1999. The Convention requires all the Contracting States, as
preventive measures, to bar their territories from being used to plan, organize, or execute
terrorist acts. 938 The Convention also prevents the Contracting Parties from hosting,
training, arming, or financing terrorists. 939
Moreover, the Convention requires all the Contracting States to arrest perpetrators
of terrorist acts and prosecute or extradite them. 940 Article 3 (II) (B) (5) of the
Convention encourages cooperation between the concerned organs in the member States,
and citizens, in order to help uncover terrorists and arrest them. For example, the
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concerned authorities in each Contracting Party should extend appropriate incentives and
ensure effective protection to witnesses on terrorists and their crimes, in order to urge
citizens to inform on such crimes.
The Convention on Combating International Terrorism strongly excludes “[the]
destruction of public properties and properties geared for public services […]” 941 from
being considered as political crimes even when politically motivated. Thus,
environmental damage during any act of terrorism is considered a terrorist crime 942 and is
subject to this Convention’s provisions.
This Convention not only considers that terrorism constitutes a severe violation of
human rights in freedom and security, but also considers that damage to the environment
caused as part of a terrorism act, including the destruction of public properties and public
services is also a violation. It should be noted, however, that Article 2 (a) states that
“[p]eoples’ struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression,
colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance
with the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime.”
Finally, no State should protect terrorists, even if they are its citizens, in order to
prevent terrorists from finding safety in “sympathetic States” that are unwilling to
prosecute them despite the international pressure.943 Under the current international legal
system, and the competent international courts of justice, all governments should
cooperate to respond to terrorist acts, by considering such acts as war crimes, rather than
treating them as crimes within the national criminal jurisdictions. 944 “[T]errorism cannot
be viewed as a criminal justice matter, like a bank robbery or a homicide. Instead, it is a
national security threat that should be dealt with by military force when State sponsorship
is proven.” 945 Recently, following the verdict against the two Libyans charged in the
bombing of Pan American Flight 103, when the Justice Department brought charges
941
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against the two Libyans in 1991, William P. Barr, the attorney general said: “justice has
been done in the case. But the main question is whether the criminal justice system is in
itself the right response.” 946
In conclusion, IHL contains formidable provisions to protect the environment.
However, they can not prevent humanitarian and environmental disasters from occurring.
Moreover, existing legal structures often allow perpetrators to avoid punishment, victims
to remain without a remedy, and the environment to be left wrecked. The existing IHL
rules should be ameliorated to provide better environmental protection. For example,
victims of the environmental destruction, and NGO’s, should be allowed to complain
against atrocities committed during armed conflicts.
Another approach to strengthen IHL protection is to allow another field of law to
reinforce the environmental protection of the IHL rules. Environmental law and the
enviro-humanitarian rules would be helpful in this field.
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Part III:
The Environmental Law Rules

Contemporary environmental law is not concerned primarily or narrowly with
armed conflict, but rather focuses more broadly on maintenance of public health and
conservation of natural systems. Nonetheless, environmental law does apply to the
phenomenon of eco-war, i.e., aggression aimed deliberately against the environment as a
means of gaining collateral advantage against the enemy. Since environmental law rules
were created primarily to secure and maintain the environment, these rules should fully
apply both in peacetime and in times of armed conflict, to the extent possible. This
section examines the role of environmental law in both situations, by (1) defining
environmental law in order to discuss when it can be applied, and what areas it covers,
and (2) identifying the environmental law rules relative to military activities both in times
of armed conflicts and peacetime, and classifying them into international environmental
law rules, comparative environmental law rules, and national environmental law rules.
Finally, (3) we will examine obstacles to effective environmental protection in times of
armed conflicts and peacetime.

A- Definition
The environmental law deals with the “biosphere,” 947 and creates the rules for
managing the effects of human society on the biosphere. Although environmental law can
be simply defined as “that body of law to which the label environment has, to date, been
attached,” 948 it can be more usefully defined as “the aggregate of all the rules and
principles aimed at global protection of air, water, earth, and forms of life that are not
unreasonably injurious to humans (environment) and controlling activities of man within
national jurisdictions that may affect another state's environment or environments beyond
947
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national jurisdiction.” 949 This broad definition takes into account not only the narrower,
more conventional conceptions of “environmental law,” but also has specific application
to the effects of military conflict. The environmental law can also be defined as the “body
of law [which] is concerned with protecting the natural resources of land, air and water
and the flora and fauna which inhabit them.” 950
Further, some regional groups of states have adopted a definition of
environmental law in order to match the purposes of a specific convention. For example,
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 951 defines the
environmental law as “any statute or regulation of a Party, or provision thereof, the
primary purpose of which is the protection of the environment, or the prevention of a
danger to human life or health.” 952
Environmental law consists of numerous rules and regulations designed to
safeguard nature and promote environmental protection. If, for example, the environment
has been harmed, the environmental law presents the legal norms for environmental
rehabilitation, and therefore, defines the parties liable for the restoration and the
governmental authority responsible for directing the cleanup.
In general, the wider the definition of environmental law, the more secure the
environment will be. In its earliest stages, environmental law focused upon persons and
individual property rights; now, however, the law often seek to develop rules for
protecting shared resources, common ecosystems and natural values. Furthermore,
environmental law has become increasingly integrated into other disciplines, such as
international law, commercial law, administrative law, health law, labor law, safety law,
agricultural law, military law, and transportation law. According to Agenda 21 the
“[e]nvironmental law and regulation are important but cannot alone be expected to deal
with the problems of environment and development.” 953 This provision shows that
environmental law is not an isolated field of law that works independently.
Environmental law extends across many sectors of socio-economic activity, and provides
949
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procedures for integration of environmental and development issues that will lead to the
achievement of human basic needs, better protected ecosystems and a safer future. 954
Historically, the Code Civil, promulgated in Ancient Rome, has been concerned
with the protection of people and their properties more than anything else. Thus, civil law
generally was never developed to protect environmental systems such as the lithosphere,
the hydrosphere, the biosphere, and the atmosphere. Thus, environmental protection in
the countries that adopted civil law must be accomplished through either public law or
administrative law.
Having noted the ramifications of defining the environmental law, generally, we
will survey the environmental law rules relative to the armed conflicts. Such rules can be
international, comparative, or national. International environmental law rules can be
classified into hard international law and soft international law. Hard international law
encompasses global instruments, regional instruments. Hard law rules are compulsory.
Soft international law encompasses the Stockholm Declaration, the Action Plan of the
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment (1972), the World Charter for Nature,
the Rio Declaration, and the International Organizations’ Resolutions of States Parties.
Soft law rules are usually not binding, with some exceptions. For example, if a genuine
well-accepted general principle of international law is included in an international
declaration, such as Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, then, this principle is
binding on all States, because it is a general principle of law, and its status as such does
not change because it was included in a soft law instrument. On the other hand,
comparative environmental law rules will be classified into comprehensive
environmental rules relevant to military activities, environmental protection in general,
environmental pollution, fauna and flora protection, air pollution control, water resources
conservation, soil pollution, hazardous wastes, and citizen suits. And finally, national
environmental law rules that are both general and specific to the military cover military
activity in peacetime, such as military bases and the preparation for armed conflicts.
Additionally, national environmental law rules can encompass military operations during
953
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times of armed conflict. Since nations use widely varying definitions of national
jurisdiction, national environmental law rules and regulations can vary also. For example,
an issue which may be considered of a great environmental importance in the United
States, may not be necessarily so in Kuwait, and vice versa.
On the other hand, since there is a major link between environmental law and
environmental science, it is necessary to refer to the scientific definition of the
environment. The definition of “environment” can be either a comprehensive one or one
more narrowly applied to a specific aspect of natural systems. Nevertheless, there is
broad “congruence” among these definitions.
Some international conventions define the environment. For example, the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Environmental Damage 955 defines the
environment as the “natural resources both abiotic and biotic, such as air, water, soil,
fauna and flora and the interaction between the same factors; property which forms part
of the cultural heritage; and the characteristic aspects of the landscape.” 956 Another
example of the definition of the environment is found in Article II of the Convention on
the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques: “the earth, […] its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere, or of
outer space.” 957 In the former Soviet Union, environmental protection is a synonymous
with ecology, and environmental laws are referred to as ecological laws. For example, the
sector that deals with environmental law in the Academy of Science’s Institute of State
and Law is called “The Sector on Ecological Law.” 958 And according to the late Prof.
Oleg S. Kolbasov, a corresponding member of the Academy of Science of the Russian
Federation, the ecology is “understood to be a complex global, national, and historical
problem. A major factor necessary to solve this problem is peace. […] At the same time,
the solution to this problem demands the mobilization of the attention and efforts of all
peoples, the willingness to allocate the necessary resources and equipment, and the
capability to balance and coordinate economic development with observance of
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ecological requirements.” 959 It was provided in the USSR that, according to the Soviet
Council of Ministries decree of April 12, 1983, “On the USSR Red Book”, any act that
can result in the destruction of the habitat of endangered species, or populations is
prohibited and a similar law is continued in the Russain Federation. 960
Other definitions of the environment can be found at the national level. For
example, the United States’ Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) provides that the
environment “includes water, air, and land and the interrelationship which exists among
and between water, air, and land and all living things.” 961 The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) defines the environment as “[t]he sum of all external conditions affecting
the life, development and survival of an organism.” 962 Moreover, the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) in Section 101 (a) describes its environmental
mission in terms of “the continuing policy of the Federal Government […] to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations.” 963
In addition, NEPA Section 101 (b), while addressing the continuing responsibility of
Federal Government to use all practicable means to impose Federal plans and programs,
states in Paragraph (4) that it is necessary to preserve historic, cultural, and natural
aspects of the national heritage, and to maintain an environment that supports “diversity
and variety of individual choice.” 964 Accordingly, the Regulations implementing NEPA
in the Code of Federal Regulations 965 provide that the term “environment” includes
ecological, aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social, or health elements. 966 On the
other hand, the Kuwaiti Law Establishing the Environmental Public Authority defines the
environment as the “biosphere including living species such as man, animal and plant
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together with all its surroundings, air, water, soil and what they contain in the form of
solid, liquid, gas or natural radiation plus fixed or mobile structure built by man.” 967
Similarly, the United Kingdom Environmental Protection Act of 1990 defines the
environment as “consist[ing] of all, or any of the following media, namely, the air water
and land; and the medium of air includes the air within buildings and the air within other
natural or man-made structures above or below ground.” 968
In sum, in light of these definitions of the environment, and for the purposes of
this thesis on the environmental law of armed conflict, the overall definition of the
environment should be a comprehensive one, in order to cover all components of the
ecosystem. Armed conflict threatens the degradation of all aspects of the human
environment, natural environment, and cultural environment, including drinking water
supplies, sewage treatment facilities, historical buildings, cultural monuments, fresh air,
endangered species habitats, soil, forests, and national parks, in order to achieve military
victory. Therefore, the definition of the environment should include all the elements that
may be affected by wartime activities in order to provide effective environmental
protection. This broad definition of environment will be the meaning intended in this
thesis.

B- Environmental Law Rules Relative to the Armed Conflicts
Environmental law rules can be categorized into international and national levels.
The first category includes hard law such as international treaties and conventions, in
addition to the well-accepted customs and general principles of international law. These
are supplemented by soft law such as international resolutions, declarations, and
recommendations which, in general, are not binding on States. The second category
includes national environmental statutes, rules, regulations, standards, and requirements
applicable to military activities both at home and when deployed abroad. In addition, it is
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relevant to address comparative environmental law rules in order to provide a whole
image.
The fact that we can discuss the environmental protection in terms of
international, comparative, and national environmental laws is itself a positive aspect,
since it shows that environmental problems are being seriously addressed by lawmakers
in all these contexts.

C- International Environmental Law Rules
Since the inception of the field of international environmental law in the late
1960s,

969

a number of international environmental law rules have been created to govern

environmental relations among states.
The environmental law rules that apply in peacetime have been, more often than
not, successful in reducing the environmental effects of human activities. But they
frequently fail to protect the environment during armed conflicts. The use of weapons of
mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons, can cause severe damage to human health and
the environment. 970 Some international law scholars believe that all environmental law
rules should be waived during armed conflicts, and that the law of war is the only source
of law that would be applicable. 971 That attitude is favored by military personnel and
governmental armed forces as they are concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with very
immediate and short-term questions of winning an armed conflict. They try to waive
environmental law rules according to the principle of military necessity, which may allow
any humanitarian or environmental harm that cannot be avoided in the battlefields.
Military personnel would aim to achieve their military objectives and attack their targets
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even if those targets are historical sites, cultural monuments, a drinking water facility or
any other natural resources. These waivers, clearly, cannot be allowed if the environment
is to be worth having after the armed conflict is over. Furthermore, if the international
environmental rules were waived, States that are not involved in the armed conflict,
neutral States and global commons would never be protected from environmental damage
caused by the armed conflict.
Other scholars believe that environmental law rules are applicable, along with the
laws of war, in wartime since there is no authority that would preclude their application.
This interpretation is the most internally consistent and can be defended for several
reasons. For purposes of this discussion, activity related to war can be divided into three
phases, before, during, and after armed conflict.
1) Military preparation for warfare. This phase should not pose a serious problem
to the applicability of environmental law rules, where the warfare is not yet raging.
Peacetime environmental law should apply fully to the military during peacetime as it
does to all other human activities. However, some, if not most, States still avoid requiring
their military to obey environmental laws, in order to give their armed forces the freedom
to build a massive arsenal without any consideration to the environmental laws that
apply to all other sectors of the government. There is no objective reason to excuse the
military from compliance with environmental laws. For instance, the United States, as we
will discuss later in this part, provides a great example by requiring its military to respect
national environmental regulations and standards, whether at home or abroad, in
peacetime.
2) During armed conflict. Some commentators agree that international
environmental laws should be suspended during armed conflict because environmental
protection is fundamentally inconsistent with the nature of war. 972 Others argue that
environmental laws, along with the laws of war, should apply to armed conflicts. In
particular, these writers argue that international customary law relating to armed
conflict 973 prohibits belligerents from causing unnecessary damage to the environment,
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and that existing international law instruments not only prohibit unnecessary
environmental harm, but also provided for “personnel criminal liability and official
financial liability.” 974 In this view, belligerents have a duty not to destroy the basic
ecological systems that people need to live in, as well as the duty to protect human rights.
Thus, military personnel need to be trained to protect the environment not only in
peacetime, but during armed conflict also, and armed forces should be prohibited from
destroying the environment in times of armed conflicts.
Some jurists hold civilians responsible for collateral damages caused during
armed conflicts, based on the failure to use reasonable precaution to remove themselves
from the area of military targets. 975 The environment is even more vulnerable, since it
cannot run away from the severe effects of armed conflicts. Consequently, protection of
the environment should receive as much attention as protection of persons. However, as
the environment is increasingly used as a weapon in warfare, then there will be growing
danger that environmental destruction will become a part of military strategy. As a rule, it
is accepted that war, by itself, does not suspend peacetime treaties between belligerents
States. 976 While there are no specific criteria to determine which treaties apply in times of
armed conflicts and which do not, if the IUCN Amman Clause, which was examined in
Part Two of this thesis, is taken as jus cogen, then the standing order to the military
should be to protect the environment unless extreme military necessity dictates otherwise
in the heat of military action.
3) Aftermath of Armed Conflict. In this phase the hostilities have ceased and the
law of war no longer functions. In this phase, international environmental law rules,
particularly rules regarding reparations, are the sole legal authority for regulating
damage, rehabilitating the environment, and defining the liability. For example, following
the Gulf War II, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolutions 686 and
687/1991 that reaffirmed this rule when it held Iraq liable, under international law, for the
environmental damage that occurred during its occupation of Kuwait in 1990. It was the
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first time the international community recognized that wartime environmental damage is
compensable, reflecting the increasing international concern for the environment.977
The ICRC, at its meeting of experts in 1992, was the first international body to
discuss State responsibility for wartime environmental damage and the need for a sound
study of that issue. 978 Given that the environment is increasingly and deliberately
exploited in times of armed conflict, it was significant that one expert declared that
[u]nder Security Council resolution 687, Iraq’s responsibility for
severe damage to the environment had led to a procedure of
compensation for such damage, and that raised the important
question of legal qualification of severe damage and the legal
regime governing such damage. With regard to legal
qualification, the damage perpetrated during the Gulf War might
fall under Article 19 of Part 1 of the draft convention on State
responsibility, currently being considered by the United Nations
International Law Commission, which defined ecological crimes
by States as violations of legal norms regarded as particularly
important by the international community and listed such crimes,
including massive damage to the environment, thus providing a
certain legal basis for qualifying the violation. The applicable
legal regime raised more difficult problems, however, and the
Compensation Commission set up by the Security Council had
not made much headway in defining the necessary criteria. On
the other hand there was a clear need to lay down the special
primary obligation of all States to refrain from inflicting massive
damage on the environment, and such an obligation might be
presumed to exist in general customary international law. 979
A State, such as Iraq, may chose not to be bound by a rule of customary
international law by displaying its opposition to the rule from the time of its inception. 980
However, Iraq did not oppose the rule establishing a duty to repair warfare environmental
damage, and “failed to formally assert any right to deviate from” such duty until such
customary rule was already established. 981 Therefore, Iraq still will be held liable for
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environmental damage caused in Kuwait and the region, despite its tentative to escape
from environmental responsibility.

1. Hard International Law
The main body of rules of international law is usually considered hard law, or
treaty law. Treaty obligations must be compulsory or they will have no effect. 982 Treaties,
together with general principles of law and international customs are the main sources of
hard law rules. 983 Law developed in these areas requires time. For instance, “custom
takes time, and often a lot of State practice, before it hardens into a legally enforceable
rule.” 984 Likewise treaties usually take a considerable time, from their negotiation, draft
approval, and signature, to their ratification, which is necessary for a treaty to enter into
force.
Nonetheless, despite the long time required to produce hard law instruments, that
time is necessary to assure the stability of the international society, because States do not
easily accept changes to existing international law rules. Thus, States often prefer to
modify an existing treaty rather than to introduce a new one, since a new treaty requires
an often lengthy process of negotiation, acceptance and ratification.
Hard law instruments can be classified as either world-wide or regional. The
first category covers all member States no matter where they are located. Regional
instruments cover countries of the same region.

a. International World-wide Hard Law Instruments
There are many international environmental law instruments that may be applied
to armed conflicts. The basic agreements constituting world order today include the
United Nations Charter, Draft Articles on State Responsibility of the International Law
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Commission, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Antarctic Treaty, and
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Specific environmental agreements
include the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Climate Change
Convention, Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention for the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the United Nations Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, and
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft.
Finally, this paper will examine general principles of law articulated under Principle 21
of the Stockholm Declaration, and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration.

1) The United Nations Charter
The U.N. Charter 985 provides a foundation for all international relations. A
number of international instruments refer to, or rely upon the U.N. Charter as a basis
for their provisions. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea declares, in the Preambular paragraph seven, that “the development of the law of
the sea will strengthen peace, security, cooperation and friendly relations among all
nations according to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter.”
Another example is the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context, which in Preambular paragraph five the relevant provisions of
the U.N. Charter.
Article 1 (3) of the U.N. Charter encourages States to:

1- maintain international peace and security by taking effective
measures to prevent threats to the peace,
2- develop friendly relations among nations, and
3- solve international problems of an economic, social, cultural or
humanitarian character.
These purposes encourage the cooperation among nations, including
cooperation in environmental protection. Similarly, Article 2 (3) and (4) of the Charter
articulates, as general principles of the organization, that:
985
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3.All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered.
4.All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 986

The direct goal of these principles is to preserve the international peace and
security. However, these principles also reflect the need for international environmental
protection, because “refrain[ing …] from the threat or use of force against […] any State”
and “settl[ing the] international disputes by peaceful means” would necessarily preserve
the environment from any harm may be caused by the use of force. Eventually, the
prevention of the use of force in the international relations, and the appeal to the peaceful
settlement of the international disputes were confirmed in the 1970 UN General
Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations. 987
The U.N. has imposed international sanctions against a number of States that
violated Article 2 (3) and (4). For instance, Iraq is still subject to the United Nations
sanctions imposed by the Security Council’s Decision 661/1990, 988 since its aggression
on Kuwait of August 2, 1990.
In effect, the ICJ found a duty to cooperate in the case concerning the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project between Hungary and Slovakia. Hungary argued that if
the proposed dam had been built, the “bed of the Danube upstream would have silted up
and, consequently, the quality of the water collected in the bank-filtered wells would
have deteriorated in this sector.” 989 Slovakia denied that the project would cause any kind
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of “ecological state of necessity.” 990 The Court found that Hungary was not entitled to
suspend work on the project, and required both countries to negotiate in good faith and to
take all necessary measures to ensure the achievement of the goals of the Treaty of
September 16, 1977 concerning the construction and operation of the GabcikovoNagymaros System of Locks. 991
Significantly, in a separate opinion, Vice-president Christopher Gregory
Weeramantry referred specifically to environmental concerns raised in the case, such as
sustainable development, development, and environmental protection. Justice
Weeramantry said that “[t]he Court must hold the balance even between the
environmental considerations and the developmental considerations raised by the
respective Parties. The Principle that enables the Court to do so is the principle of
sustainable development.” 992 Justice Weeramantry added: “the protection given to
Hungary [can be described] as the principle of continuing environmental impact
assessment.” 993 Such decisions provide a framework, which would require U.N. member
States to follow the rules of international law regarding international cooperation in order
to protect the environment.
Moreover, the U.N. Charter prohibits any armed conflict except by an act of the
Security Council. That prohibition on armed conflict should also apply to actions harmful
to the environment, because it is considered as a logical extension of the obligation of the
collective self-defense that they must take the necessary precautionary measures in order
to protect civilian populations and the environment.

2) Draft Articles on State Responsibility of the International Law Commission
Among hard international law instruments, as yet not fully accepted, are the
Draft Articles on the State Responsibility of the International Law Commission
(ILC). 994 It is an effort to codify existing international law of State responsibility. 995
990
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Although the Articles have not yet been offered for adoption by States, they have been
offered for comment. 996
Article 19 (3) (d) goes beyond recognizing the environmental effects of warfare,
it recommends that “a serious breach of an international obligation of essential
importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such as
those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas,” should be
considered an international crime. 997 Although, the ILC Draft Articles are silent on
responsibility for environmental damage directly caused by armed conflict, 998 it was
significant that they identified certain kinds of environmental degradation as
criminal. 999 That article appeared to be “aspirational” during the decades when
environmental protection was becoming a major international concern. 1000 However, in
1998, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted, giving legal
effect to the aspiration of the Draft Articles.

3) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted by the United
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court on July17, 1998. Article 8 of the Rome Statute defines war
crimes. In particular, Article 8 (2)(b)(iv) provided that, among other serious violations
of the international law rules and customs that apply to international armed conflict,
severe damage to the environment that exceeds military necessity is considered a war
crime. Under that Article,
“‘war crimes’ means: […] (b) Other serious violations of the laws
and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the
established framework of international law, namely, any of the
following acts: […](iv) [i]ntentionally launching an attack in the
knowledge that such attack will cause […] widespread, long-term
and severe damage to the natural environment which would be
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clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall
military advantage anticipated[.]” 1001
By this definition, Rome Statute expresses a great concern for the natural
environment. The language of the Rome Statute draws on both the 1977 Additional
Protocol I and Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD). Articles 35 and 55 of the 1977
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions prohibit any “method of warfare
which is intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term, and severe
damage to the environment.” “Widespread” is defined as damage that affects several
hundred square kilometers. “Long-term” should be measured in decades, twenty to
thirty years, and “severe” refers to any act that “prejudices the health or survival of the
population.” 1002 Protection under those Articles is triggered by the presence of all three
elements together. 1003
ENMOD prohibits the manipulation or use of the environment as a target.
Article 1 states that: “[e]ach State party to the Convention undertakes not to engage in
military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury
to any other State party…” This language seems to require the presence of any single
element: widespread, long-lasting, or severe damage. According to ENMOD, the
meaning of “widespread” includes several hundred square kilometers. The term “longlasting” means damage extending beyond a season. “Severe” means serious damage to
human life, natural or economic resources or other assets. 1004
It appears that Article 8 (2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute requires the presence of
the three elements together, like Article 35 of the Additional Protocol I. Moreover,
Article 8 (2)(b)(iv) uses the same “long-term” language as do Articles 35 and 55 of the
Additional Protocol I. Those Articles grant the environment a limited protection
because they require the presence of all three elements together.
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Nevertheless, the Rome Statute is significant in that it analogizes environmental
damage to other war crimes such as killing and pillaging, which reflects an increase in
environmental awareness within the international community, and that people cannot be
separated from their environment. 1005

4) Antarctic Treaty
The Antarctic Treaty 1006 was the first agreement that sought to protect a specific
portion of the earth’s environment from nuclear weapons and warfare. 1007 Article 1
prohibits any aggressive military use of Antarctic. It states that “Antarctica shall be used
for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a
military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying
out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.” 1008 Thus, it
prohibits any military activity, before, during, or after armed conflict on its territory.
Establishing military bases, practicing means of warfare, storing or testing armaments, or
dumping warfare debris a violation of the Antarctic Treaty. Furthermore, Article 5 of the
Antarctic treaty emphasizes that the nuclear arms should be totally excluded from
Antarctic. It states that “Any nuclear explosion in Antarctica and the disposal there of
radioactive waste material shall be prohibited.” 1009 This article directly prohibits any
nuclear explosion, whether as a test, such as the French tests in Mururoa, or during armed
conflicts, such as the explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Furthermore, it can be used
as a legal basis for prohibiting any dumping of radioactive waste materials, whether
produced by peacetime activities or during armed conflicts. However, the treaty does not
prevent the peaceful use of Antarctica. 1010
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Here, it is relevant to refer to the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources 1011 (CCAMLR) which was concluded as a result of the failure
of the Antarctic Treaty to refer specifically to the ocean surrounding the continent. 1012
The goal of CCAMLR is outlined in Article II (2), which states that “the objective
of the Convention is conservation of Antarctic marine living resources, and that
harvesting of those resources is to take place only in accordance with named principles.
These principles are: […] the prevention or minimization of the risk of changes to the
marine ecosystem not potentially reversible over two or three decades.” 1013
CCAMLR includes no specific enforcement procedures to allow the
Commission 1014 to implement its measures. 1015 Nevertheless, Article X (2) provides that
“[t]he Commission shall draw the attention of all Contracting Parties to any activity
which, in the opinion of the Commission, affects the implementation by a contracting
Party of the objective of this Convention.” Article X (2) is the provision that most nearly
amounts to an enforcement mechanism. 1016
CCAMLR sets up a number of organs to facilitate its goal in conserving marine
living resources in the Southern Antarctic Ocean, including the Commission and a
Scientific Committee consisting of representatives of each contracting Party. 1017
Article XXIII of the CCAMLR encourages the participation of NGO’s and
intergovernmental organizations (IGO’s). Thus, both the Commission and the Scientific
Committee are required to cooperate with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
and “other Specialized Agencies.” 1018
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5) The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1019 is the first global
attempt to limit marine pollution in any comprehensive way. 1020 It took twelve years,
from its adoption in 1982 to its entry into force in 1994.
The Convention on the Law of the Sea contains aspirational language limiting the
use of the seas for peaceful purposes. 1021 Moreover, it devotes a specific part, XII, to the
“Protection and the Preservation of the Marine Environment.” 1022
Article 192 of the Convention states that “States have the obligation to protect and
preserve the Marine environment.” This obligation requires member States to protect the
marine environment, which can be done by enacting laws, modifying existing ones, and
refraining from committing any act that may cause destruction to the marine
environment. According to Article 194, member States are required to apply a number of
measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment, and are
required to harmonize their policies in order to achieve that goal.
Accordingly, Article 206 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea stresses the
growing international use of the environmental impact assessment. It states that “[w]hen
States have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities under their
jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution of or significant and harmful
changes to the marine environment, they shall, as far as practicable, assess the potential
effects of such activities on the marine environment and shall communicate reports of the
1019
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results of such assessments in the manner provided in article 205.” Thus, Article 206
requires Contracting Parties to prepare an EIA if the planned project may have a major
environmental impact on the marine ecosystem, and to provide access to the EIA to other
nations, so that they can examine the environmental threat of the project and discuss
either its cessation or alternatives in order to provide greater protection to the marine
environment. Article 206 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, like Principle 17 of
the Rio Declaration, requires the preparation of EIA for proposed activities that may have
a significant environmental impact.
Article 194 (2) outlines that: “States shall take all measures necessary to ensure
that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage
by pollution to other States and their environment, and that pollution arising from
incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas
where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention.”
That Article is similar to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, which
prohibits States from polluting other States’ environment.1023
Significantly, according to Article 236 of the Convention, warships, naval
auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or operated in non-commercial service by a
government are excluded from the jurisdiction of this convention.
The provisions of this Convention regarding the protection and
preservation of the marine environment do not apply to any
warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or
operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on
government non-commercial service. However, each State shall
ensure, by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing
operations or operational capabilities of such vessels or aircraft
owned or operated by it, that such vessels or aircraft act in a
manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with
this Convention. 1024

Apparently, this means that war on the marine environment is contrary to the
convention. But, since the whole point of the Convention is to protect the marine
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environment, that environment should be protected from military activities and
operations whether in peacetime or in times of armed conflict.

6) The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 1025 recognizes the
global consequences of ozone depletion and states in Article 2 (1) that “[t]he parties
shall…[p]rotect human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or
likely to result from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone
layer.” 1026 The Vienna Convention was a success in that it provides an umbrella treaty
regarding the ozone layer depletion, along with annexes on “Research and Systematic
Observation” and “Information Exchange.” 1027 The former Executive Director of UNEP,
Dr. Mostafa Tolba outlined:
This is the first global convention to address an issue that for the
time being seems far in the future and is of unknown proportions.
This convention, as I see it, is the essence of the anticipatory
response so many environmental issues call for: to deal with the
threat of the problem before we have to deal with the problem
itself. 1028
Moreover, the Vienna Convention applies to rocket emissions that cause ozone
depletion. However, its lack of specific restrictions does little to alleviate that threat.1029
Furthermore, following the adoption of the Vienna Framework Convention, the
efforts of Finland and Sweden produced a Resolution of the Vienna Conference in March
1985 to conclude a protocol regulating CFC’s. 1030 Therefore, a Protocol to the Vienna
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Convention calling for fifty percent reduction in the production 1031 and consumption 1032
of specified CFC’s over ten years period was adopted in Montreal in September 1987. 1033
However, even after the adoption of Montreal Protocol in 1987, two important
issues arose. The first regarded the Antarctic ozone hole that was reported by a British
research group in May 1985 1034 and confirmed by American satellite measurements in
late summer 1986. 1035 The hole was attributed to high chlorine levels in the stratosphere
over Antarctica. 1036 Such findings were confirmed after the meeting in Montreal which
resulted in partial coverage of the Antarctic hole finding in the Protocol. 1037 The second
issue arose from statement by highly populated States such as China and India that they
would never sign the Montreal Protocol because it does not provide substantive
assistance to developing countries. 1038 Since the protection of the ozone layer cannot be
achieved without cooperation between developing countries and industrialized States,
member States went on to negotiate the adjustments and amendments in the 1990 London
Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol. 1039
Warfare is the human activity that most menaces directly our environment,
particularly warfare operations that result in the release of substances and gases that
affect the ozone layer. One example is the burning of vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) at
the petrochemical plant 1040 during the NATO raids against former Yugoslavia. Military
use of CFC, especially during warfare, constitutes a breach to Article 2 (1) of the Vienna
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Convention. 1041 It also constitutes a breach of the Montreal Protocol and London
Amendments. 1042
The Montreal Protocol does more than prohibit military uses, however, its call for
reductions in CFC consumption and production covers all human activities whether
conducted by civilians or military as long as these activities can increase the ozone layer
depletion.
For instance in the United States, the protection of the ozone layer was a major
concern in the mid-1970s, leading to the prohibition of the use of CFC’s in aerosol
spraying. 1043

7) The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1044 (FCCC) is an
outgrowth of the Earth Summit. It has been described as one of the most important
accomplishments of the 1992 Summit. 1045 The FCCC has been ratified by 152 States and
the European Union. 1046 The Earth Summit took place at a time of international attention
to the environmental effects of the Iraqi atrocity during the Gulf War II, and that
circumstance was reflected in the content of the provisions of this convention. For
instance, the FCCC reaffirms, in its preamble, the principle of State “responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” 1047 This
Preambular paragraph reaffirms a State duty to refrain from harming another State’s
environment, in both peacetime and times of armed conflicts. Article 3 (3) goes beyond
this principle to incorporate a version of the precautionary principle. It provides that
“[t]he Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the
1041
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causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a
reason for postponing such measures…” 1048
The Framework Convention also addressed threats to air quality. It noted that, as
a result of the increment a use of fossil fuels by civilian and military sectors, “humans
began to interfere seriously in the composition of the atmosphere.” 1049 The burning of the
fossil fuels resulted in the production of about six gigatons of carbon annually in recent
years. 1050 Furthermore, anthropogenic activities have caused definite atmospheric
concentration of other greenhouse gases, such as “methane and nitrous oxides.” 1051 In
particular, military activities and operations, before, during, or after armed conflict, can
generate huge amounts of greenhouse gases such as methane, which contribute
significantly to global warming. Under the Framework Convention, belligerents should
take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize these activities.

8) The Convention on Biological Diversity
The Convention on Biological Diversity1052 was opened for signature at the Earth
Summit, on June 5, 1992. It was signed by 157 States. 1053 In an introduction to a volume
published jointly by the IUCN and the International Academy of the Environment in
Geneva, the Biodiversity Convention is called:
[…]simply an enabling document and treaty. It sets out what
governments have agreed on regarding mutual support to national
efforts to conserve the wealth of the planet, and collaboration to
enable biological resources to be developed and used to the
maximum possible benefit of people. 1054
1047
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The convention recognizes the fact that “biological diversity is being significantly
reduced by certain human activities.” 1055 The environmental effects caused by the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait, the major event that overshadowed the climate of the Earth Summit,
led the parties to agree that environmental warfare is one of the human activities that
reduces biological diversity. The Bio-Diversity Convention states that “it is vital to
anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of significant reduction or loss of biological
diversity at the source,” 1056 a statement that certainly includes armed conflict activities.
Article 3 of the Bio-Diversity Convention places on States the responsibility for
environmental effects of military activities under their jurisdiction, including activities in
maneuver areas or occupied territories. It states that “[States have] the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” 1057
Furthermore, Article 4 (b) applies to activities that affect biological diversity regardless
of where their effect occurs. That Article places responsibility on any nation for
“processes and activities, regardless of where their effects occur, carried out under its
jurisdiction or control, within the area of its national jurisdiction or beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.” 1058 Unlike damages occurring within a nation, damages occurring
beyond the national jurisdiction require specific measures for the conservation and
sustainable use of bio-diversity. For example, Article 5 states that “[e]ach Contracting
Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate, cooperate with other Contracting
Parties, directly or, where appropriate, through competent international organizations, in
respect of areas beyond national jurisdiction and on other matters of mutual interest, for
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.” 1059
Responding to Article 19 (3) of the Bio-Diversity Convention, 1060 member States
adopted the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological

1055

Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note (374) pmbl.
Id.
1057
Id., art. 3.
1058
Id., art. 4 (b).
1059
Id., art. 5.
1060
“The Parties shall consider the need for and modalities of protocol setting out appropriate procedures,
including, in particular, advance informed agreement, in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of
any living modified organism resulting from biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the
1056

184

Diversity. 1061 The precautionary principle plays a fundamental role in this protocol, 1062
which has been confirmed in Article I of the Biosafety Protocol.
In accordance with the precautionary approach contained in
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, the objective of this Protocol is to contribute to
ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe
transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting
from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking
also into account risk to human health, and specifically focusing
on transboundary movements.” 1063
The precautionary principle requires member States to take necessary measures to
assure the safety of biodiversity, and to protect the environment even in the absence of
any proved specific damage. Accordingly, any use of modern technology that may have
adverse effects on conservation and sustainable use of Bio-Diversity should be prevented.
For example, the development of certain arms may considered a violation of the
principle, and therefore, illegal, if those weapons are likely to have adverse effects on the
sustainable use of biological diversity.
Finally, the Bio-Diversity Convention reinforces the EIA concept in Article 14 (a)
which requires an EIA for proposed projects that are likely to have substantial adverse
impacts on biological diversity. Article 14 further requires public participation in the
preparation of EIA to ensure that the environmental consequences of proposed activities
are taken into consideration.

9) Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage
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(374) art. 19 (3).
1061
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, January 29, 2000, available
at <http://www.biodiv.org/biosafe/Protocol/html/Biosafe-Prot.html>, (last visit March 11, 2000)
[hereinafter Biosafety Protocol].
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David P. Fidler, Challenges to Humanity’s Health: The Contributions of International Environmental
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The Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1064
is an attempt to protect the irreplaceable items of nature and cultural heritage for all the
people of the world, on an international scale. 1065 Article 6 (3) of the Cultural and Natural
Heritage Convention states that “[e]ach State Party to this Convention undertakes not to
take any deliberate measures which might damage directly or indirectly the cultural and
natural heritage referred to in Articles 1 and 2 situated on the territory of other States
Parties to this Convention.” 1066 Thus any destruction of cultural 1067 or natural heritage 1068
during armed conflict should be interpreted as a violation of this provision. However,
Article 6 (3) explicitly links Convention membership and damage to the natural and
cultural heritage. That is, the protection offered by this provision extends to member
States only; non-members, cultural and natural heritage are not covered by this
protection. For example, Iraq, a signatory of this convention, 1069 deliberately burned
Kuwaiti oil wells, and spilled oil into the Gulf waters, which damaged the natural
heritage of Convention signatories: Saudi Arabia, 1070 Iran, 1071 and other countries. 1072
The Iraqi atrocity during the Gulf War II threatened species of plants and animals of
outstanding universal value, such as dolphins, sea turtles, birds, plankton, and dugongs.
1064

Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 23, 1972,reprinted in
Sellected Multilateral Treaties in the Field of the Environment 276 (A. Kiss ed.,
1983) [hereinafter Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention].
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Id., pmbl. & art. 6 (1).
1066
Id., art. 6 (3).
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the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding
universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view.” Id., art. 1.
1068
“For the purposes of this Convention, the following shall be considered as “natural heritage”: natural
features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such formations, which are of
outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view; geological and physiographical
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precisely delineated natural areas of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science,
conservation or natural beauty.” Id., art. 2.
1069
Iraq signed the Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention since Dec. 17, 1975.
1070
Saudi Arabia signed the Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention since Nov. 7, 1978.
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In addition, military operations during the war impacted marine biological systems, and
other natural sites of beauty. 1073 Nevertheless, the State of Kuwait, which was subject to a
considerable destruction to its cultural and natural heritage, such as the Seif Palace and
the national and the scientific Museums of Kuwait, has no protection under the
Convention because Kuwait, to date, is not a party to this Convention. The importance of
the natural and cultural heritage of non-member States could be recognized by revision of
the language of the Convention, thus protecting areas of international importance
regardless of any single nation’s internal political situation.
Furthermore, as long as the protection of the cultural and natural heritage involves
two States or more, Article 6 (3) is concerned. But where the cultural and natural heritage
is threatened in an internal armed conflict within the territory of one nation, Article 6 (3)
does not apply. However, internal armed conflicts are subject to Article 4, which states
that

“[e]ach State Party to this Convention recognizes that the duty of
ensuring the identification, protection, conservation, presentation
and transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural
heritage referred to in Articles 1 and 2 and situated on its
territory, belongs primarily to that State. It will do all it can to
this end, to the utmost of its own resources and, where
appropriate, with any international assistance and co-operation, in
particular, financial, artistic, scientific and technical, which it
may be able to obtain.” 1074
Thus, Article 4 imposes a duty on each State to protect and conserve cultural and
natural heritage situated in its territory. 1075 This duty requires national authorities to
refrain from causing any damage to the natural and cultural heritage defined by this
convention. Thus, when the Iraqi Republican Guards damaged holy places in South Iraq,
Najaf and Karbala, the Convention should have had full application under Article 4. The
same result should have followed in Iraq also, where Saddam Hussein, in order to combat
opponents in South Iraq, drained the Southern marshes, and destroyed the unique culture
1073
1074

Id.
Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention, supra note (1064) art. 4.
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of the Marsh Arabs, 1076 which affected the marine ecological life in Southern Iraq and the
Gulf in which these waters end. Similarly, the Convention should have applied when, in
March 2001, Taliban authorities in Afghanistan destroyed the Buddhas of Bamiyan, a
cultural monument that reflected Afghan cultural property. 1077 Moreover, the destruction
of the Buddhas of Bamiyan led to widespread calls for improving the protection of the
cultural heritage. The Director General of UNESCO described such act as “a crime
against the common heritage of humanity” and various calls have been made to adopt a
new legal convention to ensure the prevention of such crimes and their punishment. 1078

10) The United Nations Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
The Basel Convention was adopted by 116 member States of the United Nations
on March 22, 1989, 1079 in Basel, Switzerland. The Basel Convention is a
comprehensive effort to limit waste transportation across boundaries of U.N. member
States and to promote disposal of hazardous waste in an “environmentally sound
manner.”
Article 2 (8) of the Convention provides that the “[e]nvironmentally sound
management of hazardous wastes or other wastes means taking all practicable steps to
ensure that hazardous wastes or other wastes are managed in a manner which will
protect human health and the environment against adverse effects which may result
from such wastes.”
Moreover, the third and the seventeenth paragraphs of the Convention’s
preamble requires the reduction of hazardous waste generation, by stating that the
parties are “[m]indful also that the most effective way of protecting human health and
1075
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the environment from the danger posed by such wastes is the reduction of their
generation to a minimum in terms of quantity and/or hazard potential,” and “[a]ware of
the need to continue the development and implementation of environmentally sound
low-waste technologies, recycling options, good house-keeping and management
systems with a view to reducing to a minimum the generation of hazardous wastes and
other wastes.” Therefore, the Basel Convention tries to minimize the problem at its
source before severe environmental effects.
Each contracting party to the convention must implement national legislation to
assure compliance with the convention’s provisions and to assure that hazardous waste
generation is minimized according to the economic, technological, and social forces in
each State. 1080
The Basel Convention further identifies the conditions under which
transboundary movement of hazardous waste is allowable, in order to limit its dangers.
Article 4 (9) of the convention states that:
Parties shall take the appropriate measures to ensure that the
transboundary movement of hazardous waste only be allowed if:
(a)The State of export does not have the technical capacity and
the necessary facilities, capacity or suitable disposal sites in order
to dispose of the wastes in question in an environmentally sound
and efficient manner; or
(b)The wastes in question are required as a raw material for
recycling or recovery industries in the State of import; or
(c)The transboundary movement in question is in accordance
with other criteria which do not differ from the objectives of this
Convention.

Furthermore, Article 10 calls for international cooperation in the reduction of
waste generation and transport. 1081 Significantly, parties are required to cooperate in
making information available for the harmonization of technical standards and codes of
practice, 1082 observing hazardous waste management impacts on human health and the
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Id., art. 4 para. 2 (a)
Id., art. 10.
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environment, 1083 and developing, implementing, and transferring new low-waste
technologies 1084 for the benefit of developing States. 1085 Thus, Article 10 clearly urges
member States to use their national laws to advance environmental protection.
Remarkably, the Basel Convention does not include a liability provision under
which parties could be held liable for hazardous waste transport in violation of the
convention. 1086
The convention states that parties will adopt guidelines which “set out
appropriate rules and procedures in the field of liability and compensation for damage
resulting from the transboundary movement and disposal of hazardous wastes and other
wastes.” 1087 However, a liability protocol for the convention has not yet been adopted.
It can be argued that the liability for any damage resulting from the
transboundary transportation of hazardous waste should rest upon the State of
export. 1088 According to customary international law, 1089 the State of export is “liable
regardless of the lawfulness of the underlying act.” 1090 That customary law could apply
equally to military operations, so that an exporting State could be held liable for any
harmful act with regard to a transboundary transportation of hazardous waste.

11) Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and
Aircraft
State parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, 1091 “pledge themselves to take all possible steps to
prevent the pollution of the sea by substances that are liable to create hazards to human
health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere
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with other legitimate uses of the sea.” 1092 Accordingly, substantive action is required by
member States to prevent serious pollution caused by dumping substances into the
marine environment. Marine pollution is considered serious when it threatens human
health or aquatic life, or interferes with the legitimate use of the sea. The Prevention of
Marine Pollution Convention establishes levels of hazardous substances. It divides
hazardous substances into two categories: the first category is completely prohibited
from being dumped. The second one includes substances that can be dumped only upon
permission. 1093 The Convention does not exclude governmental ships or aircrafts from
its application; 1094 thus it also applies to military vessels. Nevertheless, such provisions
are waived “in case of force major due to stress of weather or any other cause when the
safety of human life or of a ship or aircraft is threatened,” 1095 which frequently occurs
in times of armed conflicts. To give the Convention full application, therefore, State
responsibility should be raised in these circumstances, or at least for the cleanup of the
contamination sites.

12) Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration

The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in
Stockholm on June 16, 1972, 1096 adopted a Declaration to protect the environment.
The Stockholm Declaration as a written document is considered a soft law instrument.
However, Principle 21 has been accepted internationally as a part of the hard law. 1097
It requires nations not to harm another nation’s environment, by stating that:
1092

Id., art. 1.
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States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental
policies and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other states or of areas beyond the limit of national
jurisdiction. 1098
Principle 21 recognizes the right of each State, without any interference from
another nation, to capitalize on its resources. However, this right is restricted by a
state’s mandatory responsibility not to harm another nation’s environment, and not to
allow territories under their jurisdiction to do so. 1099 Principle 21 provides a legal
basis for addressing a State’s responsibility for transboundary environmental
pollution. Under this Principle, the Security Council, in its Resolutions 686 and 687,
held Iraq liable for environmental damage.
Consequently, Principle 21 is generally accepted to be a restatement of a
general principle of international law. General principles are binding on all States. 1100
The US agrees that it should be bound by this principle. 1101
Similarly, Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration 1102 states that:

States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental
and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage

Guruswamy et al. Eds., International Environmental Law and World Order, A
Problem-Oriented Coursebook 341 (1999) [hereinafter Guruswamy et al. Eds.].
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1100
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1101
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to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. 1103
Principle 2 is intended to apply both in times of armed conflict and peacetime,
as indicated by the fact that the Rio Declaration was adopted in 1992, under the
pressure of the environmental damage caused by Iraqi soldiers in Gulf War II.
Principle 21 and Principle 2 make it clear that States are responsible for acts
committed on their territories, or under their jurisdiction, that harm the environment
including the environment of other States. Accordingly, nations can be held
responsible under those Principles for any environmental damage caused by such
activities.

13) International Organizations’ Resolutions

International organizations can adopt binding resolutions, hard law, through
their main organs. For instance, by virtue of the power explicitly authorized by the U.N.
Charter to the Security Council,1104 the latter has the right to adopt binding
resolutions. 1105 Thus, any violation of such resolutions also amounts to a violation to the
Charter itself, which granted such power. For example, Resolution 686/1991 demanded
that Iraq provide all information and assistance to the U.N. in identifying any chemical
or biological weapons in Kuwait, Iraq, and the adjacent waters, 1106 in order to facilitate
the mission of protecting and rehabilitating the environment. That Resolution is
considered mandatory, i.e., an instrument of hard law. In addition, the Security Council
Resolution 687/1991 1107 placed responsibility on Iraq for environmental degradation,
another example of a binding resolution. 1108
Nevertheless, although the U.N. General Assembly is vested with
recommendatory powers, it can still adopt resolutions that are binding on member
1103

Id.
“1. There are established as the principle organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security
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States and authorized by the Charter. However, in an advisory opinion, the ICJ declared
that
[…]the function and powers conferred by the Charter on the
General Assembly are not confined to discussion, consideration,
the initiation of studies and the making of recommendations; they
are not merely hortatory. Article 18 deals with ‘decisions’ of the
General Assembly ‘on important questions.’ These ‘decisions’ do
indeed include certain recommendations, but others have
dispositive force and effect. 1109
Similarly, in another advisory opinion, the ICJ stated that “it would not be
correct to assume that, because the General Assembly is in principle vested with
recommendatory powers, it is debarred from adopting in specific cases within the
framework of its competence, resolutions which make determinations or have operative
design.” 1110
This authority under the U.N. Charter is similar to that of the European Union.
According to Article 14 paragraph three of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community of 1951, “[r]ecommendations shall be binding as to the aims to be
pursued but shall leave the choice of the appropriate methods for achieving these aims
to those to whom the recommendations are addressed.” 1111 Thus, as a policy matter,
recommendations of the Community’s High Authority are legally binding according to
the treaty itself.

b. International Regional Hard Law Instruments
Regional hard law instruments that have provisions applicable in times of armed
conflict include: The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, The
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Convention on the Environmental Impact
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Assessment in a Transboundary Context, The Kuwait Regional Convention for
Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution and its
Protocols, The Association of South East Asian Nations Agreement on the Conservation
of Nature and Natural Resources, the Regional Convention for the Conservation of the
Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, and the Bamako Convention on the Ban of
Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of
Hazardous Wastes within Africa. We will also look at the General Policies and Principles
of Environmental Protection in the Gulf Cooperation Council.

1) The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution of 1979, 1112
negotiated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE), applies
only to European States, in addition to Canada and Russia, while considering that
atmospheric pollution is capable of affecting areas far beyond the European continent. 1113
The Convention defines “air pollution” broadly, as any introduction by man into the air,
whether direct or indirect, of substances or energy which may result in degradation of the
environment and cause harm to humans, living resources, and material property or
interfere with legitimate use of the environment. 1114 “Long-range” air pollution is defined
by the convention as air pollution that originates within, wholly or in part, the jurisdiction
of one State and results in adverse effects within the jurisdiction of another. 1115 The
Transboundary Air Pollution Convention aims at limiting, reducing and preventing air
pollution, both local and long range. 1116 To this end, the convention requires the
Contracting Parties to “protect man and his environment against air pollution [and]
endeavor to limit and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution
1112
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including long-range transboundary air pollution.” 1117 As the concept of exchange of
information has gained recognition in international practice, the Transboundary Air
Pollution Convention promotes cooperation among member States in the exchange of
information, research and monitoring, and the development of policies to combat air
pollution. 1118 For example the Contracting Parties concluded the Protocol Concerning the
Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or their Fluxes, 1119 which aims at reducing
nitrogen oxides (NO) emissions from major stationary and mobile sources such as
combustion plants, gas turbines, and motorized vehicles. 1120
Furthermore, Article 8 of the Convention requires member States to exchange
available information, including “major changes in national policies and in general
industrial development, and their potential impact, which would be likely to cause
significant changes in long-range transboundary air pollution.” 1121 Thus, the Convention
actively seeks to promote exchange of information as part of the EIA.
As the Transboundary Air Pollution Convention and its Protocols bind only
European signatories, in addition to Canada and Russia, it may be inconsistent with
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, which prohibits all nations from causing
damage to the environment of other States. Principle 21 recognizes that environmental
harm does not respect any international borders, and that worldwide cooperation is
necessary to address that problem. The Transboundary Convention being much more
limited, can have only a limited impact on such pollution.

2) The Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters
The Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Åarhus Convention) of
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1998 1122 is an important treaty negotiated by the UN/ECE that combines NEPA-like
EIA with Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and judicial review requirements. 1123
According to the Åarhus Convention, information shall be made available to the
“public,” which is defined as “one or more natural or legal persons, and, in accordance
with national legislation or practice, their associations, organizations or groups.” 1124
Thus, if there is any imminent threat to human health or the environment all the
information that could enable the public to take measures to prevent or mitigate harm
must be made available. 1125 The public “shall” participate in environmental decisionmaking processes in order to provide for a complete environmental awareness among
citizens. And finally, members of the public are granted the right to seek judicial review
of decisions affecting the environment.
The Åarhus Convention is consistent with Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration,
which provides for public participation in decision-making processes in environmental
matters, access to information concerning the environment, and effective access to
judicial and administrative proceedings. Åarhus Convention was signed by thirty-nine
States and the European Community (EC). 1126 It is not yet in force, but the signatories
affirmed their support for it in their first meeting in Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, on
April 19-20, 1999. 1127
The Convention safeguards the right of citizens to request access to information
on the environment “without an interest having to be stated.” 1128 Contracting Parties
shall ensure that: “[I]n the event of any immediate threat to human health or the
environment, whether caused by human activities or due to natural causes, all
information which could enable the public to take measures to prevent or mitigate harm
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arising from the threat and is held by a public authority is disseminated immediately and
without delay to members of the public who may be affected.” 1129
However, since the general format of the Åarhus Convention follows the
Council Directive 90/313 EEC on access to information relating to the environment, 1130
The Convention exempts armed forces of the Contracting Parties from providing
information to the public regarding their activities even if such activities may cause
significant environmental impacts.
In effect, the Council Directive 90/313/EEC includes a vague list of exceptions
that allow the Contracting Parties to refuse a request for public information affecting,
for example, “the confidentiality of the proceedings of public authorities, international
relations and national defense, public security […].” 1131 In light of those exceptions,
military authorities can refuse requests for information disclosure. This situation also
applies to Åarhus Convention, which reflects the Council Directive 90/313.
The Åarhus Convention’s provisions are strong insofar as they permit the public
free access to information and participation in the decision-making process. However,
since the Convention exempts military authorities, for reasons of public security and
national defense, from its provisions, the environmental protection provided by the
Convention is so far only limited effectiveness.

3) The Convention on the Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context
The Convention on the Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context of 1991, 1132 negotiated by the UN/ECE, applies only in Europe, the United
States and Canada. It addresses problems that arise from the effect of one country’s
activities on the environment of a neighboring country. This convention enumerates
seventeen activities that have potential environmental impact outside the territory of the
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source State, 1133 including, “nuclear power plants and storage facilities; major
installations for the initial smelting of cast-iron and steel and for the production of nonferrous metals; integrated chemical installations; large-diameter oil and gas pipeline;
and waste disposal installations for the incineration, chemical treatment, or landfill of
toxic and dangerous wastes[.]” 1134 Although the Convention does not expressly address
military activities, it necessarily has application to those activities, since even in
peacetime, military bases and installations generate tons of toxic materials, and store
nuclear weapons and agents.
The convention requires the contracting parties to prevent and control
environmental damage resulting from activities that have transboundary effects by
preparing EIA 1135 and notifying any party that could be affected by such activities. 1136
This Convention is also consistent with Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration, which requires nations not to harm other nations’ environment while
conducting activities that have extraterritorial environmental impact, or outside their
national jurisdiction. Principle 21 is not limited to a specific region or continent, while
the Environmental Impact Assessment Convention applies only to Europe, the U.S., and
Canada.

4) Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Pollution
The Arabian Gulf is one of the world's most vulnerable and fragile ecosystems,
since its waters are shallow, it is virtually landlocked, and it receives almost no rain or
fresh water. There is very little flushing in the Gulf; therefore, pollution is not easily
dissipated. 1137 Because of the vulnerable nature of this marine environment, the states of
the region 1138 concluded a regional convention dealing with the Gulf water protection.
1133
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The convention was concluded at Kuwait on April 24, 1978, and entered into force on
June 30, 1979.
The Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the
Marine Environment from Pollution 1139 is a regional convention that binds the Gulf
States, which are: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates. This convention applies in peacetime as well as in times of
war. 1140
Articles III (a), IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII of the Kuwait Regional Convention
require member States to take all appropriate measures to prevent, abate, and combat
pollution of the marine environment. 1141 Under those provisions, the Iraqi armed forces,
during their occupation of Kuwait, violated the Convention by engaging in a number of
military activities that harmed the marine environment. For example, Iraq intentionally
polluted the marine environment of the Gulf by spilling millions of barrels of Kuwaiti
crude oil into the Gulf, 1142 and mining the Gulf with thousands of explosive devices. 1143
These operations violated the Convention because they polluted the Gulf water, and
killed the marine life.
Moreover, Article XV appears to provide a basis for broad application of the
Convention. Under Article XV, “[n]othing in the present convention shall prejudice or
affect the rights or claims of any contracting State in regard to the nature or extent of its
maritime jurisdiction which may be established in conformity with international
law.” 1144
However, notwithstanding the clear language of the Convention, it was not
applied to address the marine environmental harm caused during the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait. One major raison for that result is that the signatory nations have widely
divergent political relations with the Iraqi government, and thus were unable to arrive at
a consensus, despite the Regional Convention. The United Nations Compensation
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Committee, involving nations outside the Gulf Region, has proven to be more affected
mechanism for assessing responsibility.
Under the Regional Convention, disputes between member States may be settled
through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their own choice. 1145 Otherwise, an
ad hoc Judicial Commission for the Settlement of Disputes can be established by the
Council. 1146
To update and increase the member States’ cooperation in the field of
environmental protection, a number of protocols have been annexed to the Convention.
These Protocols are: (1) Protocol of Regional Cooperation to Combat Pollution by Oil
and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of an Emergency, (2) Protocol on the Protection
of Marine Environment from Pollution Derived from Land-Based Sources, (3) Protocol
on the Control of Marine Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their
Disposal, and (4) Protocol Relative to the Marine Pollution Caused from Exploring and
Exploiting the Continental Shelf.
Article XI (a) of the Convention provides that each member State shall include an
assessment of the potential environmental impact of any proposed activity or project
within its territory, particularly in the coastal areas.
Moreover, Article XI (b) of the Convention states that “[t]he Contracting States
may, in consultation with the secretariat, develop procedures for disseminating of
information of the assessment of the activities referred to in paragraph (a).” That
information would allow each contracting party to monitor the marine projects of other
parties that may have potential environmental impact.
However, despite the signing of the Kuwait Regional Convention, the marine
environment of the Gulf has yet to be accurately assessed. 1147 The Gulf States should
strengthen their environmental laws and standards, conduct research to identify threats to
the marine environment and practicable ways to prevent them, and to study the integrated
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coastal zone management (ICZM) laws, EIA laws, and pollution control laws of other
regions. 1148

5) The Association of South East Asian Nations Agreement on the Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources
In 1985, the member States of ASEAN signed this Agreement in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, 1149 recognize the importance of natural resources for present and future
generations. The convention is not yet in force; however, while it was pending, many
wars have taken place in the ASEAN region.
Article 10 of the convention declares that member States should prevent
environmental degradation. 1150 Article 11 defines the environmental harm caused by
discharges or emissions of pollutants and encourages the contracting parties to prevent
and reduce such discharges. 1151 More significant, however, Article 20 (1)(2) states that:
1. Contracting Parties have in accordance with generally accepted
principles of international law the responsibility of ensuring that
activities under their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage
to the environment or the natural resources under the jurisdiction
of other Contracting Parties or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
2. In order to fulfill this responsibility, Contracting Parties shall
avoid to the maximum extent possible and reduce to the
minimum extent possible adverse environmental effects of
activities under their jurisdiction or control, including effects on
natural resources, beyond the limits of their national jurisdiction.
This Article reflect Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, which prohibits
each State from harming another nation’s environment. Although the ASEAN
Agreement does not specifically address environmental harm caused by armed conflict,
its provisions are broad enough to encompass such harm.
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6) Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden
Environment
The Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden
Environment 1152 was concluded by some of the Arab States situated adjacent to the Red
Sea and the Gulf of Aden, including Sudan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Yemen,
and Somali. However, some other neighboring States are not parties to this convention,
including Djibouti, Eritrea, Egypt, and Israel. 1153 The region has witnessed a number of
armed conflicts among neighboring States, from the Egypt-Saudi conflict of 1960s, and
the Ethiopian-Somali conflict in 1990s, to the Arab-Israeli conflict which is still taking
place. There is no doubt that these armed conflicts affect the environment of this region.
But this convention does not respond to such needs.
The member States acknowledge, in the Preamble, the unique ecological
characteristics of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and the particular vulnerability of its
coral reefs where most biota exist.1154 The Preamble asserts that all States of the region,
not only member States, have the responsibility of the protection of the Gulf of Aden
and the Red Sea. 1155 In addition, the Preamble links industrial development and the
environment, by requiring that such development should not adversely affect the marine
environment, living resources, and human health. 1156 This text can be interpreted as the
legal basis to reduce and eliminate the development of the armament industry, which
has caused severe environmental effects on this body of water in peacetime and times of
armed conflicts.
Article III (1) declares that “[t]he Contracting Parties shall, individually or jointly,
take all appropriate measures, in accordance with the present Convention and those
protocols in force to which they are party, for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf
of Aden environment including the prevention, abatement and combating of marine
1152
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pollution.” It requires the Contracting Parties to take all the appropriate measures for the
conservation of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden environment. 1157 Consequently,
military activities that affect the marine environment of the region, including peacetime
operations, should be eliminated. Similarly, military operations during armed conflicts
that harm the environment of the region should be prevented too.
Moreover, this convention can be considered a legal basis to prevent the dumping
of military wastes in the region. For instance, Article V of the Convention states that
“[t]he Contracting Parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, abate and
combat pollution in the Sea Area caused by dumping of wastes and other matter from
ships and aircraft, and shall ensure effective compliance in the Sea Area with generally
recognized international rules relating to the control of this type of pollution as provided
for in relevant international conventions.” The Contracting States intended to prevent
such dumping whether conducted by their national authorities or by non-contracting
parties, as indicated by the language of Article V, which provides that “dumping of
wastes and other matter from ships and aircraft” which are not necessarily owned by the
Contracting Parties only, and from the illustration of the generally recognized
international rules that are relevant to the control of the marine pollution. The Convention
also prohibits discharges from land-based sources. 1158 It sets forth procedures that should
be follow in cases of emergencies. 1159
Finally, Article VIV (1) of the Convention declares that “[w]arships and other
ships owned or operated by States, only on government non-commercial service shall be
exempted from the application of the provisions of this convention.” 1160 This provision
places serious limits on the effectiveness of the Convention in protecting the marine
1157
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environment of the region. However, Article XIV (2) states that “Contracting Party shall,
as far as possible, ensure that its warships or other ships owned or operated by that Party,
and used only on government non-commercial service, shall comply with the provisions
of the present Convention.” 1161 Thus, although the Convention specifically exempts
military and other governmental vessels, it urges member States to take on that
responsibility as well, and can serve as a basis for affixing legal liability for
environmental damage caused by those vessels.

7) The Bamako Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa
As a consequence of the exploitation of the African countries as dumping grounds
for hazardous wastes generated by developed countries, which has been described as
“environmental injustice or environmental racism on a global scale,” 1162 the Organization
of African Unity (OAU) adopted the Bamako Convention on the Ban of Import into
Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous
Wastes within Africa, on January 29, 1991. 1163
This regional agreement was entered into by every African country except South
Africa and Morocco. 1164 The Bamako Convention prohibits all dumping of hazardous
wastes, including radioactive wastes at sea by the Contracting Parties within their
maritime zones. 1165 The Contracting Parties agreed to impose “strict, unlimited liability
as well as joint and several liability on hazardous waste generation.” 1166 Nevertheless, the
multiple civil wars in the region have in fact contaminated the marine environment as a
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result of the dumping of toxic materials in the sea from warships, aircraft, and
landmines. 1167
The Bamako Convention is the first agreement to adopt the “precautionary
approach.” Article 4 (3)(f), states that

Each party shall strive to adopt and implement the preventive,
precautionary approach to pollution problems which entails, inter
alia, preventing the release into the environment of substances
which may cause harm to humans or the environment without
waiting for scientific proof regarding such harm. The parties shall
cooperate with each other in taking the appropriate measures to
implement the precautionary principle to pollution prevention
through the application of clean production methods, rather than
the pursuit of a permissible emissions approach based on
assimilative capacity assumptions. 1168
The precautionary principle is one of the environmental law principles that extend
beyond the mechanisms existing in prior international instruments. 1169 As applied to
environmental damage caused by warfare, the principle would deter environmental
destruction during armed conflicts, rather than simply providing for a remedial plan after
such destruction. For example, that principle would require armed forces to avoid
attacking or destroying natural resources.
The Bamako Convention was designed to supplement and improve upon the
United Nations Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
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Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. 1170 That Convention was unanimously adopted by
116 member States of the United Nations in 1992. 1171 The Convention’s signatories
include most of the industrialized countries as well as many developing countries, but
remarkably, it includes one African State, Nigeria. 1172
The Convention calls for the environmentally sound management of hazardous
wastes. It calls upon its signatories to “take all practical steps to ensure that hazardous
wastes or other wastes are managed in a manner which will protect human health and the
environment against adverse effects which may result from such wastes.” 1173
The Bamako Convention is an attempt to redress the weakness of the Basel
Convention which was remarked by the OAU. 1174 For example, the Convention makes it
illegal to export toxic waste to Africa, 1175 and it criminalizes acts of importing wastes by
any African nation. 1176

8) General Policies and Principles of Environmental Protection in the Gulf Cooperation
Council
The principles of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) requires member states to
coordinate their policies to realize a better future through their unity. 1177 This
coordination of national policies includes environmental policies, particularly the
protection of the Gulf marine environment. Oil pollution in the Gulf is about 3% of the
global total, or 50 times the average elsewhere for a marine environment of its size. 1178

Beach oil, floating oil, and oil on coral reefs occur. High
concentrations of heavy metals have been recorded in biota and
sediments. Recently reported arsenic levels in fish in certain Gulf
areas are among the highest recorded in literature. Coastal
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resources such as shrimp and fin-fisheries are being degraded by
extensive dredging and associated sedimentation. Even the Gulf’s
air is threatened by natural gas flaring and the burning of solid
waste which contribute to both local and regional environmental
problems associated with the long-range transportation of
pollutants. 1179
To facilitate environmental cooperation in the region, the member states adopted
in December 1, 1985, a number of general policies and principles. 1180 These principles
include the preparation of an Environmental Impact Assessment for marine projects1181
and a precautionary plan to prevent marine pollution, 1182 particularly transboundary
pollution. 1183
The environment of the Gulf region is such that an action by any Gulf State will
affect other Gulf States. For instance, the release of about 1 million barrels of crude oil
into the Gulf waters by the Iraqi invaders in 1990, polluted the entire Gulf region,
requiring a coordinated response by all affected countries. The interconnectedness of the
region 1184 was recognized by the Secretariat General of the GCC, which launched an
Environmental Data Web Project among GCC members to facilitate the exchange of the
environmental information electronically.1185
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2. Soft International Law
The origin of the term “soft law” is attributed to Lord McNair. 1186 It is recognized
as a significant element of public international law, and a very rich source for the
environmental law. Soft law rules are not compulsory and do not bind any State.
Nevertheless, they have legal significance, 1187 although their legal power is often difficult
to identify clearly. 1188 Therefore, they have been described as “trouble makers” 1189 since
they are either not yet or not only law. 1190
The relatively short time period required to formulate soft law helps maintain
equity and justice in international law, because outmoded or unjust international norms
may be identified and addressed raised by soft law instruments. Thus, soft international
law can respond easily to scientific and technological developments. 1191 Since the 1950s,
and the emerging independence of many developing States, soft law has gained
increasing importance. In part, that emergence of soft law rules results from the increased
diversity of the international community. New nations have often urged that existing
international rules should be adapted according to the new composition of the
international society. 1192 More recently, NGO’s have emerged as strong advocates for
new soft law norms, and have influenced soft law development.
Although States are the sole bodies that are capable of creating hard law rules,
soft law rules can be created by NGO’s. 1193 For instance, the International Law
Association (ILA), or the Institute of International Law (IIL) can propose soft law rules
which do not necessarily coincide with State interests. Hybrid organizations, such as

1185

Shaker Mohammed, Alwatan Kuwaiti Daily Journal, Apr. 11, 2000, available at
<http://www.alwatan.com.kw/today/n12.html>.
1186
Blaine Sloan, General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later), Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 39,
106 (1987) [hereinafter Sloan].
1187
Jeffrey M. Pollock & Jonathan S. Jemison, The Emerging of International Environmental Law, 195Feb. N.J. Law. 25, 28 (1999) [hereinafter Pollock & Jemison].
1188
Dupuy, supra note (830) at 420.
1189
Id.
1190
See Societe Francaise Pour Le Droit International, L’Elaboration Du Droit
International Public (1975); E. Micwhinney, United Nations Law Making 78-79 (1984).
1191
Pollock & Jemison, supra note (1187) at 28.
1192
Dupuy, supra note (830) at 421.
1193
Id., at 423.

209

IUCN or ICRC, can adopt norms which are closer to soft law of the type characterized by
resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly. 1194
The development of soft law rules in the environmental field can facilitate the
eventual adoption of hard law. 1195 In particular, “[t]he basic role of soft law is to raise
expectations of conformity with legal norms, and to create uniformity in the creation of
these norms. Once there is compliance with a uniform legal norm, the formation of
binding hard law is a relatively simple task.” 1196
Soft law instruments can be described in terms of three categories: “(1) so called
‘non-binding’ agreements, such as the Helsinki accords, (2) ‘voluntary’ codes of conduct
for transnational corporations, and (3) resolutions of international organizations, of which
General Assembly resolutions are the leading example.” 1197 Soft law may be embodied in
declarations, action plans, draft articles, and resolutions. In the field of international
environmental law, the following soft law instruments are of particular importance:
a. The Stockholm Declaration

The Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment 1198 was approved in 1972 by 103 affirmative votes, and twelve abstentions,
without a single negative vote. 1199 Despite the fact that the Declaration does not address
war explicitly, 1200 it does not completely ignore environmental protection in times of
armed conflicts. The Declaration sets out several principles and recommendations
applicable to wartime activities. For instance, Principle 21 requires nations not to harm
another nation’s environment. Principle 21 is absolute, and actually restates a general
principle of international law applies both in peacetime and in times of armed
1194
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conflicts. 1201 Similarly, other Stockholm principles can and should apply in times of
peace or armed conflict. Principle 7 obligates States to take all possible steps to prevent
pollution of the seas by harmful substances, declaring that “States shall take all possible
steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to
human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.” 1202 In addition, Principle 22 requires
States to cooperate in developing mechanisms to compensate victims of environmental
damage caused by activities occurring within a particular State, which affect areas
outside that State. 1203 Further, Principle 24 urges cooperation between nations to prevent,
reduce, and eliminate adverse environmental effects resulting from international
conditions. 1204 Finally, Principle 26 addresses environmental protection in terms of the
use of the weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons but stating that “the
environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and other means of mass
destruction.” 1205

b. The Action Plan of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment
(1972) 1206

To supplement the principles expressed in the Stockholm Declaration, the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment created an Action Plan of 109
recommendations to protect the environment. The Action Plan outlines procedures for
States to implement the Stockholm Declaration. This Action Plan, which is considered
soft law, addresses environmental assessment, environmental management, and
supporting measures.
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Many of these recommendations urge the international community to prepare
environmental impact assessments. 1207 Five of the recommendations rely on the
“precautionary principle,” and “encourage countries to assess potential environmental
impacts before initiating any activities.” 1208 Although these recommendations are not
binding, the U.S. has agreed to them. The U.S. had earlier enacted the National
Environmental Policy Act in 1969, which requires all federal agencies to anticipate the
environmental consequences of their actions. Specifically, it requires agencies to
prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) before proceeding with any major
federal action that might significantly impact the quality of the human
environment. 1209 An EIS must set out adverse environmental effects the project will
cause. 1210 It also must clarify all reasonable alternatives to the proposed action. 1211
Such requirements embedded in NEPA are also expressed in the recommendations of
the Action Plan.
In 1985, when the European Community (EC) issued a directive requiring
member States to adopt national Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA). By that
time, France and Netherlands, in particular, had already adopted national EIA
laws. 1212 In France, some 4000-5000 EIA’s are prepared annually. 1213 In the
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Netherlands, the EIA law is annexed to the General Environmental Act (WABM) of
1979. It became effective in May 13, 1986. 1214 Those Specific laws reflect and
reinforce customary international law rules, which were themselves reaffirmed by
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration that a State’s activities shall not harm the
environment of another nation.
In addition, recommendation 3 of the Action Plan encourages nations to
consult their neighboring countries, if a project proposal might affect the environment
of such countries. 1215 This recommendation is consistent with the concept of NEPA
section 102 (2)(F), which recognizes the worldwide character of environmental
problems, and supports programs designed to increase international cooperation in
maintaining the quality of the human environment. 1216
Moreover, recommendation 74 (c) encourages international cooperation to
assist some governments, particularly those of developing countries, to promote
environmental protections. Thus, it implicitly supports the extraterritorial application
of national environmental laws, to help developing countries follow them as a model
and adopt them into their national planning processes.

c. The World Charter for Nature

The World Charter for Nature is a soft law instrument that was formulated by
the IUCN 1217 and adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1982, 1218 after some
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modifications from the IUCN proposal. 1219 The World Charter is not binding;
however, it reflects a general international law principle and extends it to cover
military activities in peacetime as well as in times of armed conflict. 1220 Principle 5 of
the Charter declares that “nature shall be secured against degradation caused by
warfare or other hostile activities.” 1221 Securing and maintaining the environment does
not mean only a prohibition of military atrocities in times of armed conflicts, but in
peacetime as well. Further, the Charter seeks to protect environmental interests prior
to any military activity by the preparation of EIA, in order to disclose any
environmental harm that might result from such activity. Principle 11 (a) states that
“activities which might have an impact on nature shall be controlled, and the best
available technologies that minimize significant risks to nature or other adverse effects
shall be used; in particular: (a) Activities which are likely to cause irreversible damage
to nature shall be avoided.” 1222 Additionally Principle 20 of the Charter prohibits
military activities that cause damage to nature. 1223
Significantly, Principle 21 (d) and (e) of the Charter reaffirm countries’ duty
not to harm another nation’s environment, either by activities within their territories or
under their control, which have impact in other countries. 1224 Therefore, military
operations during warfare should be considered with consideration foe the
environment of other nations, especially neutral parties. For instance, the
environmental effects of Gulf War II on neutral States, such as the Gulf Emirates, Iran,
India and Pakistan, resulting from the oil pollution in Kuwait, amounted to a severe
violation of Principle 21 of the Charter, as well as of Stockholm Declaration Principle
21.

1218

See G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7[hereinafter
The World Charter].
1219
Schmitt,, supra note (971) at 42.
1220
Anthony Leibler, Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage: New Challenges for International Law,
23 Cal. W. Int’l L. J. 67, 68 (1992) [hereinafter Leibler].
1221
The World Charter, supra note (1218) Principle 5.
1222
Id., Principle 11 (a).
1223
“Military activities damaging to nature shall be avoided.” Id., Principle 20.
1224
“Principle 21 of the World Charter provides that States shall “(d) Ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the natural systems located within other states or in the areas
beyond the limit of national jurisdiction. (e) Safeguard and conserve nature in areas beyond national
jurisdiction.” Id., Principle 21 (d), (e).

214

While some may argue that the World Charter for Nature is a soft law
instrument, and not yet binding on belligerents, nevertheless the World Charter was
adopted by a vote of 111 in favor to 1 against (the United States). 1225 The
overwhelming support for the World Charter reflects, to some degree, its more binding
nature. Further, according to some experts, the World Charter expresses a kind of
general principle of law recognized by the civilized nations, rather than merely an
aspiration. 1226 Finally, the preamble of the World Charter articulates “the common
standards by which all human conduct affecting nature is to be guided and judged.” 1227
Since, warfare is the human conduct most destructive of nature and natural resources,
it should be guided and governed by the standards set forth in the World Charter for
Nature.
d. The Rio Declaration 1228

On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Stockholm Conference in
1992, the United Nations sponsored the “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The
Earth Summit adopted the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the
Climate Change Convention, the Declaration of “non-binding” Principles on Forest
Conservation, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and Agenda 21. 1229
The Rio Declaration represents a restatement and reaffirmation of the
Stockholm Declaration. Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration iterates Principle 21 of the
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Stockholm Declaration, 1230 reflecting a general principle of international law that is
binding on all States.
The Earth Summit in1992 took place in a climate influenced by the
environmental effects of the Gulf War II and its decisions reflect that climate. Thus,
the Rio Declaration directly addresses environmental protection in times of armed
conflict. For example, Principle 24 states that “[w]arfare is inherently destructive of
sustainable development. States shall therefore respect international law providing
protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further
development, as necessary.” 1231
In light of warfare’s destructive consequences for sustainable development, the
Rio Declaration invokes the application of international conventions, customary law,
and general principles of law relevant to environmental protection in times of armed
conflict. The Declaration emphasizes the duty to respect fully the international and
regional environmental law instruments that were examined in the “Hard International
Law” Section. Moreover, Principle 24 goes beyond that and requires nations not only
to protect the environment in times of armed conflict, which may be accomplished
through negative action by avoiding unnecessary harm to the environment, but also
encourages positive environmental action as well. For instance, nations are urgent to
ensure that their armed forces take care to provide a suitable climate for endangered
species, or wildlife. They should also care for historical buildings and cultural
monuments. Thus, although it is aspirational rather than binding Principle 24 seeks to
engage nations in positive environmental activities.
Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration states that “[s]tates shall develop national
law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other
environmental damages. States shall also cooperate in an expeditious and more
determined manner to develop further international law regarding liability and
compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities within
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Principle 2 of Rio Declaration is considered as a general principle of international law, contrary to the
whole document, therefore Principle 2 have been examined earlier in Section “A. The Hard International
Law.”
1231
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their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction.” 1232 This provision
requires States to develop their national and international laws for liability and
compensation, because no such body of law yet exists. If this provision were followed,
States with military bases outside their territory would have responsibility for cleaning
up contaminated military sites abroad. Thus, for instance, U.S. military personnel
would be required to follow their stringent national environmental statutes anywhere
that they have bases, in order to assure the protection of the environment. Otherwise,
the U.S. international responsibility for environmental injury may not be effectively
recognized. Such a procedure would also be a recognition of the principle that global
environment is a common concern.
Finally, Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration states that “[n]ational authorities
should endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in
principle, bear the cost of pollution […].” 1233 This principle should apply equally to
wartime and peacetime environmental damage. 1234 In fact, it is easy to apply such
principle to peacetime activities. However, applying it to wartime activities is the real
dilemma, because countries seldom admit responsibility for environmental damage
after the war, and it is very difficult under international law to interfere with any
State’s own legal definition of liability. Nevertheless, under Principle 16, after any war
the invader armed forces should bear the cost of cleaning up the environment. And, in
fact, after the Gulf War II, Iraq was held liable by the U.N. for all the environmental
damage that affected Kuwait and neighboring countries.
e. International Organizations’ Resolutions

Some decisions of international organizations may be considered hard law,
such as the binding resolutions discussed earlier in Section A. However, international
organizations may adopt resolutions and recommendations that are considered soft law
and yet carry significant weight. For example, the U.N. General Assembly resolutions,
1232
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while not themselves legally binding (except those concerning the internal operations
of the U.N.), 1235 may constitute evidence of customary international law, particularly
if they are adopted unanimously, if they contain legally binding terms, or if the
document has been incorporated into other instruments and national laws. 1236 Judge
Hermann Mosler asserted such a view by stating that:
After quite a long fierce dispute it now seems that the extreme
views, on the one hand that resolutions have no binding effect at
all and on the other hand that they have a legislative effect, have
been abandoned and that a generally accepted view is emerging.
There can be no single answer to the question-resolutions must be
distinguished according to various factors, such as the intention
of the General Assembly, the content of the principles proclaimed
and the majority in favour of their adoption. 1237

Nonetheless, some of the General Assembly’s resolutions are mandatory on
member States as authorized by the Charter. Others have an operative role and create
obligations for contracting parties. 1238 Professor Oscar Schachter pointed out that in
the last few years, the United Nations’ practices witnessed binding character of some
of the General Assembly resolutions. “Typically, the [General Assembly…] submit
recommendations to [g]overnments, but an examination of such recommendation
reveals that many of them are accompanied by assertions of legal rights and
obligations under the Charter.” 1239 Such assertions are binding and characterize the
General Assembly resolutions to be binding too. 1240 These resolutions were
overwhelming accepted among States.
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It is clear that some General Assembly’s resolutions are more binding than
others. The can be said of resolutions adopted by other international organizations. For
example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an intergovernmental
organization that deals directly with the environmental effects of nuclear warfare. Its
General Conference has on several occasions adopted resolutions condemning any
possible attacks on nuclear plants, which would certainly harm the environment for
decades to come. 1241 For example, Resolution 407/1983 of the General Conference

1. Declares that all armed attacks against nuclear installations
devoted to peaceful purposes should be explicitly prohibited; and
2. Urges all [m]ember States to make, individually and through
competent international organs, every possible effort for the
adoption of binding international rules prohibiting armed attacks
against any nuclear installation devoted to peaceful
purposes[.] 1242

Additionally, Resolution 425/1984
2. Further considers that any threat to attack and destroy nuclear
facilities in Iraq and in other countries constitutes a violation of
the Charter of the United Nations and of the Statute of the
Agency[…], and
7. Reaffirms the right of all nations in exercising their right to
acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes
and for their development programme. 1243

Finally, Resolution 444/1985
2. Considers that any armed attack on and threat against nuclear
facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitute a violation of
the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law,
and the Statute of the Agency[…]
4. Affirms the reading of the international Atomic Energy
Agency to assist competent international organs, if they so
request, in any technical and safeguard aspects of the matter[.] 1244
1241
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Although these Resolutions are not legally binding instruments of hard law, the
U.N. General Assembly gave them legal force 1245 by declaring that such attacks were
the legal basis for an immediate Security Council intervention. 1246
Similarly, the twenty-seventh session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign
Ministers 1247 held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, June 27-30, 2000, adopted the nonbinding, but important, Resolution 40/27-P on the Situation in Regions of the Islamic
World Affected by Environmental Disasters, in Particular in the Basin of the Aral Sea
and the Region of Semipalatinsk. 1248 The Resolution aims at declaring the Aral Sea
and the Semipalatinsk a zones of global ecological catastrophe, in view of the loss of
second largest freshwater lake in the world and its impact on the climate of Northern
Hemisphere and Asia. The Resolution also expresses support for efforts to rehabilitate
the Aral Sea region. Such Resolution is not binding, but it still has a moral effect on
the concerned parties, since it was adopted unanimously.
Further, specialized non-governmental organizations are capable of
formulating and proposing soft law rules. For instance, the International Law
Association adopted a resolution, in 1976, to prohibit the destruction of water
installations containing dangerous materials, such as dams and dikes, when such
destruction may involve a grave harm to the civilian population or substantial damage
to the basic ecological balance. 1249 Despite the fact that this resolution is not binding,
it addresses international concerns about the environment in times of armed conflicts.
Specifically, it recognizes that no international instrument protects facilities that
contain dangerous materials other than radioactive materials or water, 1250 and seeks to
establish that Kind of protection.
1244
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D- Comparative Environmental Law
This section will examine examples of environmental laws of different nations as
they apply to military operations during times of armed conflict, and, during peacetime,
military used for civil defense in times of natural disasters. Some comprehensive
environmental rules, while formulated to be applied to civil activities, can be extended to
include military activities in some nations. Other nations still exclude the military from
compliance with environmental regulations, as we will discuss in the next few pages.
Examples will be drawn from the laws of Australia, Austria, Canada, India, Israel, Korea,
Netherlands, Nigeria, Russia Singapore, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.

the Use of the Environment as A Tool of Conventional Warfare (Ottawa, June
1991) on file with Stanf. J. Int’l L.
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In addition, it is necessary to refer to the European Union (EU) directives which
are then to be implemented by each State in the EU because the directives are simpler
than the laws of each State. The directives will show the customary practices of the EU
States, as a leading region of the world.
For the most part, in the United States and some of the EU States, environmental
laws broadly apply to every institution including the military. However, in developing
States environmental laws often apply to civilians only. In many developing countries,
the military is viewed as a necessary support for the State, and therefore civil authorities
are reluctant to impose restrictions on military activities. It is often true that the larger the
economy, the less power the military has, because the power shifts from people who have
guns to people who have money. And so, in Western Europe, North America and Canada,
the military is more likely to be subject to environmental and other regulations.
In States with a strong civilian environmental law system and a strong economy,
the military is subject to most environmental laws at least to the extent military necessity
does not override the environmental obligations. For example, in the case of the Gulf War
II, the U.S. and allies had military officers reviewing whether military operations would
endanger important cultural or natural heritage sites, and the U.S. government formulated
a “no-fire target list” of those sites. 1251 They would actually stop the bombing if they
thought it would damage such sites. So, there is an example, even in an active war, of
restraint on the military in the name of environmental and cultural protection.
India imposes similar legal restraints on its military. The Indian Territorial Army
(TA), charged with promoting and sustaining peace, consists of twenty-seven
departmental units among which are three ecological brigades called Eco-Task
Forces. 1252 The Eco-Task Forces upgrade depleted areas in Rajasthan, Jammu, and
Kashmir in collaboration with the Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests. 1253 Thus,
here is another example of cooperation between the defense and the environmental
national authorities to promote respect for, and protection of, environmental resources in
peacetime and in times of armed conflicts.
1251
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This concept should be adopted by other nations, specifically Islamic countries,
since such concept was practiced during the period of prophet Mohammed, not only to
protect nature but to protect civilians as well, when Muslim armies included an officer,
muhtasib, who had the specific duty to insure that “[t]rees are not burnt, nor unjustifiably
pulled out and that women, children, the elderly and unoffending priests or monks should
not be harmed. He also ascertains that water and medicine are given to the prisoners of
war.” 1254
However, the world abounds in examples of military operations conducted
without regard for environmental concerns. Even though the Red Cross and Red Crescent
go on to battlefields, they are very weak. However, this is really courageous that these
people going to such places where no one respects them. For instance, in April 2001, six
Red Cross nurses and aid workers have been shot to death in northeast Congo while they
were on a routine trip. 1255 They were four Congolese nationals, one Swiss and one
Colombian. The killings occurred in Ituri province, which is under the Congolese
Liberation Front control. 1256 It shows that the kinds of people that are committing such
crimes have no respect for the same rules that the army has respect for. In my view, the
only way we can help civil wars is to train civilian population, if civilian population
believes in nature protection, then they will prevent the rebels from destroying their
parks, or streams and polluting their rivers. In the civil war in Colombia, South America,
even some of the belligerents who have taken over parts of the country and establish civil
governmental controls have been reported to set up rules to protect fishing. 1257 So they
are fighting a war, but once they have control of the territory then they are managing
conservation questions, and in that case people understand that without managing our
fishing they will have no more fish, why should they win the civil war if they have no
more environment.
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Nations should take care to protect their environment, even during the chaos and
destruction of armed conflicts. Education must play an important role in accomplishing
that goal. What IUCN does in having many small NGO’s doing their public education
and shaping the minds of the people to respect nature so that when the State breaks down
or the government collapses, the values of the people are left. In the values of the people
the family is very important, people take care of their own family first. People love nature
too and this is just natural. So that if they are educated about ecology then they are more
apt to not pollute the water if they must drink it. And the more we can educate people to
respect nature, then during the absence of government, they will act to protect nature in
the same way they will act to protect their children.
It is in the nature of armed conflicts that the people see any one who is not
themselves as the enemy. The same can be said about the environment. There is a risk
that people will view the territory of the enemy as the enemy not as nature. For example,
in the Gulf War II, Saddam Hussein saw the ecology of Kuwait as part of the enemy, and
thus had no hesitation in firing the oil wells and destroyed so much of the environment.
This is a very old idea: in the Third Punic War of 149-146 B.C., after the Romans
conquered Carthage, they salted the land to sterilize its soil forever,1258 as though the land
itself was an enemy.
The U.S. made the same mistake in North Vietnam when they used napalm 1259 to
contaminate areas and destroy vast forest lands, 1260 with consequences that continue
today. The U.S. military at that time viewed the land of the enemy as part of the enemy,
and therefore felt free to destroy it. In fact, the land belongs to nature, and natural
systems everywhere are linked to each other. Destruction in one place has consequences
elsewhere.
On the other hand, some nations exercise little control over their own military
during armed conflicts. In those cases, only international force can interfere and enforce
international law. Even if the military is exempt from national environmental law,
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international law provides for the same duty, therefore, international force can be used for
environmental protection.
This Section will address the comparative environmental rules in the following
contexts: a. Comprehensive Environmental Rules Relevant to Military Activities, b.
environmental protection in general, c. environmental pollution, d. fauna and flora
protection, e. air pollution control, f. water resources conservation, g. soil pollution, h.
hazardous wastes, and i. citizen suits.

1. Comprehensive Environmental Rules Relevant to Military Activities

Generally, environmental law rules apply to all governmental sectors. As a rule,
the military, as one of the sectors that cause environmental degradation, is not exempted
unless provided so by a specific law. For example, under the Israeli Civil Wrongs Law of
1952, the State is “a corporation for the purposes of defining civil liability.” 1261 However,
it provides that “the State is not liable civilly for defamation, acts done during an army
war operation, or injuries or death of persons serving in the army.” 1262 Accordingly, the
environmental damage caused by the Army during war activities cannot result in
governmental liability.
Another example is found in Singapore, where the Arms and Explosives Act 1263
and its rules regulate the flow of arms and explosives. It provides that licenses are
required for the import, export, possession, manufacture and sale of any guns, arms or
explosives or poisonous or noxious gas. 1264 This requirement permits the State to control
the environmental effects of arms and explosives.
However, the Arms and Explosives Act specifically exempts Singapore armed
forces from its jurisdiction. Article 3 (1)(c) states that: “[n]othing in this Act shall apply
to any of the following persons or their equipment while in the course of their duty or the
employment: (i) members of the Singapore Armed Forces and of any visiting forces
1261
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lawfully present in Singapore; (ii) members of any naval, military, or air volunteer forces
established under any written law; (iii) members of any additional force established under
any written law providing for compulsory service in the defense of Singapore.” Thus, the
Singaporian armed forces are exempted from the Arms and Explosives Act despite their
extension use of arms, explosives, and poisonous or noxious gases. Thus, in order to
provide real environmental protection, the Arms and Explosives Act should include a
provision to cover even military use of such materials.
In the absence of such exclusions, the military must observe and comply with all
environmental laws. Where the military is subject to such regulations, military
participation in the work of national environmental agencies would facilitate cooperation
between the environmentalists and military authorities, and would encourage
environmental awareness among military officials. For example, in Nigeria, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is ex oficio a member of the Federal
Environmental Protection Agency. 1265 One of the agency’s goals is to “advise the Federal
Military Government on national policies and priorities and on scientific and
technological activities affecting the environment.” 1266 According to this provision, the
agency can advise the government about the environmental consequences of military
activities.
A different approach has been taken in Ukraine, where the environmental impact
assessment of proposed activities is regulated by a State ecological expertiza system, 1267
the existing Ukrainian system of environmental review. 1268 The 1991 Law on
Environmental Protection drew the framework for this system. 1269 Article 9 of that Law
provides for the right of Ukrainian citizens to participate in decision-making by
commenting on draft legislation relevant to the siting construction, or modification of
objects that might seriously harm the environment. 1270 Moreover, EIA was clearly
defined by the 1995 Law on Ecological Experiza, which declares that State ecological
1265
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expertizas are obligatory for “activities and facilities posing an increased ecological
hazard,” as listed by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. 1271 Additionally, Article 29 of
the Law on the Environmental Protection, prohibits implementation of any project
without the approval of the State ecological expertiza.

2. Environmental Protection in General

Environmental protection in general concerns all environmental elements without
focusing on a specific one, such as water, air, soil, or fauna and flora. The environmental
laws of many nations approach environmental questions from that general viewpoint.
For example, Article 2 (2) of the Korean Natural Environment Preservation Act
provides that “[t]he natural ecosystem shall be protected from any artificial damage and
pollution, and any damaged natural system shall be restored so as to perform its original
function[.]” 1272 This provision contains both precautionary and remedial measures to
protect the natural ecosystem. The precautionary goal is to protect the natural ecosystem
from artificial damage and pollution. The remedial measures are applicable when the
natural ecosystem has already been damaged. In this case, the Act requires that the
natural system shall be restored to perform its original function. Unfortunately, this
provision does not address other kinds of damage, such as the death of a person or the
ruin of a cultural monument.
Canadian law also contains both precautionary and remedial measures. In cases of
“unauthorized release or reasonable likelihood of unauthorized release in the environment
of a listed toxic substance, [the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) obliges]
any person who owns or has charge of the substance released, or who causes or
contributes to the release or likelihood of the release […] to report the release, to take all
reasonable emergency measures to prevent the release, to remedy or mitigate any danger
to the environment or to human life or health, and to notify any person who may be
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adversely affected.” 1273 As a precautionary measure, the Statute requires notice of the
incident and requires the taking of all reasonable measures to prevent the release. The
remedial measure is to remedy and mitigate any danger to the environment or to human
life or health.
Some other national laws go beyond these kinds of measures. For instance, the
Israeli Act of Prevention of Environmental Nuisance of 1992, besides the precautionary
measure of “refrain[ing] from causing or likely to cause the environmental nuisance, or to
desist from the act,” 1274 and the remedial measure of “repair[ing] damage or return[ing]
the situation to the state existing prior to the environmental nuisance,” 1275 requires person
causing the nuisance to “do everything necessary to prevent the recurrence of the
environmental nuisance.” 1276 The statute aims not only to prevent the occurrence of
environmental damage and remedy its effects, but also to avoid any recurrence. Although
the law is thus quite comprehensive in its approach, it apparently does not apply to
military operations. During the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israeli armed forces
have caused significant environmental damages without incurring liability under that
statute.
Generally, national environmental laws are applicable to private persons as well
as public agents, except in the cases of explicit exclusion. Article 2 of the Korean Basic
Environmental Policy Act provides that “[t]he fundamental idea is to have [not only the
citizens, but] the State, local governments […] make efforts to maintain and create the
environment in a better state[.]” 1277 Similarly, Article 24 of the Korean Environmental
Law addresses not only the citizens but the State too when provides that “[t]he State and
citizens shall make efforts so that the order and balance of the nature are maintained and
preserved […].” 1278 Basically, all Korean environmental laws apply to the Korean
military as an arm of the government. However, the military has a special status in
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environmental law. For example, the Korean military is exempted from EIA
requirements. And most of the Korean military data are restricted from public access
under the Administrative Information Disclosure Act. 1279 Moreover, Korean frontier
military bases are not subject to regular zoning regulations, including environmental
administration regulations, even though military bases can cause serious environmental
degradation to the surrounding soil and water resources from oil and other
contaminants. 1280
In contrast, some Russian environmental regulations do apply to the military. On
December 19, 1991, Russia adopted the comprehensive law On Environmental
Protection, which provides for various mechanisms including standards-setting,
permitting, and EIA requirements. The Russian military are obliged to obtain permits for
emission and other environmental impacts, just like other governmental organizations.
Their planned activities are subject to review by a commission of ecological experts, 1281
under the law On Ecological Expertise of 1995, 1282 just as the activities of other
governmental bodies.

3. Environmental Pollution

Environmental pollution can be caused by a wide variety of pollutants. Therefore
some national laws use general formulations to control all kind of pollutants. In the
Netherlands, “Royal Decrees can limit or restrict the manufacture, import, application,
availability, storage, trading, transportation, export, and disposal of substances and
products if there is a reasonable suspicion that there are undesirable effects for humans or
the environment.” 1283 This provision uses the general term “substances and products” to
cover any source of threat to the health and the environment. In emergency cases, where
the environment may be extremely damaged before a Royal Decree can be issued, the
1279
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provision vests in the Minister of Housing, Zoning and the Environment the power to
“issue such limitations or restrictions by means of ministerial decrees.” 1284 The statute
does not specifically exempt military activities from the scope of its effect.
Admittedly, all kinds of pollutants can harm the environment. However,
environmental pollution from hazardous substances, particularly those generated by the
military, such as nuclear weapons, chemical and bacteriological agents, present an
especially serious environmental threat. Some countries that have nuclear arsenals have
adopted rules that deal with the environmental safety of radioactive substances in
accordance with IAEA obligations.
For example, Article 9 of the Korean environmental law requires the government
to “take proper measures as to any environmental pollution by any radioactive substance
and prevention thereof.” 1285 Although that Article refers to pollution “by any radioactive
substance,” the military, a major generator of such substances, is not subject to
environmental regulations. Moreover, the Article does not make clear what measures
might be “proper.” Thus, the law appears to have a quite limited effectiveness.
Singapore has taken a different approach, by incorporating scientific expertise in
its system. Singapore established a “Radiation Protection Inspectorate”(RPI), under the
Department of Scientific Services, 1286 with responsibility for establishing guidelines for
the management and disposal of radioactive waste. 1287 Despite the importance of the
RPI’s works function, its competence is limited to radioactive wastes from laboratories
and hospitals. Military radioactive wastes are excluded from its competence.
Furthermore, another hazardous substances that cause serious environmental
pollution are the chemicals that often used by armed forces. Controlling activities that
deal with chemicals vary from one national system to another. Article 21 of the Korean
environmental law requires “[f]or the purpose of preventing any environmental pollution
by any chemical substance and danger and injury to the health, the government [is
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required to] work out measures to control properly harmful chemical substances.”1288
This provision did not indicate what are the necessary measures, and left to the
government a discretionary power to work them out. This discretionary power may
exclude some governmental facilities, such as military, from the chemical substances
control measures.
Canada’s approach to regulation of environmental pollution relies heavily on
disclosure of information about hazardous substances. For instance, Subsection 4(6) of
the Canadian Environmental Contaminants Act 1289 requires that information be provided
to the Federal Minister of the Environment by any person who manufactures or imports a
chemical compound in excess of 500 kg during a calendar year for the first time. 1290 That
information includes “a. [t]he date of manufacturing or importing; b. [t]he name of the
compound; c. [t]he quantity manufactured or imported during that year; and d. [a]ny
information in his possession respecting any danger to human health or the environment
posed by the compound.” 1291 This provision details the required information to be
delivered, including any related information respecting any danger to human health or the
environment. This provision also specifically addresses information needed to prevent or
remediate damage within and beyond the national jurisdiction, if it pose a danger to other
countries. However, limiting the applicability of this provision to only manufacturers and
importers of chemical compound in excess of 500 kg ignores the environmental effects
that can be caused by smaller amounts. On the other hand, the provision does apply to the
military’s handling of hazardous materials.

4. Fauna and Flora Protection

Fauna and flora are often damaged by military activities. Some national laws offer
general protection to this category, including protection from the effects of military
activities.
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The Environmental Law of Korea states in Article 25 (3) that “[t]he wild animals
and plants shall be protected and their species shall be preserved.” 1292 This Article offers
general protection for both animals and plants from any kind of threat, present or future.
The environmental law of Korea does not cover military activities nor it does exempt
them. However, as a rule, since Korea is one of the developing countries, its armed forces
are likely to be exempt from environmental laws and regulations. As a consequence, that
law does not cover the Korean military.
In Singapore, the Wild Animals and Birds Act prohibits certain activities,
including the killing, taking or keeping of any wild animal or bird without license. 1293
Licensing an activity is a method of controlling its effect on the environment. Therefore,
under the Act, the government can prevent activities that results in the “willful[] or
negligent[] [destr[uction], damage or defac[ing of] any object of zoological, botanical,
geological, ethnological, scientific or aesthetic interest.” 1294 Furthermore, the Act “sets
aside special areas as bird sanctuaries.” 1295 Since there is no specific provision in the
Wild Animals and Birds Act to exempt the military, it would appear to apply to military
activities as well. 1296 Additionally, in Singapore, according to the Military Maneuvers
Act, military exercises must not be conducted in nature reserves and catchment areas.
Article 7 of the Military Maneuvers Act provides that: “[n]o military maneuvers shall be
executed and no military encampment made on any land forming part of the catchment
area in connection with the impounding reservoir of any public waterworks or any land
set apart for the collection of water for the supply of any public waterworks.” That
provision provides significant protection to the nature reserves and protected areas from
even peacetime military operations. Moreover, Article 11 (1) of the Act provides for rules
to secure the safety and welfare of the public during military or air force exercises by
making specific rules. Parliament is empowered to make such rules when any “public
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right” 1297 is likely to be affected by such exercises. 1298 Thus, by application Parliament
can act to protect natural resources threatened by military operations.
Other national authorities have power that goes far beyond the power to license.
For example, in Australia, the South Australian National Parks and Wildlife Act of
1972, 1299 gives the minister the right to “create sanctuaries in order to protect animals and
plants he deems worthy of protection.” 1300 Unlike the Singaporian Wild Animals and
Birds Act, that considers the protection of animal life only, the South Australian National
Parks and Wild Life Act protects both animals and plants.
Nevertheless, as a general rule, in Australia, State laws, including environmental
laws, do not apply to the federal military. 1301 The Commonwealth assesses the
environmental impact of projects under the federal Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Act of 1999. 1302

5. Air Pollution Control

Air can be polluted by both routine and accidental activities of civilians and
military personnel. Many national laws seek to preserve air quality by controlling
harmful activities, including those of armed forces.
In Korea, for instance, an “Atmospheric Pollution Warning” can be issued
whenever the “atmospheric pollution exceeds the environmental standards [prescribed by
the same law], and might cause any grave danger and injury to the health and property of
residents or the breeding and growth of the animals and plants.” 1303 Only civilian health
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and property is addressed by this provision; the Atmospheric Pollution Warning is not
applicable to the Korean military.
In Russia, the law On Air Protection, which was adopted in 1999, provides for
establishing standards for air quality and emissions limitation. Its provisions call for an
inventory of sources of emissions, and the registration of pollutants. 1304 There is no
exemption for Russian military from the law, since its goal is to prevent and reduce
“harmful chemical, physical, biological and other effects of the pollution likely to cause
unfavorable consequences for human beings, the national economy, and the flora and
fauna [not of the national jurisdiction, but] of the world.” 1305 Therefore, any military
action that affects human beings, fauna, or flora is governed by this provision.
Environmental authorities may prevent activities causing serious air pollution. For
example, a violation of the Russian law On Air Protection “may result in imposition of
additional emission limits or even a prohibition of the entire operation or activity causing
pollution if public health is deemed to be in danger by any administrative agency.” 1306
Again, it appears that the Russian Law On Air Protection does not exempt military from
its jurisdiction, since it is applies to “any administrative agency.”
Note should be made of the Law On Defense, which was adopted in 1996
amended in 1999. That statute includes provisions that authorize the President of the
country to suspend some laws under certain circumstances. It does not define which laws
can be suspended. However, theoretically, environmental laws may be suspended as other
laws. Moreover, in times of armed conflicts, Russian environmental laws can be
suspended by the President of the State. However, that power has, to date, not been
exercised. One commentator has suggested that during the war in Chechnya, for instance,
no one cared about compliance with environmental laws anyway; thus, suspension of
those laws was unnecessary. 1307
As for peacetime, the Russian military operates as other organizations. However,
activities involving State secrets are exempt from EIA procedures or public disclosure
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laws. For instance, radioactive materials are specifically included in by the law On State
Secrets dated 1996. 1308
However, other legal systems do explicitly cover air pollution that has
transboundary effects. For example, in Canada, CEPA “prevent[s] air pollution from
sources that emit air contaminants in Canada that are likely to create air pollution in
another country.” 1309 This provision explicitly holds Canadian sources responsible for air
pollution caused in another country, and represents an application of Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration that requires each State not to harm another nation’s environment.
Under CEPA, it would appear that Canadian military operations are also subject to that
restraint.

6. Water Resources Conservation

Many national laws seek to control or prohibit human activities that threaten to
harm water resources. For example, Article 1 of the Korean Water Conservation Act
defines its goal as “preventing potential danger and injury to the national health and the
environment due to the pollution of water and by properly managing and preserving the
quality of public waterways such as rivers, lakes, marshes, etc.” 1310 Accordingly, any
activity that pollutes the water body in ways that cause potential danger or injure public
health and the environment is prohibited. It aims “to enable all the citizens of the nation
to live in a healthy and comfortable environment.” 1311 However, the statutes says nothing
about the health and the environment of other nations. Moreover, this provision uses the
criteria of causing “potential damage,” without enumerating the polluters. The Korean
Water Conservation Act exempts military from compliance, so it applies to civilian
activities only.
Damaging the water body may be caused by dangerous or harmful methods of
fishing. For example, in Singapore, the use of explosives or poisons is prohibited as a
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method of trapping fish. 1312 Most of such fishing is done illegally by civilians, but
military maneuvers also can cause a massive marine pollution by using ammunition and
sea-bed mines. The Singaporian law applies equally to civilian and military activities.
Using bodies of water for the dumping of waste is another source of
environmental damaging. In the Netherlands, the Sea Water Pollution Act, which governs
ocean dumping by ships and aircraft and the incineration of waste by ships at sea, 1313 is
designed to prevent toxic and non-biodegradable waste from being disposed of in the
sea. 1314 Furthermore, the Act for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships, which governs
pollution of the sea by harmful materials discharged from ships, 1315 is applicable to
military activities, such as maneuvers, and spreading in the sea of water explosives. This
Act defines harmful materials as those which “are dangerous to the public health, harm
the marine environment, or prevent recreational enjoyment of the sea.” 1316 Oil is another
threat to water bodies. The Nigerian Navigable Water Act 1317 considers as a guilty of an
offense any persons responsible for “any oil or mixture containing oil […] discharged
into waters […] from any vessel, or from any place on land or from any apparatus used
for transferring oil from or to any vessel [.]” 1318 Military vessels could be subjected to
this provision in case of accident, or for using oil pollution as a weapon in warfare.
The Israeli Water Law, instead of defining harmful substances, adopted a general
rule that prevents “[any] person [from] throw[ing], or caus[ing] to flow, into or near a
water resource any liquid, solid, or gaseous substance or deposit[ing] any such substance
in or near it.” 1319 The language of this provision prevents disposal of any kind of
materials whether solid, liquid or gaseous, hazardous or not, in or near the water
resources, and applied to military as well as non-military activities.
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Unlike the Israeli Water Law, the Nigerian Harmful Waste Act of 1988, does not
define gaseous materials as hazardous wastes. It provides that “dump[ing] harmful waste
under this act if [a person] deposits or dumps the harmful waste, whether solid, semisolid or liquid[.]” 1320
Water resources protection in Israel is based on the principle that “[a]ll sources of
water in Israel are public property,” 1321 and that “every person is entitled to receive and
use water.” 1322 This right is not unlimited, but persons who use the water resources
should assure that their usage “does not lead to the salination or depletion [of the water
resources].” 1323 The fact that water resources are declared public property means that any
damage or pollution to the water will be considered as a trespass to public property, and
can be punished as such.
Disputes over water resources are handled differently by different countries.
However, it is rare to find a specific court that examines disputes relevant to the
protection of water resources only. An unusual example of such a court is found in the
Israeli “Tribunal for Water Affairs, established by the Ministry of Justice [to execute] the
Water Law [and] the Drainage and Flood Control Law.” 1324
As with other kinds of environmental protection efforts, water resources can be
protected either by precautionary or preventive measures. For example, Article 20C of
the Israeli Water Law focuses on precautionary measures. It provides that “[a] person
who has under his control any installation for the production, supply, transportation or
storage of water or for recharging subsoil water resources shall take all reasonable
measures to prevent such installation or its operation from causing water pollution.” 1325
In contrast, the Austria Water Law focuses on preventive measures, by providing that
“[any] person [who] causes water contamination (Verursacher), or causes the imminent
endangerment (Konkrete Gefahr) of water […] is obliged to immediately undertake all
measures necessary to prevent the spread contamination already caused, or prevent
1320
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contamination from occurring in the first instance, and must also immediately notify the
relevant authorities.” 1326 In fact, both kinds of measures are necessary to protect and
sustain water resources.
As an example of a federal system, the Water Law of Austria established a kind of
coordination between local and federal authorities. Under that statute, each “governor
(Landeshauptmann) of each of the nine states in Austria (Bundeslander) is obligated to
notify the Federal Environment Ministry of suspected contaminated sites
(Verdachtsflachen). These sites are then prioritized for action based on an environmental
investigation.” 1327 The Israeli Water Law goes beyond that. “[It gives] the Water
Commissioner, [if he] is satisfied that any of the provisions of section 9 is not being
complied with, [the right to…] take steps to prevent immediate serious damage to a water
resource if such damage cannot be prevented in any other way.” 1328 Thus, in order to
prevent any immediate serious damage to the water resource, the Israeli law does not
depend only on the involved persons, but gives the Water Commissioner the right to take
the necessary measures. However, this provision lacks three elements: first, it does not
define “immediate serious damage”; second, it does not indicate the steps required to be
taken by the Water Commissioner; and finally, it does not describe the commissioner’s
intervention as a duty, but only as an option, thus putting the effectiveness of this
provision in the hands of the Commissioner.
Unless specifically exempted, the Israeli Water Law applies to military
operations, and if the immediate water pollution cannot be stopped in any other way, the
Israeli Water Commissioner can prevent it by taking necessary steps, even though such
pollution was caused by military activities.

7. Soil Pollution
Many harmful human activities occur on the ground, including armed forces
activities on military bases. National legislation attempts to reduce this risk. For example,
in the Netherlands, a number of Royal Decrees contain rules regarding the use and
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protection of the soil. There are rules for (1) the disposal of waste matter on or in the soil;
(2) the addition of matter to the soil in order to influence the structure or the quality of the
soil; (3) activities carried out on or in the soil, including clearing or construction of
pipelines or storage tanks, ground work, or activities using materials that may pollute the
soil; (4) transport of certain matter by pipeline or vehicles; and (5) the performance of
activities that incidentally introduce substances into the soil. 1329
Those goals are enforced by the Soil Protection Act of the Netherlands, which
provides that “anyone who carries out the aforementioned activities on or in the soil and
who knows or reasonably should suspect that the soil may be affected or polluted, is
obliged to take all measures reasonably required to prevent, restrict, or remedy the
problem.” 1330 This article adopts both precautionary measures to prevent and restrict the
problem, and remedial measure to rehabilitate the contaminated site. Many military
activities can affect the structure of the soil and pollute it, and the Act appears to apply to
such activities. The Interim Act on Soil Cleanup also applies to military operations; under
that Act, the provincial executive has not only the “authority to carry out site evaluations
and cleanups, [but also] to stop activities resulting in soil contamination[.]” 1331 This
authority should be based on an environmental assessment of the suspected damage on
such sites. Similarly, in the United States, army bases are subject to soil protection rules
under CERCLA and other legislation. 1332

8. Hazardous Wastes

Armed forces often produce large quantities of hazardous wastes, and national
laws often seek to regulate the production of such wastes. For example, the Hazardous
Substances Act of the Netherlands “regulates the transport, packaging, delivery, storage,
and removal of dangerous substances, as well as the handling of ammunition, explosives,
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and fireworks in order to protect public safety and health.” 1333 Since armed forces deal
with the ammunition and explosives they should be subject to this Act.
Similarly, the Radiation Protection Act of Singapore prohibits the accumulation
of radioactive waste. 1334 This provision eliminates the accumulation of radioactive waste
produced by military activities, and minimizes the environmental risk of such substances.

9. Citizen Suits

Some national jurisdictions authorize their citizens to invoke environmental law
provisions by means of citizen suits. Others extend this right even to foreigners. For
example, the Ukrainian Environmental Protection Act of 1991 gives standing to its
citizens only to sue in environmental matters. 1335 It “grant[s] citizens of Ukraine the right
to sue state bodies [including the armed forces] and private parties for damage to their
health and property.” 1336 Consequently, any environmental damage caused by military
activities to citizen health and property is subject to citizen suit. However, non-citizens
are excluded from this right. In contrast, the Canadian CEPA addresses “environment,
human life, and health,” 1337 without any restriction as to the citizenship of persons
involved. Therefore, any person who has sustained environmental damage or loss of life
or health can bring suit against polluters.
A different approach is reflected in the Israeli Act of Prevention of Environmental
Nuisance, which excludes individual citizens from filing suits in environmental matters.
It gives this right only to groups of people. 1338 The Magistrate Court of Israel can dismiss
any action in which “the size of the group does not justify submission of the action as a
class action.” 1339 While perhaps promoting judicial efficiency, this approach grant no
recognition of any individual’s right to sue.
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The European Union offers different example of the role of citizen suits to protect
environmental integrity. The comprehensive format of the EU’s Directives and
Regulations is similar in many ways to the U.S. Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the environmental impact assessment
requirement of NEPA. 1340
The EU States recognized the environmental protection as a priority by adopting
the Precautionary Principle as a basis for their environmental policies. Pursuant to Article
130r (2) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community “Community policy on the
environment is based on the precautionary principle and on the principle that preventive
action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at the
source, and that the polluter should pay.”
The EU’s Directive adopted public disclosure and participation in decisionmaking. Article 6 (1) of the Council Directive 89/618 1341 states that: “[m]ember States
shall ensure that, when a radiological emergency occurs, the population actually affected
is informed without delay of the facts of the emergency, of the steps to be taken and, as
appropriate to the case in point, of the health-protection measures applicable to it.”
Remarkably, the European Parliament adopted the Resolution on the
Environment, Security, and Foreign Policy in 1996. The Resolution calls on “the military
to end environmentally damaging activities and clean up polluted areas and urges
[m]ember States to take measures to support this, in particular, by applying civil
environmental legislation to all military activities.” 1342 The Resolution calls upon the EU
States to eliminate nuclear weapons, and protect the environment from unnecessary
destruction in times of armed conflicts. 1343 Additionally, the Resolution asks the military
to end all activities which damage the environment and argues that the principle of
“polluter pays” should apply to military activities. 1344
Nevertheless, some of the EU’s Directives exempt armed forces from compliance.
For instance, the Council Directive on the Harmonization of the Provisions Relating to
1340
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the Placing on the Market and Supervision of Explosives for Civil Uses does not apply to
“explosives, including ammunition, intended for use, in accordance with national law, by
the armed forces or the police.” 1345 While political consideration may demand this kind
of exemption, it undercuts the effectiveness of environmental regulations, since the
military can conduct environmentally damaging activities without considering
environmental standards and limitations.

E- National Environmental Law Rules
After discussing international and comparative environmental law rules, it is
necessary to outline national environmental law rules, in order to examine the
mechanisms applicable to environmental laws and regulations, and to military operations
in particular, of each nation individually.
As a Kuwaiti scholar pursuing my education in the United States, I have opted to
examine the national environmental law rules, federal regulations, and case law of the
U.S. as an example of developed countries, along with the national environmental law
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rules of Kuwait as an example of developing countries. Therefore, this analysis involves
the American example, an idealistic example, which extends the application of
environmental statutes and regulations to all sectors including military activities, as well
as the Kuwaiti example, which is much less comprehensive.

1. The United States National Environmental Statutes

The following subsection will evaluate U.S. environmental statutes that apply
at home as well as those that have extraterritorial application. For example, when the
United States establishes a military base in another nation, it enters into two
relationships. The first is with the host country, and is usually secured by a formal
agreement. The second relationship is with that host country’s natural environment, as
it is that environment upon which the base will be situated. Military activity on or
around the base can, and does, have an environmental impact. This impact occurs both
during periods of peace and of conflict, and it can be subject to international
environmental law, the laws of the United States, and the laws of the host country.
Activities occurring on the base may affect the base directly or the environment
outside the military base. Activities directly affecting the military base are subject to
American laws. Activities that affect the environment outside the base could be subject to
American law or the host country’s laws.
a. The Application of the U.S. Environmental Statutes at Home

The United States has many stringent environmental laws and standards that aim
at protecting, restoring, and cleaning up the environment. We will examine, in particular,
the National Environmental Policy Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, the Clean
Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act. In addition, the War Crimes Act which
considers as criminal attack on certain kinds of public properties, we will also be
considered.

1) National Environmental Policy Act
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The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 is the major U.S.
environmental statute. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) recognizes
NEPA as “our basic national charter for protection of the environment.” 1346
We can classify the purpose of NEPA into three categories:
First, it establishes a national policy for all federal agencies, requiring them to
use “all practical means…to create and maintain conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony.” 1347 Second, it also sets out a number of broad
environmental protection goals, requiring all agencies of the federal government to
“utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach…in planning and decision-making
which may have an impact on man’s environment.” 1348 Finally, it establishes the
CEQ, 1349 which assists the President in preparing an annual environmental quality
report to Congress, along with recommendations for improvements. NEPA directs
each federal agency to prepare an EIS for all “proposals for legislation and other major
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 1350
NEPA does not exempt any facility or agency from compliance. 1351 NEPA
Section 101 (b) states that it is the “continuing responsibility of the Federal
Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other considerations of
national policy, to improve and coordinate federal plans, functions, programs, and
resources” to protect and enhance a variety of environmental values.” 1352 Moreover,
when Congress enacted NEPA, it promoted efforts to “prevent or eliminate damage to
the environment or biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man,” 1353
regardless of the source of that damage. Therefore, NEPA applies to national security
activities, even though the statute does not say so explicitly.
One of NEPA’s purposes is to require all federal agencies to prepare an EIS,
which is supposed to describe the proposed federal action, identify the environmental
1346
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impacts of the proposed action, and consider alternatives and their environmental
impact. It forces agencies to consider the environmental consequences of their actions.
Indeed, military installations and facilities generate huge amounts of hazardous
wastes that can directly affect human health and the environment. Thus, American
legislators did not exempt military activities from being subject to EIS procedures.

2) The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 aims at protecting
human health and environment by regulating the management of hazardous waste
from its generation through disposal, or from “cradle to grave.” Subtitle (C) of RCRA
governs hazardous waste. 1354 According to the statute, wastes are “hazardous” if they
pose a significant threat to human health or the environment “when improperly
treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.” 1355
Federal agencies are subject to the same rules for handling solid wastes that
govern everybody else. The Department of Defense produces a lot of ordinary garbage
that is “recycled, incinerated, or sent to sanitary landfills. It also generates large
amounts of hazardous wastes in its different activities.” 1356 RCRA insures federal
facility compliance with “all federal, state, interstate, and local requirements, both
substantive and procedural…in the same manner, and to the same extent, as any
person is subject to such requirements.” 1357 However, “the president may exempt any
solid waste management facility of any department, agency, or instrumentality in the
executive branch from compliance with a such requirement if he determines it to be in
the paramount interest of the United States to do so.” 1358
If U.S. military bases abroad produce hazardous waste which constitutes a
hazard to human health and the environment, RCRA should apply, since its broad
language applies to all federal facilities, 1359 regardless of location.
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Few amendments to RCRA’s provisions would be necessary to accommodate
extraterritorial application in status-of-forces agreements. 1360

3) The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) of 1980 1361 authorizes remediation of sites contaminated with hazardous
substances, 1362 and it imposes liability for cleanup costs. The CERCLA cleanup process
is activated by any “release of a hazardous substance” 1363 into the environment. It applies
to federal hazardous waste sites as well as nonfederal sites. “Each department, agency,
and instrumentality of the United States (including the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of the government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the
same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any
nongovernmental entity.” 1364 In point of fact, CERCLA provides for a remediating
Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) to pursue cost recovery actions under section 107,
and actions for contribution under section 113, against other PRPs.
Although CERCLA remedial action is expensive, cleanup costs incurred by the
federal government may be charged to PRPs, including any past or present owner of a
site, or a generator or transporter of the released contaminant. 1365 Liability is strict,
joint, and several. Defenses to liability are limited to acts of God, war, and an act or
omission of a third party. 1366 Consequently, if the release or the threat of release of
hazardous substances was caused in times of war, there is no liability under CERCLA.
In contrast, the release or the threat of release of a hazardous substance which may
present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare of the
environment in peacetime military activities is not exempt from CERCLA liability. In
1360
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one case, “the federal government was held jointly liable for cleanup costs at a
National Priority List (NPL) site contaminated during World War II by a company that
manufactured rayon for the war effort under close government supervision.” 1367 Any
person or a state can file a suit in federal court to enforce compliance with CERCLA
or with any regulation, order, or standard issued under CERCLA. 1368

4) The Clean Water Act

The Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1972 contains a comprehensive program of water
pollution control where federal agencies work with States and other agencies to prepare
programs to reduce, eliminate, and prevent water pollution from the surface, navigable
and underground water and to maintain their sanitary conditions. 1369 The discharge of any
pollutant 1370 by any person is unlawful unless permitted to do so by variance or
permit. 1371 Even if the discharge results from an inspection of a facility, there would still
be a violation. 1372 Thus, permit application must be submitted to ensure the State water
quality standards are not violated. Permits may not be issued if the facility cannot ensure
compliance with water quality standards of all affected States.1373 It is clear that Section
301 of the CWA does not exempt the Department of Defense from compliance, since it
applies inclusively to all federal agencies. Therefore, U.S. military personnel are
prohibited from discharging any pollutant into the surface, navigable and underground
water, a particularly important provision since preparation for warfare often contaminates
the water body with discharged materials, fuel, debris, and other toxic substances.
5) Endangered Species Act
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The Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 defines endangered and threatened
species and protects their ecosystems to ensure their survival. Section 2 (c)(1) of the
Endangered Species Act states that “[i]t is […] the policy of Congress that all Federal
departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened
species and shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.”
Section 7 requires federal agencies to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
or the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) when a proposed action may jeopardize
an endangered or threatened species, or destroy their critical habitat. 1374 In addition,
Section 11 allows any person, regardless of citizenship, to bring a cause of action in U.S.
courts for any act violating ESA provisions. 1375 Again, this statute applies to all federal
agencies, including the military. Thus, if a military base or installation was built on an
endangered species habitat, the ESA may require that it be removed to another location.
In addition, during armed conflicts, American armed forces are similarly prohibited from
harming the endangered species habitat, or attacking protected areas. 1376

6) War Crimes Act
The War Crimes Act 1377 (WCA) of 1996 carries out the U.S. international
obligation under the 1949 Geneva Conventions to establish criminal penalties for war
crimes.
Section 2401 of the Act states that “whoever whether inside or outside the United
States, commits a war crime, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or any
term or years, or both, and if death results to the victim, shall be subject to the penalty of
death.”
A “war crime” means any act “defined as a grave breach in any of the
international conventions signed at Geneva 12 August 1949, or any protocol to such
convention to which the United States is a party[…]” 1378 According to Article 50 of the
Geneva Convention I, Article 51 of the Geneva Convention II, and Article 147 of the
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Geneva Convention IV, “grave breaches” are those which involve “extensive destruction
and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly.”
Under that statute, environmental destruction during armed conflicts whether
international or internal can be considered a grave breach of the international obligation
of protecting the natural environment, and therefore a war crime. Thus, it constrains the
U.S. armed forces from destroying properties or causing unnecessary environmental
harm.

b. The Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Environmental Statutes

Many U.S. environmental laws do not explicitly state that their protection
extends to include extraterritorial sites. That lack of specificity can create problems.
Some regulations do explicitly apply to overseas sites. For instance, DoD Directive
6050.7, entitled “Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Department of Defense
Actions,” imposes NEPA-like requirements on major DoD actions that may adversely
affect the environment of a foreign nation, a protected natural or ecological resource
of global importance, or the global commons. This subsection will deal with
provisions of law that do explicitly apply to overseas facilities:
-NEPA’s language and legislative history,
-RCRA’s exportation of hazardous waste, and citizen suit provision,
-CERCLA’s foreign claimants provision, and

1) NEPA’s Language and Legislative History

Both the requirement of EIS, and NEPA’s language and legislative history,
urge the statute’s application abroad. The EIA requirement entails the extraterritorial
application of NEPA: Section 102 (2)(C)(i) requires that, “to the fullest extent
possible…all agencies of the federal government shall…include in every
recommendation or report on proposals for…major federal actions significantly
1378
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affecting the quality of human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible
official on the environmental impact of the proposed action.” 1379 According to this
language, NEPA does not require a federal agency to assess every impact or effect of
its proposed action, but only those that may have a major impact on the environment.
The application of Section 102 requires an examination of the relationship between the
agency’s action and the change in the physical environment it causes. If an action is
likely to cause a change in the physical environment, then the agency is required to
prepare a detailed EIS.
This sweeping language also ensures that every agency will maintain the
relevant environmental information necessary to make decisions on proposed actions.
Similarly, the Council on Environmental Quality guidelines requires federal
agencies to assess the environmental effects of any proposed action "as it affects both
the national and international environment." 1380
The U.S. Military has also developed an environmental ethic. 1381 For example,
the U.S. Army has a comprehensive program for factoring environmental
consideration into its decision-making and operations. 1382 It requires an environmental
impact assessment of peaceful operations that may affect the environment, even when
the impact occurs outside U.S. territory. Other countries have adopted the concept of
environmental impact assessment first developed in the U.S. 1383 to encourage their
agencies to consider the possible environmental harm of their activities. For instance,
the Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Pollution 1384 urges member States to include an assessment of the
environmental impact of any project in the coastal areas which may significantly harm
the marine environment. 1385 In addition, the Åarhus Convention 1386 requires member
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States to subject their activities concerning “environmental matters” to national or
transboundary EIA procedures. 1387
NEPA’s language shows Congress’ concern with the global environment and
the worldwide character of environmental problems. The purpose of NEPA is to
"declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony
between man and his environment...." 1388 The Act requires all agencies of the Federal
Government to prepare EIS for major federal actions "affecting the quality of the
human environment." 1389 However, it does not explicitly provide that its requirements
are to apply extraterritorially. NEPA requires federal agencies to "recognize the
worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems,” and it recognizes
that actions should, “consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend
appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize
international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of
mankind’s world environment.” 1390
The legislative history suggests the same conclusion. In the Senate debate,
Senator Henry M. Jackson, the principal sponsor of NEPA, declared that: “taken
together, the provisions of section 102 direct any federal agency which takes action
that it must take into account environmental management and environmental quality
considerations.”
Furthermore, the comment of the State Department’s spokesman during
congressional consideration of NEPA emphasizes the importance of extending
NEPA’s reach abroad: “The department wishes to call attention to the fact, moreover,
that the objective of the bill or, for that matter, of any proposition dedicated to the
protection of the national environment, cannot be effectively achieved unless it
recognizes that existing ecosystems are interrelated by nature or by the activities of
man, and that the environmental forces affecting our natural resources disregard
political and geographical frontiers.” 1391
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Thus, NEPA’s language and legislative history strongly suggest the
extraterritorial applicability of the statute, and that “Congress intended to bring all
activities of foreign affairs agencies, even those taking place entirely within the
territorial jurisdiction of another nation, within the scope of the Act.” 1392

2) RCRA’s Exportation of Hazardous Waste, and Citizen Suit Provisions:
The plain language of RCRA, and its legislative history, suggest that the
citizen suit provision and the exportation of hazardous waste provision were passed as
part of a single bill, 1393 which indicate a congressional intent to apply RCRA
extraterritorially.
During congressional debate on the hazardous waste provision, Representative
Barbara A. Mikulski stated that “our own country will have safeguards from the ill
effects of hazardous waste upon passage of [the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments to RCRA]. We should take an equally firm stand on the transportation of
hazardous waste bound for export to other countries.” 1394 This statement indicates
congressional intent to protect the global commons and worldwide environment, as
well as protecting the U.S. environment. RCRA’s stringent provisions protect not only
U.S. territory from hazardous wastes, but protect foreign countries as well from
hazardous waste transportation. 1395
Section 6938 (a)-(f) of RCRA prohibits the exporting of any hazardous waste
from the U.S. to a foreign country unless that country has agreed otherwise. Even
where such an agreement applies, the exporter must provide the following information
to EPA: the types and the estimated quantities of hazardous waste to be exported, the
manner in which the hazardous waste will be transported to and treated, stored, or
disposed in the receiving country, and the identification of the final treatment, storage
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or disposal facility. 1396 Then the Secretary of the State, acting on behalf of EPA, is
required to
1-Forward a copy of the notification to the receiving country,
2-Advise that government of the U.S. prohibition against exporting without
consent,
3-Describe to the government of the receiving country the federal regulations
which would apply to the treatment, storage, and disposal of the hazardous waste in
the United States, and
4- Request the government to provide the Secretary with written consent or
objection to the terms of the notification. 1397
When the Secretary receives the receiving country’s response, he must then
forward it to the exporter. 1398
RCRA also includes a citizen suit provision which provides that: “Any person
may commence a civil action on his own behalf against any person (including (a) the
United States, and (b) any other governmental instrumentality or agency…) who is
alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement,
prohibition, or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter.” 1399 The
U.S. District Courts have jurisdiction without regard to the citizenship of the parties to
enforce the provision, 1400 and the use of the term “any person” indicates congressional
intent to apply that provision extraterritorially.
These two sections together suggest that a foreign citizen can sue the U.S.
government in U.S. Federal District Court for the exportation of hazardous waste.

3) CERCLA’s Foreign Claimants Provision:
CERCLA authorizes U.S. claimants 1401 to sue in the U.S. courts. The citizen
suit provision grants standing to any person to commence a civil action on his own
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behalf against another person, the President of the United States, or any other officer
of the U.S. including the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency for
the violation of CERCLA requirements. 1402 Similarly, under CERCLA’s foreign
claimants provision, any foreign citizen can sue the U.S. military for releases of
hazardous substances into the shoreline of the country of which the claimant is a
citizen. 1403 He can sue in the U.S. courts, 1404 but only if recovery or remediation is
authorized by a treaty or an executive agreement between the U.S. and the foreign
country involved, or if the Secretary of State decides that the foreign country provides
a comparable remedy to U.S. claimants. 1405

2. The United States Federal regulations

Federal regulations and policies that apply to the U.S. military can be divided into
two categories: first, the rules that apply to the U.S. military at home, and second, the
rules that apply to the U.S. military abroad.

a. Federal Regulations and Policies that Apply to the U.S. Military at Home

This subsection will highlight on the Environmental Compliance Assessment and
Management Program, the Department of Energy Environmental Management Program,
and the Air Force Policy Directive 32-70.

1) The Environmental Compliance Assessment and
Management Program (ECAMP)
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This Air Force initiative is a comprehensive program management system for
achieving compliance with environmental laws. The Air Force issued ECAMP to help
its installations to comply with all applicable environmental standards, as well as DoD
Instructions 4715.6, the Environmental Compliance of 24 April 1996 and 7415.3, and
the Environmental Conservation Program of 3 May, 1996.
According to Chapter 1, 1.2.1., the primary objectives of ECAMP are to
accomplish the following:
-Improve Air Force environmental management to meet compliance standards
such as those required by RCRA and CERCLA, and
-Provide funds to meet environmental compliance requirements.
ECAMP utilizes internal and external evaluations. Internal evaluations are the
foundation of ECAMP, and are normally conducted annually by installation personnel,
who have technical knowledge and background. In addition, Major Commands
(MAJCOMs) conduct external evaluations at least once every 3 years. 1406

2) The Department of Energy Environmental Management Program

The DoE office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for waste
management, environmental remediation, maintenance of facility safety,
transportation, and technology development costs domestically at 137 sites in 34
states. These facilities include sites involved in weapons research, assembly and
testing, nuclear materials production, and waste storage. Foreign military installations
perform these very same operations; however, while the DoE’s Office of
Environmental Management is responsible for environmental remediation at these
sites in the U.S., no oversight agency is in place at military sites abroad.

3) Air Force Policy Directive 32-70
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The Air Force Policy Directive 32-70 of 1994 1407 sets out the Air Force guidelines
for maintaining environmental quality and compliance with environmental laws.
According to 1.1. the Air Force is committed to: “cleaning up environmental damage
resulting from its past activities; meeting all environmental standards applicable to its
present operations; planning its future activities to minimize environmental impacts;
managing responsibly the irreplaceable natural and cultural resources it holds in public
trust; and eliminating pollution from its activities whenever possible.”
The Directive requires that all Air Force Commanders, employees whether
military or civilians, and contractors be in full compliance with national environmental
policy 1408 in addition to their compliance with the applicable Federal, State, and local
environmental laws and standards. 1409 All Air Force employees are deemed responsible
for the environmental consequences of their actions. 1410 The Air Force will aim at
reducing health and environmental hazards created by past activities at each
installation. 1411
More significant, however, is the “pollution prevention” paragraph, which states
that “[t]he Air Force will prevent future pollution by reducing use of hazardous materials
and releases of pollutants into the environment to as near zero as feasible.” 1412
The Directive reflects a serious commitment by the Air Force both to prevent and
remediate environmental hazards.
b. Federal Regulations and Policies that Apply to U.S. Military Abroad

This subsection will focus on President Carter’s Executive Order No. 12,114 of
1979, Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document, Title 32 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, Part 855, Air Force Policy Directive 32-70, and the
Environmental Program in Foreign Countries.
1) President Carter’s Executive Order No. 12,114 of 1979: 1413
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On January 4, 1979, President Jimmy Carter ordered special implementing
procedures when any federal agency undertakes actions overseas that affect the quality
of the environment. This requirement applies when the federal agency takes an action
that could affect the “global commons outside the jurisdiction of any nation (e.g., the
oceans or Antarctica).” 1414 This Executive Order is implemented by DoD. 1415 Army
Regulations state that: “the protection of the environment is an Army priority, no
matter where the installation is located.” 1416 As to the global commons, the regulations
go on to state that: “all the nations of the world share the stewardship of these
areas.” 1417
Under Executive Order 12,114 of 1979 the Army was required to prepare a
written assessment of the impact of its operations on the global commons. An example
of such analysis can be found in Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Stone, 1418 where the global
commons environmental assessment discussed “the effects of the transportation of the
weapons, from Germany to Johnston Atoll, on water quality, air quality, the risks of
threatened, endangered and special interest species, risks to commercial fisheries and
to the human population.” 1419
2) Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document (OEBGD) 1420

The “Overseas Guidance” was issued by the Pentagon, and directed military
personnel at each site abroad to develop environmental standards based on DoD’s
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“suggested criteria” for pollutants. The standards for each overseas facility must meet
DoD’s suggested criteria, or host country laws, whichever provides greater protection
for the environment. Foreign standards are generally not enforceable on DoD military
sites. However, “written findings are accepted, and corrective action is taken, if the
condition is out of compliance with the Final Governing Standards (FGS) imminent
and substantial danger to human health and safety.” 1421 Those Final Governing
Standards may be those of the host country. DoD submits annual reports to Congress,
setting out its policy of adhering to U.S. requirements at all bases, including those
located overseas. In addition, DoD requests funding annually from Congress to
achieve environmental standards, in its overseas activities. 1422 The language of this
directive reflects a serious obligation to protect the global environment from the
effects of military operations abroad.
3) Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 855: 1423

Section 855.1.states that “civil aircraft use of Air Force airfields in foreign
countries will be subject to U.S. federal laws and regulations that have extraterritorial
effects and to applicable international agreements with the country in which the Air Force
installation is located.” This provision considers the U.S. Air Force airfields in foreign
countries as American territory, and any U.S. civil airplane that uses these airfields will
be subject to U.S. laws as well as international treaties. On the other hand, the language
of this provision implicitly authorizes Congress to decide which federal laws or
regulations have extraterritorial effects. Thus, Congress has the power to extend the reach
of this provision.
4) Air Force Policy Directive 32-70: 1424
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This Directive, as discussed earlier, outlines Air Force standards for complying
with environmental laws and policy. According to 1.3.2. (compliance) of the
Directive, Air Force operations overseas shall comply with the FGS, or OEBGD of
DoD. Moreover, “consistent with security requirements, the Air Force will support
environmental compliance inspections of its operations and activities worldwide, and
will aggressively correct areas not in compliance.” 1425
The Air Force undertakes to reduce imminent and substantial health and
environmental risks caused by Air Force activities at installations located in foreign
countries. 1426 More significant, the Air Force also undertakes to use Zero-waste
management to the extent possible, by reducing the use of hazardous materials and the
releases of pollutants into the environment. Moreover, the Directive encourages Air
Force personnel to prevent pollution by stating that “where environmentally damaging
materials must be used, their use will be minimized. When the use of hazardous
materials cannot be avoided, the spent material and waste cannot be reused or
recycled, dispose of the spent material and waste as a last resort in an environmentally
safe manner, consistent with the requirements of all applicable laws.”1427 In addition,
this Directive implements various statutes and international protocols including NEPA
and CERCLA.

5) The Environmental Program in Foreign Countries 1428

This Air Force Instruction implements AFPD 32-70, “Environmental Quality,”
by setting forth specific objectives and standards for the activities of the Air Force
overseas. According to this Instruction, the Air Force undertakes to achieve
environmental quality in foreign countries to guarantee long term access to the land,
air, and water necessary to protect U.S. interests, while conducting day to day
1425
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activities abroad. 1429 Under Chapter 2 of the Instruction, sites contaminated by Air
Force operations must be restored to eliminate known imminent and substantial
dangers to human health and safety, 1430 unless the Air Force is bound by international
agreement to do more. 1431
Since this Instruction implements an AFPD, Air Force activities in foreign
countries must comply with the DoD Final Governing Standards; or, where the FGS
have not been established, must comply with the criteria of OEBGD, if the criteria do
not conflict with any applicable international treaties. 1432
Finally, Chapter 5 of the Instruction deals with Pollution Prevention, and
requires all Air Force personnel to comply with Air Force Policies, Directives, and
Instructions in all operations in foreign countries. 1433 Again, that requirement applies
unless international agreements such as the Status of Forces Agreements, or bilateral
agreements, direct otherwise.
These materials indicate that DoD officials are aware that environmental harm
anywhere in the world will sooner or later affect the U.S. environment, and also that
good environmental practices help to maintain good relations with host countries.
Accordingly, they have taken steps to insure that U.S military operations take into
consideration environmental protection in foreign countries. The fact that the U.S.
government has taken those steps may encourage other countries to do likewise.

3. The United States Case Law

There are many cases that deal with the environmental law statutes in the United
States. This subsection will examine U.S. case law involving environmental laws,
particularly, NEPA, RCRA, and CERCLA. As with previous sections, these cases may be
classified into two categories: case law relevant to the application of the environmental
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statutes at home, and case law relevant to the extraterritorial application of the
environmental statutes.

a. The United States Case Law Relevant to the Application of the Environmental Statutes
at Home
Here, we will focus on the U.S. case law relevant to the application of NEPA,
RCRA, and CERCLA, in particular, on military activities at home.
In 1988, citizen groups and several members of Congress asked DoD to prepare a
programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) for its plans to clean up and
rebuild the entire weapons complex. They contended that such a statement was required
by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 1434 Only such a comprehensive
analysis, they argued, could furnish the perspective needed to set sound priorities and
make the most efficient allocation of limited resources. A PEIS would reveal common
environmental problems at various sites, avoiding the need to develop unique responses
on a case-by-case basis, and speeding the overall cleanup. Equally important, they
insisted, members of the public would be given an opportunity to participate in the
planning process.
When DoD failed to respond, the citizen groups asked a federal court to order the
preparation of a PEIS. 1435 They maintained that “one of the largest industrial
rehabilitation programs ever undertaken” required public comment and security. Failure
in planning such a massive cleanup, they pointed out, could led to further contamination
of the air and water and exposure for workers and the public.
Six months later, before a trial could begin, DoE agreed in a settlement of the
litigation to prepare one PEIS for the cleanup process, and another for a “modernization”
of the weapon complex. 1436 The PEIS for the cleanup was to contain a broad
environmental assessment of the program’s plan. In 1991, public hearing were held in
twenty-three cities to determine the range of issues that would be addressed in the
1434
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statement. DoE received a number of comments concerning the need for greater public
participation and oversight, public and worker health and safety, adequate resources for
the cleanup, alternative technologies, and environmental standards.
The PEIS proved to be so massive and complex that DoE conducted six regional
workshops just to develop a detailed strategy for completing it. DoE then proposed to
eliminate the environmental restoration alternative from the PEIS, since cleanup
decisions at individual sites had to reflect local conditions and involve state regulators
and the public. 1437 After additional workshops, a draft impact statement was issued in
mid-1995, to be followed by public hearing around the country and release of the final
PEIS sometime thereafter. 1438
Another case arose in 1977, when the Navy prepared an environmental impact
statement (EIS) for its upgraded and expanded extremely low frequency (ELF) submarine
communication facility. ELF uses radio antennas spread over a large area of northern
Wisconsin and the Upper Peninsula of Michigan to transmit instructions to submerged
submarines around the world. When new information subsequently came to light about
possible adverse biological effects of such low frequency radiation, the State of
Wisconsin brought suit to compel the Navy to prepare a supplemental EIS before the
facility was completed. The trial court found that a supplemental EIS was indeed
required. It also found that the Navy had failed to overcome a presumption that violations
of NEPA should be enjoined, and that no remedy short of an injunction would serve the
purposes of the act. 1439
The Court of Appeals reversed, deciding that a supplemental EIS was not
needed. 1440 It found that the new information failed to raise concerns of such gravity that
another formal, in-depth look at the environmental consequences was required. In dictum,
the court went on to declare that even if there had been a NEPA violation.
NEPA cannot be construed to elevate automatically its procedural
requirements above all other national considerations. Although
there is no national defense exception to NEPA, and the Navy
does not claim one, the national well-being and security as
1437
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determined by the Congress and the President demand
consideration before an injunction should issue for a NEPA
violation. 1441
The court insisted that its job was to “tailor its relief to fit each particular case,
balancing the environmental concerns of NEPA against the larger interests of society that
might be adversely affected by an overly broad injunction.” 1442
b. The United States Case Law Relevant to the Extraterritorial Application of the
Environmental Statutes

U.S. courts have decided that domestic laws do not apply abroad unless
Congress makes it clear that they should. 1443 Thus, in one case the court found no
congressional intent to apply the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to
extraterritorial disposal of hazardous waste by private parties. 1444
An older, but particularly instructive, case on the extraterritorial application of
statutes is Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo. 1445 In that case, the United States had
contracted with Foley Brothers to help build public works in Iraq and Iran. The
employer hired Filardo as a cook at the construction sites, but did not pay him
overtime wages for working over eight hours a day. After the employers refused to
pay him overtime, Filardo sued under the Federal Eight Hours Law. 1446 The court held
that this statute did not cover Filardo’s employment abroad: “nothing in the act itself,
as amended, nor in the legislative history, would lead to the belief that the Congress
entertained any intention” to apply the statute extraterritorially. 1447 It also concluded
that: “administrative interpretation of the act…tended to support petitioner’s
contention as to its restricted geographical scope.” 1448 The court relied on the statute’s
silence as to extraterritoriality. Since Congress did not explicitly provide intention for
1441
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the statute application abroad, then the court did not consider the international effects
of applying the statute extraterritorially, and whether it might conflict with the laws of
the host country. In the court’s view, only an explicit Congressional directive could
provide a basis for extraterritorial application. 1449
However, the court held that a U.S. statute did have extraterritorial application
in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. 1450 There, Bulova sued the defendant, a U.S. citizen,
for a patent infringement that had allegedly occurred in Mexico. The court read the
statute broadly to cover the defendant’s actions, holding that Congress can enact laws
governing its citizens in other jurisdictions when the laws do not trespass upon the
other jurisdiction’s rights. The court also held that “the U.S. had a statutory interest in
the outcome of this case because some of the watches the defendant made had found
their way across the border, and thus the effects of the defendant’s activity were felt in
the U.S.” 1451 Thus, U.S. courts could properly exert jurisdiction over the activities
broadly in some cases. 1452 One reason for doing so, perhaps, would arise if such cases
involve foreign country interests in which U.S. military has installations, to the extent
possible to protect these interests from devastation by military activities.
The court applied another statute extraterritorially in Skiriotes v. Florida, 1453
which involved the application of a Florida statute to a U.S. citizen whose activities
took place on the high seas, not in Florida’s territorial waters. The court concluded
that whether the defendant was in Florida waters or not was beside the point because
the “U.S. is not debarred by any rule of international law from governing the conduct
of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights of
other nations or their nationals are not infringed.” 1454 Thus, the court held that a U.S.
statute can have extraterritorial application even it does not explicitly state so, so long
as its application does not interfere with other nations or their citizens’ rights.
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NEPA was held to have extraterritorial effect in Environmental Defense Fund
v. Massey. 1455 There, a U.S. research installation in Antarctica generated food wastes
which were burned by National Science Foundation (NSF) in an open landfill until
1991, when asbestos was discovered in the landfill. After that discovery, NSF began
burning the wastes in an “interim incinerator.” The Environmental Defense Fund
moved to stop that operation under NEPA, claiming that “the incineration of NSF’s
wastes could produce toxic pollutants and thus would be hazardous to the
environment.” 1456 To determine whether the U.S. statute could be applied to activities
in Antarctica, the D.C. Circuit reviewed the history of the extraterritorial application
of statutes in conjunction with the presumption against extraterritoriality. It
determined that there are three “well-established exceptions to the presumption: the
first is where there is an affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed to
extend the scope of the statute to conduct occurring within other sovereign nations, the
second exception applies when adverse effects will occur in the United States if the
statute is not extended to the foreign sovereignty, and the third exception is applicable
where there may be significant effects outside the United States, but the regulated
conduct itself occurs in the United States.” 1457 The court found that NEPA could be
applied to that situation, because of the “sweeping scope of NEPA and the EIS
requirement.” The broad statutory language led the court to the conclusion that
Congress intended to apply NEPA abroad. 1458
Therefore, U.S. environmental statutes can be applied extraterritorially if they
do not create interference with other countries laws, or any effect on foreign relations.
NEPA was applied extraterritorially to allow a foreign citizen to intervene in a
suit in Wilderness Society v. Morton. 1459 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit authorized a Canadian citizen and a Canadian environmental
organization to intervene in a suit seeking to require compliance with NEPA prior to
1455
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issuance of a permit for the trans-Alaska pipeline. There were two proposed routes for
the pipeline: one ran across Canada to the U.S.; while the second terminated at a super
tanker port in Valdez, Alaska, for seaborne shipment to the lower 48 states. The court
found that either of the two routes would have a potentially harmful effect on
Canada, 1460 and thus, it granted the application for intervention. Interestingly, the
court also recognized that foreign policy considerations may at times outweigh
NEPA’s extraterritorial application.
Accordingly, a citizen of a country where the U.S. military has sites and bases
can sue in U.S. courts for injury resulting from military activities under U.S.
environmental statutes, such as RCRA, and CERCLA. A citizen of the host country
may also have the right to sue U.S. military officials in the U.S. courts when a status
of forces agreement grants that right. In People of Enewetak v. Laird 1461 , the court
held that NEPA was applicable to federal actions in the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands. That case involved the use of the atoll for experiments to determine the
vulnerability of strategic defense to nuclear attack. The Enewetak court concluded that
“NEPA is not restricted to U.S. territory delimited by the fifty states.” 1462 It based this
conclusion on the legislation’s use of the broader term “Nation” instead of the more
limiting term “United States.” 1463 Moreover, even though Enewetak is located outside
the U.S., its people are subject to U.S. authority. 1464 The U.N. Trusteeship
Agreement 1465 gave the U.S. “full power of administration, legislation, and
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jurisdiction” over Enewetak. 1466 The original language which omitted, was more
precise in saying: “as an integral part of the United States.” 1467 Thus, the court
concluded that NEPA applied to activities on that island. By extension, NEPA can be
applied to all major U.S. activities that have significant environmental impact on
places outside the U.S. including activities of the military.
On the other hand, in Amlon Metals Inc., v. FMC Corp., 1468 the court held that
RCRA did not apply extraterritorially. There, a U.K. corporation and its American
agent sued a Delaware corporation, alleging violation of the Alien Tort statute, and
two provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: its hazardous waste
exportation provision, § 3017, 42U.S.C.§ 6938, 1469 and the term “any person” in its
citizen suit provision § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972. The case raised the question of
RCRA’s applicability abroad. 1470 The court held that RCRA did not apply, because
“subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under Alien Tort Statute, and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act did not apply extraterritorially” because Congress did
not clearly express an intent that it should.
A case where the court stated that NEPA did not apply extraterritorially, was
Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Stone, 1471 in which the United States Army undertook a plan to
remove munitions from Germany to a facility on Johnston Attoll. The transportation
consisted of three phases:
-Transportation of munitions from their magazines to a railhead in
Germany.
-Shipment by rail to a German port, and
-Transport by sea to Johnston Atoll. 1472

The court stated that NEPA did not apply to the movement of munitions within
Germany, because it would result in “grave foreign policy implications and would
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substantively interfere with a decision of the President and a foreign sovereignty in a
manner not intended or anticipated by Congress.” 1473 NEPA could not apply
extraterritorially there, because of that interference with foreign policy decisions.
In Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 1474 environmental organizations challenged
a Department of Interior regulation limiting some provisions of the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) to action occurring in the U.S. or on the high seas. The court held
that Congress intended for the ESA to extend to all agency actions affecting
endangered species, whether within the U.S. or abroad, since section 7 of the Act
requires every federal agency to insure that its activities in the United States, upon the
High Seas, and in foreign countries, will not jeopardize the continued existence of a
listed species. 1475 The court also found that both the act’s plain language and its
legislative history supported the conclusion that Congress intended to extend the
application of ESA extraterritorially.
In some cases, NEPA may require a federal agency to prepare an EIS for
action taken abroad, especially where the agency’s action has direct environmental
impacts within a foreign country, or where there has clearly been a total lack of
environmental assessment by the foreign country involved. However, the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to give extraterritorial application to U.S. statutes if doing so
would conflict with a treaty or with a law of a foreign nation. 1476

4. Kuwait Environmental Laws and Regulations
Kuwait has a system of environmental laws and regulations. However, many of
these laws and regulations do not respond adequately to the nation’s environmental needs
as a developing country, and particularly to the threat of resource depletion and
environmental pollution. Nonetheless, these laws provide a basis for the restoration and
maintenance of environmental quality, in times of peace and in times of armed conflict.
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Under the Kuwaiti legal system, environmental rules can be expressed in the
constitution, statutes, or rules and regulations. In addition, Islamic laws and teachings can
have an impact on environmental protection.

a. The Islamic Reflection on the Kuwaiti Legal System
As an Islamic country, Kuwait stabilizes and protects its environment because it is
considered an Islamic obligation. This obligation originates in the view that man does not
own the environment, that God is the real owner of everything, and therefore any abuse
to god’s property is unacceptable.

[G]od’s wisdom has ordained to grant human beings stewardship
(khalifah) on the earth […] And as such man is only a manager of
the earth and not a proprietor […] and must use it as a trustee. 1477
The prohibition of abuse is stated in the prophetic declaration that “there shall be
no damage and no infliction of damage.” 1478
Moreover, in Islam there are protected areas that must be protected from human
abuse, such as Al-haramaan and Al-Waqf. 1479 In those sanctuaries, any harm to the
natural resources or people, and any harm to the property is strictly prohibited. Indeed,
scriptural law prohibits any warfare in these areas. The Prophet Mohammed said that
“Any Muslim, believing in God and the day of resurrection, should never butcher in
Alharam.” 1480
More generally, Islam encourages human beings to develop the environment,
when the prophet, upon him be blessings and peace, declared 1481 “[i]f any Muslim plants
a tree or sows a field, and a human, bird or animal eats from it, it shall be reckoned as
charity from him.” 1482 Conversely, any destruction of the nature will be punished by God.
1477
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Therefore, a number of Muslims offers a part of their property to the authorities to treat
them as Waqf, 1483 which is a religious endowment, a property giving revenues, as
regulated by Islamic law, 1484 so that authorities can plant crops, or build a dam, so other
people can benefit from its boons.
However, Islamic law does not directly mandate environmental protection, as
contemporary laws and international norms reflect it. But this does not mean that Islam’s
influence is completely absent regarding environmental protection. Religious
considerations may encourage the government to enact laws or regulations that ensure
environmental protection. For example, the Kuwaiti Municipal Council, for purely
Islamic reasons, 1485 adopted a rule prohibiting the taking of shellfish and oysters, and
closing the shellfish market. 1486 Islamic Fatwa was the reason for the adoption of this
rule, but one effect of it was to protect the shellfish and oysters.
The Holy Koran 1487 also speaks to environmental protection during armed
conflict. For instance, the first Muslim Khalipha, Abu Baker, prohibited his army
commanders 1488 from killing women, children, and aged persons, cutting fruitful trees,
destroying buildings, killing sheep or camels unless for eating, or burning or flooding
palm trees. 1489 Those recommendations included a number of environmental
considerations. For instance, the prohibition against cutting fruitful trees, or burning or
flooding palms, should be interpreted as guaranteeing protection to all flora. Moreover,
recommending the avoidance of killing sheep or camels should be interpreted as
recommending the protection of all fauna. Finally, recommending the avoidance of
destroying the buildings should be interpreted as protection of the cultural heritage.
Apart from Islamic teaching on the environmental, Kuwaiti law has sought to
protect ecological interests from the moment of its independence in 1961, Kuwait’s
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Constitution included some provisions of environmental protection during armed
conflict. 1490
Moreover, there are a number of general laws that include environmental
protection provisions. A number of authorities in Kuwait are charged with ensuring
environmental protection, such as Kuwait Municipality, 1491 the Ministry of Trade and
Industry, the Ministry of Transportation, 1492 the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Oil,
the Ministry of Health, 1493 and the Public Authority for Agriculture and Fisheries
Patrimony. Some of these authorities have successfully achieved certain environmental
protections, but some have not, as will be explained later.
Environmental law in Kuwait is still a new field. Greater attention was given to
the environment after the environmental damage caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
in 1990. The first specific Authority charged with protecting the environment is the
Environmental Public Authority (EPA), which was created in 1995 by the law
No.21/1995 amended by the law No.16/1996. Before this date, environmental protection
was the responsibility of a number of ministries and authorities, which resulted in
contradiction among their duties.
In 1997, environmental concerns mere introduced into Kuwait University’s
program, where the Faculty of Law started to teach environmental law to undergraduate
students. 1494 In 1999, study of the environmental law was incorporated into graduate
level studies 1495 as well. The same year, the Faculty of Law of Kuwait University, for the
first time offered scholarships to a number of its distinguished graduate students to obtain
an advanced degree in environmental law in developed countries and thus to benefit from
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their experiences in the environmental field. And I have the honor to be the first Kuwaiti
who held this position.
Nevertheless, environmental law in Kuwait is still in its early stages. To
ameliorate this situation the Higher Council of the Environmental Public Authority
adopted a Bill concerning the establishment of an Environmental Court. 1496 This Bill has
been recently approved by the Cabinet of Ministers, and is likely to be enacted into law
by the National Assembly. This future court will be composed of one judge to examine
all environmental questions, but its jurisdiction will be criminal only.1497 To date,
environmental issues have been resolved by non-specialized courts. 1498
In an important case, the Felonies Court in Kuwait decided that express
negligence in port or aboard a tanker, during shipping operations, is the main cause of
Kuwait’s territorial sea pollution. 1499 While the Felonies Court has decided such cases, an
environmental Court is likely to be better equipped to decide more technical matters of
environmental law.

b. Constitutional Provisions Relevant to Environmental Protection
In 1963, with the enactment of the Kuwaiti constitution, Kuwait adopted a very
modest environmental protection system. However, the Iraqi destruction of Kuwait’s
environment during the Gulf War II provoked the urgent need to address amelioration of
environmental conditions.
A number of provisions in the Constitution deal with environmental protection in
general. Moreover, this protection may be extended to cover environmental effects of
armed forces, in both peace and times of armed conflicts.

1496

Mashroa’a Ghanoon Bi’insha’a Watandeem Mahkamah Bi’iyyah [A Bill Establishing and Regulating
the Environmental Court], Approved by the Higher Council of EPA in its Meeting No. 2/99 in Dec. 29,
1999.
1497
Article 1 of the Bill asserts the establishment of an Environmental Criminal Court, guided by a single
judge, and specialize in environmental crimes determination. Id., art. 1.
1498
The Bill of Establishing and Organizing an Environmental Court.
1499
Case No. 2445/1978 October 3, 1978, and 1646/78 December 3, 1978, unpublished judgments, See, Al
Al Awadi Badria, A Commentary on a Judgment Relative to Polluting the Sea by Oil, the Necessity to
Abandon Negligence as Responsibility Base in Pollution Cases, 1L.& Sharia J., 193, at 194 (March
1979).
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1) The Prohibition of Offensive Wars
Until Gulf War II, Kuwait had never been involved in an armed conflict, internal
or international. Article 68 of the Kuwait Constitution totally prohibits offensive wars. 1500
Consequently, any military arms or tactics usable only in offensive war are completely
prohibited and their possession is unconstitutional. This can explain the absence of
nuclear arsenal in the Kuwaiti armed forces. However, defensive war is allowed. 1501
Upon this right, and under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter Kuwait used force to
liberate its territories occupied by Iraq in 1990-91.
2) Public Health
Article 15 of the Constitution states that “[t]he State cares for public health and
for the means of prevention and treatment of diseases and epidemics.” Consequently,
caring for the public health is a duty of the State, any breach of this duty raises the State’s
responsibility before the National Assembly. This provision includes both preventive and
remedial measures. The armed forces, as a part of the government, also have to consider
both preventive and remedial measures, such as avoidance of any use of arms or tactics
that result in a real threat to the public health. Moreover, whenever a military activity
affects the public health, the armed forces have the duty to take remedial measures
necessary to eliminate and reduce the risk of such effects.
Even if the military forces were to neglect this obligation, the Ministry of Health
is charged with maintaining public health, including support of a healthy and safety
environment. 1502 In accordance with Article 15 of the Constitution, a Decree relevant to
the Ministry of Public Health was issued in 1979. Article 2 of this Decree charged the
Ministry of Health with responsibility for the prevention and treatment of disease,
including diseases resulting from military activities. However, the Ministry of Health was
not prepared to cope with the environmental effects of Gulf War II. For example, no
preventive measures were taken to isolate the suspected areas of nuclear pollution from
the general population, and there is a remarkable absence of medical rehabilitation, such
1500

Kuwaiti Const., supra note (1490) art.68.
Id.
1502
Ministry of Health Decree, supra note (1493) art. 1.
1501
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as that provided in the United States by the U.S. Veterans administration regarding the
Gulf War Veterans’ Illness. 1503
3) Natural Resources Conservation
and Proper Exploitation
Article 21 of the Constitution protects natural resources and considers them public
property. Both the State and individual citizens therefore have responsibility to protect
those resources. 1504 Consequently, any military activities that destroy public property,
such as the damage or depletion of natural resources, should be considered a
constitutional violation, and subject to the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. This
article also charged the State with the task of assuring proper exploitation of natural
resources. Therefore, the armed forces must avoid any activities that may interfere with
the protection and the proper exploitation of natural resources.

4) Liability for Damages
Article 25 of the Constitution addresses warfare damage, by declaring that: “[t]he
state shall ensure the solidarity of society in shouldering burdens resulting from public
disasters and calamities, and it shall compensate damages or injuries resulting from war
or military performance.” 1505 This article holds the State responsible for compensating
victims of warfare and military injury, during both peacetime and wartime. This
provision does not detail the nature of the damage for which the State should provide
compensation, and does not specifically address environmental damage. Moreover,
although military activities can injure civilian as well as military personnel, civilians are
1503

About the U.S. efforts to cope with “Gulf War Syndrome”, see, in general Carol H. Picou, Living with
the Gulf War Syndrom, in Metal of Dishonor: Depleted Uranium, How the Pentagon
Radiates Soldiers & Civilians with DU Weapons (Rosalie Bertell et al. eds., 1997)
[hereinafter Picou;] The Environmental Aftermath of the Gulf War, A Congressional Report prepared for
the Committee on Environment and Public Works, Gulf Pollution Task Force, 102d. Congress, 2d Session.
(Environment & Natural Resources Policy Division et al. Eds., 1992) [hereinafter A Congressional Report
of the Environmental Aftermath of the Gulf War].
1504
Article 17 of the Constitution states, “Public property in inviolable and its protection is the duty of
every citizen.” Kuwaiti Const., supra note (1490) art. 17.
1505
Kuwaiti Const., supra note (1490) art.25.
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not entitled to State compensation. Thus, the State did not compensate injuries suffered
during the Iraqi invasion, and instead only encouraged victims to apply to the United
Nations Compensation Commission. 1506

5) Conserving The Heritage of the State
Numerous buildings and sites in Kuwait are considered a part of Kuwaiti cultural
heritage. For instance:

1) Old city wall gates that were left standing as monuments to the
past, including Maqsab Gate (by the sea, down from the Sheraton
Hotel), Jahra Gate (inside the roundabout at the bottom of Fahad
Al-Salem Street), Shamiya Gate (at the start of Riyadh Street,
Beraisi Gate (at the end of Mubarak Al-Kabeer Street), and Bneid
Al-Qar Gate (in Bneid Al-Qar), in the green belt between Soor
(well) Street and the First Ring Road. The gates were destroyed
by the Iraqi invaders but have since been rebuilt. 2) Bayt Lothan
which is a cultural center was set up to preserve the culture, and
develop skills in the creative arts and crafts of Kuwait and the
Gulf, and to promote fine arts and handicrafts both locally and
internationally.
3) Sadu House is the house of weaving, presents a fine example
of Bedouin camel bags, decorations, tent dividers, carpets and
cushions.
4) the National Museum, comprising four buildings and a
planetarium. It once housed the Dar Al-Athar Al Islamiyah, the
Al-Sabah collection of Islamic Art, one of the most
comprehensive in the world. Other buildings housed pearl diving
relics, ethnographic artifacts and archaeological material from
excavations on Faylaka Island.
5) the Science and Natural History Museum, which contains
displays of the petroleum industry, natural history, aviation,
machinery, electronics, space and zoology subjects, as well as a
health hall and a planetarium.
6) Tareq Rajab Museum, a private museum that specializes in
Islamic arts and crafts.
7) Qurain House, liberation monuments that was site of a bloody
battle on February 24, 1990 between the Kuwaiti resistance and

1506

Robin L. Juni, Elliot Eder, Ecosystem Management and Damage Recovery in International Conflict,
Natural Resources & Environment, 3 A.B.A. Sec. Env’t & Energy & Resources, Winter 2000,
at 193.
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the Iraqi occupiers. Twelve of the nineteen members of the group
who took part in the fight died. 1507
In addition, cultural heritage sites include the Greek archaeological sites in
Faylaka, a Kuwaiti Island in the Gulf, the old building of Kuwait University in Shuwaikh,
and many other buildings. These buildings and sites were seriously devastated during the
Gulf War II, either by pillage or by use as military centers.
The Kuwaiti Constitution places responsibility on the government to protect the
Islamic and Arabic heritage. Article 12 of the Constitution states, “the state safeguards
the heritage of Islam and of the Arabs and contributes to the furtherance of human
civilization.” 1508 The Kuwaiti Monuments Law, which will be discussed latter in this
section, also applies to the forecited sited and buildings. As part of the State, the military
also share responsibility for safeguarding these sites, and for avoiding damage to them.

c. Environmental Laws and Decrees
Under Article 51 of the Constitution, the National Assembly and the Emir 1509 of
Kuwait have authority to enact laws. Accordingly, the Emir exercises the legislative
power along with the National Assembly. The National Assembly has the primary power;
however, the Emir, through “Decrees,” holds legislative powers when the Assembly is
dissolved or on vacation. This subsection will address a number of Laws and Decrees
addressing the environmental effects of military activities, in peacetime and times of
armed conflicts.
1) Law Decree Regulating the Usage of Ionizing
Radiation and Preventing its Hazards

1507

1998 Kuwait Premier Guide, available at <http://www.kpgonline.com/general.php3> (visited May 12,
2000) [hereinafter Kuwait Guide].
1508
Kuwaiti Const., supra note (1490) art. 12.
1509
Article 51 of the Constitution states, “Legislative power shall be vested in the Emir and the National
Assembly in accordance with the Constitution.” Kuwaiti Const., supra note (1490) art.51.
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The Law Decree Regulating the Usage of Ionizing Radiation and Preventing its
Hazards was enacted in 1977, 1510 and prohibits usage of this kind of radiation without the
permission of the Ministry of Health. 1511 Even with permission, any person using it must
take all precautionary measures to assure the safety of workers, citizens, and the
environment. 1512 Since ionizing radiation is used by military forces, they are also subject
to these rules. Armed forces must obtain permits from the Ministry of Health for any
activities involving Ionizing Radiation, such as from use of weapons. Moreover, Article 4
of the Decree expressly requires consideration of environmental concerns in activities
involving Ionizing Radiation, 1513 whether by military or civil authorities or personnel, in
peacetime and times of armed conflicts. Consequently, any environmental damage
resulting from the use of Ionizing Radiation during military activities is a violation of the
provision, even if a permit has been granted.
Since execution of this law requires specialized personnel in the field, this Law
Decree created the “Environmental Prevention from Ionizing Radiation Department,” in
the Ministry of Health, 1514 to assure sound environmental practices.

2) Law Relative to the Conservation
of Petroleum Resources
Petroleum and natural gas are the major resources upon which the State of Kuwait
depends. Any environmental limitation to conserve and use this resource applies to all
government agencies, including the military. For instance, Article 3 of the Law
No.19/1973, concerning the conservation of the petroleum patrimony resources 1515
provides that

[E]ach delegated in the work, should take all necessary
precautionary measures and actions to prevent any damage or
1510

Marsoom Biganoon Bisha’an Tantheem Istikhdam Alashya’ah Almoai’yanah Walwygayah Min
Makhatirha 131/1977 [Law Decree Regulating the Usage of Ionizing Radiation and Preventing its Hazards
No 131/1977][hereinafter Kuwaiti Ionizing Radiation Law].
1511
Id., art. 3.
1512
Id., art 4.
1513
Id.,
1514
Id., art. 6.
1515
Ghanoon Bisha’an Almohafadah ala Masadir Atharwah Alpetroliah 19/1973, [Law Relative to the
Conservation of Petroleum Resources No. 19/1973] [hereinafter Petroleum Resources Conservation Law].
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risk produced from petroleum operations, on human life, public
health, property, natural resources patrimony, cemeteries,
religious, antiquarian, or tourism sites. He should also take all
necessary precautionary measures to prevent air, surface and
underground waters pollution. 1516
This provision gives priority to environmental consideration in the use of
petroleum resources, and specifically requires taking precautionary measures to prevent
air, surface and underground water pollution. This restriction applies to all such
operations, including those of the military, as a matter of national policy.

3) Law Decree Relevant to the Interdiction of Certain
Acts Hurtful to Public Cleanliness and Agriculture
The Law Decree relevant to the Public Cleanliness and Agriculture 1517 prohibits
uprooting of trees and plants in public lands. 1518 This Decree applies even to military
operations such as the installation and the preparation of a training or combat field. Any
violation of that nature is punishable. 1519 However, the Decree protects trees and plants
on public lands only, not on private lands. Nor does the Decree protect against other
harmful acts, such as spraying harmful substances, or burning. Moreover, the Decree
does not specifically address other natural resources, such as fauna, water resources, and
minerals.

4) Kuwait Monuments Law

Kuwait, as a member State of the four Geneva Conventions and the Additional
Protocols I and II, is required to apply their provisions regarding the protection of cultural
heritage. Thus, Kuwaiti military personnel are obliged to safeguard historical and cultural
1516

Id., art. 3.
Marsoom Biganoon Bisha’an Ba’ad Alafa’al Almodirah Benadafah Ala’ammah Walmazroa’at 9/1987,
[Law Decree No. 9/1987 relative to the Interdiction of Certain Acts Hurtful to Public Cleanliness and
Agriculture No. 9/1987] [hereinafter Law Decree on Cleanliness].
1518
Article 2 of the Law Decree on Cleanliness states, “the uprooting of overland trees, and plants, where
ever founded in public lands, is completely prohibited.” Id., art. 2.
1519
Article 3 of the Law Decree on Cleanliness states, “without confrontation to any more restricted
punishment, a fine that not less than 5 and not more than 200 Kuwaiti Dinars will be imposed upon any
violation of this law provisions.” Id., art. 3.
1517
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sites whether in peacetime or in times of armed conflicts. For example, Article 16 of the
Additional Protocol II provides for the protection of historic monuments, works of art or
places of worship.
Furthermore, Kuwait adopted the Monuments Law in 1960. 1520 That law has an
extraterritorial effect, since it extends its jurisdiction to protect international cultural
heritage, and it implements the Kuwaiti Constitution, as discussed above. Article 1 of the
Monuments Law provides that

The State shall protect its cultural heritage, and conserve the
monuments that exist in its territory according to the international
conventions rules. Kuwait shall respect Arab and other Nations’
monuments that exist outside its territory. 1521
Accordingly, both civilian and military forces in Kuwait must comply with this
law by avoiding damage to cultural heritage in other States’ territories, whether in
peacetime operations or in times of armed conflicts.

5) Law Decree Concerning the
Future Generations Fund
In order to protect its petroleum reserves and avoid their depletion, Kuwait has
taken steps to guarantee that future generations will be able to enjoy the benefits of the
wealth that petroleum provides to the people of Kuwait. Accordingly, a Law Decree
Concerning the Future Generations Fund 1522 was adopted in 1976, to impose a “ten
percent deduction from Kuwait’s yearly budget to be saved and deposited in a special
account called the future generations account, starting from the year 1976/1977.” 1523
1520

Mursoom Ameiry Biganoon Alaathar 11/1960 [Emery Decree Relevant to the Monuments Law No
11/1960][hereinafter The Kuwaiti Monuments Law].
1521
Id., art 1.
1522
Marsoom Biganoon Bisha’an Ehtyaty Alaj’yal Algadimah 106/1976[Law Decree Relevant to the
Future Generations Fund No. 106/1976][hereinafter Future Generations Fund Law].
1523
Future Generations Law declares in Article 1 that “starting from the budgetary year 1976/1977, a
percentage of 10% will be saved yearly from the state’s incomes. ” Article 2 of this law states, “a special
account will be opened in which these amounts will be deposited. These amounts will be used auxiliary
alternative to the Petroleum Patrimony called “Future Generations Fund. The Ministry of Finance is
charged to invest these funds, and add their benefits in this account.” Article 3 states, “the percentage
mentioned in Article 1 cannot be reduced, and any intake from the Future Generations Fund is not
allowed.”
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This law secures future generations from being neglected by the present
generation. However, this Law Decree does not mention environmental security, by
providing clean air, clean drinking water, fertile soil, vegetation and agriculture. If its
purpose is to protect resources for future generations, it should address environmental
security as well as economic security. The fund could be used to cover the costs of
environmental rehabilitation that are not covered under any national law.

6) Law of the Prohibition of the
Navigable Water Pollution by Oil
As a result of the ratification of the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil in 1962, Kuwait issued the Law No. 12/1964 the prohibiting
Navigable Water Pollution by Oil. 1524 Article 1 of the Law articulates that “[p]olluting
naval areas, defined in Paragraph 2 of this Article, is completely prohibited, whether by
discharging, or leaking oil, or any other liquid containing oil, from any ship, any place on
the land, or any equipment prepared to store the oil, or to transport it from one place to
another, on board the ship or on the land[…].” Naval areas mentioned in Paragraph 2 of
the Article are “A) Kuwait’s internal waters, and B) Kuwait’s territorial sea.” This law
prohibits any discharge of oil or other liquid containing oil in those areas, whether from
military or civil sources. The Ministry of Transportation, in coordination with the
concerned agencies in the field of the marine environment protection, is charged with
supervising the protection of navigable waters. 1525 The Ministry of Transportation
coordinates its activities with military authorities regarding any installation that contains
oil or liquid mixed with oil and that may pollute Kuwaiti marine areas.

7) The Law of Kuwait Municipality
and the Internal Regulations of the Municipal Council

1524

Ganoon Ragom 12 Lisanat 1964 Bisha’an Man’a Talweeth Almiah Asalihah Liulmilahah Bizait [Law
No. 12/1964 Concerning the Prohibition of Navigable Water Pollution by Oil,][hereinafter Kuwaiti
Navigable Water Pollution Prohibition Act,] art. 8.
1525
The Ministry of Transportation Decree, supra note (1492) 2 (6).
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The Law No. 15/1972 relating to Kuwait Municipality and the Internal
Regulations of the Municipal Council 1526 as amended in July 1984, requires the
Municipality Director to take, within municipality competence, all necessary measures to
conserve the public health, safety, and comfort, especially “[…]controlling sites
containing inflammable substances and limiting their allowed quantities in these
sites.” 1527 Since some armed forces activities involve utilizing flammable substances,
they too are subject to measures taken by the Municipality Director.

8) Law Decree Relevant to
the Ministry of Health
The Law Decree relevant to the Ministry of Public Health of 1979 1528 assigns to
the Public Health Ministry the task of maintaining a healthy environment in the state, and
caring for citizens’ health. 1529 Article 2 of the law vests the Ministry of Health with a
number of tasks, among them the prevention of environmental pollution, establishment of
health treatment services, and the supervision of public health organizations. 1530 That
authority also extends to military operations that have effect on public health.

9) Army Law
Army Law 1531 No. 32 of 1967 sets out general procedural rules for certain army
activities. It does not address the environmental consequences of military activities, or
military responsibility for environmental damage. Nevertheless, some of its general rules
can be interpreted to apply to the environment. For instance, it defines military operations
1526

Kuwait Municipality Law, supra note (1491).
Id., art. 15.
1528
Ministry of Health Law, supra note (1493).
1529
Id., art. 1.
1530
Id., art. 2.
1531
Ghanoon Ragom 32/1967 Fey Sha’an Aljaish [Law No. 32/1967 Relevant to the Army].
1527
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as “all works and movements by the army or some of its units, in wartimes and during
internal disturbances.” 1532 It can be argued that military operations include peacetime
activities too, such as military maneuvers.
Article 25 of that law authorizes the Minister of Defense to compensate military
personnel for damages caused to their properties, during their service or its consequences.
It excludes damages caused by victim’s negligence. 1533 And the compensation will be
limited to the value of the necessary objects to the victim and his family, 1534 without any
regard to the environmental harm. In other meaning, Article 25 does not compensate
environmental damage.
Article 26 authorizes damages caused during military operations and
maneuvers. 1535 Although it does not specifically address damage for environmental harm,
logically it should apply to any damage to the environment, since according to this
Article a Ministerial Decision can regulate the right to compensate any damage caused to
any person or his properties 1536 and people cannot be separated from their environment.

10) Law Decree Relative to Civil Defense
Law Decree No. 21/1979 Relative to Civil Defense 1537 was enacted to assure the
safety of the civilian population, the safety of transportation, and protection of buildings,
public projects and properties, and communications in times of emergency. 1538 One of the
Civil Defense duties is to “prepare precautionary plans to avoid warfare risks, by […]
finding unexploded munitions, mines, and bombs and neutralize them.” 1539 Neutralizing
these unexploded ammunitions will also save the surrounding environment, including
human beings, fauna and flora.

d. Environmental Rules and Regulations
1532

Id., Annexed Table No. 4.
Id., art. 25.
1534
Id., art. 25.
1535
Id., art. 26.
1536
Id.,
1537
Marsoom Byghanoon Ragom 21/1979 Fey Sha’an Adeifa’a Almadany [Law Decree No. 21/1979
Relative the Civil Defense].
1538
Id., art. 1.
1533
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1) Rules annexed to the Law Relative
to the Conservation of Petroleum Resources
The Minister of Oil has enacted the Rules annexed to the Law Relative to the
Conservation of Petroleum Resources. 1540 These rules require the preparation of a
preliminary environmental impact assessment on petroleum projects and operations, 1541
and prohibit any soil disturbance, surface or underground pollution, 1542 and discharge in
the surface or the underground of hazardous, solid or liquid substances, in areas under
Kuwait’s sovereignty and its continental shelf. Thus, these rules seek to protect the
environment as well as to facilitate the exploitation of oil resources.

2) Kuwait Municipality Announcements
Regarding Camping Areas
The Kuwait Municipality issues yearly announcements to organize and control
spring camping areas, and their terms. These announcements can, and do, have an impact
on environmental resources. For instance, announcement No 130/1998 declares that
camping areas do not require a permit unless they include the construction of Shabra, a
temporary structure which may be used as a kitchen or a living room. 1543 Moreover,
according to the announcement, sandy fences are prohibited. 1544 Garbage from the camps
must be deposited in dedicated sites, 1545 and at the end of the camping period, campers
must clean up and level their sites. 1546 These rules addresses spring camp areas; however,
1539

Id., art. 1 (2nd) (3).
Technical Affairs Department of Ministry of Oil, Rules of Petroleum Patrimony Resources
Conservation, chapter 4 Surface, Underground and Marine Pollution (1989) annexed to the Petroleum
Resources Conservation Law, supra note (1515) annex.
1541
The Petroleum Resources Conservation Law states in Section 1 of the First Chapter of the general rules
annexed to this law, “4-the delegated in work shall proceed on a preliminary environmental impact
assessment of the petroleum projects and operations, to determine whether these operations need a
comprehensive evaluation of their effects on the environment to prepare a detailed environmental impact
assessment.” See Annex of the Petroleum Resources Conservation Law, supra note (1515) Annexe (Part 1)
(1)(4).
1542
Petroleum Resources Conservation Law, supra note (1515) annex (Part 1) (Generalities) (1).
1543
Baladiat AlKuwait I’alan Ragom 130/1998 [Kuwait Municipality Announcement No.130/1998]
[hereinafter Kuwait Municipality Announcement,] at the Second Condition.
1544
Id., at the Third Condition (A).
1545
Id., at the Third Condition (B).
1546
Id., at the Third Condition (C).
1540
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the environmental effects caused by military camps in operational areas are similar to, if
not much more worse than, the effects caused by spring camps. Consequently, military
forces should be subject to these requirements 1547 and the Kuwaiti military should adopt
similar rules.

3) Decision Concerning the Rules of
Public Stores that are Annoying and Harmful to Public Health
Decision No.3367/81, establishing the rules of public stores that are annoying and
harmful to public health 1548 adopted by the Municipality of Kuwait, in 1981, sought to
entail a 1549 number of activities that would be termed nuisance under U.S. law. For
example, mineral fusion shops, carpentry workshops, varnish and oil factories, pesticide
factories, and forage factories are all required to insure that their activities do not pose
threat to public health. 1550 The reasoning of this Decision could logically be extended to
include military activities that pose similar hazards to the public health and the
environment.
4) Ministerial Decision Regulating the Procedures of the Environmental
Impact Assessment for Structural and Industrial Projects
The Ministerial Decision No. 9/1999, Regulating the Procedures of the
Environmental Impact Assessment for Structural and Industrial Projects, 1551 requires
all government sectors that have infrastructure projects to cooperate with EPA
before they start any major development project to prepare an environmental impact
1547

Malallah, supra note (549).
Garar Ragom 3367/1981 Bisha’an La’ihat Almahalat Alaamah Wal Mogligah Lilrahah Wal Mothirah
Bisyhah [Decision No 3367/1981 Relative to the Rules of Public Stores, Annoying, and Harmful to the
Health][hereinafter Public Stores Rules].
1549
The first table annexed to the Decision No. 3367/1981 is “Public Stores,” which includes hotels, movie
theaters, theaters, entertainment cities, public swimming pools and baths, coiffeurs, tailors, laundries and
manual ironing, shoe repairing, florist, birds and ornament fish stores. The second table is “Annoying and
Harmful to the Health Stores,” which include asphalt plants, paints plants, car tires plants, cartons factories,
pesticides plants, smelter plants, ironsmith factories, gas, weld factories by electricity or acetylene or
oxygen, mechanics, carpentry plants, cemented bricks plants, glass plants, charcoal stores, timber stores,
printing houses, motorbikes and bicycles repairing stores, car washing stores…etc.
Public Stores Rules, supra note (1548) annexed table No.1 & 2.
1550
Id., art. 1.
1551
Gharar Bisha’an Tantheem Ijra’a Dirasat Almardood Albei’ey Lilmashroa’at Alinshaeiah Wasina’eiah
9/1990 [Decision Regulating the Procedures of the Environmental Impact for Structural and Industrial
Projects, No. 9/1990] [hereinafter the Environmental Impact Assessment Ministerial Decision].
1548
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assessment. 1552 Article 2 of the Environmental Impact Assessment Decision states,
“[p]rojects eligible to prepare and submit an environmental impact statement include
those likely to lead directly, or indirectly, either alone, in combination or through
interaction with other factors, to pollute the environment, to threaten public health or
interfere in any way with healthy life and making good use of property.” 1553 Since
the armed forces are part of the Kuwaiti government, they are subject to this
Decision. Military activities, in peacetime and times of armed conflicts, can pollute
the environment, threaten public health, and interfere with healthy and safety life,
and thus, armed forces should prepare an EIA for all projects that can cause
significant impact on human health and the environment.
An EIA should investigate and elaborate the

1- Impacts on inhabited areas, 2- effects on ecological systems in
the areas impacted by the project, 3- expected deterioration in the
aesthetic values of the area or any recreational, cultural, scientific
properties, or any other important environmental aspects of the
area, 4- effects on areas or buildings that have historical,
scientific, archaeological, cultural or social importance for the
present and future generations, 5- threats to the ecosystem and
wild life, 6- significant demand on natural resources, especially
those which are rare or non regeneratable, and 7- cumulative
environmental effects that may take place as a result of present or
future activities of the project. 1554
This provision has not yet been applied to the Kuwaiti military, even though its
operations can affect quality of the human environment in Kuwait. In contrast, in the
United States, under NEPA, the military as part of the Federal Government is required to
prepare an EIA for any major activity that has a significant impact on the human
environment. 1555 The EIA is supposed to describe the proposed federal actions, discuss
the environmental impacts of the proposed action, and consider alternatives and their
environmental impacts. U.S. law, in contrast to Kuwait law, requires agencies, including
the military, to consider the environmental consequences of their actions.

1552

Gharar Majlis Alwozara’a Ragom 906/1994 [Council of Ministries Decision No. 906/1994].
Id., art.2.
1554
Id., art.3 (A).
1555
NEPA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 102 (2)(C), § 4332 (2)(C).
1553
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e. The Role of Environmental Authorities
In the wake of the Gulf War II, environmental awareness among the Kuwaiti
people and government officials has increased dramatically. That awareness is reflected
in the establishment of the Environment Public Authority, the adoption of the
Environmental Court Project, and in the September, 2000, launched of the Arab Regional
Center for Environmental Law (ARCEL) at the Faculty of Law in Kuwait University.
ARCEL will work in the Arabic-speaking world, across North Africa, Middle East and
the Gulf Region. 1556
ARCEL and IUCN, through the Environmental Law Center and the Commission
on Environmental Law, propose to do a comparative study of environmental laws
applicable to the Baltic, the Mediterranean, and the Great Lakes regions, in order to
strengthen the provisions of the Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the
Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution of 1978. 1557

1) The Public Authority for Agriculture
and Fisheries Patrimony Affairs
In 1968, the government established a modest Agricultural Department in the
Ministry of Public Works, while a mandate to conduct research and experimentation on
various plants and animals to determine those best suited to Kuwait’s natural
environment. 1558 In 1984, this department became an independent entity called “The
Public Authority for Agriculture and Fisheries Patrimony Affairs” 1559 (PAAFPA).
PAAFPA is responsible for agricultural development, protection of the natural
landscaping, beautification, and greenery, and for the development and protection of
various fish resources. 1560

1556

Robinson, International Environmental Legal Trends, supra note (1123) at 534.
Robinson, Arab Regional Center for Environmental Law, supra note (1147) at 10.
1558
Hawally Governorate, Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, available at
<http://www.hawally.com/agriculture.html>, (visited Feb. 9, 2000)[hereinafter Hawally].
1559
Law No. 94/1983 Establishing the Public Authority for Agriculture and Fisheries Patrimony Affairs,
amended by the Law Decree No. 6/1988 [hereinafter Agriculture Authority Law Decree].
1560
Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research, The Public Authority for Agriculture Affairs and Fish
Resources, available at <http://www.kisr.edu.kw/events/gebaz05.htm>, (visited Feb.15, 2000).
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One of its goals is to “protect and assure the best use of land and water.” 1561
Accordingly, any activities that interfere with the best use of land and water should be
eliminated, including military activities that occur on land and water.
2) The Environmental Public Authority
The law establishing the Environmental Public Authority 1562 (EPA) vests the
Authority with the power to carry out activities and functions to assure the protection of
the environment in the State. In particular, the EPA is to “[p]repare and supervise the
execution of the complete Action Plan relating totally to the protection of the
environment in the short and long terms in co-ordination with the concerned Authorities
in the country[…]” 1563 Since the armed forces in one of the “concerned authorities” that
deals with activities harmful to the environment, the armed forces should co-ordinate
their activities with EPA, identify potential environmental problems, and seek to avoid
damage to the environment. 1564 Moreover, EPA is empowered to “[p]repare a
comprehensive plan against environmental catastrophes and take necessary actions
required in time of war and peace in coordination and cooperation with the concerned
authorities.” 1565 That language also suggests that military operations should be subject to
environmental regulation.
In fact, there has already been effective cooperation between EPA and the
Administration of Military Installations Engineering in the Kuwaiti Military, with regard
to the environmental standards when establishing a new military base, or when choosing
maneuver sites. 1566
The Kuwaiti military is also helping in many other environmental protection
issues. For example, they provided heavy-duty equipment for the landfill rehabilitation in
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Article 2 of PAAFPAA Law states, its goals are to “fulfill the charges of agricultural development, in
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Fisheries Patrimony.” Agriculture Authority Law Decree, supra note (1559) art. 2 (1) (2).
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Al-Qurain, “the smelliest neighborhood in Kuwait.” 1567 For three decades, an abandoned
quarry in Al-Qurain was used for dumping household garbage, construction waste, and
chemicals, which resulted in emitting toxic substances such as “methane, carbon
monoxide, nitrogen, and hydrogen-sulfide.” 1568 Finally, the EPA, led by Chairman and
Director General Dr. Mohammed Al-Sarawi decided to turn the dump into a clean, free
source of natural energy for about 300 homes surrounding the landfill. 1569 The steps that
they were followed were described as follows:
“First [EPA’s team] scraped of some 28,000 truckloads worth of garbage off the top of
the heap, leveling the area. Then they brought in about 400,000 cubic meters of ‘gatch’Arabic for a pebbly semi-porous sandstone from the desert-and spread it over the top of
the leveled garbage. Fires died. Smells grew fainter. Then they degassed the site by
drilling 300 bore holes into the gatch-covered landfill. They inserted pipes and later
connected them together in an underground gridwork. And engineers discovered a
fortuitous byproduct of the off-gassing methane.” 1570
According to Article 4 of the EPA Law, EPA’s Higher Council (HC) is comprised
of “1) Minister of Transportation, 2) Minister of Oil, 3) Minister of Trade and Industry,
4) Minister of Public Health, 5) Minister of Information, 6) Municipal Council President,
7) Director General of Public Authority of Fisheries Patrimony and Agriculture Affairs,
and 8) Director General of Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research.” 1571 The HC is
concerned with drafting general objectives and policies of EPA and other functions
stipulated by law. 1572 Since its creation in 1995, the HC has never included military
personnel in its membership. 1573 It may be argued that HC is a civilian council and the
military has no place in it. Nevertheless, HC’s goals are to protect the environment from
any threat, including military activities. Therefore, the HC’s membership should include
experts in enviro-military matters.
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The Board of Directors, 1574 the executive body of EPA, is required to “prepare the
systems and criteria that might be found upon determination of the location or establish
or use or remove of any establishment or production of materials or carry out operations
or any other activity that may lead to environmental pollution. [EPA] shall carry out and
execute [EIA] of the development projects.” 1575 The general formulation of this provision
does not exclude military authorities, and in fact suggests that the Board can exercise
authority over military projects. 1576
Under the EPA Law, the Board of Directors has the right to claim compensation
for environmental damage 1577 resulting from the violation of this provision. Moreover,
according to Article 10 of EPA’s law, the HC upon the proposal of the Board of Directors
can suspend any activity or prevent the use of any material if they have a significant
environmental impact. 1578 In cases of emergencies, the HC shall authorize the Director
General to issue the suspension order for a period not exceeding seven days. 1579 All
administrative authorities and concerned parties are subject to such an order. 1580 Military
authorities should be subject as any other governmental agency. However, as a practical
matter, the Board is unlikely to exercise that kind of control over military projects.

3) Kuwait Municipality

Kuwait Municipality was established in 1964, by Law No.11/1964, amended by
law No. 15/1972. 1581 The municipality is charged with managing wastes in the State, 1582
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including military wastes. The Ministry of Public Health, for example, has established its
own incinerator to manage medical wastes. There is no comparable facility for wastes
generated by the military.
After examining the environmental law rules (international, comparative and
national) it appears that the environment is still not completely secured during military
operation of peacetime and in times of armed conflict. Therefore, it would be necessary
to find other source of law to reinforce the environmental protection during military
operations. The rules of disarmament instrument, enviro-humanitarian law, would
provide further assistance in the goals seeking by this thesis.

Part IV:
Enviro-Humanitarian Rules
An examination of international humanitarian rules relevant to armed conflicts
demonstrates that their primary goal is human protection. These rules were examined in
Part Two of this thesis, entitled “Environmental Protection in International Humanitarian
Law.” On the other hand, international environmental rules that were examined in Part
Three, entitled “The Environmental Law Rules,” are concerned with environmental
protection, principally in the absence of armed conflicts. There exists, in the international
law, a third sort of instruments that are not expressly adopted to protect only either
humans or the environment. They can be classified as “enviro-humanitarian rules,” which
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combine elements of both the humanitarian and the environmental law rules, and aim at
protecting people amidst nature. The former President of the United States, William J.
Clinton, referred the essential relationship between man and nature when he declared that
“[w]hen we work to restore nature, we are also working to enhance the health and wellbeing of our economy, our communities, our families. Human well-being is inextricably
connected to the quality of the environment, and our future.” 1583
The terrible humanitarian and environmental consequences of armed conflict have
given rise to environmental law rules and humanitarian law rules. From the idea of
humanizing and “environmentalizing” warfare enviro-humanitarian rules emerge. As the
former Secretary General of the United Nations, Javier Pérez De Cuéllar, said, “The
Charter of the United Nations Charter governs relations between States. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights pertains to relations between the States and the individual.
The time has come to devise a covenant regulating relations between humankind and
nature.” 1584

A- Enviro-Humanitarian Rules Criteria
This section will delineate the elements of enviro-humanitarian rules in order to
distinguish these rules from those in related fields, such as environmental law and
international humanitarian law. International rules relevant to military activities that are
hybred of both environmental and humanitarian considerations may be defined as envirohumanitarian rules (EHR) based on the fact that such rules address both environmental
and humanitarian protection.
The EHR are analogous to the systems of arms control and disarmament, which
seek to reduce the danger of the level, type, and disposition of armaments to the
minimum. 1585 In recent decades, as advanced technology has been used increasingly to
1583
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serve the evil of war, the EHR become very important to assure the safety of the people
and to promote environmental protection as well. This situation is similar to that in “a
crime-ridden city, when citizens, in order to combat the crime, said to each other: let us
undertake to hold, dispose and display the arms we have in a such way as to minimize the
danger we present to each other.” 1586 Likewise, EHRs seek to minimize the danger
presented by the modern technologies of war, by placing limits on the use, disposal, and
“display” of those technologies.
EHRs have the following common characteristics: 1) they are formulated by a
competent State organ, often under the supervision of military authorities; 2) they are
applicable in times of armed conflicts; 3) they are included in bilateral or multilateral
conventions that seek regulate or eliminate the use of certain weapons or tactics of war;
4) generally, only State parties to the EHR conventions can investigate compliance with
these rules; 5) unlike International Humanitarian Law, they do not vest the ICRC with
any major role; and 6) parties to EHR conventions have the right to withdraw at any time.
Each characteristic can be examined as follows:

1. Rules Formulated by Competent State Organs, Often under the Supervision of Military
Authorities:
In the International Humanitarian Law, ICRC played a principal role in the
preparation of most of the instruments, 1587 including drafting the four Geneva
Conventions 1588 and their Additional Protocols I 1589 and II, 1590 which have been
examined previously. Most environmental law instruments are enacted either by national
civil authorities as in the case of national and comparative environmental law, or by
1586
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international environmental organizations such as UNEP or IUCN in the case of
international environmental law. In contrast, in the case of disarmament agreements,
usually it is the military authorities that are concerned with the quantity and the nature of
arms that can be safely disarmed consistent with goals of national defense and security.
Each armed force has a limit beyond which they will not go. For example, the Israeli
limit of armament is not similar to the limit of Switzerland; nor is the limit of North
Korea the same as Japan’s. Very often military commanders have the authority to define
and enforce that limit. Therefore, these rules are often negotiated, formulated, approved
and sometimes signed by military authorities. For instance, the Kuwaiti delegates during
the work of the Brussels Conference for the Landmines held in June 24-27, 1997, were
subject to the direct authority of the Kuwaiti Minister of Defense. 1591 Another example is
the participation of the Kuwaiti Minster of Defense in the work of the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, of Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines
and on their Destruction of September 18, 1997. The Minister was authorized to sign the
instrument, or raise objections to it. Under this authority the Kuwaiti delegate decided not
to sign this convention. 1592 Another example is the Declaration on Arctic Military
Environmental Cooperation, 1593 which was signed by the defense ministers of Norway,
Russia, and the United States.
Unfortunately, too often military authorities consider such agreements from a
purely military perspective, without giving any concern to the environment. However, it
is increasingly recognized that environmental security 1594 is a goal that the military must
also achieve if a nation’s over-all security is to be assured. Therefore, military authorities
1590
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can and should consider the environment as part of their national security concerns, by
consulting or adjoining environmental experts in their delegation to international
weapons regulation conferences. Negotiations regarding issues of disarmament or
security should consider issues of environmental protection. Those that do so, comprise
environmental law.

2. Rules Applicable in Times of International Armed Conflicts:

A significant difference between EHR and humanitarian or environmental rules is
that humanitarian law rules are usually applicable to both international and internal armed
conflicts. For example, the IHL rules expressed in Article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions, the Additional Protocol I aims at the protection of the victims of
international armed conflicts, while the Additional Protocol II is relevant to the
Protection of the Victims of the Non-International Armed Conflicts. 1595 Similarly,
environmental law rules are found at both international and internal levels, and thus apply
to both internal and international armed conflicts since the environment will suffer even
in the event of civil wars. 1596
However, EHR applies only at the international level. International conventions
relevant to arms control and the disarmament of military forces are the main source of
EHR. States do not demilitarize their armed forces capacity unless an international
convention, bilateral or multilateral, assures the national security and safety of such
State. 1597 Multilateral arms control conventions relevant to the prohibition of the use of
certain weapons, such as nuclear, chemical, poisonous gases, and anti-personnel mines,
are another source of EHR. Finally, EHR are also derived from international conventions
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that are directed to restrain military activities that may harm the environment during
armed conflicts, such as ENMOD. 1598
Although current EHR applies only to international conflicts, EHR should be
applied to internal armed conflicts as well. This is so because the nature of arms,
weapons of mass destruction, and techniques used in international armed conflicts are
similar to those used in internal armed conflict, and thus can result in the same lkind of
damage. Civilian populations can be targeted in both international and internal armed
conflicts. And the environment is subject to severe destruction in times of international
and internal armed conflicts. Because internal armed conflicts can also harm international
interests in the environment, States cannot claim that internal armed conflict is a purely
internal affair beyond the competence of the international community. The Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court acknowledges that internal armed conflict “crimes”
can be cognizable internally. Therefore, EHRs should apply to internal armed conflicts as
well.

3. Rules Aimed at Reducing Damages of Modern Technology and Techniques of War:

EHRs are negotiated and codified under international pressure to humanize and
environmentalize warfare. The atrocity of modern warfare is made worse by the use of
modern technology and techniques in military operations, such as nuclear, biological,
chemical weapons. In order to humanize and environmentalize warfare, such technology
and techniques should be restricted or prohibited to reduce and eliminate warfare atrocity
on civilians, the environment and the combatants themselves. Accordingly, warfare
activities can and should be restricted to achieve the sole goal for which they are
intended: to paralyze the opponent’s military capacity. EHRs seek to immunize noncombatants and civilian objects from military attacks that do not distinguish between
military targets and civilian objects or cultural and natural sites.
IHL, in some respects, provides serves environmental protection also. IHL seeks
to prohibit unnecessary suffering or excessive pain. The environment often benefits from
such restriction, since immunizing non-combatants, civilian objects and cultural sites, and
1598
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securing combatants from excessive suffering will necessarily reflect on the environment
at the same time. If warfare aims solely at weakening an enemy’s armed forces, then it
will not focus on attacking the environment.
On the other hand, EHRs seek to assure protection by prohibiting the military
from using some weapons altogether. Admittedly, examining many arms control
conventions shows that the goal is not to completely disarm military forces, but to impose
regional, and international balances between military powers. The balance of power
approach does not assure protection of the environment or of civilian. For instance, States
may obtain environmentally destructive arms and ammunitions, and yet still completely
comply with the EHRs. However, balancing military power through EHRs can result in
provoking military forces to an arms race in order to reach the level of the opponent
armed forces. This is seen in the case of the Iranian-Iraqi, and the Indian-Pakistani
situations.
To achieve effective environmental protection, EHRs should not only seek to
diminish the effects of modern technology and techniques on the environment, but also to
develop and increase environmental protection in general. In other words, military forces
should not just avoid harmful activities to the environment, but should also act
affirmatively to ameliorate the environmental situation

4. Generally Only State Parties to the Conventions Relevant to the EHRs Can Investigate
Compliance with these Rules:
In environmental law, national authorities supervise compliance with the national
environmental law rules. International environmental organizations along with the
member States supervise compliance with international environmental law rules. In IHL,
member States and the ICRC supervise compliance with the humanitarian rules.
However, with a few exceptions, such as the germ warfare agreement of 2001, only
member States are qualified to assure compliance with the EHRs.
Because EHRs often involve purely military information, and because States’
national security and enviro-humanitarian rules are thus closely linked, only military
forces of the contracting States are in a position to monitor the tactics and arms produced,
imported or used by the contracting parties. Consequently, international humanitarian and
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environmental organizations are excluded from formally supervising States’ compliance
with the EHRs. For instance, the ICRC cannot monitor the complex of arms used or
intended to be used by military forces, since its mission is limited to addressing
humanitarian concerns in times of armed conflicts. Similarly, environmental
organizations cannot supervise the nature of arms processed by military forces; they can
only seek to prevent the environmental harm that may result during military operations.
However, Greenpeace, a non-governmental organization, has sought to play a role in
pressuring States about their observance of the EHRs. 1599
Furthermore, in observing compliance with the EHRs, States can closely monitor
international military cooperation between other signatory nations, and determine
whether such cooperation includes suspicious activities that can be interpreted as a
violation of the EHRs. Even outside of formal agreements, States enforce their balance of
power. For example, in the Cuba missile crisis of 1962, 1600 when Cuba had a mutual
military agreement with Russia regarding the establishment of a Russian military base in
Cuba, the United States monitored the military cooperation between Russia and Cuba to
protect its own interests. Moreover, internal military actions may also be subject to the
contracting parties’ monitoring. More routinely, States can monitor increments in the
budget for the national defense purposes. Increases in arms spending may indicate EHR
violation.

5. Unlike International Humanitarian Rules, Enviro-Humanitarian Rules Do Not Vest the
ICRC with any Major Role:
There exists some similarity between the IHL rules and the EHRs, since both seek
to restrict military activities. However, unlike the EHRs, IHL rules attribute to the ICRC
a great role in fulfilling the position of a neutral body. 1601 This role is clearly absent in
the EHRs, where treaties provide no such role. Where treaties do not provide for
monitoring or supervision, under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and
1599
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public international law which provide the rules for supervising treaty compliance, only
member States can supervise the State’s compliance with the EHRs.
However, there have been some indications that neutral NGOs may be able to
participate in monitoring compliance with EHRs. In the statement of the former President
of the Security Council of the United Nations, Njuguna Mahugu, of May 20, 1998,
regarding Sierra Leone, the Security Council recognized “the important role played by
[…] non-governmental organizations” in the peacekeeping process in that area. 1602
NGO’s like Greenpeace and Amnesty International are playing a significant role in the
enforcement of international law by observing States’ compliance with international law
rules, and providing assistance in the environmental protection and humanitarian law
areas. 1603 It is my thesis that Enviro-Humanitarian Law could and should refer to such
NGO’s, in addition to the ICRC, in order to enforce its rules internationally.

6. State Parties to the Convention Relevant to the Enviro-Humanitarian Rules have the
Right to Withdraw at Any Time:
Until 1949, date of the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions, IHL did not
prohibit member States to the IHL instruments from withdrawing from their agreements.
For example, the 1899 Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, 1604 and the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, 1605 do not prohibit the right to withdraw. However, since the
IHL rules stabilized, IHL conventions started to restrict the right of member States to
withdraw, and either impose conditions on withdrawal or prohibited it outright. This is
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the case in Geneva Convention IV, 1606 Additional Protocol I, 1607 and Additional Protocol
II. 1608
Similarly, environmental law conventions do not restrict or prohibit the right to
withdrawal, primarily because environmental matters are new agenda items in both
national and foreign policy. 1609 States would refrain from participating at all in an
international environmental convention if it denied their right to withdraw. Therefore, the
majority of environmental law instruments offer member States the right to withdraw. As
with the IHL, environmental law rules need to be established and stabilized prior to
giving rise to a duty that would restrict or prohibit a State from withdrawing. Only then
could such a duty be accepted by the nations of the world. Since 1970, national and
international environmental law rules have begun to be as clear and stabilized as the IHL
rules, so perhaps that time is approaching.
It would be useful to note that, of all the conventions that have been examined in
the Third Part of this thesis, only the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in
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A Transboundary Context restricts the withdrawal right. 1610 This restriction may be
interpreted as a first step in a transition towards the absolute prohibition of withdrawal
from environmental law conventions, as happened in the case of IHL, in order to
reinforce the environmental law rules and attain their constancy.
The development that occurred in IHL, and is likely to occur in environmental
law rules, regarding the right to withdraw is completely absent in the EHRs. This is
because EHRs directly involve military activities as well as environmental and
humanitarian issues. If EHRs were seen focusing primarily on environmental and
humanitarian concerns, then as with IHL and the environmental law instruments,
withdrawal would be restricted or prohibited.
However, with most of the EHRs, the military concerns predominate. Where
that is so, nations demand an unrestricted withdrawal right. Nevertheless, some EnviroHumanitarian conventions have been seen as primarily non-military instruments and
therefore do restrict any right to withdraw. For instance, the Convention on Prohibition of
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which may be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 1611 and the South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, 1612 restrict the right of member States to withdraw. However,
those instruments are the exception, not the rule.
1610
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Weapons provides that “High Contracting Party is engaged in one of the situations referred to in Article 1,
the Party shall continue to be bound by the obligations of this Convention and of the relevant annexed
Protocols until the end of the armed conflict or occupation and, in any case, until the termination of
operations connected with the final release, repatriation or re-establishment of the person protected by the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in the case of any annexed Protocol containing
provisions concerning situations in which peace-keeping, observation or similar functions are performed by
United Nations forces or missions in the area concerned, until the termination of those functions.”
Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional weapons, supra note (761) art
9 (2).
1612
Article 13 (1) of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty provides that “This Treaty is of a
permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that in the event of a violation by any
Party of a provision of this Treaty essential to the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty or of the
spirit of the Treaty, every other Party shall have the right to withdraw; from the Treaty.” South Pacific
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B- When Enviro-Humanitarian Rules can be Applied
Environmental law rules are applicable both in peacetime and in times of armed
conflicts, to prevent activities harmful to the environment. However, under the pretense
of emergency situations, some of these rules may be suspended. For example, Article 69
of the Kuwaiti Constitution provides that

The Amir shall proclaim Martial Law in the cases of necessity
determined by law and in accordance with the procedure
specified therein. The proclamation of Martial Law shall be by
decree. Such decree shall be referred to the National Assembly
within the fifteen days following its issue, for a decision on the
future of Martial Law. If the proclamation takes place during the
period the National Assembly is dissolved it shall be referred to
the new Assembly at its first sitting. Martial Law may not
continue unless a decision to that effect is made by a majority
vote of the members constituting the Assembly. In all cases the
matter shall be referred to the National Assembly in accordance
with the foregoing procedure, every three months. 1613
And Article 164 of the Kuwaiti Constitution states that “[l]aw shall regulate the
Courts of various kinds and degrees and specify their functions and jurisdiction. Except
when Martial Law is in force. Military Courts shall have jurisdiction only over military
offenses committed by members of the armed and security forces within the limits
specified by law.” 1614
Moreover, the Convention on the Law of the Sea provides, in Article 236, that
The provisions of this Convention regarding the protection and
preservation of the marine environment do not apply to any
warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or
operated by a State and used, for the time being only on
government non-commercial service. However, each State shall
ensure, by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing
operations or operational capabilities of such vessels or aircraft
owned or operated by it, that such vessels or aircraft act in a
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, art. 13 (1), Aug. 6, 1985, 1445 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter South Pacific Free
Zone Treaty].
1613
Kuwaiti Const., supra note (1490) art. 69.
1614
Id., art. 164.
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manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with
this Convention. 1615
And the Kuwait Regional Convention, Article XIV, states that

Warships or other ships owned or operated by a State, and used
only on Government non-commercial service, shall be exempted
from the application of the provisions of the present convention.
Each Contracting State shall, as far as possible, ensure that its
warships or other ships owned or operated by that State, and used
only on Government non-commercial service, shall comply with
the present Convention in the prevention of pollution to the
marine environment. 1616

The IHL rules are applicable in times of international and internal armed conflicts
only. But they are no longer apply after armed forces are withdrawn from occupied
territories, refugees are returned home, bodies are buried, sick and injured are recovered,
prisoners of war are exchanged, and criminals of war are prosecuted. Similarly, EHRs
apply only in times of international armed conflicts. For example, when Iraq used
unlawful arms and chemical weapons during the Gulf War II, 1617 Iraq was internationally
held responsible for violating enviro-humanitarian international law. 1618
In contrast, some agreements apply both in peacetime and times of armed
conflicts. One example is the bilateral convention of disarmament, the Anti-Ballistic
Missiles, 1619 concluded between the U.S. and Russia in 1972. Compliance with this
convention is the domain of military forces of both nations. This convention seeks to
avoid the use of weapons that employ high-risk technology, and thus focuses on military
activities directly related to war. On the other hand, even in peacetime, according to the
bilateral convention’s provisions, the U.S. and Russia monitored each other to assure
compliance, monitors were posted in each other’s countries. Thus, the document applies
also in times of peace.

1615

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note (1019) art. 236.
Kuwait Regional Convention, supra note (1139) art. XIV.
1617
See, Hearing Before the Committee of Veteran’s affairs, supra note (662).
1618
S.C. Res. 687, supra note (559). See, Bernard, supra note (981).
1619
This Treaty will be examined in Section III “Billateral Conventions of the Enviro-Humanitarian Rules.”
1616
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Whenever EHRs apply, detecting violations can be very difficult. The production
or obtaining of arms is always considered a national security matter not subject to public
disclosure. So proving such violation is not an easy task since no data is available.
However, some mechanisms have been suggested for dealing with the difficulty. For
example, one mechanism can be a fact-finding mission. Another could be forming a
committee of experts to investigate a member State’s violation.

C-Arms and Disarmament Conventions are the Main Source of Enviro-Humanitarian
Rules
In the wake of most armed conflicts, the survivors or worried non-belligerents
negotiate rules for the next war that they would, in retrospect, like to have seen applicable
during the previous war. 1620 Conventions concluded to attenuate atrocities and regulate
methods and means of war are most likely to be concluded after wars. These arms control
and disarmament conventions are the main source of the EHRs. These conventions
“recognize, at least in part, that weapons of modern warfare threaten destruction of
humanity via alteration or destruction of the environment.” 1621 While their provisions
often do not cover the environment per se, 1622 because of the fear of certain weapons and
techniques of war that resulted in the restriction or the prohibition of their use, the duties
agreed upon in these agreements are coincident with the environmental protection.
This section will classify the instruments that include EHRs into universal,
regional, and bilateral as follows:

1. Universal Instruments of the Enviro-Humanitarian Rules
Universal instruments of the EHRs are those involving all countries of the world,
such as (a) the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water; (b) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; (c)
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use
1620

George H. Aldrich, Some Reflections on the Origins of the 1977 Geneva Protocols, in Studies and
Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles 132
(Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984) [hereinafter Aldrich].
1621
Popovic, supra note (619) at 82.
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of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction; (d) Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons; (e)
Geneva Protocol on Monitoring Compliance with Biological and Germ Warfare; (f)
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on their Destruction; (g) Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the SeaBed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; (h) Convention on the Prohibition
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, which may be Deemed to
be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; (i) The Geneva Protocol for
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and (j) Convention on the Prohibition of Military or
any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. These are all clear
examples of the Enviro-Humanitarian conventions. Finally, (k) The United Nations
System of Disarmament will be examined among the universal instruments of the EHRs.

a. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water
[The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere,
in Outer Space, and Under Water] 1623 was the first concrete result
of 18 years of efforts by the United States to impose limits on the
nuclear arms race. 1624
The aim of the three original parties to the Treaty, the U.S., Russia, and the U.K.,
was to put an end to the armament race and eliminate the incentive to produce and test all
kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons, at all times. 1625
1622

Id., at 83.
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial
Test Ban Treaty), Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, [hereinafter PTBT.]
1624
See, Message from the former President of the United States of America John F. Kennedy to the U.S.
Senate Transmitting the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, in Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Hearings before the U.S.
Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Executive M., Washington, 1963, at
2.
1625
Nicolas Mateesco Matte, The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water, IX Annals Air & Space L. 391, 400-01 (1984) [hereinafter Matte].
1623
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The PTBT has only five articles. Article I contains the main prohibition against
nuclear tests. It states that

[each Party] to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and
not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other
nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:
(a) in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space; or
under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive
debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under
whose jurisdiction or control such explosions is conducted.
According to Article I, nuclear explosions are prohibited in all environments
except underground tests that may carried out within the territorial limits of the member
States. Although the phrase “in any other environment” seems to include underground
tests, the treaty does not expressly prohibit such tests, as it does with regard to nuclear
tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. 1626 However, underground tests
which may cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the
concerned State party are expressly prohibited.
The PTBT prohibits all nuclear tests carried out in outer space regardless of the
distance of their sites from the Earth, since there is no limit to outer space. 1627 Therefore,
celestial bodies are covered by such prohibition of nuclear tests, since they constitute part
of outer space and testing could result in their contamination. 1628
Moreover, a careful reading of Article I shows that the phrase “any other nuclear
explosion” covers “peace-time nuclear explosions that are not weapons tests.” 1629 Thus
nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are also prohibited. This prohibition applies
only to nuclear tests and not conventional, chemical or biological tests, even though they
can also contaminate the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.
Article I (2) of the PTBT is ineffective in preventing state Parties from conducting
nuclear tests. For example, India, a party to the Treaty, concluded underground nuclear

1626

Nambiar, K. R., The Test Ban Treaty, 1963: Form and Content, 3 Ind. J. Int’l L. 315, 317 (1963).
Matte, supra note (1625) at 402.
1628
Id.
1629
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Hearing before the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th
Congress, 1st Session, Executive M., Washington, 1963, at 77, 13.
1627
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tests, 1630 and other countries such as “Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, Brazil,
Argentina, Taiwan, France, and China” have developed and are developing their nuclear
weapons capacity. 1631 These acts could be considered severe violations of the treaty
provisions, and might lead to the State’s international responsibility, as we will discuss in
the final part of this thesis.

b. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968, 1632 was concluded
based on the fear that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the
danger of nuclear war. 1633 Therefore, it looks to decrease and eliminate nuclear
technology as a weapon in armed conflicts. However, it does not prevent any peaceful
use of nuclear power; indeed, it even requires cooperation in this field. 1634 The NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty sets upon member States a number of
obligations that vary according to the nuclear capacity of each State. The NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty was ratified by 61 countries, including four
major powers: China, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States. 1635
According to the Treaty, nuclear powers are required in the first place to engage
in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear
arsenals. 1636 Since such powers are considered the main source of nuclear technology, if
they can agree to control such technology, the risk of a new nuclear war would be
reduced. Moreover, nuclear powers have the duty “not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist,
1630

See, David Albright, The Shots Heard Around the World, 54 Bull. Atom. Scientists (1998),
available at <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1998/ja98/ja98albright.html> (last visit Nov. 6,
2001)[hereinafter Albright, The Shots].
1631
Husssain, F., The Impact of Weapons Test Restrictions, Adelphi Paper No. 165, 1981, at 11 (citing U.S.
Dept. of Energy and Swedish National Defense Research Institute source).
1632
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, [hereinafter NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty.]
1633
Id., pmbl.
1634
Id., pmbl., art. IV.
1635
United Nations Treaty Series-UNTS Document Display, available in <http://untreaty.un.org> (last visit
Aug. 17, 2001).
1636
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, supra note (1632) art. VI.
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encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices.” 1637
The nuclear powers have a negative and positive duty towards the non-nuclear
States. For example, nuclear powers are committed not to attack or threaten to attack nonnuclear States, and they should assist them if they might be attacked by nuclear
weapons. 1638 Accordingly, the United States, during the 1978 United Nations Special
Session on Disarmament, pledged that it would not use nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear State party to the Non-Proliferation Nuclear Weapons Treaty except in the case
of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a
State allied to a nuclear power or associated with a nuclear power in carrying out or
sustaining the attack. 1639 That exception, which has been confirmed on another
occasion, 1640 is quiet broad and can include many of the armed conflicts in the world.
It would be useful to mention that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) does not
completely prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. It allows their use whenever self-defense
is in question. However, it provides that: “a threat or use of force by means of nuclear
weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and that
fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful,” 1641 since it violates
international law rules and standards.
This trend is reinforced by the 1961 United Nations Declaration on the
Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons, which provides that
the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the
spirit, letters and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct
violation of the Charter of the United Nations […is considered
1637

Id., art. I.
Thomas Graham, International Law and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 33 Geo. Wash.
Int’l L. Rev. 49, 49 fn. 60 (2000) [hereinafter Graham].
1639
George Bunn, Expanding Nuclear Options: Is the U.S. Negating its Non-Use Pledges? 26 Arms
Control Today 7, 7 (1996) [hereinafter Bunn, Expanding Nuclear Options].
1640
In 1995, the U.S. former Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, delivered to the non-nuclear States the
assurance of the United States that it would not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear State party to
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. However, he included an exception on this assurance,
which contains the same meanings, but was updated to match the actual situation, especially after the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. See, George Bunn, Arms Control By Committee:
Managing Negotiations With The Russians 8 (Stanford Univ. Press 1992).
1641
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note (83) at 43.
1638
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as] war directed not against an enemy or enemies alone but also
against mankind in general, since the people of the world not
involved in such a war will be subjected to all the evils generated
by the use of such weapons. Any State using such nuclear and
thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the
Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of
humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and
civilization […]. 1642
Except the former Soviet Union, all the major nuclear powers opposed this
declaration, which reflected on its international acceptance. Eventhough the Declaration
does not bind member States, it refers to the United Nations Charter as a source of such
obligation. From my point of view, the international community should be more specific
in applying self-defense conditions, particularly, whenever weapons of mass destruction
are involved.
On the other hand, non-nuclear States are committed under the Treaty to never
develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. 1643 Therefore, for example, even if the
nuclear powers do not comply with their obligations under the Treaty, the nuclear
weapons risk will still be limited so long as non-nuclear States refrain from receiving
such technology. The nuclear risk will increase only if both the sender and receiver States
violate their obligations under the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. For
example, Iraq breached its obligations under the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Treaty provided in Article II, 1644 when it provides that
[e]ach non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes
not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly;
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any

1642

U.N.G.A. Res. 1653 (XVI), reprinted in The Laws of Armed Conflicts (Schindler &
Toman eds., 1988), cited in Leslie C. Green, State Responsibility and Civil Reparation for
Environmental Damage, in Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflicts at
422-23 (R. Grunawalt et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter Green, State Responsibility].
1643
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, supra note (1632) art. II.
1644
Berhanykun Andemicael et al., Measure for Measure: The NPT and the Road Ahead, available at
<http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Periodicals/Bulletin/Bull373/priest.html>, (last visit June 22, 2001)
[hereinafter Andemicael].
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assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices.
The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty greatly expands the
verification system, and assigns a much more considerable role to the IAEA. According
to Article III of the Treaty, the non-nuclear States are subject to the safeguard system of
the IAEA. 1645 However, the North Korea breached its obligations under the Treaty when
it refused to be subject to the IAEA safeguard system as provided in Article III. 1646
According to the general rules of international law, particularly the “Pacta Sunt
Servanda,” 1647 the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty is binding, and this was
confirmed by the ICJ Advisory Opinion relating to the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons. 1648 In its Advisory Opinion the ICJ reaffirms that any use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons would “generally be contrary to the rules of international law

1645

Article III of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty provides that “1. Each non-nuclearweapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be
negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of
the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of
verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special
fissionable material
whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such
facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material
in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under
its control anywhere. 2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special
fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or
production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless
the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article. 3. The
safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of
this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or
international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of
nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful
purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the
Preamble of the Treaty. 4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements
with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or
together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this
Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period,
negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements
shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.” NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, supra note (1632) art. III.
1646
Andemicael, supra note (1644).
1647
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note (751) art. 26.
1648
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note (83) Disenting Opinion of Justice
Higgins, para 40.
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applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian
law.” 1649 The ICJ declared that “the environment is under daily threat and that the use of
nuclear weapons could constitute a catastrophe for the environment.” 1650 It added that the
“destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They
have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet.” 1651
Significantly, Justice Weeramantry confirmed that “the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons is incompatible with international law and with the very foundations on which
that system rests.” 1652 Because the use of nuclear weapons has the ability to destroy
nations and entire ecosystems, any such threat would contravene the principles of
international law embodied in the United Nations Charter, the basic document of all
international instruments.
According to the non-nuclear States, the worst part in the Treaty is the
discriminatory regime, 1653 under which non-nuclear States are subject to an inspection,
even though the nuclear powers are not fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the
Treaty, which states that “[e]ach of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
The Treaty is given a twenty-five years life span from 1970, the date of its entry
into force, with options to extend it permanently, for an increment of years or to have no
extension thereafter. 1654 States’ dissatisfaction was reflected in their position during the
1995 Review and Extension Conference. During the Conference, participant States
completely rejected the idea of a permanent treaty, and instead agreed to hold a Review
Conference every five years. 1655

1649

Id., para 105.
Id., para. 29.
1651
Id., para. 35.
1652
Id., dissident opinion of Justice Weeramantry, at 312.
1653
Graham, supra note (1638) at 49.
1654
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, supra note (1632) art. X (2).
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Graham, supra note (1638) at 49.
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However, the Statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear NonProliferation and Disarmament 1656 was negotiated during the Conference as an associated
consensus agreement. It aims at reinforcing the existing regime and thus to keep the
treaty in effect. It sets forth a number of primary objectives. For example, member States
should universalize the membership and adherence to the treaty. In addition, the
Statement of Principles and Objectives reaffirms Article VI of the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons Treaty and requires member States to pursue, in a good faith, measures
related to eventual disarmament. 1657 The Statement calls for the commencement of the
negotiation for a fissile material cutoff treaty, which is the effort by the nuclear powers to
reduce nuclear arsenals. 1658 Moreover, it confirms the contents of Article VII by
encouraging the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones. 1659 Finally, it requires
further steps to protect non-nuclear States from threats from nuclear powers. 1660
To assure compliance with its provisions, the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons Treaty established a verification system, 1661 which was subject to member
States’ reservations. 1662 However, the Statement of Principles and Objectives reinforces
the verification system for the compliance with the Treaty. The Statement includes an
agreement to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification
system with regard to non-nuclear States. 1663 However, it still fails to include the nuclear
powers under the verification system, and only non-nuclear States are subject to the
verification requirements.
The environmental aspects were considered by the IAEA during negotiation of
an enhanced safeguards protocol that enabled the IAEA to use environmental monitoring
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U.N. Dep’t for Disarmament Affairs, 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the Fact Sheet 5, Decision 2 (Press Kit, 2000) U.N. Doc. DPI/2085
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techniques to detect trace amounts of residue left behind during the production of
enriched uranium and plutonium. 1664 Unfortunately, that protocol is not yet in force.
While the nuclear powers accepted some responsibilities under the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, they have been privileged by the right to
suspend any amendment to the Treaty. Article VIII (2) provides that “[a]ny amendment
to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty,
including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.” 1665
Practically, the intention of the U.S. Dept. of Defense, under Presidents William
Clinton and George W. Bush, to deploy a national defense missile system, in violation of
the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty (ABM), which will be discussed in the next few pages,
has seriously affected the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty’s regime. For
instance, the former Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, stated that “[unilateral U.S.]
deployment of a national anti-missile defense system would have extremely dangerous
consequences for the whole disarmament process.” 1666 Moreover, the Russian President
Vladimir Putin has stated that the national missile defense (NMD) “will create insecurity,
breach the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, disrupt strategic arms reduction
talks (START III), and provoke a new arms race.” 1667
Additionally, the dissatisfaction of Russia, France and China with the American
project has moved these States to expand their strategic nuclear arsenals. 1668 For
example, a Russian military official said: “recent weapons tests prove that modern
technology can pierce any antimissile defense shield.” 1669 And a Russian Tu-95 MS
(“Bear”) long-range strategic bomber launched an air-basesed strategic missile on
February 16, 2001 and another bomber, a Tu-22 (“Backfire A”), launched two tactical

1664

Strengthened Safeguard System: Additional Protocols, International Atomic Energy Agency
<http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/updates/safeguards.html> (last visit June 13, 2001).
1665
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, supra note (1632) art. VIII (2).
1666
Yeltsin Warns Clinton Not to Undermine ABM Treaty, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Feb. 11,
1999 available in <http://www.lexis.com> (last visit Aug. 20, 2001)[hereinafter Yeltsin Warns].
1667
Simon Tisdall, Foreign Fears Won’t Deflect Bush on Missile Shield,
<http://english.sohu.com/20010122/file/0888,244,100014.html> (last visit Aug. 17, 2001).
1668
John King, Clinton, Putin Exchange Complaints in Oslo Meeting,
<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9911/02/clinton.putin/index.html> (last visit, June 15, 2001).
1669
Yuri Karash, Russia Responds to U.S. Missile Shield with Massive Missile Tests, Missile Defense,
<http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/launches/missile_defense_010216.html> (last visit Aug. 17,
2001).

312

missiles during training exercises. 1670 The Americans’ use of anti-ballistic missile shield,
and the Russians’ missile tests, significantly increase the possibility of massive
radioactive contamination that will harm the environment. If nations believe they must
choose between national security and environmental protection, they are likely to give
priority to national security, by virtue of the old-fashioned thinking that the strength of
any nation is measured by the capacity of its military arsenal. As a result, we need time to
increase nations’ awareness of environmental protection as a high priority for any healthy
society.

c. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 1671 (CWC) was ratified by 143
States, including the five major powers: France, China, Russia, United Kingdom, and the
United States, 1672 which shows an international concern regarding chemical weapons and
their use. The CWC restricts not only the use of chemical weapons, but even the threat of
their usage. Article X (8) of the CWC provides that: “[e]ach State Party has the right to
request, and […] to receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of
chemical weapons if it considers that: (a)Chemical weapons have been used against it; (b)
Riot control agents have been used against it as a method of warfare; or (c) It is
threatened by actions or activities of any State that are prohibited for State Parties by
Article I.” 1673 Unlike the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or other Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, the
CWC deals more specifically with chemical weapons.
To achieve its goals, the CWC urges that further steps be considered, such as
imposing “a complete and effective prohibition of the development, production,
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acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and their
destruction […].” 1674
Chemical agents are “fast-acting synthetic compounds” 1675 designed to poison
enemy armed forces, animals, and plants. They come in either persistent or non-persistent
form. 1676 A persistent chemical agent has long-lasting environmental effects. Some
experts believe that it is easy for anyone who can make pesticides to make chemical
weapons. 1677 Moreover, chemical weapons are frequently used in an active armed
conflict in order to poison enemy troops and destroy his land.
In order to avoid ambiguity, the CWC clearly defines the substances that are
covered under its jurisdiction. For example, it expressly affirms the prohibition of the
herbicides embodied in the pertinent agreements and relevant principles of international
law. 1678 It prohibits also the use of riots control agents as methods of warfare. 1679
The CWC is one of the few international conventions that expressly considers the
environment. In three of its provisions the Convention requires member States to assure
the protection of the environment. It provides that: “[e]ach State Party, […] shall assign
the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the
environment.” 1680 Moreover, in executing the CWC, each member State is required
assure the safe and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons within its
national jurisdiction. For example, the United States now has “successfully destroyed
6,000 tons of chemical weapons by incineration, [and] has learned that there is no silver
bullet solution for [chemical weapons] destruction.” 1681 Furthermore, the U.S. Army has
concluded that on-site incineration is safe and efficient and carries environmental
consequences that are “quite limited in scope and significance.” 1682 It would be useful for
1674
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the people and the environment as well, while destroying chemical weapons, to reduce to
the minimum the effects of their destruction. States are under the international obligation
to destroy chemical weapons and to prevent their humanitarian and environmental perils.
However, the safety and the mechanism of such destruction are left to the consideration
of each State.
The CWC establishes an independent international agency, the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), with the mission of implementing,
monitoring, and enforcing the Convention’s provisions. 1683 Member States are required
to declare to the OPCW all the information regarding their chemical arsenals. For
instance, OPCW is authorized to verify chemical weapons, abandoned chemical
weapons, production facilities, other facilities designed or constructed or used primarily
for development of chemical weapons, and riot control agents. 1684 The CWC vests the
OPCW with the right of inspection, and, at the same time requires all State Parties to
enact the necessary legislation to ensure the ability of OPCW to carry out its
activities. 1685 The OPCW’s inspection is based either upon the declaration of a member
State, 1686 which is called the initial and periodical inspection, or upon another member
State’s request, 1687 which is called the challenged inspection. The first inspection
systematically takes place after a State’s declaration to the OPCW. 1688 However, the
challenged inspection takes place only after a request for such inspection is made by
another member State and submitted to the OPCW according to the procedures enacted
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by Article IX of the CWC. 1689 Such inspections include on-site investigations by an
international verification agency, and will cost an estimated $33-500 million per year. 1690
The attitude of the CWC member States substantially affects the effectiveness of
the OPCW inspection system. Some States introduced reservations that frustrate the
OPCW verification system. For example, the United States Congress included three
1689

Article IX of the CWC provides that “8. [e]ach State Party has the right to request an on- site challenge
inspection of any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of
any other State […] by an inspection team designated by the Director- General […]; 9. Each State Party is
under the obligation to […] provide in the inspection request all appropriate information on the basis of
which a concern has arisen regarding possible non- compliance with this Convention; 10. […E]ach State
Party shall permit the Technical Secretariat to conduct the on- site challenge inspection; 11. […T]he
inspected State Party shall have: (a) The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to
demonstrate its compliance with this Convention and, to this end, to enable the inspection team to fulfill its
mandate; (b) The obligation to provide access within the requested site for the sole purpose of establishing
facts relevant to the concern regarding possible non- compliance; and (c) The right to take measures to
protect sensitive installations, and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data, not related to
this Convention[…]; 12. […] (a) The requesting State Party may, subject to the agreement of the inspected
State Party, send a representative who may be a national either of the requesting State Party or of a third
State Party, to observe the conduct of the challenge inspection. (b) The inspected State Party shall then
grant access to the observer in accordance with the Verification Annex. (c) The inspected State Party shall,
as a rule, accept the proposed observer, but if the inspected State Party exercises a refusal, that fact shall be
recorded in the final report […]; 13. The requesting State Party shall present an inspection request for an
on- site challenge inspection to the Executive Council and at the same time to the Director- General for
immediate processing […]; 14. The Director- General shall immediately ascertain that the inspection
request meets the requirements specified in Part X, paragraph 4, of the Verification Annex, and, if
necessary, assist the requesting State Party in filing the inspection request accordingly. When the inspection
request fulfills the requirements, preparations for the challenge inspection shall begin […] 15. The
Director- General shall transmit the inspection request to the inspected State Party not less than 12 hours
before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry […]; 16. After having received the
inspection request, the Executive Council shall take cognizance of the Director- General's actions on the
request and shall keep the case under its consideration throughout the inspection procedure. However, its
deliberations shall not delay the inspection process […]; 17. The Executive Council may [decide] against
carrying out the challenge inspection, if it considers the inspection request to be frivolous, abusive or
clearly beyond the scope of this Convention […] Neither the requesting nor the inspected State Party shall
participate in such a decision. If the Executive Council decides against the challenge inspection,
preparations shall be stopped, no further action on the inspection request shall be taken, and the States
Parties concerned shall be informed accordingly […]; 18. The Director-General shall issue an inspection
mandate for the conduct of the challenge inspection […]; 19. […]The inspection team shall be guided by
the principle of conducting the challenge inspection in the least intrusive manner possible, consistent with
the effective and timely accomplishment of its mission […] 21. The final report shall contain the factual
findings as well as an assessment by the inspection team of the degree and nature of access and cooperation
granted for the satisfactory implementation of the challenge inspection. The Director- General shall
promptly transmit the final report of the inspection team to the requesting State Party, to the inspected State
Party, to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties. The Director- General shall further transmit
promptly to the Executive Council the assessments of the requesting and of the inspected States Parties, as
well as the views of other States Parties […] 22. The Executive Council shall[…] review the final report of
the inspection team; 23. […T]he Executive Council […] shall take the appropriate measures to redress the
situation and to ensure compliance with this Convention[…]” Id., art. IX (8)-(23).
1690
Detlev Vacts & Raymond A. Zilinskas, Book Review, 84 Am. J. Int’l L. 984, 986 (1990) (reviewing
Nicholas A. Sims, The Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament: Vicissitudes of a
Treaty in Force 1975-85 (1988) [hereinafter Vacts & Zilinskas.]

316

‘poison-pill’ provisions introduced by treaty opponents that could impair the CWC
inspection’s system. 1691 First, it authorizes the President of the U.S. to refuse a
challenged inspection on “national security grounds.” 1692 Second, it prevents the removal
of samples from U.S. territory for analysis, 1693 and finally, it limits the number of U.S.
chemical plants that are subject to inspection. 1694 These positions of the U.S. can have
unfortunate consequences, because other countries may be inclined to put forth similar
limitations on OPCW inspections.
Furthermore, when a member State refuses to comply with the CWC
requirements, or to cooperate with the OPCW, the OPCW can suspend its privileges
under the CWC, 1695 impose collective measures by other State Parties, 1696 or impose
measures in accordance with the General Assembly or Security Council of the United
Nations. 1697 It would be useful if the OPCW had the authority to directly impose
measures against the State that violated the CWC provisions, without having to rely upon
the U.N. General Assembly or the Security Council. These bodies are concerned with so
many delicate international situations that they may not be able to deal effectively with
specific issues of chemical weapons inspections.
Despite the apparent strength of the OPCW measures, their effectiveness is
contingent upon their adoption by the Conference of the OPCW, which is a political
organ. The Conference of the OPCW is composed of the member States’ representatives,
which means that they may consider the interests of their States over the interests of
human well being and the environment. Additionally, some States may be subject to the
OPCW measures, while some others may not, because of political considerations.
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Finally, as a rule, any international convention binds its contracting parties
only. 1698 Thus, the provisions of the CWC do not bind non-member States, even if they
obtain chemical weapons. These States still present a major threat to human health and
the environment, since they can use such chemical weapons, and even distribute them to
other non-parties to the CWC, such as non-member States, combatants in internal armed
conflicts, or terrorists.
Even States which have not ratified the CWC are prohibited from harming the
environment of other nations according to the international customary law and the
general principles of international law, such as Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration
and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, and the Martens Clause and the IUCN Amman
Clause which was examined in Part Two of this thesis. As long as the use, export, sale,
production, or possession of chemical weapons is considered a great threat to human
health and the environment, their use should be prevented immediately. Even nonmember States to the CWC must be in compliance with such general principles of
international law in order to protect the common globe.
The question of the legality of herbicides and certain other chemical agents’ usage
is still subject to arguments. One argument suggests that the prohibition of their usage has
become a stable principle in international customary law. 1699 Nevertheless, armed forces
are still using herbicides and other chemical agents during armed conflicts in order to
defoliate enemy lands. 1700

d. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons
By ending development of biological weapons and forbidding their use even in
retaliation for biological warfare, the United States helped to develop an international
standard against any use of biological weapons. The outlawing of biological warfare
would preserve the American, Russian, or Chinese strategic positions as nuclear powers.
Since they are cheaper and easy to build, biological weapons could give poorer nations a
1698
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weapon that could “balance” or level the strategic advantage of the nuclear States. 1701
Biological weapons can be easily obtained by developing countries, and countries
currently suspected of developing biological programs include China, Cuba, India,
Iran, 1702 Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Russia, Japan, and Syria. 1703
However, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons 1704 (BWC) of 1972 seeks to
completely eliminate bacteriological and toxin weapons through their destruction or
conversion to peaceful purposes. It is considered the first convention that completely
outlaws an entire category of weapons. 1705 The BWC was ratified by 28 countries and
remarkably none of the major powers is a member-State to it. 1706
Article I (1) of the Convention provides that “[e]ach State Party to this
Convention undertakes never in any circumstance to develop, produce, stockpile or
otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever
their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.” 1707 This provision may cover
military production, use, and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons since they
cannot be described as protective and peaceful. Furthermore, Article II of the BWC
provides that “[e]ach State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to
peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into
force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery
specified in Article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its
jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this article all necessary safety
precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment.” Article II
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gives military forces the possibility of possessing biological weapons, under the condition
of transferring their use into peaceful purposes. 1708
Responding to the fact that member States may not completely comply with the
BWC, and non-member States are excluded from BWC jurisdiction, the U.S. Army
created a special program to deal with the States that have aggressive biological weapons
program, the Biological Defense Research Program (BDRP). The funding of that
program grew by 400 percent from 1980 to 1988. 1709 Some of the States, particularly the
developing States, obtained their technology from the U.S. For instance, Iraqi scientists
ordered and received lab samples of biological warfare agents from the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control. 1710 On the other hand, in 1996, the United States expanded its domestic
implementation of the BWC to punish crimes associated with possession of biological
weapons components. 1711
In 1979, an accident at a covert Russian biological weapons plant resulted in the
outbreak of an epidemic of anthrax in Sverdlovsk, 1712 Russia, and killed up to one
thousand persons. 1713 The Russian government denied that the deaths were caused by any
activity relating to biological weapons. But thirteen years later, in 1992, the former
Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, admitted that the anthrax outbreak was the result of
military activity at the facility. 1714 He allowed a team of Western scientists 1715 to
investigate the outbreak in Sverdlovsk in June 1992 and August 1993. 1716 Their results
showed that on the day of the outbreak all the victims were “clustered along a straight
line downwind from the military facility” and the livestock in the same area also died of
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anthrax. 1717 The team concluded that the outbreak resulted from a release of an aerosol of
“anthrax pathogen” at the military facility; however, they were unable to determine what
caused the release specifically. 1718 In the Sverdlovsk accident, the BWC proved its
inefficiency. Its weakness consists in the absence of verification and enforcement
provisions, since no authority could investigate the situation in Sverdlovsk to assure
Russian compliance with the BWC provisions. Nevertheless, in such environmental
disasters and even in the absence of enforcement measures, the involved countries can
appoint a commission composed of military and environmental experts and may seek the
assistance of experts from neighboring countries to monitor the violation and investigate
the State’s compliance with its duty under the BWC and under international customary
law.

e. Geneva Protocol on Monitoring Compliance with Chemical and Germs
Warfare
The Geneva Protocol on Monitoring Compliance with Biological and Germ
Warfare of July 2001 1719 has been rejected formally by the United States. The U.S. chief
negotiator, Donald A. Mahley, said: “In our assessment, the draft protocol would put
national security and confidential business information at risk.” 1720
The draft Protocol aims at enforcing the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons
(BWC), which bans germ weapons. The Protocol aims at providing compliance
provisions that were lacking in the BWC, because when the Convention was adopted in
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1972, during the Cold War, negotiators ignored enforcement issues, thinking that one
would ever use germ weapons. 1721
The Protocol was drafted to create a way to inspect biological weapons sites
without interfering with other legitimate facilities. 1722 However, Mr. Mahley added “[t]he
draft will not improve our ability to verify Biological Weapons Convention compliance”
and it will not prevent some countries from developing their biological weapons. 1723
The negotiators set November 2001 as a target to complete the enforcement
provisions, which will be important to ensure compliance with the BWC’s provisions and
deter some countries from using or threatening to use or develop biological weapons and
resorting to germ warfare.

f. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan described the conclusion of the Ottawa
Convention as a “landmark step in the history of disarmament.” 1724
Before 1997, Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
Booby-Traps and Other Devices of 1980, 1725 was the only instrument that officially
recognized the danger from landmines. Protocol II does not completely prohibit the use
of landmines, but only restricts member States from directing them against civilians. 1726
Therefore, using landmines to harm combatants or the environment may not be
interpreted as a violation of the Protocol’s provisions as long as civilians are not
1721
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concerned. However, the Protocol does recognize the importance of protecting civilians.
On May 3, 1996, Protocol II was amended and promulgated 1727 at the Review
Conference of the State Parties to the United Nations on Certain Conventional Weapons
Convention (UNCCW). The Amended Protocol II of the UNCCW extends to internal
armed conflicts, whereas the original Protocol was limited to international armed
conflicts and certain wars of national liberation. 1728 This extension is important for
combatants who use mines in internal conflicts, such as in Cambodia and Angola. 1729
Thus, the Amended Protocol II will reduce civilian casualties from landmines and
booby-traps. Nevertheless, the Amended Protocol II does not include environmental
protection from landmines whether in international armed conflicts or during civil wars.
Even though it considers the danger from the use of these weapons in internal armed
conflicts on civilians, it ignores their threat to nature and the environment.
As the effects of landmines have grown more apparent, it has become evident
that the existing international legal protection is too weak and inadequate to cover the
atrocities caused by these weapons. Existing law it does not include measures to enforce
compliance with the international conventions’ provisions and does not impose a strict
liability on States that use landmines. Complete protection from landmines needs to be
provided for civilians and the environment in times of armed conflicts and even in postarmed conflict situations. Therefore, the international community formulated a new
instrument to cover that need. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction,
(Ottawa Convention), was adopted in 1997 1730 to prevent the use of landmines. The
Ottawa Convention was ratified by 118 States, including France and the United
Kingdom. 1731
The Ottawa Convention prohibits completely the use of anti-personnel
landmines. It also forbids their development, production, stockpiling, and transfer. The
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Convention requires the destruction of anti-personnel landmines whether they are in
stockpiles or are already placed in the ground. Article 1 of the Ottawa Convention states
that “1.[e]ach State Party never undertakes, under any circumstances: (a) To use antipersonnel mines; (b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or
transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines; (c) To assist, encourage
or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under
this Convention. 2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of
all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.” 1732
States’ obligations according to the Ottawa Convention are to cease the use of
anti-personnel mines, to prohibit their development and production, to prohibit their
stockpile, to prohibit their transfer, and to never assist, encourage, or induce anyone to
engage in the forecited activities. The use of anti-personnel mines would kill people in
one hand and harm the environment on other hand, since cadavers may contaminate the
soil, or water bodies where it may be dumped. Moreover, the destruction of antipersonnel mines can also harm the environment since toxic materials and other
hazardous substances may be released into the ground, water, and air.
Furthermore, the use of landmines by a signatory State is considered a breach of
its international obligations, since under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of the Treaties, “a State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the
purpose of a treaty when [...] it has signed the treaty.” Although, the U.S. is not a party
to the Treaty, the White House in a Statement issued September 17, 1997, declared a
new United States landmine policy. The United States would observe a permanent ban
on landmines’ export, increase funding for landmine alternatives, and commit
substantial funding to de-mining efforts in 1998. 1733

g. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and
other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and
in the Subsoil Thereof
1731
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On December 7, 1970, the United Nations General Assembly approved the Treaty
on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass
Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, known as
the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (SACT) 1734 by Resolution 2660 (XXV). On February
11, 1971, the SACT was signed in simultaneous ceremonies held in London, Moscow,
and Washington, the capitals of the depository States. In addition, more than sixty other
nations also signed the Treaty. 1735 At the signing in Washington, President Nixon said
that the Treaty is only another step “towards a greater goal: the control of nuclear
weapons on earth and the reduction of that danger that hangs over all the nations of the
world as long as those weapons are not controlled.” 1736 Upon ratification by the
depository governments, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia on May 18,
1972, the SACT entered into force.
It is necessary to examine the historical background of the SACT in order to
understand its provisions.
At the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, Bulgaria was the first
country to suggest the demilitarization of the sea-bed. 1737 Bulgaria introduced a proposal
to be included in the Convention on the Continental Shelf, that a coastal State shall not
use the continental shelf for the purpose of building military bases or installations. 1738
Bulgaria’s proposal was replaced by India’s analogous proposal. 1739 The Indian proposal
read as follows: “[t]he continental shelf adjacent to any coastal State shall not be used by
the coastal State or any other State for the purpose of building military bases or
installations.” 1740 However, India’s proposal was rejected by twenty-one votes to
1734
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eighteen, with six abstentions, because the western States were not ready to take an
obligation of demilitarizing the continental shelf. 1741
On March 18, 1969, Russia, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics at that
time, submitted to the Disarmament Committee a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use
of the sea-bed ocean floor and the subsoil thereof for military purposes. 1742 It was based
on the complete prohibition of military uses and strict control over compliance with the
treaty’s provisions. 1743
On May 22, 1969, the United States submitted its counter-proposal to the
Disarmament Committee, The Draft Sea-Bed Arms Control Treaty.1744 It aimed at
banning the emplacement on the sea-bed, ocean floor and the subsoil thereof of nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruction. 1745 Accordingly, the U.S. draft treaty provided
that the prohibitions should apply beyond the three-mile coastal zone. Russia realized
that, without cooperation with the U.S. and its supporters, there could not be any
satisfactory seabed arms limitation. Thus, on October 7, 1969, Russia and the U.S. jointly
submitted a revised draft treaty. 1746 The joint draft treaty was amended on October 30,
1969, 1747 and as amended was presented during the General Assembly session on April
23, 1970. 1748 Further discussion in the Disarmament Committee resulted in a revised and
supplemented draft on September 1, 1970. 1749 This text was presented at the 25th session
of the General Assembly, and was accepted by ninety-one votes to two (El Salvador,
Peru) with six abstentions. 1750 At the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the treaty
was accepted by 104 votes to two (El Salvador, Peru) with two abstentions (Ecuador,
France). 1751
According to Article I of SACT, the parties committed themselves not to implant
or emplace on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and on the subsoil thereof beyond the coastal
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zone defined in Article II, any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass
destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically
designed for storing, testing, or using such weapons and also not to assist, encourage or
induce any State to carry out these prohibited activities and not to participate in any other
way in such actions. The prohibition includes different types of nuclear weapons, but it
does not include nuclear installations of a peaceful, non-military, character. 1752 It also
applies to biological and chemical weapons, as it covers all weapons of mass destruction.
Article III provides that each State party shall have the right to verify, through
observation, the activities of other States parties on the sea-bed, ocean floor, and subsoil
thereof beyond the 12-mile coastal zone, provided that such observation does not
interfere with such activities. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the treaty does not
provide for the free access to all projects and installations arousing suspicion, which may
affect the verification system.
Article VIII of SACT provides that a nation has the right to withdraw from the
Treaty if it determines that its “supreme interests” are being jeopardized by
“extraordinary events” related to the Treaty. Finally, SACT does not directly solve the
problem of the demilitarization on the sea-bed, ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, and
also does not cover activities on the sea waters. Nevertheless, SACT could be cited as an
example of “how common interests, representing a compromise among several
competing interests, could be achieved.” 1753

h. The United Nations Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, which may be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
The United Nations Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons, which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects of 1980, 1754 and its additional Protocols 1755 are different
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from other enviro-humanitarian rules instruments because this convention and its
additional protocols deal with specific modes of conventional weapons. 1756 Other envirohumanitarian rules deal with unconventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction.
Article 1 of the Inhumane Weapons Convention provides a link between this
convention 1757 the four Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol I. 1758 Therefore,
the Inhuman Weapons Convention has been described as an extension of those earlier
agreements. 1759 It was ratified by 85 States, including China, France, Russia, United
Kingdom, and the United States. 1760
The Preamble to the Convention provides that “it is prohibited to employ methods
or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, longterm and severe damage to the natural environment.” 1761 Here, the Preamble reiterates
Article 35 (3) of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which addresses
environmental damage in times of armed conflicts. It will be recalled that Article 35 (3)
1755
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of the Additional Protocol I’s text offers less than ideal environmental protection,
because it applies only to damage that is severe, long-term, and widespread.
Because it links human injury to environmental injury, the Inhumane Weapons
Convention also provides collateral environmental protection while recalling “[t]he
general principle of the protection of the civilian population against the effects of
hostilities.” 1762 In times of armed conflicts, civilian populations are subject to direct and
indirect injury from the weapons of war. By seeking to avoid such injury, the convention
also seeks to protect the environment. However, its Additional Protocol on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices, provides for much
more protection for civilian populations than the protection provided in the Inhumane
Weapons Convention itself. For instance, Article 3 (2) of the Booby Traps Protocol states
that “[i]t is prohibited in all circumstances to direct weapons to which this Article applies,
either in offence, defence or by way of reprisals, against the civilian population as such or
against individual civilians.” 1763 This Article prohibits any attack by mines, booby traps
or other devices against civilian populations, whether in offensive or defensive cases. It
also prohibits indiscriminate uses of mines, booby traps and other devices. 1764 Moreover,
it requires combatants to avoid foreseeable injury to civilians or civilian objects. 1765
Civilian objects are defined, in Article 2 (5) of the Booby Traps Protocol, as “all objects
which are not military objectives.” 1766 A military object is defined as “any object which
by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.” 1767 Consequently, national parks,
zoo, reservoirs, rivers, and forests are considered by their nature civilian objectives,
unless they misused by military forces.
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The Booby Traps Protocol requires member States to take all feasible precautions
necessary to assure the protection of civilian population from the effects of weapons. 1768
Therefore, any severe, widespread, and long term environmental damage that may reflect
on the public health and safety should be avoided. The Protocol also prohibits the use of
mines, booby traps, and other devices in areas of concentration of civilians, such as cities,
towns, and villages, except for explicit military proposes, since the booby traps can affect
both people and any animals that trigger them. 1769 Moreover, Article 6 (2) of the Protocol
prohibits causing any superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 1770 Civilian protection
does not end by the cessation of combat, it continues after the combat. Article 7 (3) (a) (i)
declares that combatants should “take all necessary and appropriate measures, including
the use of [records of minefields, mines and booby-traps], to protect civilians from the
effects of minefields, mines and booby-traps.” 1771 The absence of these records can lead
to the harm of the civilian population as well as the environment.
Similar protection is offered to civilians by the Additional Protocol of the
Inhuman Weapons Convention on Incendiary Weapons, which prohibits incendiary
weapons attacks against civilian population, 1772 or areas with a concentration of civilian
populations. 1773
Article 2 (4) of the Incendiary Weapons Protocol provides that “[i]t is prohibited
to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by incendiary
weapons[…].” 1774 This provision seeks to eliminate the “tectonic of burned land” used by
some military forces during international or internal armed conflicts. Unfortunately, this
tactic is still not strictly forbidden. Moreover, once again environmental protection has no
priority over military necessity. Accordingly, Article 2 (4) grants the armed forces the
right to ignore the protection of natural resources if they are “used to cover, conceal or
camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military
objectives.” 1775 Just as the international community should deal with combatants who use
1768
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civilian populations as a cover to benefit from their protection, it should prohibit
combatants from using nature and natural resources as a cover during armed conflicts.
The preamble of the Inhumane Weapons Convention reaffirms the inadequacy of the
existing rules of armed conflicts and emphasizes “the need to continue the codification
and progressive development of the rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict.” 1776
Another direct environmental protection is provided in the Booby Traps Protocol
when it states that “it is prohibited in all circumstances to use […] booby-traps which are
in any way attached to or associated with […] historic monuments, works of art or places
of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples; animals or their
carcasses.” 1777
Significantly, the Inhumane Weapons Convention adopted the Martens Clause to
cover all the cases that are not covered by its provisions, the three Additional Protocols,
or other international agreements. It provides that “the civilian population and the
combatants shall at all times remain under the protection and authority of the principles
of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity
and from the dictates of public conscience.”1778 Unlike the IUCN Clause, the Martens
Clause does not deal directly with the environmental protection, and offers its protection
only to civilian populations and combatants. 1779 Therefore, the environment is not
considered as high a priority in the Inhumane Weapons Convention as injury to persons.

i. The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and Bacteriological Methods of
warfare
The international community fought to ban the use of poisonous gases and
bacteriological weapons a long time ago. Yet that campaign has not resulted in significant
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victory. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 expressly banned the employment of
poisoned projectiles used to disburse gases. 1780 Eight years later, while adhering to the
letters of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, the German Army launched the first
chemical attack in modern warfare without using poisonous projectiles. 1781 They
positioned chlorine-filled containers along a four-mile front, waited until the wind blew
toward the French positions, and then opened the canisters and released a cloud of
chlorine gas. 1782 Technically, the German did not violate the Hague Conference
agreements because they did not use the projectiles to release the poisonous gas, instead
they used the wind to transmit the gas to the enemy’s line. However, such action can be
interpreted as a violation of the general principle of international law, i.e., the good faith
codified in Article 15 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties. 1783 After the
German action, the French, English and Americans developed their own chemical
weapons and retaliated. 1784 Chemical weapons caused 1.3 million casualties during
World War I.
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more comprehensive agreement was needed to deal with this matter specifically.
Responding to this need, a new instrument was concluded on June 17, 1925: the Geneva
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases
and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. 1787
The Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating Gases was ratified by 132
countries including the five major powers. 1788 It covers the gaps in The Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907. It completely outlaws the use of chemical and biological
weapons against other treaty signatories.1789 In addition, the Geneva Protocol for the Use
of Asphyxiating Gases recognizes environmental protection, by prohibiting the use of
biological weapons, whether on humans, animals, or plants without any distinction.
Moreover, Member States to the Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating Gases
recognize the importance of environmental protection. For example, during the
preparatory works of the Protocol, the Polish delegate declared that “[b]acteriological
warfare can also be waged against the vegetable world, and not only may corn, fruit and
vegetable suffer, but also vineyards, orchards, and fields.” 1790
Furthermore, the United Nations General Assembly has reflected the principles
adopted in the Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating Gases in a number of its
resolutions. The most relevant to the environment is Resolution 2603A (XXIV) of
December 16, 1969, which provides that “chemical and biological methods of warfare
[…] are inherently reprehensible because their effects are often uncontrollable and
unpredictable and may be injurious without distinction to combatants and noncombatants […]” That resolution also “[d]eclares contrary to international law: (a) [a]ny
chemical agents of warfare – chemical substances […] which might be employed because
1787
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of their direct toxic effects on man, animals or plants; (b) [a]ny biological agents of
warfare – living organisms, […] which are intended to cause disease or death in man,
animals or plants, and which depend for their effects to multiply in the person, animal or
plant attacked.” 1791
Non-signatory States are not covered by the protection offered by the Protocol.
Moreover, the Protocol “did not, however, prohibit all use of chemical weapons or
preclude the development of new technologies or stockpiling of such weapons.” 1792 A
number of States ratified the Protocol with reservation of reciprocity, or the right to
retaliate, under which the violation of the Protocol by a member State will free other
members from their obligations set forth in the Protocol. 1793 In case of either aggression
or retaliation, humans might be directly or indirectly affected, but the environment is
always the direct victim of such attacks since it cannot run, escape, or find shelter.
Needless to say, the use of asphyxiating and poisonous gases will hurt the environment
by releasing toxic substances, killing animals and plants, and poisoning bodies of water.
Although some signatories reserved the “right to retaliate,” the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) implicitly has rejected the act of reprisal on one occasion. 1794 While this
occasion did not involve the use of chemical or bacteriological agents, the Court’s
rejection of reprisal can be applied to those circumstances. The occasion was when an
Albanian battery fired at two British warships that passed through the Corfu Channel on
May 15, 1946. The Albanian Government declared that foreign warships had no right to
pass through Albanian territorial waters without previous notification. Nevertheless, the
United Kingdom Government replied that if fire was opened on any British warship
passing through the Corfu Channel in the future, the fire would be returned. 1795 The ICJ
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declared that “the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian
sovereignty” in order to ensure respect for international law. 1796
The restrictions imposed by the Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating
Gases are limited to international armed conflicts, and do not apply to internal conflicts
or peacetime military operations. 1797 Moreover, the Protocol does not ban testing,
production, or stockpiling of biological or chemical weapons, and it permits any
retaliatory use of chemical weapons. 1798 For instance, when the United States ratified the
Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating Gases, it reserved its right to use chemical
weapons if an enemy used such weapons first. 1799 Finally, the Protocol does not contain
any mechanism to investigate or verify any suspected violation to its provisions.
In fact, restricting gas warfare would provide environmental protection, because
manufacture and storage in peacetime could result in accidents, or to theft by terrorists. A
considerable debate surrounds the scope of application of the Geneva Protocol for the
Use of Asphyxiating Gases, as to whether it limits attacks against civilian populations
only, or against animals and plants too. 1800 International law provides a number of
standards and guidelines against targeting any environmental object; therefore, member
States to the Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating Gases should consider these
standards and guidelines before when using poisonous gases or bacteriological
weapons. 1801
Additionally, the attitude of the United States during its ratification to the
Protocol recalls the principle of good faith examined earlier under this title. The official
English text version of the Protocol expressly prohibits the use “asphyxiating, poisonous,
or other gases.” 1802 The phrase “other gases” was so open-ended that the United States
objected to the English version of the text, and strongly supported the French text that
prohibits asphyxiating, poisonous, or similar gases. The French text “similar gases” 1803
1796

Id., at 35.
Scharf, supra note (1692) at 481.
1798
Rosen, supra note (1021) at 61.
1799
Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating Gases, supra note (1787) at 571.
1800
Yuzon, supra note (695) at 830.
1801
Id.
1802
Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating gases, supra note (1787).
1803
The French text read as follows: “Concsiderant que l'emploi à la guerre de gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou
similaires, ainsi que de tous liquides, matières ou procédés analogues, a été à juste titre condamné par
l'opinion générale du monde civilisé.”
1797

335

was expressly interpreted not to preclude irritants or herbicides, used by the United States
in Vietnam, because their effects are not similar to more lethal chemical agents like nerve
or mustard gas. 1804 In an attempt to clarify the ambiguity arising from the difference
between the French and the English texts, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
Resolution 2603 A (XXIV) of December 16, 1969, that interpreted the prohibitions in the
Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating Gases to include “any chemical agents of
warfare-chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid-which might be employed
because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals, or plants.” 1805
In 1935, Italy became the first signatory to the Geneva Protocol for the Use of
Asphyxiating Gases to use chemical weapons, when it invaded Ethiopia. 1806 Eventually,
the international community sought to strengthen the prohibition against such weapons,
by adopting the four Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols I and II. 1807
However, these efforts were not successful, and chemical and biological attacks have
proliferated significantly during international and internal armed conflicts. The
international community has not imposed sanctions for documented violations, such as
the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, bacteriological and chemical agents by the United
States in Vietnam, Russia in Afghanistan, 1808 during the Gulf War I, 1809 by the Iraqi Army
against the Kurds in Northern Iraq, 1810 by Iraq against Iran, and in the terrorist action of
the Aum Shinrikyo doomsday religious cult in Japan. 1811 All these incidents show that
this instrument does not offer effective environmental protection, and the conclusion of a
new treaty to deal more efficiently with the environmental effects of chemical weapons
has become a matter of great urgency.
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j. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques
In 1976, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolution 31/72, 1812 which contains
the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques (ENMOD). 1813 The ENMOD Convention is not customary
international law. 1814 It is the sole Convention designed specifically to protect human
welfare by prohibiting any environmental disruption. 1815 It combines military activities,
human welfare, and environmental protection. The Convention responded to the
environmental modification techniques used by the United States Armed Forces during
the Vietnam War. 1816 The U.S. “employed several modern techniques to clear the
rainforests and slow the movement of the Viet Cong, [such as] herbicides and defoliants
to clear the jungle and reduce food supplies, large bladed tractors known as ‘Rome
ploughs’ in deforestation efforts, and ‘cloud-seeding’ techniques to increase rainfall in
certain areas to slow guerrilla actions and to impede the supply maneuvers of the North
Vietnamese Army.” 1817 It can also be argued that during the Gulf War II, Iraq created the
“worst man-made environmental disaster in history,” 1818 by setting fire to the Kuwaiti oil
wells, and releasing crude oil into the Gulf. However, whether a State is a party to the
Convention as is the United States, or a non-party such as Iraq, it is subject to
international responsibility if it violates ENMOD requirements, as we will discuss in the
final Part of this thesis.
Article 1 of ENMOD provides that “[e]ach State party to this Convention
undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental
modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of
destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.” According to ENMOD, effects
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are “widespread” if they have consequences in areas of several hundred square
kilometers. The term “long-lasting” means damage extending beyond a season, and the
term “severe” means serious damage to human life, natural or economic resources or
other assets. 1819 Some international and political experts viewed that the modification
prohibited by ENMOD “must be large scale[, including] earthquakes; an upset in the
ecological balance of a region; changes in weather patterns [.]” 1820 Any use or
manipulation of the environment that is either widespread, long-lasting, or severe,
violates ENMOD’s single element requirement. 1821 This single element requirement is
unlike that of Articles 35 and 55 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions, 1822 which requires the presence of the three elements “widespread, longterm, and severe damage” together. 1823
Article IV of ENMOD provides that “[parties agree] to prohibit and prevent any
activity in violation of the provisions of the Convention anywhere under [their]
jurisdiction or control.” 1824 However, if the individual efforts of a member State fail to
assure compliance with ENMOD provisions, Article V of ENMOD provides enforcement
procedures that should be followed whenever a violation of ENMOD has taken place and
environmental harm has occurred. Those enforcement procedures, include bilateral
consultation and cooperation, an inquiry commission, complaint to the U.N. Security
Council, or other member States’ assistance as follows:

1) Bilateral Consultations and Cooperation
In general, consultations and negotiations to resolve any mutual concern are
considered the best way to settle the matter. Accordingly, the primary way to assure
compliance with ENMOD is mutual negotiations and consultations among nations.
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Article V (1) of ENMOD states that “[t]he States Parties to this Convention
undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may
arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the
Convention.” States are often willing to cooperate and consult regarding environmental
damage caused by warfare, but often do not have adequate experience and qualified
experts to settle the problem. This is particularly true of developing States. Nevertheless,
the U.N. offers the concerned member States its assistance through its competence
organs, such as the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and the World Health
Organization (WHO). In addition, Article V (1) also provides that “[c]onsultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate
international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance
with its Charter. These international procedures may include the services of appropriate
international organizations, as well as of a Consultative Committee of Experts as
provided for in paragraph 2 of this article.” The Consultative Committee of Experts shall
make accurate findings of facts and provide expert opinions relevant to any dispute raised
by a member State of ENMOD. 1825
Despite the advantage of the direct consultation and cooperation among member
States, it could be argued that when consultation takes place between a superpower and
one of the developing countries, it may not attain its purpose because the superpower will
use its pressure upon the developing country. If so, environmental protection may be
undermined.

2) Inquiry Commission
In some cases, consultation and cooperation among member States may be
hampered by inadequate information. The ENMOD Convention seeks to remedy that
problem by offering an expert commission of inquiry. 1826
[T]he Depository shall, within one month of the receipt of a
request from any State Party to this Convention, convene a
Consultative Committee of Experts. Any State Party may appoint
1825
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an expert to the Committee whose functions and rules of
procedure are set out in the annex which constitutes an integral
part of this Convention. The Committee shall transmit to the
Depository a summary of its findings of fact, incorporating all
views and information presented to the Committee during its
proceedings. The Depository shall distribute the summary to all
States Parties. 1827
The formulation and the procedures of the committee are laid out in annex to
ENMOD, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, which provide that

1. The Consultative Committee of Experts shall undertake to
make appropriate findings of fact and provide expert views
relevant to any problem raised pursuant to paragraph 1 of article
V of this Convention by the State Party requesting the convening
of the Committee. 2. The work of the Consultative Committee of
Experts shall be organized in such a way as to permit it to
perform the functions set forth in paragraph 1 of this annex. The
Committee shall decide procedural questions relative to the
organization of its work, where possible by consensus, but
otherwise by a majority of those present and voting. There shall
be no voting on matters of substance. 3. The Depository or his
representative shall serve as the Chairman of the Committee. 4.
Each expert may be assisted at meetings by one or more advisers.
5. Each expert shall have the right, through the Chairman, to
request from States, and from international organizations, such
information and assistance as the expert considers desirable for
the accomplishment of the Committee's work.
Each member State may appoint an expert to this committee. 1828 However, some
States prefer appointing political experts to defend their foreign policy rather than
environmental experts who will consider environmental protection as a high priority.
As to decision-making issues, the Annex to ENMOD distinguishes between
procedures and matters of substance. With regard to procedural questions, the
Committee’s decisions should be adopted by consensus as possible, or they should be
adopted by the majority of present and voting members. However, all matters of
substance are not subject to voting. 1829
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3) Complaint to the U.N. Security Council
The U.N. Security Council is charged with examining any matter regarding
“international peace and security,” 1830 and therefore has competence to receive
complaints regarding aggression and other acts that may threaten international security. A
similar procedure was adopted by ENMOD in Article V (3):
Any State Party to this Convention which has reason to believe
that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations
deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a
complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such
a complaint should include all relevant information as well as all
possible evidence supporting its validity.
It is notable that ENMOD’s text is general, and does not require any link between
a violation of the treaty and a threat to international peace and security. Nevertheless,
according to Article 24 (1) of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is not
competent to examine any matter that does not amount to a threat to international peace
and security, even if it is considered a violation of ENMOD. To identify whether a
certain situation is considered a threat to the maintenance of international peace and
security, the Security Council may investigate such situation. 1831
If any violation is qualified as a threat to international peace and security, member
States of ENMOD, and particularly concerned States, are obliged to cooperate with an
investigation that may be initiated by the U.N. Security Council. However, initiating an
investigation is left to the decision of the Security Council. According to Chapter VI of
the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has a number of choices. 1832 For
instance, it may invite member States to recur to negotiation, inquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement, recur to regional agencies or
arrangements, and finally, recur to other peaceful means of their own choice. 1833
In order to resolve the question, the Security Council may decide to initiate an
investigation. In such case, ENMOD and Resolution 31/72 require all member States to
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cooperate with the Security Council. 1834 On the other hand, according to Article 25 of the
United Nations Charter, “[t]he members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” 1835
Consequently, the results of the investigation conducted by the Security Council bind al
U.N. members, whether or not they are ENMOD signatories.

4) Other Member States’ Assistance
According to the foregoing enforcement procedure, the U.N. Security Council can
initiate an investigation to determine if a party has harmed or is likely to harm another
member State in violation of ENMOD. 1836 However, to assure the rehabilitation of or the
compensation for environmental damages, the harmed State may recur to the assistance
of other member States. Article 5 (V) of ENMOD provides that “[e]ach State Party to this
Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party which so requests, if
the Security Council decides that such Party has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as
a result of violation of the Convention.” 1837
This requirement is consistent with and re-emphasizes Article 49 of the U.N.
Charter, which provides that “[t]he Members of the United Nations shall join in affording
mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided by the Security Council.” 1838
Furthermore, according to the U.N. Charter, several kinds of assistance and
support can be provided to the harmed State. For instance, Article 41 of the U.N. Charter
provides for coercive actions, which may include “complete or partial interruption of
economic relations and of rail, sea, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” 1839 The armed forces of the
U.N. member States may also be helpful in assisting the harmed State through
1834
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“demonstrations, blockades, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces.” 1840 Last and
most undesirable, according to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, collective self-defense can
be provided to the harmed State. 1841 However, it should be stressed that the U.N. Charter,
and international law in general, is not considered a suicide pact and does not provide a
license to kill. 1842 In other words, there are limits to the right of self-defense.
The environmental protection of ENMOD applies only to military activities
during armed conflicts. Military activities and operations in peacetime are not covered by
ENMOD environmental protection and yet they may also cause long lasting, widespread,
and severe damage to human health and the environment. For instance, military
maneuvers and weapons production and testing in peacetime can contaminate the
surrounding environment severely for decades, as mentioned in the first Part of this
thesis. Such activities should be covered by ENMOD, since they can manipulate the
environment with extremely advanced technology and ENMOD can be violated as a
result of these activities. For example, the use since 1941 of Vieques, Puerto Rico, by the
U.S. Navy as a maneuver area during peacetime resulted in wide-spread, long lasting, and
severe environmental destruction. 1843 Thus ENMOD should be applicable to Vieques
situation.
Finally, Article II of ENMOD bans the manipulation of the environment with
advanced technology which changes the “natural processes, dynamics, composition or
structure of the earth.” 1844 Such manipulation may be affected through the alteration of
atmospheric conditions to bring about rainfall or through “ocean current modification
(military use of tidal waves).” 1845 It does not cover low technological activities such as
tearing down trees to construct an airfield or a dam, 1846 since such low-technology
activities have no wide-spread, long lasting, or severe environmental impacts.
ENMOD was ratified by sixty-six States including Russia, United Kingdom, and
the United States. 1847 It prohibits environmental modification techniques which change
1840
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the environment through the manipulation of natural processes. Article II of ENMOD
states that “the term ‘environmental modification techniques’ refers to any technique for
changing- - through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes – the dynamics,
composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and
atmosphere, or of outer space.” For example, the techniques which cause “[e]arthquakes;
tsunamis; an upset in the ecological balance of a region; changes in weather patterns
(clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various types and tornadoes); changes in climate
patterns; changes in ocean currents; changes in the state of the ozone layer; and changes
in the state of the ionosphere.” 1848 In addition, herbicides were added to the forecited list
at the Second Review Conference in September 1992. 1849
There is an argument among writers, with respect to Iraq’s international
responsibility for the Kuwait oil fires and oil spills during the Gulf War II. The consensus
is that Iraq would not have violated ENMOD, 1850 particularly since Iraq is not party to
the Convention. 1851 However, some other authorities suggest that Iraq would have
violated the Convention. 1852 The former group suggests that there is no violation, since
ENMOD prohibits only the use of the environment as a weapon, 1853 and the environment
as such was not used a weapon in the Gulf War II. For instance, Adam Roberts states that
“[i]t might well be asserted that this was, rather, a case of deliberate abuse of man-made
installations and artificial processes: of damage to the environment, but not necessarily
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damage by the forces of the environment.” 1854 On the other hand, the latter group
suggests that Iraq violated ENMOD since the environmental damage caused by Iraq
during the Gulf War II, specifically the oil fires and the oil spills, have widespread,
severe, and long-lasting effects on human life and the environment. It is clear that
ENMOD requires a lower level of damage in comparing with the level of damage that is
required by the Additional Protocol I. 1855 This view is consistent with the views of the
ENMOD’s member States at the Second Review Conference of 1992, which added
herbicides to the list of the environmental modification techniques. 1856 It is hard to
distinguish between herbicides and oil fires since both damage the environment
severely. 1857
In my view, Iraq would have violated the ENMOD Convention, for the following
three reasons: First, the Final Declaration of ENMOD’s Second Review Conference of
1992 confirmed that herbicides are an environmental modification technique, even
though it did not address the oil spills and fires explicitly, and thus made it easier to
include other examples of environmental modification techniques, that disequilibrate the
natural environment. Second, the damage caused by Iraq exceeded the “widespread, longlasting, or severe” threshold. Finally, a showing of “hostile intent” indicates a violation of
ENMOD. 1858 It is clear that Iraq had such intent when it invaded Kuwait in August 2,
1990. Thus, Iraq violated the ENMOD Convention’s provisions by spilling oil into the
Gulf and burning the Kuwaiti oil wells.

k. The United Nations System of Disarmament
According to the United Nations Charter, maintaining peace and security is the
organization’s primary purpose. 1859 This purpose may be achieved by prohibiting the use
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of force, and instead promoting the peaceful settlement of international disputes.1860
Peace and security are threatened as long as nations are involved in the armament race.
Therefore, the United Nations efforts cannot be separated from disarmament procedures.
Significantly, the Security Council and the General Assembly are the U.N. organs most
directly concerned to disarmament procedures.

1) Security Council Disarmament Mechanisms
Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is directly concerned with
the armament system. Since armaments are considered a threat to international peace and
security, 1861 they are subject to the supervision and control of the Security Council. 1862
Thus, whenever an armament system in a given State may pose a real threat to
international peace and security, the Security Council will be involved in the effort to
eliminate such risk, by preventing the concerned State from obtaining any further arms,
or disarming its arsenal to the minimum.
According to the U.N. Charter, the Security Council has the authority to sanction
any State that exceeds the limit of use of its military power, or threatens other United
Nations members. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter authorizes the Security
Council to prohibit any military cooperation with States that threaten international peace
and security. 1863 Article 41 of the United Nations Charter provides that
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its
decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication,
and the severance of diplomatic relations.
And Article 42 of the United Nations Charter provides that
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for
in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be
1860
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inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and
other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations.

Under this authority, the Security Council prohibited the import of arms by
Iraq, 1864 Liberia, 1865 former Yugoslavia, 1866 and Libya. 1867 Moreover, international
developments following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait gave the Security Council the
power to disarm any State arsenal, through ad hoc bodies, when it may threaten the
international peace and security. Iraq was the first U.N. member State that was subjected
to the Security Council disarmament system. In its decision 687/1991, based on the 1925
Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating Gases, and the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC), the Security Council required that Iraq “unconditionally accept the
destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, […a]ll chemical and biological weapons and
all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research
development, support, and manufacturing facilities.” 1868
By the end of the Gulf War II, in 1991, to better assist the Security Council in
disarming the military capacity of Iraq, an ad hoc body was created under the name of the
United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). UNSCOM was charged with the duty
of inspection and investigation of all known and suspected weapon sites. 1869 The
complete execution of 687/1991 Resolution would secure both human health and the
environment in Iraq and in the neighboring States from any Iraqi military threat in the
future, since harmful arms will be dismantled.
To assure Iraqi compliance with the Security Council requirements, the Security
Council required full compliance with its resolutions concerning the elimination of all
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, prior
to the cessation of sanctions against Iraq. 1870 Nevertheless, what constitutes full
1864
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compliance with the Security Council resolutions is a matter of major controversy among
the permanent members of the Security Council. 1871
UNSCOM was able to greatly curtail the Iraqi armament program, despite the
absence of the Iraqi government’s cooperation. 1872 Repeatedly, the Iraqi authorities
suspended their cooperation with UNSCOM, 1873 rather than allow U.N. inspections of
secret weapons sites. The Iraqi attitude threatened the credibility of the U.N. Security
Council. 1874 In response, U.S. and the United Kingdom launched air strikes against
targets in Iraq. 1875 Sometimes, the air attacks activated Iraqi cooperation with
UNSCOM, 1876 but only temporarily. 1877 Despite the positive results of such strikes in
promoting cooperation between Iraq and UNSCOM, negative results against civilians and
natural environment may result from such strikes. It would be environmentally safer if
the United States and the United Kingdom reinforced the sanctions imposed against Iraq
by the U.N., instead of using military tactics.
Moreover, a considerable number of member States of the United Nations
condemned the strikes against Iraq, including, Russia, China, and France. Desert Fox air
strikes by the United States and the United Kingdom put limit to the function of
UNSCOM. 1878 Air strikes hurt the UNSCOM inspection, because inspectors should leave
Iraq for their safety, and Iraq use these strikes as a pretext to object the inspection. After
1871
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the dissolution of the UNSCOM, and after ten years of inspection, Iraq is still presenting
a threat to international peace and security. It not only developed chemical weapons, but
also had weaponized VX, the most toxic of nerve agents.1879 Responding to this failure,
the Security Council voted to create a successor body, which is the United Nations
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). 1880 UNMOVIC will
retain UNSCOM’s mandate, rights, privileges, facilities, and immunities. 1881 The
establishment of UNMOVIC does not completely overcome the failure of UNSCOM,
since the abstention of three major powers of the Security Council, France, China, and
Russia, denied the political credibility of UNMOVIC. 1882 This abstention left the U.S.
and U.K alone as the only permanent members who support the Resolution.
On January 27, 2000, Kofi Annan, the U.N. Secretary General, announced that the
Security Council had approved his appointment of Hans Blix of Sweden as Executive
Chairman of UNMOVIC. 1883 However, Iraqi officials continue to refuse any resumption
of international weapons inspection by UNMOVIC. 1884
Two aspects of the experiment with Iraqi disarmament are particularly relevant to
environmentalists. First, environmental protection was a high priority, since the Iraqi
weapons presented a particular threat to the environment. Second, the disarmament
process itself presented an environmental threat. It had been documented through the
media that UNSCOM agents had to take precautions, while destroying some biological
and chemical weapons in Iraq, because the explosion of such weapons released toxic and
poisonous gases, which would necessarily affect the surrounded environment in the short
and long terms.

1878

Some jurists attributed the dissolution of UNSCOM to Richard Butler, the Executive Chairman of
UNSCOM. Perlak, supra note (1871) at 248.
1879
Richard A. Falkenrath et al., America’s Achilles’ Heel, Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack 148 (M I T Press, 1998).
1880
S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. SCOR, 54the Sess., S/RES/1284 (1999).
1881
Petter W. Mason, Arms Control and Disarmament, 34 Int’l Law. 609, 622 (2000) [hereinafter
Mason].
1882
Perlak, supra note (1871) fn. 12.
1883
Secretary General Appoints Hans Blix of Sweden Executive Chairman of UN Monitoring, Verification
and Inspection Commission, U.N. Press Release SG/A/721 (Jan. 27, 2000), available at
<http://www.un.org/russian/question/sga721.htm> (last visit Aug. 28, 2001).
1884
Steven Lee Myers, Signs of Iraqi Arms Buildup Bedevil U.S. Administration, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1,
2000, at A1.

349

The Iraqi campaign sought to protect the environment from destruction. For
instance, UNSCOM destroyed a significant number of weapons of mass destruction
handed over by Iraq or found by its inspectors. 1885 Moreover, some of the sites of
weapons of mass destruction were recognized by the United States during the Gulf War
II, but were not attacked because of the risk that their accidental destruction could have
caused. 1886 The bombing of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons could have created the
risk of releasing poisonous agents into the atmosphere and potentially impacting Iraq's
environment and civilian populations and those of its neighbors. 1887
The best methods of disarmament are those that do not harm the environment, or
are done in an environmentally friendly manner. In some cases, disarmament can be
directed to serve the environment, and some weapons can be transformed to protect the
environment, for example, transforming tanks into agricultural watering machines.
2) General Assembly Disarmament Mechanisms
After the catastrophic damages caused by the explosion of nuclear bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the General Assembly was fearful that other countries could
obtain such technology. Thus, the General Assembly called for the elimination of nuclear
weapons, 1888 by adopting the Resolution on the Prohibition of the Development and
Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such
Weapons, 1889 which urged States to refrain from developing new weapons of mass
destruction whether conventional, chemical, biological or other types of weapons of mass
destruction. 1890 However, legally, the Resolution is not binding as it was adopted by the
General Assembly rather than the Security Council, and it does not establish any
mechanism of enforcement.
1885
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However, the General Assembly, by Resolution 502 (VI) of January 1952, created
the United Nations Disarmament Commission under the Security Council with a general
mandate on disarmament questions. However, it met only occasionally after 1959.1891 In
1978, the first special commission of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament
established a successor Disarmament Commission (UNDC) as a subsidiary organ of the
Assembly, composed of all member States of the United Nations. It was created as a
deliberative body, with the function of considering and making recommendations on
various problems in the field of disarmament and following up on the relevant decisions
and recommendations of the special session. It reports its findings annually to the General
Assembly. 1892
The UNDC takes the environmental protection into consideration. This mandate
was included in the text of principles, guidelines, and recommendations that have been
unanimously adopted by the UNDC since its inception in 1978. 1893 The UNDC requires
“further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use of environmental modification
techniques.” 1894
Another body within the General Assembly related to disarmament is the
Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) which was established in 1982, upon the
recommendation of the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament (
SSOD II ), and continued until 1992. It was re-established in January 1998 by the
General Assembly Resolution 52/12. 1895 The Department advises the Secretary General
on disarmament-related security matters; monitors and analyzes developments and trends
in the field of disarmament; supports the review and implementation of existing
disarmament agreements; assists member States in multilateral disarmament negotiation
and deliberation activities towards the development of disarmament norms and the
creation of agreements; promotes openness and transparency in military matters,
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verification, confidence-building measures, and regional approaches to disarmament. 1896
It is composed of five branches that function as follows:

(1) A Secretariat and Conference Support Branch;
(2) A Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch (WMD) which
provides substantive support in the area of the disarmament of
weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons). It supports and participates in multilateral efforts to
strengthen the non-proliferation of WMD and in this connection
cooperates with the relevant intergovernmental organizations and
specialized agencies of the United Nations system, in particular
the IAEA, the OPCW and the CTBTO; 1897
(3) A Conventional Arms Branch (CAB), which focuses its
efforts in the field of conventional arms disarmament;
(4) A Regional Disarmament Branch (RDB), which provides
substantive support to member States, regional and sub-regional
organizations on disarmament measures and related security
matters. It oversees and coordinates the activities of the three
regional centers: in Africa, in Asia and the Pacific, and in the
Latin America and the Caribbean;
(5) A Monitoring, Database and Information Branch (MDI),
which organizes a wide variety of special events and programs in
the field of disarmament, produces DDA publications (such as
the Disarmament Yearbook) and occasional papers, and
maintains the database for specialized areas like Register of
Conventional Arms, and Status of Treaties. 1898

Another related U.N. body is the United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research (UNIDIR). UNIDIR was approved by the General Assembly in December 1984
and became effective on January 1, 1985. 1899
The UNIDIR is charged to
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(a) Provid[e] the international community with more diversified
and complete data on problems relating to international security,
the armaments race and disarmament in all fields, particularly in
the nuclear field, so as to facilitate progress, through negotiations,
towards greater security for all States and towards the economic
and social development of all peoples;
(b) Promot[e] informed participation by all States in disarmament
efforts;
(c) Assist[…] ongoing negotiations on disarmament and
continuing efforts to ensure greater international security at a
progressively lower level of armaments, particularly nuclear
armaments, by means of objective and factual studies and
analyses;
(d) Carry[…] out more in-depth, forward-looking and long-term
research on disarmament, so as to provide a general insight to the
problems involved and stimulating new initiatives for new
negotiations. 1900

The UNIDIR considers as the United Nations center that enhances and
encourages member States to fulfill their international obligations in the field of
disarmament, and to focus on nuclear disarmament.
Except for ENMOD, the universal instruments of the EHRs are not providing for
a real and complete environmental protection. Their goals are diffuse since they aim at
disarmament and arms control on one hand, and environmental protection in the other
hand. However, such weakness does not affect their important rule in minimizing
environmental harm during and after armed conflicts. Even though some of the
environmental law instruments do not specifically provide substantial environmental
protection, they still represent an important source of legal authority for future actions
and enactment.

2. Regional Instruments of the Enviro-Humanitarian Rules
Regional instruments are those international agreements among States located in a
certain region. In general, any State located out of the concerned region is restricted from
being party to such instruments. This section will examine the Treaty for the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, the African
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Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, and the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. In
addition, this section will discuss the urgent need for a Middle East Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone.
a. General Background of the Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
As a result of the environmental consequences of nuclear tests, and to keep their
territories clean and safe from tests’ effects, nuclear power States often prefer to test their
weapons abroad. 1901 For example, French nuclear tests took place in Mururoa and
Fangataufa Atolls, 6,000 kilometers east of Australia, 1902 and the United States tests of
the hydrogen bomb took place in a number of islands under the trusteeship of the United
States in the South Pacific area. 1903 Nuclear weapons free zones were created to avoid
nuclear States’ abuse of other regions of the world as well as to prevent an arms race to
acquire nuclear weapons by any State in a region.
The idea of establishing a free zone was first presented to the U.N. General
Assembly by the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, in 1957, as an “atom free
zone” for central Europe, 1904 which was not adopted. Then, in the late 1950s a proposal
to establish the Nordic nuclear weapons free zone, which encompasses Norway, Finland,
Sweden, and Denmark was adopted. 1905 The Balkan area was also proposed as a nuclear
weapons free zone. 1906 However, none of these proposals has ever seen the light.
The nuclear weapons free zones were established in response to Article VII of the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, which provides that “[n]othing in this
Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to
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assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” 1907 Moreover,
the objectives cited in the Statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear NonProliferation and Disarmament 1908 confirms the need for nuclear weapons free zones.
Nuclear weapons free zones have a number of advantages. For example, they can
restrict activities more than the international treaties, since they concluded among a
smaller group of States, which often have common goals and concerns. Consequently,
free zones can establish norms regionally, which cannot be established universally, such
as the prohibition of testing or stationing of nuclear weapons inside a certain region. 1909
Moreover, the free zones can be used to establish an inspection safeguard system that
covers a greater number of activities than the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) system found in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. 1910 For
instance, a regional weapons-free zone would be able to cover nuclear activities of
regional States that are not parties to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty,
as we will examine in the next few pages.
Significantly, three nuclear weapons free zones were initially established in
different parts of the world, Latin America, South Pacific and Africa. These parts of the
world compose altogether some ninety nations. 1911 Later on, a Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone was created among ASEAN members. Despite the role that these
nuclear weapons free zones play in minimizing the risk of a future nuclear warfare, a
much more important zone, the Middle East, witnesses ongoing armed conflicts and is
badly in need of a similar agreement.
Most of the regional instruments contain one or more protocols that the nuclear
powers are eligible to sign. These Protocols provide negative security assurance, 1912
according to which nuclear powers confirm their obligations to never use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against the contracting parties in the nuclear weapons free zone
treaty. For example, according to Protocol II of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty the five major powers (U.S., France, U.K., Russia, and China) agree not to use or
1907
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threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any party to the Treaty. France, China,
the U.K., and Russia ratified Protocol II; however, the United States signed it on March
25, 1996, but has not yet ratified it. 1913
Additionally, the binding character of the nuclear weapons free zone treaties, in
general, was reaffirmed in the 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJ. The ICJ implied that the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty related assurance commitments are as
binding as the nuclear weapons free zones undertakings. 1914

b. Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Latin America
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1915
(Tlateloco Treaty) creates a Latin American nuclear-free zone. It provides that “nuclear
weapons, whose terrible effects are suffered indiscriminately and inexorably […]
constitute […] an attack on the integrity of the human species and ultimately even render
the whole earth uninhabitable.” 1916
This regional agreement was easier to achieve, in part, because the diversity
among member States, in terms of their quantity and quality 1917 is much less than the
diversity among member States involved in drafting universal instruments. Regional
instruments can establish much stronger obligations and duties than international
conventions normally do. For instance, the Treaty of Tlateloco established safeguards for
Brazil’s nuclear programs during the period of time Brazil remained outside the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. 1918 After signing the Tlateloco Treaty in 1967,
Brazil did not ratify it until 1994. However, according to Article 18 (a) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Brazil was obliged to “refrain from acts which would
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defeat the object and purpose of [the Treaty].” 1919 This obligation was confirmed in 1991,
when Brazil signed an agreement with the IAEA to abandon its nuclear weapons
development programs. 1920
The Additional Protocol II to the Tlateloco Treaty of 1968 1921 provides a negative
security assurance, which prohibits the use or threat to use nuclear weapons against a
contracting party. The United States signed the Additional Protocol II in 1968, 1922 even
before signing the Additional Protocol I in 1977.1923 The U.S. military bases at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Panama, and Puerto Rico are located in the Latin America zone
and, therefore, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Tlateloco Treaty and its Additional
Protocols. 1924 Except for Belize, Cuba, St. Lucia and St. Christopher/Nevis,1925 all the
other Latin American countries have now ratified the Treaty, although in some cases not
until years after signing it. For instance, although Brazil and Argentina signed the
Tlateloco Treaty in 1967, Brazil ratified it only in 1994, and Argentina ratified it in
1996. 1926 Similarly, Chile had ratified the treaty in 1974, but its posture was dependent
primarily on that of Argentina. Consequently, Chile became party of Tlateloco six
months after Argentina’s ratification. 1927 This delay necessarily affected the efficiency of
the treaty.
c. Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Pacific
The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty was negotiated and signed in the mid
1980s under the auspices of the South Pacific Forum. 1928 It entered into force in 1986.

1919

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note (751) art 18 (a).
Rosen, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, supra note (1021) at 38.
1921
Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Apr. 1,
1968, 22 U.S.T. 754 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II to the Tlateloco].
1922
United States Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Arms Control And
Disarmament Agreements 130 (1990).
1923
Rosen, supra note (1021) at 37.
1924
Id., at 38.
1925
These States signed the Tlateloco Treaty but not yet ratified it. See, The Transnational Institute,
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones Project, available at <http://www.tni.org/nwfz/pages/exinwfz.htm>, (last visit
Dec. 30, 2001) [hereinafter The Transnational Institute].
1926
Rosen, supra note (1021) at 338 fn 51.
1927
See, Savita Pande, Regional Denuclearization-I Tlateloco Treaty: How Successful? 12 Strategic
Analysis 35, 35-45 (1998), available at <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-apr8-3.html> (last visit Dec. 30,
2001).
1928
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, supra note (1612) art. pmbl.
1920

357

The Treaty has three protocols, prohibiting activities related to the manufacture,
stationing, and testing of nuclear explosive devices on the territories of the contracting
parties. 1929 Protocol II contains the prohibition of any actual or threatened use of nuclear
weapons, i.e., the negative security insurance. 1930 Protocol III prohibits testing of nuclear
weapons. 1931 The treaty provisions affect the world’s nuclear powers. 1932 Under Protocol
I, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom are required to apply the basic
provisions of the Treaty to their territories in the zone established by the Treaty.
Therefore, the Treaty will apply to the U.S. possession in the South Pacific, Jarvis Island
and American Samoa although they do not contain any military facilities. Under Protocol
II, the U.S., France, the U.K., the Russian Federation and China agree not to use or
threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any party to the Treaty or to each others
territories within the zone. Under Protocol III, the U.S., France, the U.K., the Russian
Federation, and China agree not to test nuclear explosive devices within the zone
established by the Treaty. 1933 However, the French nuclear tests that took place in
October 20, 1995, in the Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls,1934 apparently to violate the
treaty, provoking public opinion against the nuclear States, and resulting in the French
adherence to the Additional Protocol III. 1935 Consequently, France scaled back the
number of tests conducted from eight to six to adhere to the South Pacific Free Zone
Treaty and its protocols. 1936
The South Pacific Free Zone Treaty, unlike other regional agreements, gave a
great consideration to zone’s environmental protection. For instance, member States
“[d]etermined to ensure, so far as lies within their power, that the bounty and beauty of
the land and sea in their region shall remain the heritage of their peoples and their
descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace.” 1937 Member States also
“[d]etermined to keep the region free of environmental pollution by radioactive wastes
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and other radioactive matters.” 1938 In order to achieve such environmental protection, the
Treaty requires member States “to support the conclusion as soon as possible of the
proposed Convention relating to the protection of the natural resources and environment
of the South Pacific region and its Protocol for the prevention of pollution of the South
Pacific region by dumping, with the aim of precluding dumping at sea of radioactive
wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone anywhere in the region.” 1939 These
provisions show the signatories concern not only for the prevention of the nuclear
weapons proliferation, but for protecting the environment as well.
Moreover, the South Pacific Free Zone Treaty requires member States to refrain
from possessing nuclear weapons. 1940 It also regulates peaceful use of nuclear materials
and equipment. 1941 It prevents member States from stationing on their territories nuclear
devices, 1942 or even testing them. 1943 Moreover, it prohibits dumping of radioactive
wastes and other material in the sea of the zone. 1944 However, the South Pacific Free
Zone Treaty did not address the dumping of radioactive wastes and other materials on the
land.
d. Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Africa
The African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty was signed in Cairo on April 11,
1996. 1945 According to Annex I, the Treaty’s jurisdiction consist of the entire continent
mainland Africa and certain number of islands. 1946 This zone covers the U.S. Naval
Facility leased from the British on the island of Diego Garcia. 1947
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According to some scholars, the African continent “represents the smaller States
of the world that do not wish to have their security compromised by the threat and/or use
of nuclear weapons.” 1948 However, it is also the case that the widespread poverty and
short-sighted governmental policies have led many African countries to accept shipments
of wastes, including radioactive wastes. 1949 For example, an American-European
company signed a contract with the government of Guinea-Bissau to dump 3.5 million
tons of wastes in its territory in exchange for 140 million dollars granted to the
government of Guinea-Bissau. 1950 In addition, some American companies signed
contracts with the Congo and Senegal governments to store wastes in their territories for
a payment of $100 per barrel. 1951 As a result, these companies got clean waste disposal,
officialdom was paid, and the general population suffered consequences, or moved. 1952
The risk of receiving such nuclear wastes is that most of the African countries are
developing States; they lack the advanced technology and equipment to treat such wastes
which if dumped into water bodies or released into the air or even leaked into the ground
will cause severe damage to human health and the environment. Thus, rather than
actually solving the problem of safe disposal of radioactive materials, developed
countries have often simply moved the problem to poorer, less developed states.
The nuclear States have shown little support for the African Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone, because it does not advance their interests. Unfortunately, in international
relations, States’ interests are a higher priority than the protection of human life, and the
natural environment. The United States and the United Kingdom led the efforts of partial
support when adhered to the three Additional Protocols to the African Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone, but not to the treaty itself, 1953 because it is not open to them yet.
The existence of rogue States in the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone has had
an effect on the attitude of the nuclear powers. For instance, the fear of a possible Libyan
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nuclear attack against NATO Forces or land targets in Southern Europe, 1954 has led the
United States and the United Kingdom to show little enthusiasm for the African Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone Treaty.
Long ago, the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) recognized the need for a
nuclear weapons free zone. All African countries have endorsed that policy, even the
Republic of South Africa, which halted its nuclear weapons program. 1955
The sole environmental consideration in the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
Treaty is found in the Preamble. It provides that member States have “[d]etermined to
keep Africa free of environmental pollution by radioactive wastes and other radioactive
matter.”
Furthermore, the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty considers the fact
that developed countries dump their nuclear wastes in Africa, and therefore prohibits
dumping of radioactive wastes in the free zone. 1956 However, only member States are
bound by this obligation, unless general principles of international law or international
customary law extend it to other countries.
Article 3 of the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty requires member States to
renounce nuclear weapons devices, 1957 whether developed by their own capacity or
assisted by other States. 1958 Member States are also prevented from developing,
manufacturing, stockpiling, acquiring, or possessing any nuclear explosive devices. 1959
Similarly, member States are prevented from testing, assisting or encouraging the tests of
nuclear explosive devices in the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. 1960 Moreover,
even if member States obtained nuclear devices prior to the entry into force of the Treaty,
they are required, according to Article 6 (b) and (c), “[t]o dismantle and destroy any
nuclear device that it has manufactured prior to the coming into force of this Treaty;
1954
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[and] (c) [t]o destroy facilities for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices or, where
possible, to convert them to peaceful uses.”
As most States in Africa are developing countries, and are wary of threats to their
sovereignty, Article 4 of the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty combines the
Treaty’s objectives and the member States’ sovereignty by providing that “[e]ach Party
undertakes to prohibit, in its territory, the stationing of any nuclear explosive device.
Without prejudice to the purposes and objectives of the treaty, each party in the exercise
of its sovereign rights remains free to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign
ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and
navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic waters in a manner not
covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage
of straits.” 1961
To assure compliance with the Treaty’s provisions, the African Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone Treaty established a verification process that includes the creation of the
African Commission on Nuclear Energy. 1962 Article 6 (d) of the Treaty requires States to
verify “the processes of dismantling and destruction of the nuclear explosive devices, as
well as the destruction or conversion of the facilities for their production.” Moreover,
according to Article 12 of the Treaty, the Commission on Nuclear Energy is also
responsible for
(a) [c]ollating the reports and the exchange of information as
provided for in article 13; (b) arranging consultations as provided
for in annex IV, as well as convening conferences of Parties on
the concurrence of simple majority of State Parties on any matter
arising from the implementation of the Treaty; (c) reviewing the
application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by IAEA
as elaborated in annex II; (d) bringing into effect the complaints
procedure elaborated in annex IV; (e) encouraging regional and
sub-regional programmes for cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear science and technology; (f) promoting international
cooperation with extra-zonal States for the peaceful uses of
nuclear science and technology.
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Finally, despite the role that the Treaty should play to exclude any nuclear arms
from the African zone, Africa still suffers from radioactive materials that have been
dumped or stored in the free zone. Moreover, while the Treaty deals with future nuclear
danger, it says nothing about the risk of materials that have already been dumped and
does not provide for cleanup and rehabilitation procedures.

e. Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Southeast Asia
The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, the Treaty of Bangkok,
was signed by the ASEAN States in Bangkok, Thailand, on December 15, 1995 1963 to
minimize nuclear weapons proliferation in the Southeast Asian region.
Significantly, India and Pakistan are the most dangerous nuclear States in the
region. However, neither India nor Pakistan has ratified the broader Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons Treaty. 1964 Long ago, the States in the region attempted to eliminate
the nuclear risk posed by India and Pakistan. For example, they attempted to establish an
ASEAN Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality to serve as a buffer between Southeast
Asia and Pakistan on one side, and India on the other side. 1965 In the mid-1980s,
Indonesia and Malaysia proposed the establishment of a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon
Free Zone. And in 1995, all the ten Southeast Asian States signed the Treaty. 1966
Under the Treaty, member States pledge themselves to environmental protection,
having “[d]etermined to keep the region free of environmental pollution by radioactive
wastes and other radioactive matter.” 1967 It also requires member States to undertake “to
support the conclusion as soon as possible of the proposed Convention relating to the
protection of the natural resources and environment of the South Pacific region and its
Protocol for the prevention of pollution of the South Pacific region by dumping, with the
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aim of precluding dumping at sea of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by
anyone anywhere in the region.” 1968
The United States has expressed some support for the Treaty, but only of a limited
nature. In 1993, the former U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Christopher, told ASEAN that the
United States was willing to see a draft of the Treaty. However, in early 1995, then
President Clinton informed the Indonesian President that the text of the Treaty and its
Protocol did not meet all fundamental U.S. concerns, and that the U.S. would not sign the
document until it did. 1969

f. The Urgent Need for A Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
Like the other regions discussed in this section, the Middle East region also needs
the conclusion of a nuclear weapons free zone treaty. In fact, the Middle East has an
urgent need for this kind of agreement, because the region contains a number of rogue
States that aim at building a nuclear arsenal to face the United States intervention in the
region. The creation of the State of Israel, and the development of its nuclear weapons
program, in the middle of this region has created a heightened state of tension. The
nuclear powers have interests in the area, which facilitate the advancement of nuclear
weapons program in the region. Moreover, the Israeli success at developing a nuclear
weapons program, and its vulnerable geographic position, led to its refusal to adhere to
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. 1970 On the other hand, Libya, Iran, and
Iraq, with the support of Russia, have taken steps to develop similar nuclear weapons
programs capable of countering the Israeli program that is supported by the United States.
Moreover, acts of terrorism that have occurred in the region raise concerns about
terrorists’ access to nuclear weapon sites and ability to use such weapons in their attacks.
Given all of these dangers and tensions, the establishment of a nuclear weapons
free zone is an urgent matter. This fact was expressed, universally, by the Revision
Conference of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty of 1995, which
announced that the “the development of [Nuclear Weapons Free Zones] and zones free of
1968
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all weapons of mass destruction, especially in regions of tension such as the Middle East,
was encouraged as a matter of priority.” 1971 On the regional level, the Cairo Declaration,
adopted on the occasion of the signing the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty,
provides that “the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of
tension, such as the Middle East, on the basis of arrangement […] enhance global and
regional peace and security.” 1972
The rules of the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty should be
formulated by Israel, Iran, and the Arab States, in order to prevent a future nuclear war in
the region, especially since they all have the same concerns. For example, in 1974, Egypt
and Iran raised the necessity of establishing a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone,
before the United Nations General Assembly. 1973 And in 1980, Israel also urged the
establishment of a regional nuclear weapons free zone. 1974
The establishment of the free zone requires cooperation among regional States,
and the participation of a neutral State, excluding the United States and Russia, or an
international organization that can supervise the application of such a Treaty. This neutral
body would be charged also with verifying compliance, with the treaty’s provisions.

3. Bilateral Conventions of the Enviro-Humanitarian Rules
Bilateral conventions are those which involve two States only, without any
reference to the region in which they are located. The most relevant bilateral convention
that I will examine are the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaties.

a. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty:
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The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) 1975 was concluded between the United
States and the former Soviet Union on May 26, 1972. 1976 The ABM Treaty was based on
Article VI of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, which requires member
States to pursue, in a good faith, measures related to eventual disarmament. Four years
after the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, the United
States and Russia concluded the ABM Treaty as a means of promoting disarmament in
those two countries.
The contracting parties agreed that each would have only two ABM deployment
areas. 1977 Later on, both countries signed a Protocol to the treaty in order to reduce the
number of ABM deployment areas to one. 1978 Accordingly, the former Soviet Union
chose to deploy an ABM system around Moscow, but the U.S., as an indication of the
great success of the treaty’s efforts, decided not to deploy an ABM system at all. 1979
Moreover, the ABM Treaty requires that “[e]ach Party may have no more than a total of
fifteen ABM launchers at test range.” 1980 Any excessive number of restricted or
prohibited devices should be “destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within
the shortest possible agreed period of time.” 1981 The Treaty represented the minimum
agreement reached by the U.S. and the former Soviet Union, and therefore it requires the
parties to continue “active negotiations [to achieve a real] limitations on strategic
1975
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offensive arms.” 1982 Consequently, the treaty “has subsequently been extensively
modified by amendment, and various common understandings and protocols.” 1983
According to Article IX of the ABM Treaty, the two nations are prohibited from
transmitting anti-ballistic missiles technology to other States. Therefore, the United States
violated its obligations under the treaty by providing Israel an advanced missile defense
system and its components, to face threats from the neighboring States 1984 that illegally
obtained from other nuclear powers, i.e., China and Russia, such technology. 1985 In
addition, a number of violations have been committed by the Russians. The most blatant
of these was the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar facility, which was deployed in
violation of the ABM Treaty. 1986
In order to comply with the ABM Treaty provisions, the two countries were
required to destroy excessive numbers of devices. According to Article XII (1), each
country was entitled to verify that the other had in fact complied. However, that Article
also required the signatories to consider the generally recognized principles of
international law, 1987 such as the precautionary principle, intergeneration and
intergenerational equity, and avoiding harm to the environment of other nations.
Therefore, enforcing the provisions of the ABM Treaty would entail consideration of the
recognized principles of international law, including environmental protection.
Environmental protection was included in the agenda of the 1972 Summit at which the
Treaty was concluded, in addition to the policies of the two superpowers’ cooperation,
Vietnam War, negotiations for a strategic arms limitations, trade, science, and
technology. 1988
Furthermore, in May 23, 1972, the two nations concluded an Agreement on
Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection, 1989 which restricted any
1981
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environmental disturbance resulting from the ABM Treaty application. This
environmental agreement was the effort of a series of informal discussions, involving
specialists such as Dean Douglas Costle 1990 and Professor Nicholas A. Robinson, 1991 and
sponsored by the United Nations Association of the U.S. (UNA-USA) and the United
Nations Association of the U.S.S.R. (UNA-USSR), 1992 as proxies for both nations’
governments.
The ABM Treaty does not completely eliminate the risk of attacks by antiballistic missiles. Inadequate technology can still lead to errors. For example, “[o]n
January 25, 1995, a scientific rocket was launched from Norway into space. The rocket’s
payload contained instruments for studying the Aurora Borealis. The Norwegian
government had notified the Russian Foreign Ministry of the launch plan well in advance
of the launch date. But the Foreign Ministry failed to pass this information to the Russian
Ministry of Defense. The result was that the Russian military authorities initially
misinterpreted the launch as a missile attack heading for Russian territory. This
precipitated a nuclear alert that caused the former Russian President Mr. Boris Yeltsin
and the chief of the Russian General Staff General Mikhail Kolesnikov to open their
nuclear control briefcases and consult each other via a hotline.” 1993 Some commentators
expected that, in response to that kind of mistake, Russia would necessarily target the
United States. 1994 Fearful of such mistakes, the U.S. Congress concluded that the national
security of the United States requires the funding of Russian programs to eliminate
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and thus promote “defense by other
means.” 1995 Approximately 1.6 billion has been appropriated through Department of
Defense to fund the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. 1996 Besides
1990
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increasing the national security of the United States from a Russian nuclear threat, this
Program also secures the environment from future harm or threats that may result from
such arsenal.
Moreover, the 1994 Agreement between the United States and Russia on the
Cooperation in the Prevention of Pollution of the Environment in the Arctic 1997 requires
bilateral consultation on technical solutions for the elimination of radioactive and other
types of pollution. Norway, as a neighboring country, fears nuclear pollution and has
therefore agreed to protect its shared environment with Russia 1998 by rendering free
technical assistance for the dismantling of Russian nuclear powered submarines,
delivering equipment, transferring technology, and providing financial assistance.
When the ABM Treaty was concluded during the cold war, it was described by
U.S. President Kennedy as, “a step back from the shadows of war.” 1999 The importance
of the agreement was reflected in the provision that “this treaty shall be of unlimited
duration.” 2000 However, in 1998, many U.S. Congressmen asserted that the ABM Treaty
was a relic of the Cold War, and argued that U.S. national security requires the
deployment of a limited missile defense system against missile attacks from “rogue
States” regardless of the ABM Treaty. 2001 They described the ABM Treaty as the second
mistake committed during the cold war, along with the mistake of managing the Vietnam
War. 2002 Therefore, the former U.S. President Clinton was prepared to pull out of the
ABM Treaty, 2003 if an amended agreement was not reached with Russia. 2004 Later,
President Clinton’s successor, President George Walker Bush, declared that the “thirty
years old ABM treaty with Russia should be scrapped.” 2005 He added that “no treaty that
prevents us from addressing today’s threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising
1997
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technology to defend ourselves, our friends, and our allies, is in our interests or in the
interests of the world peace.” 2006 This statement may be interpreted as an intention to
abrogate the ABM Treaty. However, according to Article XV (2) of the treaty, a member
State has the right to withdraw from the treaty only if it decides that extraordinary events
demanded it. Accordingly, in order to effectuate the withdrawal, each signatory “shall
give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the
Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying
Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.” 2007 However, as a result to the
dissolution of the former Soviet Union, some legal fellows believe that the ABM Treaty,
which was concluded with the former Soviet Union: Russia, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine, is no longer binding to Russia itself, and that Russia is not a part to the
Treaty. 2008 Recently, the American President George W. Bush believed that ABM Treaty
presented a different era and was formulated to face the threat of different enemies,
therefore he submitted a withdrawal request to Russia. 2009 Since ABM Treaty is a
bilateral treaty, the withdrawal of the United States would eliminate the jurisdiction of the
treaty.
The ABM Treaty of 1972 was concerned only the United States and the former
Soviet Union. Nevertheless, now, “more than [twenty] Third World countries, including
rogue States, possess ballistic missiles,” 2010 and the ABM Treaty does not cover them.
This situation effectively requires an international instrument to regulate the matter
internationally, in order to protect human health and the environment.

b. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties
The Strategic Arms Reduction (START) program is a four steps program, each
step of which requires the conclusion of a START treaty. 2011 Each treaty seeks to reduce
2006
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the nuclear arms of the contracting parties beyond the level reached by the previous one.
The program started in a bilateral treaty, concluded on July 31, 1991, between the United
States and the former Soviet Union. 2012 The dissolution of the former Soviet Union, five
months later, produced number of States, some of which inherited nuclear arms, such as
Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. 2013 Consequently, to control these weapons
and to respond to the needs of the new international circumstances, START I has been
modified in the Lisbon Protocol 2014 of 1992. Under that Protocol START I became a
multilateral convention concluded among five States: The United States, Byelarus,
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. 2015 According to the Lisbon Protocol and its associated
documents, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine committed to accede to the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear States “in the shortest possible time,” 2016 and
to fulfill all the duties and obligations under that Treaty. 2017 Consequently, member
States required to get rid of all nuclear weapons and other strategic offensive arms from
their territories.
For Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine to be included in the program to
eliminate their nuclear arms that were inherited from the former Soviet Union, they have
to ratify START I. In addition, they are required to ratify the NPT. Since these States
have different governmental systems, the process of ratification also varies. For example,
the legislatures in Ukraine delayed the ratification of both the START I and the NPT, by
voting against the dismantling of Ukraine’s nuclear weapons, and in favor of remaining
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as a nuclear power for an unspecified transitional period. 2018 The Kazakhstan legislature
took similar action. 2019 Although these new States were sensitive to the international
interest in reducing nuclear arms, they did not seriously want to fulfill their obligations
under the treaty, because they think that getting rid of these nuclear arms would weaken
and threaten their national security. Therefore, some nuclear States, such as the United
States and the United Kingdom, offered to provide these new member States with
security assurance, 2020 in order to encourage them to ratify START I. The United States
went even further by offering 175 million dollars in Nunn-Lugar funds to aid Ukraine in
dismantling their nuclear weapons when it ratified START I and NPT. 2021 The United
States also informed Russia that it would not purchase uranium from its dismantled
weapons until Russia reaches an agreement with the other States on an equitable sharing
of the proceeds. 2022
After all these efforts, all the Lisbon Protocol signatories fulfilled their obligations
under START I and its associated documents. However, a delay of three and a half years,
from the original date of the START I’s entry into force resulted from involving the postSoviet States. 2023
The objective of START I is to increase stability at significantly lower levels of
nuclear weapons. 2024 It addresses the “daunting challenge of reducing the balance of
terror created by nuclear weapons through dramatic cuts in submarine-launched ballistic
missiles.” 2025 On the other hand it raises concerns regarding the need to safely dispose of
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huge quantities of weapons, launchers, and nuclear and fissile materials mandated by the
Treaty. 2026
The strength of START I lies in its verification system, which responds to
question of trust between the enemies of yesterday and friends of today. The wellestablished verification system was the result of a nine-year period of negotiations. 2027
The verification regime established by START I provides for: (a) data exchanges and
notifications on strategic systems and facilities covered by the Treaty; (b) exchange of
telemetry data from missile flight tests; (c) a ban on the encryption of telemetry data;
(d) twelve types of on-site inspections and exhibitions; and (e) continuous monitoring of
mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). 2028
To better assure compliance with START I and its verification system, a Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) was formed under to Article XV of the
START I. Consequently, a number of inspections have been conducted in Russian and
American facilities to detect nuclear weapons. 2029 Moreover, the United States began
continuous portal monitoring activities at missile assembly plants in Votkinsk and
Pavlohrad. 2030 Similarly, Russian inspectors began portal monitoring at a Thiokol
Corporation facility in Promontory, Utah. 2031
The development of disarmament systems shows that the arms controllers,
themselves, are becoming aware of the environmental problems they have created. 2032
Thus, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) sought to dismantle nuclear
warheads and missiles. In START I, they are dealing with dismantling the reactors of
nuclear submarines from which these missiles are launched. 2033 START II was the next
step towards demilitarization.
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START II was signed on January 3, 1993. The U.S. ratification was completed on
January 26, 1996, and the Russian Duma completed its ratification on April 14, 2000. 2034
Unlike START I, START II is a purely bilateral treaty, between the U.S. and
Russia. While START I reduced the strategic arms possessed by both sides, START II
went beyond this limit to require reduction of the strategic forces on each side to no more
than 3,500 warheads. START II bans all Russian heavy ICBMs and their launchers by the
year 2003, 2035 including Multiple Independent Targeted Reentry Vehicles, which will
necessarily reduce the risk of nuclear war. 2036 According to START II, Russia agreed to
eliminate all SS-18 n-missiles, both deployed and non-deployed. 2037
START II does not stand-alone, but relies upon START I, and cannot enter into
force without the prior entry into force of START I. 2038 START II contains the same
provision as START I, except as explicitly modified by its provisions. 2039 Consequently,
START II adopted the same verification system provided in START I, except that
START II provides for additional inspections to confirm the elimination of heavy ICBMs
and their launch canisters, as well as additional inspections to confirm the conversion of
heavy ICBM silo launchers. 2040
Despite the substantial reduction in strategic arms, the nuclear risk still persists. A
minimum number of warheads are still permitted under START II. Therefore, on March
22, 1997, 2041 the former American President Clinton and the former Russian President
Yeltsin affirmed their intention to establish a framework for START III. 2042
START III will be established by December 31, 2007, and will impose a ceiling
of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear weapons for each party. 2043 START III will be based on
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the rules and regulations provided in START I and START II, and will include measures
relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction
of strategic nuclear warheads. 2044 Similar to START II, START III will consist of a
bilateral convention between Russia and the United States.
Once a degree of stability is secured between the U.S. and Russia by the
compliance with STARTs I, II, and III, other nuclear powers, such as China, France and
the United Kingdom, would become more directly involved. Thus, a future START IV
is intended as a multilateral convention, involving all the nuclear powers. 2045 START
IV will derive the experiences of STARTs I, II, and III. However, it may cause new
difficulties and conflicts of interests, because it will involve more than two nations.
Despite the fact that the START treaties do not explicitly address environmental
protection, they do have an environmental dimension. This issue can be examined,
according to the nature and goals of these treaties, from two positive and negative
visions: The positive vision is that the elimination and reduction of strategic arms would
necessarily reduce the environmental risk of any future armed conflict. The negative
vision is that the disarmament of nuclear weapons presents its own environmental
hazards in terms of safe long-term disposal. To avoid the negative risk, the U.S. agreed to
purchase Russia’s uranium from dismantled weapons, 2046 which would eliminate the
hazardous discharge of such substances. Furthermore, the U.S. offered 175 million
dollars in Nunn-Lugar funds to aid Ukraine in dismantling their nuclear weapons, 2047
since they lack sophisticated disposal technology.
In sum any arms dismantling would assure the environmental protection from
possible future threat. However, poor disarmament technology would cause side
environmental effect, unless developed States would contribute and assist to assure safe
environmental disarmament.
Except for ENMOD, none of the EHR instruments were specifically intended as
means of environmental protection. These agreements are focused on the protection of
civilian populations; environmental concerns are only accidental to that goal. Moreover,
2044
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most of the EHRs were codified and adopted by military authorities since they are
relevant to disarmament and arms control. And each nation seeks to protect and secure
its national defense and security without any consideration to arms race environmental
consequences.
In addition, EHRs do not address the newly invented weapons of mass
destruction such as Depleted Uranium (DU), which is similar to chemical weapons
since it has indiscriminate effects, is uncontrollable, and has long-lasting environmental
impacts. Therefore, a new Enviro-Humanitarian Convention should be adopted to
include the prohibition of such newly invented weapons.
Nevertheless, the enviro-humanitarian rules can play a great role in promoting the
environmental protection, both in peacetime and in times of armed conflicts. However,
this role cannot be maintained unless military personnel learn to consider the
environment as much as national security. This goal can be achieved by introducing
environmental education in military schools. A stronger relationship can be established
between military establishments and national environmental organizations. Moreover,
environmentalists can be included in the planing of military operations in order to
indicate the protective areas where military operations should be avoided, provide the
best way to rehabilitate any militarized areas, inspect any military accidents, report
environmental damages and recommend means of rehabilitation, and participate in
codifying national and international military rules to better serve both the national
security and the environment.
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Part V:
Responsibility for
Environmental Damage Caused by Warfare

377

As examined in Part I of this thesis, responsibility for environmental destruction
can be described in two categories: international responsibility and national
responsibility. If the environmental damage triggers one of the International
Humanitarian Law Rules (IHL), International Environmental Law Rules (IEL), or the
Enviro-Humanitarian Rules (EHR), the responsibility that might be raised is
“international” responsibility. However, if the environmental harm triggers the national
environmental law rules, then it becomes a “national” responsibility.
Like all other rules of the law, environmental law rules need an enforcement
authority to implement them. Since the examined rules are relevant to armed conflicts,
the belligerents are considered the enforcing authority. However, once the armed conflict
is over, they might neglect such enforcement. 2048 Therefore, it would be useful if an
international entity, such as the United Nations, 2049 plays the role of the enforcing power.
According to the forecited classification, the international responsibility will be
examined in Section I, and national responsibility will be examined in Section II.

A- International Responsibility
The evolution of the system of international relation has generated substantive
changes in international responsibility for environmental damage. Historically, the State
was considered to be the only international actor in international law. Accordingly,
international responsibility was originally conceived of as a set of international rules
governing States’ international obligations in their relations with other States. 2050
However, another definition of international responsibility was adopted by the
International Law Commission (ILC), providing that “[e]very internationally wrongful
act of a State entails the international responsibility of the State.” 2051 International
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responsibility is also defined as “accountability for a violation of international law, as the
legal relationship originating automatically between the State that violates its
international obligations and the State whose rights are injured.” 2052
More recently, actors other than State- e.g., international organizations, NGOs,
and private parties- have been recognized as actors subject to international responsibility.
“[States] can no longer claim to be the sole holders of the right to participate in the
international legal order and its processes, having been joined by a new range of
actors.” 2053 Thus, the scope of law of international responsibility has expanded to include
these non-State actors.
Moreover, the international responsibility system is governed by International
Humanitarian Law, International Environmental Law Rules, and Enviro-Humanitarian
Rules. Therefore, there exist two types of international responsibility: the responsibility
of international persons, and international criminal responsibility. Each type of
responsibility has its own subjects and rules.

1. The Responsibility of International Persons
In international law, “international persons” are defined to include States and
international organizations. When a State or an international organization violate an
obligation undertaken or imposed on them by international law, claims may be brought
before the ICJ or other international tribunals. In environmental cases, responsibility
arises either because of the breach of one or more international customary obligations
recognized among nations, or because of the violation of a treaty. 2054 A breach of
international environmental law rules results when activities within a State cause damage
to other States’ environment or areas beyond the limits of their national jurisdiction. 2055
Practically, the State and the international organization cannot cause
environmental damage during peacetime or during times of armed conflicts by
2052
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themselves. However, certain actors that represent a State or an international organization
could commit such acts, and accordingly, those acts may be considered acts of the State
or the international organization and can raise question of the State’s or the international
organization’s responsibility for the environmental damages that may result from them.
For example, the armed forces of a State are clearly a governmental body, where their
wrongful activities are attributable to their States. 2056
Far too often, States become involved in armed conflict, and when they do, their
acts are often responsible for damage to the environment. It has also become familiar to
find international organizations involved in armed conflicts. Since States and
international organizations could be involved in armed conflict, their agents may cause
warfare environmental damage, and may result in international responsibility for that
damage. For instance, the 1999 Nis airfield attack by NATO in Kosovo affected civilians,
civilian objects, a market, and a clinic, when a CBU-87 cluster bomb container
mistakenly missed its target and hit unintended civilian areas. 2057 Therefore, on May 8,
1999, the former Secretary General of the NATO, Javier Solana, confirmed the
responsibility of NATO for the attack. 2058 Similarly, the United Nations Security Council
has the right to form subsidiary organs to enforce its decisions relevant to the
international peace and security. 2059 Some of those organs may be involved in military
activities, such as the armed forces organized under the umbrella of the U.N, 2060 the
United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the United Nations Monitoring,
Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), 2061 which have been charged
with the disarmament of the Iraqi armament program. The work of those organs may
cause severe environmental consequences. Once “[t]he United Nations forces engage as
combatants in an armed conflict, they are subject to the laws of armed conflict.” 2062 Thus,
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severe environmental consequences may raise the international responsibility of the
United Nations if such activities violated mandatory international rules.
On the other hand, responsibility is involved under the U.N. Charter only when a
U.N. organ determines that there is a threat to peace and security, so no such
responsibility arise from a small environmental harm. Thus, responsibility would arise if,
for instance, when the Soviet Union broke up, some terrorists were able to get smallpox
virus from former Soviet facilities, hide it in Western Europe, Canada and the United
States, and then threatened to spread the smallpox in Europe and North America. In that
situation, the Security Council would have the right to allow the World Health
Organization (WHO) to eliminate smallpox, and to require all States to cooperate.
Because of the threat to international peace, international responsibility rests on all States
and on the U.N. itself. The U.N. can constitute the U.N. Sanitary Inspection as a new
U.N. subsidiary organ to visit every country, and assist in the elimination of smallpox by
giving every one vaccination to prevent it. It could thus create an army of medics who
would go around the world and carry out this task, and indeed would have the
responsibility to do so. Another example would arise if any group or individual
threatened to blow up a nuclear facility and cause radiation to spread around the world. In
these examples, the U.N. would have the responsibility to act, and any action by the
Security Council would be justified under the environmental security concept.
In addition to these hypothetical examples, the U.N. has in fact recognized its
responsibility under international law to safeguard the environment. Thus, in 1993, the
United Nations, in its military operations in Rwanda, undertook to conduct operations
“with full respect for the principles and spirit of the general conventions applicable to the
conduct of military personnel,” 2063 including the environmental protection provisions.
Similar provisions were introduced in the United Nations Status of Force agreements
signed after 1993, such as in Haiti, 2064 Angola, 2065 Croatia, 2066 Lebanon, 2067 and in West
Sahara in 1999. 2068
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In recent years, the responsibility of “international persons” for environmental
damage has become an important concept. Previously, environment damage was regarded
as merely incidental to armed conflict, but now it has become a fundamental part of
military strategies in armed conflicts. 2069 Accordingly, international responsibility is
triggered when there is an act imputable to an international person, whether a legal act, or
an act in violation of an international obligation, which causes damage to the
environment.

a. An act imputable to an international person
Acts can constitute a legal basis for international responsibility, whether they are
legal or illegal, based on the fact that any nation is responsible for acts, whether legal or
illegal, committed within its jurisdiction.

1) Fault Responsibility for Environmental Harm in Times of Armed Conflicts
Under the traditional view, the international responsibility that results from an
illegal act imputable to an international person is “fault responsibility.” To establish such
responsibility the plaintiff State has to show that the defendant State has committed an act
in breach of an international obligation. The plaintiff State also has to prove the link
between the alleged conduct and the damage that was suffered (causation). Fault
responsibility is based on a State failure to use due diligence to avoid causing damage. 2070
Fault responsibility was confirmed by the ILC when it provided that “[t]here is an
internationally wrongful act of a State when: (a) conduct consisting of an act or omission
is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) that conduct constitutes a
breach of an international obligation of the State.” 2071 Under that definition, fault is a
2065
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violation of any international rule. Many of those rules relevant to environmental
protection in times of armed conflicts have been examined in Parts Two, Three, and Four
of this thesis.
The violation of an international obligation, whether derived from customary or
conventional source, 2072 is a wrongful act and can result in the imposition of
responsibility on an international person for damage caused by such act. This obligation
could be very general, such as good neighborliness, or very specific, such as reduction of
hazardous substances in certain areas, or the monitoring or reporting of ozone levels. 2073
For example, France was held responsible for the action of its special forces in destroying
the vessel Rainbow Warrior in New Zealand in July 1985. 2074 Another example is the
case of Cosmos 954, when a Soviet nuclear powered satellite fell on January 24, 1978, in
Canadian territory, depositing radioactive substances. It was interpreted as a violation of
Canadian sovereignty, and raised the international responsibility of the former Soviet
Union. 2075
The Secretary General of the United Nations, as a “Commander in Chief” of the
United Nations armed forces, issued a binding 2076 Bulletin that prohibits his forces from
“using methods of warfare intended to cause widespread, long lasting, and severe damage
to the natural environment.” 2077 This provision clearly held the United Nations armed
forces, or any U.N. operations conducted under U.N. command or control, 2078 responsible
for any environmental damage that qualified as “widespread, long-lasting, and severe
damage.” Here, it would be useful to mention that only the U.N. operations during armed
conflicts are subject to that prohibition. 2079 The exclusion of peacetime operations from
this provision is another threat to the environment. Moreover, the Bulletin would offer
2072
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more effective environmental protection if it responded to damage that is widespread,
long-lasting or severe, rather than requiring all three elements.
Since the United Nations armed forces are provided, according to Article 43 of
the U.N. Charter, by State members, 2080 one may question whether the responsibility for
environmental damage should be attributed to the international organization or the State
that provides the soldiers. The answer to this question depends on the nature and
inducement of the act. If it has been committed according to the international
organization’s orders, objectives, and rules then the responsibility will be on the
international organization. However, if the act was committed in accordance with or in
violation of national orders, objectives, and rules then the State will be held responsible.
The individual State would thus be responsible for ensuring the lawful behavior of the
soldiers it provides to the U.N.
In contrast, if uniformed personnel of the United Nations is victimized by a
certain State’s armed forces, would the United Nations or his State raise the international
responsibility of this State. Since the attack is against United Nations personnel, then
both the United Nations, which has been affected by the violated of its immunity and
reputation, and the State the victim’s own State, which has been substantively harmed by
losing its citizen, could do so. Accordingly, in 1948, both Sweden and the United Nations
made claims against Israel concerning the killing of Count Bernadotte, the United
Nations missionary to Israel, which was held responsible for his death, and paid
compensation. 2081
Practically, it is difficult for the United Nations to make claims for environmental
damage, because most of its employees and services belong to member States, and most
of its buildings are located in host States such as the United States and Switzerland.
However, when environmental damage occurs in a United Nations building located in a
host country, the claims filed by the host nation against the United Nations for causing
environmental damage can present a legal standard for the United Nations to file similar
2079
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claims against the perpetrator State. For example, in 1994, when Hizbollah Guerrillas in
South Lebanon targeted Israeli cities, and hid in the civilian population, Israeli armed
forces threatened to target the perpetrators, even if they were hidden among civilians.
Under that threat, many civilians sought shelter in United Nations building, in South
Lebanon. However, the Israeli Air Force targeted the building, causing the death of about
100 civilians, and polluting the surrounding environment. 2082 A fact finding commission,
formed by the former Secretary General of the U.N. Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, held
Israel responsible for the massacre. 2083
A State or other international actor can be held responsible, even if the individual
who committed the violation does not represent it. However, here the responsibility will
stand on a different legal basis, i.e., the violation of “a duty to exercise due diligence visà-vis private actors.” 2084 That duty imposes on States the duty to examine in each
circumstance whether the environment is in danger from the acts of the private actors,
and therefore, requires protection from the State.
The State will then be subject to the control of the international community, to
verify whether the protection procedures that have been taken are suitable to the actual
threat. For instance, the Solomon Islands claimed the United States was responsible for
environmental damage, resulting from oil leakage of the sunken warships, based on the
failure to fulfill its duty of due diligence, 2085 when it failed to prevent the foreseeable
discharge of oil into the fragile island ecosystem. 2086 The Prime Minister of the Islands
asserted that the Solomon Islands were never a party to World War II, and were therefore
not responsible for cleaning up wartime debris. 2087
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Armed conflict often causes transboundary pollution in neutral States, which will
hold the source States responsible whether the armed conflict took place according to the
rules of law or not. For example, when Iraqi military operations caused pollution that
contaminated Iran, Pakistan, and India, those countries held Iraq responsible, even if it
raised the legal issue of self-defense.
The State obligation to protect other States from transboundary pollution,
including those resulting from armed conflicts, was first elaborated in the Trail Smelter
Case. 2088 The Trail Smelter rule, as “a framework for the analysis of interstate dispute
with environmental dimensions,” 2089 has been widely accepted as a statement of
customary international law generally applicable to cases of pollution, including media
other than air. 2090 The Court stated that under the principles of international law “no State
has the right to use or permit the use of territory in such a manner as to cause injury by
fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein.” 2091 Thus, as a
result of the emission of sulphur dioxide by the smelters of the Consolidated Mining and
Smelting Company activities, Canada was held liable for the damages produced in the
State of Washington by pollution, engendered by the discharge of sulphur dioxide into
the atmosphere. 2092
The ICJ reaffirmed the same obligation in the Corfu Channel Case, which was
concerned with the right of passage of British warships through the Corfu Channel. 2093 In
1946, Albany tried to prevent the British warships from passing through the Channel by
military forces, including laying anti-vessels mines, to prevent their passage. 2094 In this
case, the Court concluded that it is “every State’s obligation not to knowingly allow its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.” 2095 In 1972, the
Stockholm Declaration incorporated the Corfu Channel standard in Principle 21, which
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prohibited States from allowing their territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of
other nations. 2096 Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, relevant to transboundary
environmental damage, is almost identical to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration:
“States have […] the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States.” These legal provisions
hold any source State responsible for environmental damage crossing its borders and
harming any neighboring State. 2097 They are also reflected in the principle newly set forth
by the American President George W. Bush that, since terrorist groups are based in
certain States’ territories and harm other nations’ environment, not only terrorists are
responsible for their crimes, but also those “who harbor them,” 2098 since States have to
use their territories so as not to harm others. There are four situations in which a State
may be held responsible when acts committed in its territory causes harm to other States:
First, if a private actor uses the territory to harm others without the State’s
permission or against its will. For example, if pirates in Indonesia seize a ship in the
Strait of Malacca, Indonesia will considers these people to be acting in violation of
international law. Another example occurred when the U.S. unwittingly allowed AlQaeda to act inside its territory. In this situation, the State cannot be responsible, under
international law unless it defeats the international efforts to combat such international
crimes, whether piracy or terror, and does not cooperate on an international scale to arrest
the perpetrators and punish them. For instance, in the Indonesian example the State will
not be internationally responsible if it cooperates and opens its territory to other nations
for the purpose of arresting the pirates.
Second, if the State knows that there are terrorists groups in its territory, but is
passive, and looks the other way. For example, Kuwait and some other Islamic countries
provide money to certain charitable organizations in their territory, knowing that some of
the charity money is going to help terrorists. Here, the State can be held responsible for
its passivity, since it turns the other way in order to avoid internal problems on its
2096
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territory. The State provides, indirectly, a good soil for the terrorists to operate. However,
the State could avoid being internationally responsible by cooperating with other States to
arrest the perpetrators and bring them to justice.
Third, the case of negligence, when the country knows that there are terrorists on
its land and it could arrest them, but it does not do so because it does not take the threat
seriously. For instance, prior to September 11th attacks, the U.S. failed to act against
terrorists operations in its territory, because it did not regard the threat seriously enough
to act. As with the previous scenario, the State can be held responsible for its negligence,
since it could have arrested the terrorists but it did not before the terrorists committed
their crimes. Here also the State could avoid international responsibility by cooperating
with other countries to fight terrorism.
And finally, when the State is harboring terrorists, and is actively helping
terrorists and hiding them. An obvious example of this situation involves the Taliban
Government, in Afghanistan. In this situation, the State is internationally responsible,
since without Afghanistan’s help, the Al-Qaeda terrorist group would have had no place
to train their personnel or to plan their crimes.
Significantly, some national systems, besides establishing different kinds of
responsibility, reinforce the international responsibility system. For example, the
Restatement Third of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides that
(1) A State is obligated to take […] measures as may be
necessary, to the extent practicable under the circumstances, to
ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control (a) conform
to generally accepted international rules and standards for the
prevention, reduction, and control of injury to the environment of
another State or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction; (b) are conducted so as not to cause significant
injury to the environment of another State or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. (2) A State is responsible to all
other States (a) for any violation of its obligations under
Subsection (1)(a), and (b) for any significant injury, resulting
from such violation, to the environment of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. (3) A State is responsible for any
significant injury, resulting from a violation of its obligations
under Subsection (1), to the environment of another State or to its
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property, or to persons or property within that State’s territory or
under its jurisdiction or control.2099

Often, States try to escape international responsibility by raising the argument that
an environmental violation was committed under the law of war, which under certain
circumstances allows violations under the umbrella of military necessity. 2100
Nevertheless, under more desirable environmental rules, and the restrictions imposed on
the military necessity principle, there would be no difference if the violation is of a
peacetime international rules or a wartime international one,2101 since both kinds of
violation will be interpreted as wrongful acts committed against international rules and
will hold the concerned actor responsible before the international community.

2) Responsibility Without Fault
An international person can be held responsible in international law not only for
violations of international obligations, but also for acts which conform to international
law rules but harm another nation’s environment. Thus, this responsibility is considered
absolute because it directly attaches to the defendant international person without regard
to fault. 2102 This sort of responsibility has been adopted by the ILC in the “International
Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by
International Law” topic. 2103
Absolute responsibility has proved to be a controversial issue, 2104 since the
environmental harm is caused by a lawful activity of the international person, without
any failure of due diligence.
Absolute responsibility may be imposed if “a State invades its neighbor in
circumstances which could not possibly justify a plea of self-defense, so that there is a
clear violation of Article 2 (4) of the [U.N.] Charter. [If] in the course of the fighting […]
the invader[’s armed forces…] destroy a [military] installation, [despite its legality in a
2099
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regular combat, the environmental effects of such lawful act, even if it does not respond
to the needs of] Article 35 (3) and 55 of the Additional Protocol I, [will] hold the [invader
State] responsible for the damage because it was a direct consequence of the illegal
invasion.” 2105
Another example of absolute responsibility involves UNSCOM and
UNMOVIC, which work according to the rules of international law. However, their
work caused environmental damage in Iraq, without violation of any international rules.
Nevertheless, the U.N. was held to be internationally responsible for all environmental
damage resulting from destruction of the Iraqi armament program. Iraq does not have to
prove anything except a causal link between UNSCOM or UNMOVIC activity and the
environmental harm suffered. 2106 Therefore, responsibility without fault is used to deter
activities by any international person that might result in environmental damage, even
without evidence of negligence or fault. A clear example of absolute responsibility is
found in Article 11 of the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, 2107 which provides that “a State which launches a space
object is liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the
surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight.” Accordingly, compensation was sought by
Canada for damage resulting from the Soviet nuclear power satellite, Cosmos 954,
when it fell onto Canadian territory. 2108
Absolute liability has been adopted in a number of international instruments. For
example, Article III (1) of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage 2109 provides that “the owner of a ship at the time of an incident or,
where the incident consists of a series of occurrences, at the time of the first such
occurrence, shall be liable for any pollution damage caused by oil which has escaped or
been discharged from the ship as a result of the incident.” However, this Article excludes
2104
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the owner from liability if he can prove that such pollution “resulted from an act of war,
hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable
and irresistible character.” Another example is found in the Vienna Convention on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage, adopted absolute responsibility to hold an operator of a
nuclear installation, including a military installation, “liable for nuclear damage upon
proof that such damage has been caused by a nuclear incident […].” 2110 Similarly, the
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy imposes strict
liability on an operator of a nuclear installation when any incident at the facility causes
damages or loss of life or property. 2111

b. Causation
Causation is a link between the wrongful act attributed to an international person
and the environmental damage that results from such act. The cause must not be too
remote or speculative, 2112 and must be established by clear and convincing evidence. 2113
Some international instruments that address international responsibility explicitly
require a link between the State’s acts and the damage. For example, Article II (1) (3.4)
of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage provides that “[t]he
operator of a nuclear installation shall be liable for nuclear damage upon proof that such
damage has been caused by a nuclear incident in his nuclear installation.” 2114
A much older instrument that required proof of causation is the Treaty of
Versailles of 1919, which required, in Part VII Section 1 of Annex I paragraph 9, that
Germany compensate “damage directly in consequence of hostilities or of any operations
of war.” 2115 A State may be found to have caused damage when any of its representatives
2110
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cause it, even if the representative act without authority. For example, the United StatesMexican Mixed Claims Commission provides that:
Soldiers inflicting personal injuries or committing wanton [or
environmental] destruction or looting always act in disobedience
to some rules laid down by superior authority. There could be no
liability whatever for such misdeeds if the view were taken that
any acts committed by soldiers in contravention of instructions
must always be considered as personal acts. 2116
States can be held responsible, in such cases, for failing to prevent such harm. 2117
If military personnel use available arms, such as nuclear, biological or chemical weapons,
to harm human health and the environment, the State’s failure to prevent that behavior
can result in the State’s liability.
On the other hand, a State will not be held responsible for environmental damage
caused by persons who do not represent the State, e.g., when damage is caused by
persons operating without authority in a State’s territory. 2118
A State or an international organization will not be held to have caused damage in
another State when the other State’s actions itself triggered the damaging conduct. For
instance, in the Gulf War II, the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC)
declared that “[t]he two essential elements of admissible losses are (a) that such losses
must be the result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait and (b) that the
causal link must be direct. Since the U.N. trade embargo was imposed in response to
Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, losses suffered solely as a result of that
embargo are not considered eligible for compensation because the causal link between
the invasion and the loss is not sufficiently direct.” 2119
Proof of causation is often particularly difficult in environmental cases,2120 since
the environmental effects of military activities may be difficult to trace, particularly when
more than one international actor is involved. For example, the oil discharge from sunken
warships from World War II in the marine environment of the Solomon Islands cannot
2116
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yet be linked to ships of any particular country. 2121 Modern technology and science can
be very useful in identifying the multiple sources of the environmental effects. For
example,
in the case of the pollution of the Rhine by chloride the District
Court of Rotterdam has clearly stated that the author of 37,5 per
cent of the pollution, the French Potassium Mines sited in the
proximity of Mulhouse, was liable for the damage caused in the
Netherlands, but asked for expertise as far as the amount of the
damage was concerned. At the end the two parties agreed on the
payment of a lump sum. 2122

Another difficulty in the proof of causation results from the fact that activities
occurring in one place may have harmful effects in another far away place. 2123 Moreover,
many environmental effects do not appear immediately after the alleged act, and may
take years or decades to appear. For instance, over fifty years after the cease-fire of
World War II, environmental problems started to appear in the marine environment of
Solomon Islands, as a result of the sunken warships’ oil leakage. 2124

c. Damage
International persons can be held responsible for damages caused to another
belligerent or a neutral State resulting from its wrongful acts. Damage may result during
peacetime military operations or during armed conflict. One example of peacetime
damage is the destruction caused by the United States Navy in Vieques. 2125 Another
example was on October 4, 2001, when a Ukrainian missile was mistakenly launched
during military exercises and killed all the seventy-eight passengers and crew-members
on board civilian airliner. The airplane crashed into the Black Sea en route from Tel
2120
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Aviv, Israel, to Siberia. 2126 Another example of peacetime damage was the death of five
U.S. citizens and one New Zealander who were observing an U.S.-Kuwaiti military
maneuver on March 12, 2001, and were accidentally targeted by an U.S. jet. 2127
Most military-related environmental damage results from armed conflicts. For
instance, during the Gulf War II, Iraq was responsible for exploiting the resources of
Kuwait and the Gulf States and inflicted serious, if not irreversible environmental
damage. 2128 Since environmental effects can cross borders, military activities can
damage the environment of a neutral State, and can trigger the same rules of
international responsibility as would apply to harming other belligerent States. For
example, during the Gulf War II, it appears that Iraq caused extraterritorial
environmental damage, and harmed the environment of neutral nations. 2129
An important question is whether a State can be held internationally responsible
for damage caused by its own armed forces to its own environment. Based on the fact
that the environment is not only owned by the present generation, but also future
generations as well, a State should be held responsible for all acts interpreted as a
violation of international law rules and which damage the environment, even acts
committed against its own environment. Thus, the Iraqi government should be held
responsible for acts committed against its own environment, such as the exploitation of
Iraqi natural resources, and harming the environment with chemical weapons during the
attack against the Kurds of Northern Iraq.
Another question involves the damage caused to the environment of areas that
do not belong to any State, and which may qualify as the common heritage of humanity,
“res communis,” 2130 such as damage caused to the high seas, outer space, or
Antarctica. 2131 Here, no State can represent all those who may be affected by such acts.
However, that does not mean that acts committed in these areas will escape
international responsibility. In such cases, Article 145 of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea provides that
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[n]ecessary measures shall be taken in accordance with this
Convention with respect to activities in the Area 2132 to ensure
effective protection for the marine environment from harmful
effects which may arise from such activities. To this end the
Authority shall adopt appropriate rules, regulations and
procedures for inter alia: (a) the prevention, reduction and control
of pollution and other hazards to the marine environment,
including the coastline, and of interference with the ecological
balance of the marine environment, particular attention being
paid to the need for protection from harmful effects of such
activities as drilling, dredging, excavation, disposal of waste,
construction and operation or maintenance of installations,
pipelines and other devices related to such activities; (b) the
protection and conservation of the natural resources of the Area
and the prevention of damage to the flora and fauna of the marine
environment.
Article 145 created a legal basis to impose responsibility on all States with
regard to these areas. Any environmental damage caused to these areas as a result of the
violation of the contractual obligations will constitute, according to the general rules of
international law, a legal basis for all other contracted States to raise the responsibility
of the concerned State. 2133 This right to action is confirmed in Article 139 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which states that

States Parties shall have the responsibility to ensure that activities
in the Area, whether carried out by States Parties, or State
enterprises or natural or juridical persons which possess the
nationality of States Parties or are effectively controlled by them
or their nationals, shall be carried out in conformity with this
Part. The same responsibility applies to international
organizations for activities in the Area carried out by such
organizations.
It is notable that Article 139 does not distinguish between damage committed by
a State or by an international organization; either can be held responsible.
2131
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Based on the right of any contracting party to defend the marine environment,
both Australia and New Zealand filed a suit against France for nuclear tests committed
under the sea in the Pacific. 2134 They claimed that France’s tests violated, not only their
rights, but the rights of all members of the international community, by causing
radioactive fall-out and thus violating the rights of the international community to be
protected against radioactive contamination of the environment. 2135
In this case, where the claimant States defended the interests of all nations, they
could not claim damage for themselves unless they had suffered damage themselves.
Nevertheless, they did draw international attention to the harm committed against
common interests, and to protest against France’s non-compliance with international
law rules. 2136 Nevertheless, in order to provide a greater environmental protection, some
international persons, such as the U.N. Security Council, may have the right to represent
the international community 2137 even without requiring a direct environmental harm.
In 1998, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a set of rules seeking to
limit the amount of liability that can be imposed on the United Nations, in order to
avoid any future unlimited financial claims of damage. 2138 Nevertheless, this limitation
does not give the United Nations’ armed forces unlimited freedom to cause any kind of
damage. Therefore, gross negligence and misconduct are excluded from such limits, and
the United Nations will bear liability for compensation in full in these cases. 2139

d. International Responsibility’s Consequences
If a State’s international responsibility is proven, one or more of four
consequences can be resulted: (1) stopping the violation, (2) satisfaction, (3) restitution
or (4) compensation. 2140

1) Stopping the Violation
2134
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A State whose conduct constitutes an internationally wrongful act
having a continuing character is under the obligation to cease that
conduct, without prejudice to the responsibility it has already
incurred. 2141 The injured State is entitled, where appropriate, to
obtain from the State which has committed an internationally
wrongful act assurances or guarantees of non-repetition of the
wrongful act. 2142

One response to a violation of international environmental rules is to stop the
violation. For example, if belligerents are spilling oil into the water bodies of the enemy,
such as the Iraqi military did in 1991 in the Gulf, they can be required to stop such act
immediately. However, this approach is useless in most environmental disasters that
result from armed conflicts, because when harmful techniques are used on the
environment, they are typically used only once rather than repeated. For example, the
atomic bombs were used against Japan once, 2143 and Iraq used chemical weapons against
the Northern Iraqi Kurds once. 2144 Thus, requiring the cessation of such acts is useless
since they will not be repeated, and have already produced their environmental effects.
However, it is still a positive sign when a nation agrees to stop causing unlawful damage
to the environment. For example, after the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan, in
1945, the United States undertook not to use these weapons against any other nation in
the future. Other nations could act similarly; for instance, Iraq could undertake not to use
any more chemical weapons, against the Kurds or any other nation, and thereby help to
protect the environment.

2) Satisfaction
Satisfaction for all international environmental violation entails an
acknowledgment of the violation and some action to offset the damage. As provided in
the ILC Report of 1996,
2141
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1. The injured State is entitled to obtain from the State which has
committed an internationally wrongful act satisfaction for the
damage, in particular moral damage, caused by that act, if and to
the extent necessary to provide full reparation.
2. Satisfaction may take the form of one or more of the
following:
a. an apology;
b. nominal damages;
c. in cases of gross infringement of the rights of the injured State,
damages reflecting the gravity of the infringement;
d. in cases where the internationally wrongful act arose from the
serious misconduct of officials or from criminal conduct of
officials or private parties, disciplinary action against, or
punishment of, those responsible.
3. The right of the injured State to obtain satisfaction does not
justify demands which would impair the dignity of the State
which has committed the internationally wrongful act. 2145

Satisfaction is an act undertaken by a State that violated the international rules, to
satisfy another State that was affected by such violation. The nature of the satisfaction
varies with the nature of the violation. Satisfaction may taken the form of an apology,
the replacement of diplomatic or consular personnel, or an increase in the level of
diplomatic relations.
Any of these actions may amount to satisfaction of an environmental violation or
other violation of international law. For example, the Japanese government apologized
for damage caused during World War II, during diplomatic dealings with specific
countries, and during the U.N. human rights sessions in Geneva. 2146 The former
Japanese Prime Minister, Morihiro Hoskawa, presented his country’s apology, during
talks with Korean President Kim Young-Sam. 2147 Similarly, another former Japanese
Prime Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, apologized for the same reason, to the former
President of the Philippines, Fidel Ramos, in 1993. 2148 A more recent example occurred
in 2001, when an American air plane violated the air space of China, Beijing refused to
2145
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hand over the crew or the air plane unless the United States apologized for its violation
of China’s air space. 2149
Nevertheless, in environmental matters, satisfaction does not rehabilitate the
environmental effects caused by wrongful military actions. Since future generations will
be affected by environmental damage, the present generation has no right to accept
apology for the sake of future generations. That view does not mean that nations should
retaliate for environmental violations, but it does mean that environmental damage can
be ameliorated only by restitution and compensation.
On the other hand, some environmental harms involve both dignitary or symbolic
harm and ecological harm. One example could be the destruction of historic sites, or the
destruction of a holy shrine or a national monument. Here, the damage is not just
ecological, but also damage to the pride of the nation.
A blatant example of such harm occurred in November 1993, when the Bosnian
Croats destroyed the four-century-old Neretva Bridge in Mostar, in former
Yugoslavia. 2150 Although the bridge did not appear on the UNESCO list of protected
sites, it linked Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was a symbolic because both the Muslims
and the Orthodox population used it and cooperate in maintaining it. 2151 Thus, by
destroying it, the Serbs also symbolically attacked that tradition of cooperation. With
that kind of environmental harm, an apology in addition to restoration and/or
compensation is preferable in order to rebuild the nation’s pride and dignity.
As mentioned earlier, liability may be imposed as a result of acts that are not
prohibited in international law. In such cases, the defendant State may refuse to
apologize because it behaved in accordance with international law. For example, in
2001, when China claimed that the United States violated its sovereignty, by allowing an
espionage plane to fly over its air space, the United States refused to apologize because
it believed that its airplane was flying in international airspace. However, the U.S.
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administration presented its apology to China when it appeared that the U.S. airplane
violated the Chinese airspace. 2152

3) Restitution
Article 43 of the ILC Report provides that
The injured State is entitled to obtain from the State which has
committed an internationally wrongful act restitution in kind, that
is, the re-establishment of the situation which existed before the
wrongful act was committed, provided and to the extent that
restitution in kind:
a. is not materially impossible;
b. would not involve a breach of an obligation arising from a
peremptory norm of general international law;
c. would not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit
which the injured State would gain from obtaining restitution in
kind instead of compensation; or
d. would not seriously jeopardize the political independence or
economic stability of the State which has committed the
internationally wrongful act, whereas the injured State would not
be similarly affected if it did not obtain restitution in kind.
Restitution is not always an available choice. When restitution is possible it
could be very expensive. For example, a survey of the looting and destruction in Kuwait
City estimated the repair costs at over US $ 100 billion. 2153 Restitution is considered the
best way to rehabilitate the environment, so that the environmental status can be
returned to its condition before the harmful activities. However, in some cases of
environmental damage, such as the extinction of fauna or flora species, or the
destruction of a historical site or a cultural monument, where damage is irreparable,
restitution is not feasible solution.
In a non-environmental case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) highlighted
the fundamental uncertainties as to the availability of restitution in international law. 2154
In Paraguay v. USA, Paraguay argued that the U.S. violated its obligations under the
1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, in not informing Breard, a Paraguayan
2152
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national convicted of murder in the U.S. and due to be executed, of his rights of access
to the Paraguayan Consul and in not notifying the consulate of his detention. Paraguay
sought restitution for being prevented from exercising its consular rights and ensuring
the protection of its interests and those of its nationals. 2155 Paraguay also submitted an
urgent request for immediate measures to prevent the execution, in order to protect the
life of Breard and the ability of the ICJ to order restitution to Paraguay. 2156 Paraguay
argued that if the U.S. executed Breard before the Court could consider the merits of the
case, Paraguay would be deprived of the opportunity to restore the status quo ante. 2157
The U.S. admitted the breach of Vienna Convention, but argued that an apology was a
sufficient response. 2158 The U.S. also claimed that the invalidation of the proceedings
and a return to the status quo ante as penalties for the failure to notify was without legal
support and was unworkable. 2159 The U.S. argued that restitution could not be ordered
by the Court. The ICJ left open the question of the availability of restitution, and found
that the dispute as to whether restitution was available under the Vienna Convention
could be determined only as part of a ruling on the merits of Paraguay’s claim. 2160
In environmental cases, the availability of restitution as a remedy should be
given particular attention for several reasons: the environment is not owned by the
present generation only, but by future generations also; the risk that environmental harm
might traverse State borders and harm neighboring nations; and the fact that, unlike
Breard, the environment cannot defend itself. This point of view was implicitly adopted
by the U.S. in Paraguay v. U.S., when it accepted that “whether restitution is necessary
or appropriate may depend on the rule broken.” 2161
Restitution in an environmental disaster requires clean up and rehabilitation
efforts. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), in the Chorzow Factory
case, provided that “[r]eparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences
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of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed.” 2162 Wiping out all the consequences of an
illegal act against the environment requires cleanup and rehabilitation. Rehabilitation
without cleanup may threaten the environment more than help it, since rehabilitation by
normal construction work on an affected area can actually create additional
unacceptable health hazards. 2163
The cleanup process requires both funds and expertise. Funds can be provided as
a result of the compensation process; in addition, wealthy States may be able to provide
funds to clean up environmental disasters in poor States.
Cleanup costs were considered by the Criteria of Claims of the UNCC, which
provided that environmental damage includes losses or expenses resulting from “(a)
[a]batement and prevention of environmental damage, including expenses directly
relating to fighting oil fires and stemming the flow of oil and coastal and international
waters; and (b) [r]easonable measures already taken to clean and restore the environment
or future measures which can be documented as reasonably necessary to clean and
restore the environment […].” 2164 Obtaining the necessary funds may be a lengthy
process, especially when the liable State tries to avoid, escape, or minimize due
compensation, such as Iraq has done with regard to Kuwait. When that kind of situation
occurs, other nations can perform a valuable service by providing funds quickly to
promote the cleanup process.
In the case of the Gulf War II, one of the major problems was that the Gulf States
ignored the priority of environmental cleanup, and concentrated instead on the
economy. 2165 The Gulf States, most of which are wealthy, did not provide the money to
fund the expensive environmental cleanup, 2166 hoping instead that Iraq would shoulder
that responsibility. Moreover, the United States, which led the coalition against Iraq and
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participated in destroying the environment of the region, did not contribute any kind of
assistance to the cleanup process, whether monetary or by equipment. 2167
Another major obstacle to environmental restoration is the availability of
expertise, since cleanup requires a sophisticated level of environmental talent that is
available only in some developed countries, such as the United States and the United
Kingdom, and some specialized international organizations, such as UNEP and IUCN.
For instance, after the defeat of the Iraqi Army in Kuwait in 1991, UNEP created a task
force, which included experts from UNEP, the World Health Organization (WHO), and
various regional governments, to conduct a detailed 90-day study of the environmental
destruction, 2168 in order to determine the level of the environmental cleanup needed.
The shortage of both money and highly trained specialists would necessarily
affect the cleanup process. 2169 To avoid such shortages, an international fund could be
created to promote, along with the cooperation of the specialized international
organizations, a source of money and expertise. States could participate in the fund to
preserve the environment. One model for such a plan is the European Community
Commission’s formation of a $20 million plan to combat oil well fires and protect
wildlife on April 10, 1991. 2170 $12 million of the money was directed to support firefighting operations. 2171 This plan includes the creation of a model sanctuary, which
involves cleaning a heavily polluted zone, then creating a buffer zone around it. 2172
Another fund to support the environmental cleanup in the aftermath of the Gulf
War II was created by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and received
pledges totaling $5 million from three undisclosed nations. 2173
Other problems can arise in the cleanup of damaged sites. For example, Kuwait
faced difficulties in cleaning up the unexpected burning of its oil wells by Iraq. Although
military hostilities were anticipated, the environmental disaster was not; thus, the
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Moreover, the lack of transportation and facilities in Kuwait

was another serious problem that delayed the cleanup operations. 2175
As military forces are the major pollutants of the environment during armed
conflicts, they also participate, intentionally or unintentionally, in the cleanup process.
Intentionally, they assist civil authorities in fulfilling their tasks to protect the
environment. Unintentionally, armed forces may clear certain areas of harmful
substances, such as landmines, because they have to pass through these areas. 2176 For
example, during the Gulf War II, coalition troops cleared landmines on their way into
Kuwait. Later on, in order to rebuild Kuwait without any fear of unexploded landmines,
the country was classified into eight geographical areas. Each area was assigned to a
foreign military team, in addition to a Kuwaiti team, to clear landmines. 2177 The efforts
of clearing these areas can only be interpreted as an environmental cleanup. 2178
However, cleaning military debris may present practical problems. For example,
the sunken ships that threaten the marine environment in the Solomon Islands cannot be
cleaned up for two reasons: (1) liability is divided between the United States and Japan;
and (2) the United States claims ownership of the sunken warships, which are protected
by the U.S. historic preservation laws. 2179 The United States’ attitude in this case is
environmentally unfriendly, because it has delayed any action to restore the site.
Cleanup is not the only means of restitution. The rehabilitation of the
environment is also required.
In order to get back to normal, the damaged environment should be
rehabilitated. The rehabilitation process should include the restoration of human health
by medically treating affected persons, and fight the diseases that result from
environmental disasters. In compliance with this requirement, the Criteria for Claims of
the UNCC provides that environmental damage includes losses or expenses resulting
from “(b) Reasonable measures already taken to […] restore the environment or future
measures which can be documented as reasonably necessary to […] restore the
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environment; (c) Reasonable monitoring and assessment of the environmental damage
for the purpose of evaluating and abating the harm and restoring the environment
[...].” 2180 Similarly, in the U.S., residents of areas surrounding the Feeds Material
Production Center (FMPC) in Fernald, Ohio, have been collectively awarded millions
of dollars, placed in a trust fund to cover the costs of related medical problems. 2181
Nevertheless, despite the cleanup process, environmental damage often persist
for a long time. For example, the effects of the Kuwaiti oil fire during the Iraqi invasion
could take centuries to rehabilitate. 2182 It has also been predicted that in Saudi Arabia
the pollution will last for years. 2183 And the marine life in the Gulf will take decades to
recover from pollution. 2184

4) Compensation
Article 44 of the 1996 ILC Report provides that
1. The injured State is entitled to obtain from the State which has
committed an internationally wrongful act compensation for the
damage caused by that act, if and to the extent that the damage is
not made good by restitution in kind.
2. For the purposes of the present article, compensation covers
any economically assessable damage sustained by the injured
State, and may include interest and, where appropriate, loss of
profits.
In general, “[s]ecuring compensation for an injured party is an undisputed
objective of liability principles. Indeed, compensation defines the essence of the classic
tort case, in which the injured party sues the allegedly responsible party for monetary
damage to recover direct expenses or losses such as medical expenses, lost wages,
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diminished property values, or non-monetary reparation such as oil spill cleanup or a
revegetation areas.” 2185
Whenever there is environmental damage, because nature is a living thing,
restoration should always come before compensation. Payment of compensation does not
eliminate the harm to the environment, just as paying compensation for the death of a
human being does not restore that person to life. However, compensatory payment can,
for example, fund the planting of trees in a damaged forest; and international law does
provide for compensation as a remedy. If a State is held responsible according to the
international rules, it is obliged to pay compensation for environmental damage caused
by its agents or representatives. But compensation is always secondary to restoration.
Article 3 of the Hague Convention IV provides that “[a] belligerent party which
violates the provisions of the said regulations shall […] be liable to pay compensation.”
Similarly, Article 91 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions provides
that “[a] Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this
Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation.”
Compensation can be required regardless of whether the environmental effect
occurred in times of armed conflict or in peacetime. The Kuwaiti environmental requests
presented to the UNCC against Iraq as a sort of compensation for environmental damage
occurred during times of armed conflict. However, the compensation requested by the
Sibir Airlines for damages resulting from the October 4, 2001, accidental missile attack
during an Ukrainian military exercise is an example of compensation for damage during
peacetime military activities. Another example of peacetime military activities that is
subject to compensation is the Canadian request of the former Soviet Union for over six
million dollars for damage from the Cosmos 954 Soviet nuclear power satellite that fell
over Canada’s territory. 2186
Some scholars distinguish between the violation of international obligations that
afford direct protection and those that afford indirect protection to the environment in
times of armed conflicts, and argue that only the direct ones are compensable. 2187 This
argument, however, would eliminate the possibility of compensation for much of the
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environmental destruction that accompanies war. There is no way to separate the direct
and indirect environmental effects of armed conflict. According to Arbitrator Parker, the
distinction between direct and indirect damages is “frequently illusory and fanciful and
should have no place in international law.” 2188 Moreover, in environmental matters there
should be always someone responsible for the environmental damages, whether directly
or indirectly, and even when multiple parties are involved. For example, some scholars
believe Iraq should not be held liable for the environmental destruction committed by the
Iraqi troops during the Gulf War II, 2189 under the pretext that the Persian Gulf is already
subjected to substantial pollution from peacetime activities. 2190
The U.S. has asserted that compensation is more practical than restitution, and is
therefore preferable as a means of reparation. 2191 This practice can be accepted in nonenvironmental cases; however, the best and most just environmental relief is restitution.
But if such restitution is impossible, then, in environmental damage cases, compensation
can be accepted.
Some scholars have argued that, whenever damage is irreparable, no
compensation should be required, “since nothing can reasonably be done to reinstate the
affected area.” 2192 This point of view is illogical and completely incompatible with
established rules and principles of law. Waiving compensation only because the damage
caused is irreparable is a kind of reward for the perpetrators. It would also encourage
military forces to avoid paying compensation, to cause only irreparable damage by
targeting irreparable environmental elements such as endangered species and unique
monuments. According to the rules of law, acts causing irreparable damage should not be
forgiven. Instead, they should be subject to extraordinary compensation, equivalent to the
extraordinary value of the damaged elements. Such compensation would be useful to
fund projects seeking the replacement of the irreparable elements, commercially or
2188
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scientifically, and to fund efforts to protect similar environmental elements, to assure
their safety in other portions of the world.
Compensation has been required under international law in many situations
involving irreparable harm. For example, Germany paid billions of dollars in direct
compensation to its World War II victims. 2193 As a direct result of the Luxembourg
Treaty, signed in 1952 between West Germany and Israel, the latter still receives
compensation for the victimizing of Jewish people by the Third Reich. 2194 Similarly,
Iran received compensation from the United States for the damage caused, when the
U.S.S. Vincente shot down a civil airliner in 1988. 2195 The United States also paid $2
million to Japan in ex gratia compensation for disruption of its fishing industry, and
$950,000 to the Marshall Islands, for damages resulting from nuclear tests of 1954 on
Eniwetok Atoll and Bikini Island. 2196
Belligerent States have often compensated neutral States as well for damage
caused by their armed forces. The United States received compensation from Israel for
damage caused to the USS Liberty in 1967, and from Iraq for the damage caused to
USS Stark in 1987. 2197 Non-belligerent States may also be affected by environmental
pollution from armed conflict. Here, the source State should be held responsible for
damage that occurs in another nation’s environment. A legal basis for this liability can
be found in Trail Smelter case, which affirms that if the environment of one State is
adversely affected by activities of another, the former will be liable for any damage
caused thereby and will be required to pay compensation and to take steps to ensure that

2193

Parker & Chew, supra note (2146) at 528.
Id., at 529.
2195
Greenwood, State Responsibility, supra note (2056) at 403.
2196
Cervi, supra note (347) at 389-90.
2197
According to the U.S. Note to Iraq on Liability “The U.S.S. Stark was attacked by an Iraqi aircraft […]
while [it] was engaged in peaceful activities in international waters. At the time of the attack, the U.S.S.
Stark was flying the American flag and its identification was clearly indicated in large white numeral on its
hull. The U.S.S. Stark twice notified the Iraqi aircraft that it was approaching U.S. warship. The
Government of Iraq [wa]s aware that U.S. vessels navigate in the area. In the circumstances, Iraqi
personnel knew or should have known that the U.S.S. Stark was an American vessel. Moreover, they
should have taken the steps necessary to identify it and determine whether was a legitimate military target.
The attack by the Iraqi aircraft resulted in a tragic and needless loss of life, personnel injury, and property
damage.” The Iraqi Government admitted its international responsibility and its result to offer
“[c]ompensation […] for the loss of life, personal injuries and material damage.” U.S. Note to Iraq on
Liability and Iraqi Note to U.S. on Compensation, May 20, 1987, XXVI I.L.M. 1427, 1427, 1428 (1987);
Greenwood, State Responsibility, supra note (2056) at 403.
2194

408

the cause of such damage is dealt with so as to remove the possibility of further damage
in the future. 2198
The United Nations Security Council, using different terms, has also imposed
liability in the form of compensation. For instance, the Security Council Resolution
387/1976 of March 31, 1976, “call[ed] upon the government of South Africa to meet the
just claims of the People’s Republic of Angola for a full compensation for the damage
and destruction inflicted on its State.” 2199 Much stronger language was used by the
Security Council Resolution 290/1970 of December 8, 1970, which “[d]emand[ed] that
full compensation by the Government of Portugal be paid to the Republic of Guinea for
the extensive damage to life and property caused by the armed attack and invasion.”
Both resolutions, apparently, include compensation for environmental damage. In 1990,
the Security Council Resolution 674/1990 used similar language when

[reminded] Iraq that under international law it is liable for any
loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third
States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the
invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq; [invited]
States to collect relevant information regarding their claims, and
those of their nationals and corporations, for restitution or
financial compensation by Iraq with a view to such arrangements
as may be established in accordance with international law[...]
Some member States, such as Iraq and Cuba, argued against the Security
Council’s right to impose on Iraq responsibility for damage caused during its invasion of
Kuwait, on the grounds that it is a political body and imposing liability is a judicial
function. The Iraqi representative argued that “the [Security] Council exceeded its
mandate […] it is not a judicial body consist[ing] of independent judges competent to
rule on compensation for those entitled to it in any conflict.” 2200 Similarly, Cuba
contested the Security Council’s right to make decisions as to liability as a court might
2198
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do, 2201 and argued that the ICJ is the judicial body competent to impose responsibility on
States. 2202
The examination by the Security Council of the Lockerbie disaster raised the
question of separation of powers between the Security Council and the ICJ. The Security
Council demanded that Libya hand over two of its nationals 2203 accused of the 1988
bombing of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, 2204 typically a judicial matter. The
former President of the ICJ, Justice Bedjaoui examined the interaction between the
Security Council and the ICJ and stated that
the difficulty […is that] the Security Council not only has
decided to take a number of political measures against Libya, but
has also demanded from it the extradition of two nationals. It is
this specific demand of the Council that creates an overlap with
respect to the substance of the legal dispute with which the Court
must deal, in a legal manner, on the basis of the 1971 Montreal
Convention and international law in general. 2205
Judge Ni voiced a similar concern:
The Security Council, as a political organ, is more concerned
with the elimination of international terrorism and the
maintenance of international peace and security, while the [ICJ],
as the principal judicial organ of the [U.N.], is more concerned
with legal procedures such as questions of extradition and
proceedings in connection with prosecution of offenders and
assessment of compensation [.] 2206
When member States accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ, they usually raise to
question concerning the separation of powers. However, the issue can be quiet
troublesome when a dispute involves States that do not accept ICJ jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Security Council should act to clarify the legal authority to order
2201
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compensation, request extradition, or take other judicial actios. One basis for such
action, particularly in environmental cases might be the 1972 Stockholm Declaration.
Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration provides that “States shall co-operate to
develop further the international law regarding liability and compensation for the
victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within the
jurisdiction and control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.” 2207
In at least one instance, the Security Council used very strong language in
imposing responsibility for environmental damage and depletion of natural resources,
and held Iraq responsible for such damages. There, the Security Council:

[r]eaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and
obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be
addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under
international law for any direct loss, damage, including
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or
injury to foreign governments, national and corporations, as a
result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. 2208

This unprecedented Resolution imposed responsibility for environmental damages
on Iraq for warfare damage caused in Kuwait, including environmental damage. It was
the first time that international law recognized that environmental damage caused by
armed conflict is compensable. 2209 The Security Council “reaffirm[ed] that Iraq must pay
for environmental damage and the loss of natural resources caused by its role in the
Persian Gulf War,” 2210 whether in Kuwait or other countries. 2211
The United Nations Security Council, under Article 29 of the Charter, 2212 created
the United Nations Compensation Committee (UNCC). The UNCC functions as a
subsidiary organ of the United Nations’ European headquarters in Geneva, 2213 to process
2207
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claims, including the environmental claims, and pay compensation for losses resulting
from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 2214 The Security Council decided to create fund to pay
compensation for claims and to establish a Commission to administer the fund. 2215
To evaluate damages caused by the Iraqi invasion, the UNCC classified claims
into three categories: (1) claims of individuals, categories A through D, (2) claims of
corporations and other private entities, category E, and (3) claims of governments and
other international organizations, category F 2216 which includes the environmental
claims. 2217 The last category is expected to include the largest claims, 2218 because it
consists of forty-two claims from twelve countries, 2219 aggregating nearly $40 billion. 2220
Compensation for environmental damage should include the amount of direct
ecological damage, cleanup costs, and the value of the depletion and damage to the
natural resources. According to the UNCC, in the Iraqi case,
[The] environmental damage [should include] losses or expenses
resulting from: (a) Abatement and prevention of environmental
damage, including expenses directly relating to fighting oil fires
and stemming the flow of oil and coastal and international
waters; (b) Reasonable measures already taken to clean and
restore the environment or future measures which can be
documented as reasonably necessary to clean and restore the
environment; (c) Reasonable monitoring and assessment of the
environmental damage for the purpose of evaluating and abating
the harm and restoring the environment; (d) Reasonable
monitoring of public health and performing medical screenings
for the purposes of investigation and combating increased health
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risks as a result of the environmental damage; and (e) Depletion
of or damage to natural resources. 2221
It makes sense that compensation for loss of properties be paid to the affected
governments. However, payment for losses of the natural environment and depletion of
natural resources should not be made to individual governments, without any
international supervision as to whether compensation will be directed to the
environmental rehabilitation process or not. Thus international control or even
participation in the environmental rehabilitation is very important, because the
environment is not owned by the present generation only, but also future generations. In
addition, the rehabilitation process necessarily affects neighboring States through the
transboundary pollution. Therefore, it would be important for an international
environmental organization such as UNEP to have the authority to monitor such funds.
As of September 2001, little had been done in the way of environmental rehabilitation
and cleanup in Kuwait. Instead, the government is concentrating on building its economy
and restarting the exportation of oil rather than rehabilitating and cleaning up the
environment. 2222
However, deadlines were established for the filing of the various categories of
claims. The deadline of January 1st, 1995 was set for category “A”, “B”, “C” and “D”
claims, and January 1st, 1996, for category “E” and “F” claims; and February 1, 1997, for
the environmental claims, in category “F.” All of the deadlines have now expired with the
exception of claims of missing persons and claims for damage and losses resulting from
landmine or ordnance explosions since they cannot be easily found or detected. The
UNCC extended the deadline for presenting such claims. 2223
According to Security Council Resolution 687/1991, 2224 the Secretary General
created a fund to pay the compensation to victims approved by the UNCC. 2225 This fund
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is financed by no more than thirty percent of Iraqi oil sale revenues. 2226 To assure these
revenues, the oil buyers must deal with the United Nations, not with Iraqi oil
companies. 2227
The “amounts recommended by the panels of Commissioners 2228 will be subject
to the approval by the Governing Council,” 2229 whose membership reflects the
composition of the Security Council at any given time. The Governing Council’s
decisions are final and not subject to any appeal or review. 2230 The guidelines that the
Commissioners must consider in their examination of claims are set forth in “Security
Council Resolution 687/1991 and other relevant Security Council Resolutions, the
criteria established by the Governing Council for particular categories of claims, and any
pertinent decisions of the Governing Council. In addition, where necessary,
Commissioners shall apply other relevant rules of international law.” 2231 The invocation
of “international law” as a general expression allows the application of IHL, EHRs, and
IEL that were examined earlier. Therefore, Commissioners’ expertise in the fields of the
law or environmental damage assessment 2232 should assist in applying international law
rules and requirements.
Despite the fact that the Security Council Resolution 687/1991 considers the
environmental damage resulting from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, “[R]esolution 687 did
not define environmental damage or the depletion of natural resources, and did not
provide any guidance to the UNCC as to how the environmental claims should be
assessed for purposes of reparation or compensation.” 2233
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In general, compensation should cover the value of the harmed objects, and
should be sufficient to establish the situation as it was before the harmful act. With regard
to environmental damage, compensation should seek to cover the costs of containment
incurred by any nation, the clean-up costs by any nation, the costs of restoration of the
natural resources, and any other costs associated with these environmental
catastrophes. 2234 It is estimated that Iraq may face as much as $100 million in war
reparation. 2235
Two kinds of problems may arise in calculating the amount of compensation:
those related to assessment, and those related to evaluation. Assessment can be a problem
because modern technology still lacks the methods and techniques necessary to precisely
assess environmental damage. Moreover, a nation facing liability may be very reluctant
to allow an assessment team to enter the area to be assessed. 2236
Even if the environmental damage can be assessed, evaluation of the damage
may be difficult. First, evaluation of wartime environmental damage may be difficult to
determine, because war often imposes severe and simultaneous damages. In addition,
the damage amount is affected by the length of time over which the disaster occurs,
with longer exposures creating more severe damage. 2237 Furthermore, some experts
consider that reliance on future income, e.g. future oil revenues is an unreliable source
for meeting necessary expenses, even when they are evaluated. Finally, if the
responsible country is poor, it may be simply unable to pay regardless of their
intentions. 2238
After an armed conflict the victorious States may pressure the defeated
belligerents to abandon any request for compensation resulting from the armed conflict.
For example, despite the substantial human and environmental effects caused by World
War II, including the disasters of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when Japan signed the peace

2234

137 CONG.REC. H.715 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1991) (statement by Rep. Lagomarsino).
Youssef M. Ibrahim, Another War Begins As Kuwait Oil Well Fires Threaten Region’s Ecology, N.Y.
Times, March 16, 1991, at D2 [hereinafter Ibrahim, Another War].
2236
Green, State Responsibility, supra note (1642) at 418.
2237
“Background paper”, “First International Conference on Addressing Environmental Consequences of
War”, prepared by the Environmental Law Institute, June 10-12, 1998, at 14, available at
<http://www.eli.org/ecw.htm>, (last visit Oct. 20, 2000).
2238
Kelly, supra note (1817) at 950.
2235

415

treaty, 2239 it abandoned the right to claim compensation against the United States. 2240
Article 19 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan provides that
[Japan] waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the
Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of the war or out of
actions taken because of the existence of a state of war, and
waives all claims arising from the presence, operations or actions
of forces or authorities of any of the Allied Powers in Japanese
territory prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty.

The political circumstances surrounding the signing of the treaty, including
pressure from the U.S., and Japan’s fear of continuing the combat, explain the large part
why Japan agreed to it. Nevertheless, despite the Japanese apparent waiver of any
claims, Japan still has the right to request compensation from the United States, because
the waiver is incompatible with the general rules of international law. Abandoning a
substantial right already established by the rules of international law, erga omnes and
jus cogens rules, is beyond the authority of any State. 2241 Specifically as to
environmental claims, the waiver is ineffective because the harmed environment is not
owned by only one Japanese generation, but by future generations also, whose right
cannot be waived. Despite the waiver, the Japanese government was still responsible to
its population and to the environment. 2242
Once compensation is due, the responsible nation must pay it to the injured
international person. Refusing to pay due compensation may form a legal basis for a
new kind of international responsibility, 2243 and may result in further charges. For
example, despite the fact that the domestic investigation of the 1986 Chernobyl accident
concluded that “the prime cause of the accident was an extremely improbable
combination of violation of instructions and operating rules committed by the staff of
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the unit,” 2244 the former Soviet Union did not compensate any of the affected
nations. 2245 This refusal should result in additional charges against the former Soviet
Union, nevertheless, the international community did nothing regarding this situation.
Finally, even if a State is found to be liable, individuals may still be responsible
for serious international law violations 2246 under international criminal law.

2. International Criminal Responsibility
A State cannot be hanged, whipped or imprisoned, and thus cannot be subject to
those forms of criminal responsibility. 2247 However, some jurists argue that a State can
still be subjected to criminal responsibility. 2248 This argument based on the analogy
between the State and the corporation, since both, the State and the corporation, have
moral personality and are represented through individuals. Many domestic legal systems
do recognize the criminal responsibility of the corporation, and therefore they recognize
the criminal responsibility of the State. 2249 They also consider the international sanctions
that may be imposed on the State as analogous to the criminal punishment that may
imposed in the national system. 2250 Therefore, according to this opinion there is no legal
basis for excluding the State from the international criminal responsibility. Nevertheless,
punishing a State presents a number of unique difficulties. In domestic criminal law, an
individual can be subjected to the power of the State directly, and society is bound to
respect the execution of the punishment. However, in international law, sanctions are a
method of exerting international pressure to assure respect for international law rules.
Moreover, the State, unlike criminal individuals, can in many circumstances waive
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sanctions under international law. Furthermore, in international law, criminal sanctions
are effective only when other States agree to impose that punishment. If a particular State
refuses to participate, there is no legal basis for compelling it to do so. For example,
despite the sanctions imposed on Iraq by U.N. Security Council resolutions, some nations
have maintained diplomatic and economic relations with Iraq. To that extent criminal
sanctions under international law are much less effective than domestic criminal
punishment. 2251
International criminal responsibility is not a new principle of law. It has
developed and evolved over time. Following World War II, one of the first trials under
international criminal law was held in the city of Nuremberg. The main trial was on
November 20, 1945 against former Reichsmarschall Hermann Göering and other
members of German military command. 2252 The Nuremberg trials sentenced thirty-six
persons to death and twenty-three to life imprisonment in the thirteen trials. 2253
The ILC defines international criminal conduct as “a serious breach of an
international law obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation
of the human environment.” 2254 A combatant may be held criminally responsible for the
serious violation of the law of war in times of armed conflicts, and other international law
rules in peacetime. Criminal responsibility may be assigned even if a combatant’s act is
in compliance with the orders of a superior official. If a combatant “acted pursuant to an
order of his Government or of a superior, the order shall not free him from responsibility,
but may be considered mitigation of punishment […].” 2255
Specific courts have been established to examine international crimes. Currently,
there are two ad hoc criminal courts, one for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia
and the other for crimes committed in Rwanda. Moreover, there is a permanent
International Criminal Court scheduled to convene in the near future. In view of these
historical developments, the next section will address the obstacles that face the system.
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a. A Historical View of the International Criminal Responsibility
The roots of international criminal responsibility are deep in the history of the
law. The first international criminal tribunal was held in 1474 when Peter von
Hagenbach, governor of a German territory that included the Upper Rhine, was tried and
convicted by a court composed of Swiss, German, and Alsatian judges for crimes
committed against God and man, and atrocities against the citizens of Breisach during its
occupation. 2256 Although it is 500 years old, this reasoning could be applied today, so that
“crimes against God” could include crimes against God’s creatures, such as the natural
environment.
In more modern times, international criminal responsibility has been inspired by
other international law rules. For instance, the second sentence of Article 3 of The Hague
Convention IV suggests a form of international criminal responsibility,2257 by providing
that “[a] belligerent party […] shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons
forming part of its armed forces.” Similarly, Article 91 of the Additional Protocol I of the
Geneva Conventions provides that “[a] Party to the conflict which violates the provisions
of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its
armed forces.”
Historically, individuals accused of war crimes have been prosecuted in national
courts. For example, the “atrocities committed by the United States troops in the
Philippines during the insurrection of 1899-1902 […] led to the court-martial of a number
of American soldiers.” 2258 However, the national jurisdiction does not always respond
and completely satisfy the needs of international community. For example after World
War II, “a few of the more than eight hundred accused German war criminals were tried
by the Supreme Court of the Reich at Leipzig. Although several of these Germans were
convicted, they received particularly light sentences […] and some even escaped from
2256
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prison.” 2259 The dissatisfaction of Germany’s handling of nationals turned over to it for
prosecution following World War I, 2260 led to the abandonment of that method of dealing
with criminal responsibility. 2261 However, the ICRC has proposed a model law for the
punishment of war crimes that would serve as an example for national legislation. 2262
This model would eliminate differences among national legal systems, assure neutral
judicial procedures, and reduce the number of cases examined before the international
criminal tribunals regarding environmental crimes.
Between October 1943 and January 1944, efforts of the United States and the
United Kingdom resulted in the creation of the United Nations War Crimes Commission
(UNWCC). 2263 Since then, other judicial agencies have been created, including the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 2264 and International Military Tribunal at
Tokyo. 2265 Proceeding before these tribunals were the first in which individuals were held
internationally responsible for the violation of international law. The major powers,
France, the United Kingdom, the former Soviet Union and the United States, were
represented in the Nuremberg military tribunal. 2266 The Tokyo military tribunal was
composed of judges from eleven nations, including the four major powers. 2267
Article 6 of the London Charter, which established the rules of Nuremberg and
Tokyo trials, defines “War Crimes” as violations of the laws of customs of war and
specifically the “plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities,
towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.” The Nuremberg
2258
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trials included the first recognition of a “purely environmental war crime” 2268 when it
charged nine Germans with “ruthless exploitation of Polish forestry [including] the
wholesale cutting of Polish timber to an extent far in excess of what was necessary to
preserve the timber resources of the country.”2269 Most warfare environmental damages
falls under the jurisdiction of Article 6. Additionally, Article 6 introduced a remarkable
development in the field of international responsibility of individuals, in that “the
requirement of diversity of citizenship was eliminated, extending the reach of
international criminal law to violations irrespective of the dictates of national law.
National sovereignty no longer served as a shield against individual criminal
responsibility.” 2270 Despite the absence of explicit environmental protection in the
London and Tokyo Charters, this development will substantially served the environment
by subjecting individuals to international criminal justice for crimes committed at home,
especially when committed during armed conflicts. Moreover, the Japanese, after being
defeated in World War II, accepted the principle of international criminal responsibility.
Article 11 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan provides that “Japan accepts the judgments
of the International Military Tribunals for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes
Courts […].” 2271
Practically, environmental crimes were not recognized as explicitly as they are
now, and the international military tribunals were not specifically focused on such
crimes. For example, in U.S.A. v. Wilhelm List, et al., “the destruction of communication
and transport facilities and houses in Norway (province of Finnmark) was not considered
a war crime.” 2272 However, nine German civilian officials were charged, in occupied
Poland, with “ruthless exploitation of Polish forestry [including the] wholesale cutting of
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Polish timber.” 2273 That action violated Germany’s duty as occupier to protect Poland’s
land. 2274
Under the Nuremberg Principles, which provides that political leaders could no
longer hide behind national sovereignty, 2275 Saddam Hussein and others who are alleged
to have caused “grave breaches” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1907 Hague
Convention, and International Environmental Laws, can be tried for war crimes and
crimes against humanity. 2276 In Strasbourg, the Council of Europe’s 183-member
Parliamentary Assembly condemned the Iraqi attack on the environment, describing it as
a “disgraceful attack,” and called for a war crime tribunal analogous to those of
Nuremberg and Tokyo. 2277 A similar attitude was taken by some United States senators,
who urged that the Iraqi President be put on trial for crimes against the environment.
Senator Lieberman said, “there was substantial sentiment in Congress to create some kind
of treaty or convention that would make clear that vindictive assaults on the environment
[…] would be punished- and punished severely.” 2278
The trials of Nuremberg and Tokyo resulted in 3,686 convictions and 924
acquittals. By the end of 1958, the Western Allies had convicted 5,025 Germans of war
crimes, 806 being sentenced to death, and the Soviet Union had convicted around
10,000. 2279

b. The Ad Hoc Criminal Courts
After the trials of Tokyo and Nuremberg, it seems that the international
community turned away from the concept of individual criminal responsibility. During
the 1970s, the Khmer Rouge caused the death of an estimated 2 million people in
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Cambodia, yet the international community did nothing about it. 2280 However, in 1993,
this concept was reestablished when the U.N. Security Council established the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law in Yugoslavia (ICTY). 2281 Two years after its
establishment, the ICTY’s “judges […] were elected, Rules of Procedure and Evidence
were promulgated, a Headquarters Agreement was entered into, […] Prosecutor and
Register were appointed, courtrooms, offices, and a jail were constructed at the Hague, a
staff of over 500 persons were hired, seventy persons were indicted, and trials were
commenced. 2282 The expenses of the ICTY are covered by contribution from United
Nations member States, and voluntary contributions from some States, international
organizations, and private entities. 2283
The ICTY is charged with prosecuting crimes committed on the territory of the
former Yugoslavia since 1991. The 1993 Statute of the ICTY includes provisions for
punishing wanton destruction, 2284 including destruction of the environment. On May 24,
1999, the ICTY indicted the former Yugoslavian President Milosevic with four other
former government officials, 2285 Milan Milutunovic, President of Serbia until January 25,
2001, Nikol Sainovic, former Deputy Prime Minister, Dragoljub Odjanic, former
Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff, and Vlajko Stojilkovic, former Serbian Minister of
Internal Affairs. 2286
This development was not universally appreciated. Some commentators feared
that similar indictments could be issued against representatives of nations that intervened
to stop the civil war there. For example, the former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger,
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expressed his worry that such a broad mandate could provide a basis for indicting U.S.
officials involved in the NATO air campaign in Kosovo. 2287 However, this fear should
not be allowed to hinder prosecutions of any person who is justifiably charged with war
crimes.
One year later, the Security Council created a similar body, 2288 the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other
Serious Violation of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Rwanda (ICTR). It is authorized to prosecute violations of IHL rules, 2289 especially the
genocide murder of 800,000 members of the Tutsi Tribe in Rwanda. 2290 The only
environmental jurisdiction of the ICTR is for crimes that can be interpreted as
“pillage”. 2291
Unlike the Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals, which tried individuals for war
crimes committed in international armed conflict, the ICTY and ICTR have the authority
to try individuals for war crimes committed in internal armed conflicts. 2292 Despite the
similar internal characters of the Yugoslavian and the Rwandan conflicts, the
international community deemed the Yugoslavian conflict, unlike the Rwandan conflict,
to be international, because it involved different ethnic groups fighting for the right of
self-determination. Under the applicable law of the ad hoc courts, that factor made
Yugoslavia the scene of an “international” conflict. The ICTY applies the law of
international armed conflicts, while the ICTR applies the law of internal armed
conflicts. 2293 Another difference between the two courts is that the ICTR statute does not
limit “crimes against humanity” to those occurring during armed conflict, while the ICTY
statute does. 2294
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c. The International Criminal Court
The ad hoc and temporary international criminal tribunals of ICTY and ICTR, do
not cover all kinds of crimes, and not all countries are subject to their jurisdiction. The
continuing violations of international law rules, including those relevant to the
environmental protection, encouraged States to create a permanent International Criminal
Court of Justice (ICC). The ICC follows, in many senses, from the world’s experience
with the ICTY and ICTR. 2295
The statute of the ICC was adopted as a Final Act of the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International
Criminal Court held in Rome in 1998. 2296 It will come into force after ratification by the
sixtieth State, 2297 which has not yet occurred. 2298 The creation of the ICC was described
by the former Secretary General of the U.N., Boutros Boutros-Ghali, as result of a
“renaissance of international law.” 2299
The Rome Statute is not a pure environmental document. However, it focuses on
assuring the protection of the IHL rules. 2300 Article 5 of the Statute provides that the ICC
shall have jurisdiction over “the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole.” This Article grants jurisdiction to the ICC to hear cases
involving charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression. The ICC also has jurisdiction over crimes of environmental destruction
committed during armed conflicts. However, only crimes committed after the date of
entry into force of the Rome Statute may be adjudicated by the ICC, even if they were
committed during armed conflicts. 2301 The Rome Statute defines any “intentional
launching of an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life
or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term, and severe
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damage to the natural environment […]” as a war crime. 2302 This text can be described as
less stringent than the ENMOD’s text, because it requires the presence of the three
elements together, whereas ENMOD requires the presence of only one element out of the
three, whether long-lasting, severe, or widespread.
It appears that the attacks on the United States, on September 11th, 2001, can fall
under the jurisdiction of the ICC, since such attacks can be interpreted as “intentional[…]
attack[s which] cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects or widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment
[…].” 2303 Thus, the ICC could provide a forum for the prosecution of those crimes.
However, the United States has not only refused to ratify the Rome Statute, but has
asserted its exclusive right to judge such criminals. Significantly, on November 13, 2001,
the American President, George W. Bush, signed, an executive order giving domestic
military commissions the right to try suspected terrorists. 2304 This controversial order
could be said to undercut international support for the ICC as a forum for crimes of
international terrorism. 2305
The ICC is not a substitute for national legal systems, 2306 but instead is intended
to provide a means of prosecuting crimes that national systems are ill-equipped to handle.
The ICC would function, only in exceptional situations, where the national legal system
is either unable or unwilling to respond, and to avoid proceedings which may be
“politically expedient, but manifestly unsatisfactory.” 2307 The ICC cannot be involved in
cases where a national legal system would be adequate.2308
The ICC is comprised of four organs: (1) the Presidency; (2) the Chambers:
Appeals, Trial and Pre-Trial Divisions; (3) the Office of the Prosecutor; and (4) the
Registry. 2309 Eighteen judges are required to compose the different Chambers. 2310 The
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Assembly of States Parties elects the eighteen judges, according to their
qualifications, 2311 by a secret ballot. 2312 Once the judges are elected, they elect, by
absolute majority, the President and, his first and second Vice Presidents. 2313 The judges
divide themselves into an Appeals Division, composed of the President and four other
judges, a Trial Division, composed of no less than six judges, 2314 and a Pre-Trial Division
which can function with three or fewer judges. 2315
Three authorities have the power to transmit cases before the ICC: member States
can refer the matter to the Prosecutor, 2316 the U.N. Security Council can do so according
to the power of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, 2317 and the Prosecutor can initiate an
investigation on his own. 2318 The jurisdiction of the ICC can be contested by the accused,
by a State that would otherwise have jurisdiction over the case, or by a State whose
acceptance of jurisdiction is required according to Article 12 of the Statute. 2319
Based on the fact that the ICC has jurisdiction over environmental crimes, 2320
United Nations Environmental Program “[UNEP] could act as the environmental
equivalent of the [United Nations Security Council] with respect to the Rome Statute.”2321
Some international law jurists have contended that genocide against the
environment (ecocide) should be regarded as a serious breach of international
environmental law rules, and treated as a crime of war. 2322 Ecocide means the “denial of
life to areas of plants and vegetation, or total destruction of other features of the natural
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environment.” 2323 Including this crime as a war crime could serve deter nations and
individuals from committing this kind of wholesale destruction, although it must be said
that defining genocide as a crime has not prevented it from happening.

d. Difficulties with the Current System of International Criminal Responsibility
There exist some legal obstacles that prevent international criminal responsibility
from being as effective as it might be. The major obstacle is sovereign immunity, which
exempts each State and its high officials from the judicial jurisdiction of another State, or
even from the jurisdiction of international tribunals. 2324 According to this principle no
obligations can be enforced on a State unless it agrees to be bound by it. Therefore, most
of the examined instruments do not bind non-member States to accept the jurisdiction of
either the ad hoc or the permanent criminal courts. The ad hoc criminal courts, ICTY, and
ICTR have no jurisdiction over crimes committed beyond the former Yugoslavia or
Rwanda. 2325 Similarly, the ICC has no jurisdiction over non-member States, unless they
express their acceptance. 2326
However, international law recognizes a “duty to prosecute or extradite” in certain
circumstances. 2327 This duty is set forth in number of international instruments including
the four Geneva Conventions 2328 and the Additional Protocol I. 2329 Where that duty
applies, prosecution presents no threat to States’ sovereignty and eliminates any
international tension that may result therefrom. Practically, not all the States are subject
to this duty unless they are signatories to these instruments. “The extradite-or-prosecute
requirement is intended to ensure that States make some effort to bring [criminals] to

2323

Id.
Gallarotti & Preis, supra note (2256) at 2.
2325
For the ICTR see, James Bucyana, The International Penal Tribunal for Rwanda and National
Reconciliation, 8 Int’l J. Refugee L. 622, 624 (1996) [hereinafter Bucyana].
2326
Rome Statute, supra note (191) art. 12.
2327
This duty is codified in most of the international conventions, such as the International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostage , Dec. 17, 1997, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14,
1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
2328
Geneva Convention (I), supra note (56) art. 49; Geneva Convention (II), supra note (56) art. 50;
Geneva Convention (III), supra note (56) art. 129; and Geneva Convention (IV), supra note (56) art. 146.
2329
Additional Protocol (I), supra note (79) arts. 85, 88.
2324

428

justice, either through prosecution or extradition.” 2330 Under that requirement, a State has
the right to choose between the two procedures, but if prosecution does not respond to the
needs of justice, then affected States may intervene. For example, in the case of U.S.A. v.
Omar Mohammed Ali Rezaq, et al., Mr. Rezaq

hijacked an Air Egypt flight shortly after takeoff from Athens,
and order[ed] it to fly to Malta. On arrival, [he] shot a number of
passengers, killing two of them, before he was apprehended.
Rezaq pleaded guilty to murder charges in Malta, served seven
years in prison, and was released in February 1993. Shortly
afterwards, he was taken into custody in Nigeria by the United
States authorities and brought to the United States for trial. [He
was convicted on one count of aircraft piracy under 49 U.S.C.
app. § 1472 (n) (1994)]. 2331
Arguably, the sentence there did not adequately serve justice since seven years in
prison does not respond to the harm caused by hijacking, shooting, killing and terrifying
innocent civilians. Therefore, despite the prosecution and punishment that took place in
Malta, the United States believed that justice had not been achieved, and U.S. agents
captured the hijacker and prosecuted him in the U.S.
If, for any reason, the State cannot properly prosecute a criminal suspect, it should
extradite him. Extradition is based on a State’s international duty to cooperate. This duty
was set forth in the 1973 General Assembly Resolution of the Principles of International
Co-operation in the Detention, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of
War Crimes Against Humanity. 2332 Specific importance was attributed in that resolution
to crimes of war and crimes against humanity based on the fact that “such offenses are
international crimes over which there exists universal jurisdiction.” 2333 It would be
internationally and environmentally useful to include environmental crimes under this
duty, especially where environmental crimes have extraterritorial effects, over which the
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international community should have jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the “extradition of war
criminals in general has already been the exception rather than the rule […and] the
possibility of extraditing war criminals for the destruction of the environment seems,
therefore, hardly a serious option.” 2334
The violation of the principle of co-operation in the field of detention, arrest,
extradition and punishment in war crimes and crimes against humanity is considered
“contrary to the United Nations Charter and to generally recognized norms of
international law.” 2335 The same view should apply to those environmental crimes that
may qualify as crimes of war, especially when they cause “widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the natural environment […].” 2336 Unfortunately, crimes committed
against the environment but which do not cause long-term, widespread, and severe
damage to the natural environment are not subject to international criminal jurisdiction.
Sometimes the choice between prosecution and extradition is not available, even
if the State is a signatory of an international instrument that imposes that duty. A State
may be reluctant to prosecute or extradite for a political, ideological, religious, or ethnic
reason. For example, Libya, as a result of its political differences with the United States,
refused to adhere to the “duty to prosecute or to extradite” provided in the Montreal
Convention on Safety of Civil Aviation. Similarly, the Taliban, because of their alleged
religious differences with the United States, refused to extradite the suspected terrorist
Osama Bin Laden. Some States may offer to prosecute criminals on their own territory,
but in a situation where this offer would be internationally unacceptable, because of the
State’s role in the crime and, therefore, the international violation. For example, the
Libyan offer to prosecute the two national Libyans in the Lockerbie case was
unacceptable, because it was believed that the accident was planned by the Libyan
Government and executed by its agents. Similarly, prosecuting Bin Laden according to
the Afghani legal system was also unacceptable, because there was considerable evidence
that Taliban Government was under the influence of Bin Laden.
On the other hand, sovereign immunity excludes some persons from being subject
to international criminal responsibility, especially when crimes are committed by heads
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of State or other influential persons. 2337 For example, the immunity of Saddam Hussein
and his official army commanders exempt them from prosecution before the International
Criminal Tribunal. Similarly, the immunity of the former Yugoslavian President,
Slobodan Milosevic, during his presidential mandate, prevented his prosecution before
the ICTY for his responsibility in the killing and expulsions of thousands of ethnic
Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo. 2338 Once this mandate expired, the
Yugoslavian authority handed over Milosevic to The Hague, where the ICTY is located,
to be the first former head of State to be prosecuted in that forum. 2339 Saddam Hussein
and his army leaders will not be prosecuted for the war crimes that they committed as
long as they remain in power, unless another State can obtain physical custody over
them, 2340 such as when the United States successfully arrested General Manuel
Noreiga 2341 in Panama to try him in the U.S. 2342
The U.S., in similar circumstances, could prosecute the persons suspected of
hijacking the cruise ship, Achille Lauro, and killing an American, 2343 only by gaining
physical custody over the suspects. The U.S. got physical custody by using a military
aircraft to force an Egyptian airplane, which was transporting the suspects from Italy to
Egypt, to land. 2344 Similarly, Israel abducted suspected Nazi war criminal, Adolf
Eichmann, from Argentina, in order to prosecute him in Israel for war crimes and
genocide. 2345 Israel, faced with repeated refusals to extradite Eichmann, claimed that it
had no alternative but to kidnap him and, thus, proceeded to try, convict, and execute
him. 2346 Such tasks are not always easy. For instance, the United States failed to capture
the Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid, 2347 who was responsible for the murder of
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24 U.N. Peacekeeping troops in 1993. 2348 The difficulty in this case was attributed to
local loyalty and the knowledge by Aidid of his homeland. 2349
It can be argued that the U.S. action in Panama was a breach of Panama’s national
sovereignty, because General Noreiga was subject to arrest by the Panamian authorities
and not by the United States, unless Panama asked the U.S. for help. The entry of the
U.S. forces into Panama to arrest Noreiga would be lawful only if made pursuant to such
a request. Similarly, the U.S. action to arrest the suspected Achille Laura hijackers could
be seen as a violation of the sovereignty of both the State of the airplane’s registry, as
well as a violation of the airspace of the country over which the airplane was flying.
Likewise, the Israeli action of kidnapping Eichmann was also a violation of Argentina
sovereignty, since Argentina granted Eichmann the right of asylum. Therefore, his
abduction by Israel inside Argentina’s territory without their permission could be
considered a breach of Argentina’s national sovereignty.
The legality of such unilateral actions must be viewed in light of two elements: a
physical element and a moral element. The physical element is the action itself. The
moral element involves the question of whether the action should be internationally
accepted. In the forecited examples, the moral element was absent since the actions were
not internationally accepted and violated other States’ sovereignty. Thus, these unilateral
actions tended to undermine the effectiveness of international criminal law.
The Rome Statute of the ICC creates a State duty to cooperate and hand over
criminals. Article 90 (7)(a), (b) of the Rome Statute provides that
7. Where a State Party which receives a request from the Court
for the surrender of a person also receives a request from any
State for the extradition of the same person for conduct other than
that which constitutes the crime for which the Court seeks the
person's surrender:
(a) The requested State shall, if it is not under an existing
international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting
State, give priority to the request from the Court;
(b) The requested State shall, if it is under an existing
international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting
State, determine whether to surrender the person to the Court or
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to extradite the person to the requesting State. In making its
decision, the requested State shall consider all the relevant
factors, including but not limited to those set out in paragraph 6,
but shall give special consideration to the relative nature and
gravity of the conduct in question.

Under this statute, States must adhere to the international law rules and
obligations, and do not act unilaterally to arrest or abduct terrorists and criminals.
Otherwise, these disputes will be settled simply by power, not by law.
Significantly, some States do not grant any protection to criminal perpetrators
even under the coverage of immunity, at least for particularly serious crimes. For
example, when an international warrant was issued by a Spanish judge, the United
Kingdom rejected the immunity claimed by Augusto Pinochet, and he was arrested
during his hospitalization in London for crimes against humanity committed while he was
the Chilean head of State. 2350 The United Kingdom thus created a precedent for other
States to dismiss immunity claims for such serious crimes.
Another kind of shield that can protect criminal suspects is international amnesty.
The amnesty accorded to alleged World War I Turkish criminals of war is a unique
example of the international protection of war criminals. 2351 “In 1923, after the failure of
ratification of the 1919 Treaty of Sèvres, 2352 which required that the Turkish government
turn over to the allies those responsible for [killing of Americans, however,] the Treaty of
Lausanne 2353 excluded such provision and a protocol was attached, giving amnesty to the
Turks who had committed the crime irrespective of whether they acted as State actors or
non-State actors.” 2354 This amnesty can itself be viewed as an international crime
committed by those who signed and negotiated it.
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A different kind of problem is illustrated by the ad hoc tribunals, Nuremberg,
Tokyo, ICTY, and ICTR, all of which were criticized for establishing “justice after the
fact. Since [they] have been created in response to transgression, critiques have
questioned whether justice was carried out according to the generally accepted principles
of nulun crimen and peona sine lege [no crime or punishment without prior law].” 2355
Some scholars noted that, during the actual trials, ICTY and ICTR Judges were creating
laws and procedures. 2356 The ICC is excluded from such critique because it was created
and its laws were codified before any trial took place, and even before any violation
occurred. However, even as to the ad hoc tribunals, its laws were not created after the
violation occurred, but before, and indeed even before the creation of these tribunals. The
instruments that established the ad hoc tribunals did not create criminal law, but only
reaffirmed the laws of IHL, IEL, and EHRs that previously existed.
Despite these difficulties in assigning international criminal responsibility, efforts
must be made in order to vindicate the rights of victims. The Criminal responsibility of
individuals does not, in any way, exclude State responsibility, but makes “individual
responsibility […] additional to, and not exclusive of, the responsibility of the
government concerned.” 2357 Both the State and individual are subject to criminal
sanctions. In The Prosecutor v. Tadic, while recognizing the criminal responsibility of the
accused, the ICTY considered that “[t]he continued indirect involvement of the
Government of the [former] Yugoslavia in the armed conflict in the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina […] gives rise to issues of State responsibility […].” 2358 The same
position was taken by the United States Congress when it declared, after the damage
caused by Iraq to the Kuwaiti environment in 1991, that “Saddam Hussein and Iraq”
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should be held legally, morally, and financially accountable for its crimes against the
environment. 2359
The politicization of the international crimes, including those committed against
the environment, is another difficulty facing the achievement of international criminal
responsibility. For example, according to the national, regional or ethnic beliefs, certain
acts can be interpreted as heroic acts, even while they can also be interpreted as crimes of
war in other parts of the world. This issue has been raised repeatedly during terrorist
attacks against Israel or its interests, where terrorists have been described by some antiIsraeli movements as heroes and martyrs.
Political considerations can influence a State’s decision as to whether to prosecute
crimes of war. Some crimes may be prosecuted vigorously, while others may be ignored
despite their severity. Since the aftermath of World War II, “many crime have been
committed but very few have been prosecuted.” 2360 Many of these crimes have been
committed during wars waged by national leaders. Should these leaders be held
“responsible [for] simply adopt[ing] or knowingly permitt[ing] the adoption of policies
and objectives the realization of which was likely to lead to the commission of
[environmental] crimes[?]” 2361 Under international practice, the response to this question
is not clear. Some national leaders have been held responsible for their policies in waging
wars, while some others have not. For instance, “it is well-known that Truman, the
[former] President of the United States, personally made the decision to use the [atomic
bombs in Japan in World War II],” 2362 and “[the former] President Nixon and [his
Secretary of State] Dr. Kissinger [designed the policy of American military intervention
in Vietnam].” 2363 Their potential criminal responsibility for the violation of the laws of
war has never been litigated. Another example involves the Khmer Rouge, who were
responsible for what are probably the worst mass killings since World War II. However,
they “were dignifie[d] in October 1991 as party to an agreement to end the civil war, [and
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were] grant[ed] legitimacy and freedom from punishment as part of the new
government.” 2364
A different example involves the United States and the Allies troops, who after
liberating Kuwait in February 1991, entered South Iraq to assure the complete defeat of
the Iraqi invaders at home, but withdrew without any attempt to arrest the Iraqi criminals
of war, including Saddam Hussein. The U.S. made the political decision that the arrest
and prosecution of Saddam Hussein was undesirable, since the Iraqi President is Sunni
and the United States does not want the region to be governed by extremists Shiia,
particularly since Iran, on the other side of the Gulf, is governed by Shiia. So political
considerations resulted in no prosecution. In fact, after the cease-fire nothing was heard
from the U.S. or its allies about any war crimes or the criminal responsibility of Saddam
Hussein. This attitude was also transmitted to the Security Council since its resolutions
were silent on this issue. 2365 The result is that, almost eleven years after the signature of
cease-fire, Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi criminals of war are still ruling the country
rather than being prosecuted in international criminal tribunals.
In contrast, Slobodan Milosevic, after negotiating and signing the peace treaty
with Bosnia-Herzegovina, was captured in April 2001, 2366 and is being tried by the ICTY
for his crimes of war.
The forecited examples reflect the double standards of the international
community as a direct result of politicizing the rules of international law. They leave the
impression that international criminal justice is imposed by victorious States, or the great
powers, 2367 as they wish. As a result, the credibility of international criminal institutions
is undermined.
To maintain the effectiveness and credibility of international criminal justice, it
would be necessary to be substantive and objective in dealing with international crimes
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and criminals. This is particularly so when such crimes result in sacrificing international
law principles, such as State sovereignty. The ICC should have extensive jurisdiction
over crimes committed within the national jurisdiction of non-member States. The ICC
should also have jurisdiction over crimes committed before its formation. In conclusion,
the international responsibility system is by no means perfect, and too often, States hide
behind their sovereignty and allow some individuals to be protected from the system of
justice.

B- National Responsibility
National responsibility arises from the laws of individual States, consistent with a
State’s legislative, judicial and executive powers. Persons suspected of international
crimes might be prosecuted under national laws, by national judges, and punished by
national enforcement authorities.
The national system has traditionally had a priority over the international system,
where questions arise of violation of either national rules or international ones. 2368 For
instance, when a national legal system is effective in prosecuting criminals and serving
justice, the international legal system will be excluded from intervention. According to
this rule, Germany was given the right to prosecute its citizens who were involved in
crimes of war during World War I. 2369 However, in that case, the national legal system
did not serve the ends of justice, since most of the criminals escaped punishment. 2370
After World War II, military tribunals were established under the national legal system of
each Allied State to prosecute criminals of war, 2371 along with the international military
tribunals of Tokyo and Nuremberg.
National legal systems differ from each other, sometimes in significant ways. For
example, some countries function under the common law system, based on judicial
precedents, such as the United States. Other countries have adopted the civil law system,
based on codified laws according to which judges are subordinated, such as France,
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Egypt, and Kuwait. Moreover, even this simple classification is very complicated, since
the sources of law vary dramatically from one country to another. For example, some
countries give priority to the codified rules of law, some others grant this priority to the
customary laws of the nation, others consider religious rules dominant over any other
laws.
These difference can have a substantial effect on the relations between nations,
since an act of an individual may be considered legal in one nation, and illegal in another
nation. For example, the occidental nationals who attempted to spread Christianity in
Afghanistan, in August 2001, acted legally according to Western legal principles, since
teaching any religion is considered a matter of liberty, that is assured by the European
Convention for the Human Rights 2372 and is a constitutional right in many European
countries. However, spreading Christianity or any other religion in Afghanistan is
considered a severe crime.
Therefore, as long as international relations exist, such differences will exist too.
Nevertheless, to eliminate and reduce their negative effects at least on the environment,
as a global common, a standard environmental law should be formulated, examined by
the representatives of all nations, and its final draft should be transmitted to the
legislators in each country for comments prior to being adopted as a national law. It is in
the ultimate interest of all States to adopt and encourage such a model environmental law.
This idea may take a long time to be realized, but it will greatly serve our generation and
future generations as well.
Until this idea turns into a fact, we should deal with the current situation and try
to illustrate the mechanisms available on the national level to assure environmental
protection. Most national systems extend traditional concepts of responsibility to cover
environmental matters. However, each national system has its own rules of responsibility.
For example, most national legal systems, directly or indirectly, enacted laws that punish
environmental crimes. Nevertheless, the same environmental crime can be considered as
misdemeanor in one nation and as a felony in another nation. The punishment may be
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monetary only in one country, and imprisonment in another, based on many factors,
including the environmental awareness in each nation.
Warfare environmental damages, theoretically, can be sought in the national
courts of the victim nation. However, even when the involved nations have similar legal
systems, the perpetrators “would normally be entitled to sovereign immunity” from
prosecution in a State other than their own. 2373 Even if the perpetrators are not immune,
“the act of State doctrine would bar consideration of the merits of the claim in some
jurisdictions.” 2374
It would be useful here to mention that in some States, particularly the Third
World States, armed forces have a certain immunity for reasons of military secrecy. This
immunity prevents any other national authority from imposing control or rules of
enforcement over military activities and installations. Nonetheless, within the State,
military activities should not be excluded from any control. Special military authorities
could be created to fulfill the goal of civil authorities. For instance, military courts could
be established to examine cases involving military activities, and military police could be
created to replace the traditional police forces in order to enforce military laws. These
military authorities are usually governed by the military, and are trained by military
personnel, which would increase their credibility and their effectiveness.
On the other hand, in circumstances such as civil wars, piracy, and narco-traffic
situations, where States are incapable of establishing order and responsibility, then a new
legal concept of responsibility, such as the United Nations’ humanitarian intervention,
must be applied. To control these situations, there should be some international force that
can step into nations to capture war criminals, to stop genocide or avoid terrible
environmental catastrophes. Here, the new legal concept of responsibility, which may be
called “internal responsibility,” 2375 could be applied. One example of that kind of
responsibility is the case of Panamanian President, Manuel Noreiga, who was protected
by sovereign immunity although he was a drug dealer. An international force could have
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effected his arrest without an invasion by another country. Another example is piracy,
which has been considered as “hostis humani generis,” 2376 i.e., a crime against all
countries. Pirates continue to commit crimes in the Malacca Strait and in the waters of
southeast Asia. International forces could serve an important function, because the two
involved States, Indonesia and Malaysia, do not have the power to stop such crime.
In other situations, such as slavery, genocide, long-lasting irreversible
environmental damage, drugs, or civil wars, there should be rules delineating when the
international community can intervene to help, stabilize the condition and make the
international rules work. These rules have to be defended wherever and whenever they
are weakened. For instance, if genocide takes place in a certain place, such as the former
Yugoslavia, a failure to prosecute will weaken the protection against genocide every
place else. The international community should recognize that when these horrible events
happen, they are not just the internal affairs of a certain State, but concern all nations.
Thus, there should be some kind of responsibility to cover the forecited situations, and it
is not the same kind of State responsibility that may arise out of formally declared war
between nations.
The absence of rules creating this kind of responsibility amounts to a missing link
in the international order. Until that link is created, there will be no reliable system for
punishing war crimes that arise in these kinds of shadowy situations. The intervention of
international forces to stabilize these situations is necessary, and may become more
necessary in the coming years. Nevertheless, until these ideas are accepted among
nations, the principal means of imposing responsibility for warfare environmental
damage is under national law. And indeed, national laws may impose more stringent
environmental constraints than international law in some cases.
Responsibility under a nation’s law may be found in three possible situations:
(A) Past actions which were already crimes or acts entailing civil liability; (B) Past
actions not yet crimes under the national law, but unlawful under international law and;
(C) Past actions which were not crimes or civil wrongs when committed, but are so under
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revisions of national law. This section will examine each of the forecited situations in two
different legal systems, the United States system and the State of Kuwait system.

1. Past Actions which were Already Crimes or Acts Entailing Civil Liability
In the case of the United States, since the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 2377 had already gone into effect,
the prosecution was for acts that had already been defined as crimes. Therefore, under
CERCLA, even the “federal government has been held accountable for cleanup costs
associated with government-owned hazardous substances.” 2378 CERCLA also created
liability for private parties either to implement government cleanup programs at each site
or to reimburse government cleanup expenses. 2379
Liability under CERCLA is strict, joint and several, and retroactive upon past and
present owners, transporters, and generators of hazardous waste, for “all costs of removal
or remedial actions.” 2380 In another words, liability is imposed under CERCLA for the
costs of removing the waste and restoring the site to acceptable environmental quality.
Strict liability holds parties accountable for waste disposal
practices regardless of intent, negligence, or causal connection.
Joint and several liability ensures that all liable parties at a site
are responsible for the entire cleanup. Retroactive liability holds
responsible parties liable for waste disposal practices that took
place before CERCLA was enacted, and which may have been
legal at the time of disposal. 2381
Under another U.S. environmental statute, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), any person who: “1) knowingly transports or causes to be
transported any hazardous waste or […] 2) knowingly treats, stores, or dispose of any
hazardous waste […] or 3) knowingly omits material information or makes any false
material statement […] in any application, label, manifest […] or 4) knowingly generates,
store, treats, transports, disposes of, exports, or […] handles any hazardous
2377

CERCLA, supra note (1361).
Hoover, supra note (534) at 134; See, FMC Corp. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833 (3d
Cir. 1994) (holding the United States liable for cleanup costs as an operator within the meaning of
CERCLA).
2379
Gaines, supra note (2113) at 342.
2380
CERCLA, § 107(a)(4)(A)-(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D).
2378

441

waste[…],” 2382 shall be subject to fines of up to $50,000 for each day of violation, or up
to two years imprisonment, or both. 2383 Under RCRA the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) can initiate and conduct investigations, and refer the matter to the
Attorney General for prosecution if necessary. 2384
Another U.S. statute, the Clean Water Act (CWA), 2385 was enacted to “restore
and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the nation’s waters.” 2386
Unlike CERCLA, 2387 it applies only to releases or threats of releases of certain
substances into navigable waters. 2388 Section 311 (b)(1) of the CWA prohibits the
discharge of oil into the navigable waters of the United States, the adjoining shoreline,
contiguous zones, or certain other designated areas, or discharge which may affect natural
resources belonging to or managed by the United States. Discharge of oil from a “public
vessel” 2389 is excluded from the CWA’s civil, administrative and criminal penalties. 2390
According to Section 309 (b), persons who violate the requirements of the CWA,
including discharging without a permit or in violation of a permit, are subject to civil
penalties by EPA, including a permanent or temporary injunction. More significant,
however, is the fact that the Congress gave EPA the authority to impose administrative
penalties without going to court. 2391 After seeking review EPA of the decision to impose
administrative penalties, alleged violators may seek judicial review of EPA’s imposition
of such penalties. 2392 The administrative penalties will not bar a citizen suit if was
brought before the commencement of the administrative penalties. 2393 Additionally, the
CWA authorizes criminal prosecution for certain negligent or knowing violations of the
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Act, 2394 and for knowing endangerment, where a person knowingly violates the CWA
and thereby places another person is imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury. 2395
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) 2396 imposes liability on parties responsible
for vessels or facilities that discharge oil or pose the substantial threat of a discharge of
oil into the navigable waters, shorelines or exclusive economic zone of the United
States. 2397 The OPA provides damages for, inter alia, injury to natural resources,
economic losses, and removal costs. 2398 Significantly, the OPA provides certain foreign
governments and individuals a right to claim removal costs or damages resulting from
discharges or substantial threats of discharges of oil from “Outer Continental Shelf”
facilities or deep water ports, a vessel in navigable waters, a vessel carrying oil as cargo
within the United States, or an Alaskan pipeline tanker. 2399 Public vessels, 2400 however,
excluded from the statutory reach of OPA. 2401
Thus, if a person is prosecuted under one of the forecited statutes after it has gone
into effect, then his acts have previously been defined as crimes.
On the other hand, in the case of Kuwait, the production and exportation of the
crude oil is the main source of living. This kind of activity threatens the environment if
not restricted by the rules of law, especially since the technology and the experience in
that field are not very advanced. Some laws regulating the production and exportation of
oil do reflect concern with environmental protection. For instance, Law No. 12/1964
Concerning the Prohibition of Navigable Water Pollution by Oil, 2402 designed to assure
the protection of the marine environment in Kuwait, and Law No. 19/1973 Concerning
the Conservation of the Petroleum Fortune Resources and its Executive Rules, 2403 include
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some provisions to assure the environmentally friendly exploitation of petroleum
resources.
Article 4 (1) of Law No. 12/1964 provides that “any pollution [that occurs in
marine areas by discharging, leakage of oil or any other liquid containing oil from any
ship or land-base source, as] described in Articles 1 2404 and 2 2405 of this law is punishable
by a fine of up to 40,000 Kuwaiti Dinard (“KD”). 2406 It is notable that a violation of this
law is punishable only by a fine, not by imprisonment. However, under this provision, the
High Court of Kuwait has, in a number of cases, fined the owner or the captain of the
ship for polluting the marine environment with oil. 2407 Fines are not always an effective
deterrent, since oil companies make fortunes out of their activities and paying some
thousands of KDs will not stop them from continuing their harmful operations.
A historical example of marine environment pollution by oil occurred in 1990,
during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when marine areas were considerably polluted by
Iraqi armed forces who discharged crude oil into these areas from land-base sources in
Mina’a Al-Ahmady, and from oil tankers already moored in Kuwaiti seaports. 2408 The
persons who committed such crimes escaped international justice, but if they are captured
and judged according to the Kuwaiti laws, they will be maximally fined. Nevertheless, no
fine will be adequate to address the harm that they caused to the marine environment.
Article 4 (1) is applicable to cases of oil pollution only. Other causes of pollution, such as
munitions that may explode during military maneuvers, or under-sea mine explosions, are
not subject to this Article, even if they cause severe marine environment pollution.
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Article 1 of the Law articulated that “[p]olluting naval areas, [Kuwait internal waters and territorial sea]
that defined in Paragraph 2 of this Article, is completely prohibited, whether by discharging, or leaking oil,
or any other liquid containing oil, from any ship, any place on the land, or any equipment prepared to store
the oil, or to transport it from one place to another, on board the ship or on the land[…].” Kuwaiti
Navigable Water Pollution Prohibition Act, supra note (1524) art. 1.
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No.1 of this law.” Kuwaiti Navigable Water Pollution Prohibition Law, supra note (1524) art 2 (1).
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The Kuwaiti government gave implicit criminal immunity for foreign petroleum
companies, to encourage them to exploit the Kuwaiti petroleum resources. For example,
Law No. 19/1973 related to Conservation of the Petroleum Fortune Resources did not
include any criminal responsibility for its violation, even in Article 3 which addresses
environmental damage. 2409 It does, however, include civil and administrative liabilities.
Article 10 of that statute provides that
[a]n administrative penalty of the amount not less than KD
10.000 and not exceeding KD 50.000 will be imposed for each
violation to this law or its executive rules. If the same violation’s
committed within three years from the date of the precedent
violation, the mentioned punishment will double. If the violation
harms the petroleum patrimony, an appropriate compensation
will be imposed beside the mentioned penalty. This
administrative punishment or the imposed compensation will not
interfere with any other punishment or penalty defined in the
laws, regulations, and contractual or international agreements.
KD 10.000 is the minimum administrative penalty for the prohibited
environmental harm. In addition, the responsible party has to pay appropriate
compensation to cover the costs of cleanup and rehabilitation. Unfortunately, Article 10
is applicable to petroleum operations only, which means that if the same damage
occurred as a result of military operations, it will not be subject to this Article.
Kuwait Municipality issued Announcement No. 130/98, 2410 relevant to the public
use of the desert’s environment. The Announcement examines and regulates the
environmental effects of the spring camps. It requires campers not to kill animals or
destroy plants. 2411 Any violation of the Announcement will be subject to the punishment
provided in the law of the public cleanliness. 2412 Kuwait military forces use training
camp in the desert of Kuwait, and therefore should be subject to the same rules addressed
2409

Article 3 of the law relevant to the Conservation of the Petroleum Fortune Resources provides that
“[E]ach delegated in the work, should take all necessary precautionary measures and actions to prevent any
damage or risk produced from petroleum operations, on human life, public health, property, natural
resources patrimony, cemeteries, religious, antiquarian, or tourism sites. He should also take all necessary
precautionary measures to prevent air, surface and underground waters pollution.”
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Kuwait Municipality Announcement, supra note (1543).
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Id., at 8.
2412
“[A] fine not less than KD 5 and not more than KD 200 will be imposed for the violation of [the Public
Cleanliness Law] provisions.” Law Decree of the Cleanliness, supra note (1517) art. 3.
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by the announcement, especially since some military campers discard ammunitions’
debris and toxic materials on their sites. However, they are not.
The Environmental Public Authority (EPA) Law goes further, and imposes
criminal punishment in addition to liability for cleanup procedures. Article 13 of the
Kuwaiti EPA Law provides that
[w]ithout prejudice to any other severe penalty stipulated by
another law, anyone who violates the norms and conditions
provided for in Article 8, 2413 or violates the suspension order
stipulated in Article 10 of this law, 2414 shall be punished with
imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years or a fine not
exceeding KD 10.000 or with both penalties if repeated. In
addition, the Court may confiscate the materials that cause
pollution of the environment or have harmful effects. The Court
may oblige the authority causing the pollution or the harm to bear
all costs required for remedying harm that may affect the
environment and which is a direct result of the violation, and to
remove the pollutants at their expense or close the places where
work is the source of pollution for a period not exceeding three
months and in case of repetition of the violation, the Court may
rule, the cancellation of the licenses[…]. 2415

Despite the applicability of this Article to civilian activities, there is no legal
obstacle that may prevent its applicability to military activities, unless explicitly excluded
by another law. It is remarkable that the EPA Law emphasizes environmental protection
by giving the Court the ability to confiscate any materials determined to be a source of
pollution. This law also grants the Court the power to require a defendant to pay expenses
for the cleanup of all damage that directly results from the violation. The Court has also
the right to temporarily order the closure of the source of pollution. However, Article 13
also has its weaknesses as a vehicle for protecting the environment. First, although the
2413

Article 8 of the Kuwaiti Environmental Public Authority Law provides that “[t]he Board of Directors
shall prepare the systems and criteria that might be found upon determination of the location or establish or
use or remove of any establishment or production of materials or carry out operations or any other activity
that may lead to environmental pollution. The Authority shall carry out and execute environmental impact
studies of the development projects. The Authority, in case of violating these systems and conditions, may
suspend the execution of the project and withdraw the license of the violator of the works or the
establishments or the activities. The authorities and the parties concerned are obliged to respond to this
request.” The Kuwaiti Environmental Public Authority Law, supra note (967) art. 8.
2414
The Kuwaiti Environmental Public Authority Law, supra note (967) art. 10.
2415
Id., art. 13 para. 1.
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Court was given the right to confiscate any materials that have actually caused pollution,
it does not have power to seize materials that are likely to do so in the future. That is,
although the law imposes punishment, it does nothing to prevent pollution before it
occurs. Second, Article 13 states that “the Court may oblige the authority [...] to bear all
costs required for the remedy,” but gives no guidance as to amounts. General criteria
should be set forth in the statute to provide predictability and fairness. Finally, this
Article does not deal with any future environmental damage that may be connected to the
violation, even though environmental damage often has long-lasting effects.
Another Kuwaiti environmental statute is Law No. 56/1996 Concerning the
Issuance of the Kuwait Industry Law, which requires the Public Authority of Industry to
“assure the total application of [any] industrial project to all national and international
rules related to environmental protection, and [to assure] that all the rules of production
are subject to these rules.” 2416 Article 1 of the Industry law is applicable to every
industrial establishment and craft. An industrial establishment is “any establishment that
mainly seeks the transformation of the primary elements and materials into complete,
partial or intermediary industrialized products, or even transforming partially
industrialized and intermediary materials into complete industrialized products. These
activities would includes mixture, disjunction, formalization, reformalization, assemblage
and packing only if the work in the establishment is based on mechanical power.” 2417 An
industrial craft is defined by the law as “every production or maintenance activity based
on the handiwork in cooperation with light use of machines and which produces
untypical products.” 2418 Thus, those would apply to, among other areas, to the activities
of the military. Kuwaiti military forces may practice some simple industrial activities
such as assembling, and thus fall within Article 2. Consequently, the military would be
bound to respect environmental protection according to Article 29 (17). Violations of the
Kuwait Industry Law would be subject to either administrative or criminal sanctions. The
Public Authority of Industry can notify, warn, revoke privileges, or suspend or cancel an
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Ghanoon Bisha’an Isdar Ghanoon asyna’ah 56/1996 [Law Relevant to the Adoption of the Industry
Law No. 56/1996] art. 29.
2417
Id., art. 2.
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Id., art. 3.
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industry’s permit as an administrative penalty. 2419 In more severe violations, a criminal
penalty can also be imposed. Article 43 of the law provides that “anyone establishes an
industrial project, or modifies an existing industrial establishment or craft, […] without
permit, is subject to imprisonment of period not exceeding three years and fine not
exceeding KD 3,000 or one of the punishment. The Public Authority of Industry can also
order the closing of the unpermitted establishment.”
According to Decision No. 9/1990 Regulating the Procedures of the
Environmental Impact Studies for Structural and Industrial Projects, all industrial
establishments, including military industrial establishments, are required to prepare an
Environmental Impact Study prior to starting any activity. 2420 Any serious environmental
effect of the industrial project would result in the denial of the permit request.
Additionally, Kuwaiti Monument Law No. 11/1960 2421 provides that “every one
who deliberately damages a registered movable monument, even if it is under his
possession, demolishes a historical building or site, or trespasses on a historical building
or a monumental site shall be imprisoned for no less than a year and no more than five
years and be subject to a fine of no less than [Indian Rupees] IR 1000 and no more than
IR 10,000.” 2422 Military activities may present a serious threat to the monuments and the
cultural heritage of every nation, and therefore should be subject to this statute. For
example, in 1990, the Iraqi military forces caused severe damage to the Kuwaiti
monuments, whether the monuments were located in Kuwait National Museum or located
in Kuwait Scientific Museum. Iraqi troops also damaged the historical sites located in the
Failaka Island. Moreover, military maneuvers may cause damage to the historical
monuments and sites as well. 2423 Definitely, Iraq was not punished under Kuwaiti
Monument Law.
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Id., art. 39.
The Environmental Impact Assessment Ministerial Decision, supra note (1551) art. 1.
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Cyclopedia, 5.180.31 (Professor Kenneth Rober Redden ed., 1990) [hereinafter The
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Finally, Law No. 131/1977 Regulating Ionizing Radiation Usage and the
Protection Against its Hazards should be extended to apply to military activities, since
their activities occasionally involve the use of ionizing radiation. Article 17 of the Kuwait
Ionizing Radiation Law provides that “any violation of Articles 2, 3, 4, and 8 2424 of this
law is punishable with imprisonment for a period of time not exceeding three years and
fine not less than KD 100 and not more than KD 225 or one of these punishments.”
Regrettably, the environment in Kuwait is underestimated, and many severe
environmental crimes are considered misdemeanors, leaving the country volnerable to
many serious environmental threats.

2. Past Actions Not Yet Crimes Under the National Law, But Unlawful Under
International Law
Responsibility may arise under a nation’s laws, even when a person commits an
action not a crime in his country, if the act amounts to a violation under international law
rules. For example, Iraqi armed forces used chemical weapons to combat the Kurds in
Northern Iraq. Under Iraqi law, the use of weapons of mass destruction is neither
prohibited nor allowed; their national law is silent on the subject. However, international
law prohibits the use of weapons of mass destruction such as chemical weapons since
they have significant humanitarian and environmental impacts. Various international
instruments reaffirm this concept, such as the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their
Destruction (CWC). 2425 Thus, Iraq as a member of the United Nations must adhere to this
international norms, and can properly be sanctioned under international law foe failing to
do so.
Similarly, the former Yugoslavian President, Slobodan Milosevic, and his military
commanders committed genocide against their Muslim populations. Although genocide
against Muslims is not considered a crime under Serbian law, it is an international war
2424

Articles 2 and 3 require the possession of permit, from the Ministry of Health, before the importing,
exporting, manufacturing, possession, rotating, transport, or discard of ionizing radiation equipments or
materials. Article 4 requires the permitted entity to limited with the conditions of the permit, and to take
the necessary measures to assure the safety of the citizens, the workers, and the environment. Article 8
obliges the permitted entity to inform the concerned authority in case of loosing ionizing radiation materials
or equipment, or in case of serious accident. Kuwaiti Ionizing Radiation Law, supra note (1510) arts. 2, 3,
4, and 8.
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crime, and many international instruments prohibit it. Article 5 of the Rome Statute, for
example, provides that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction
in accordance with this Statute with respect to […t]he crime of genocide.” Article 6 of
the Rome Statute states that
[f]or the purpose of this Statute, “genocide” means any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Thus, even though their acts were not criminal under Serbian law, these officials
could properly be prosecuted under international law. Likewise, the Iraqi President,
Saddam Hussein, may in the future be prosecuted under international law for committing
war crimes, even if his acts were not criminal under the Iraqi law.
The dropping of atomic bomb on Japan by the United States, although not
unlawful act under U.S. law, may also be considered a crime under international law.
“[In 1963] the Tokyo District Court […assessed] the legality of dropping the
atomic bombs by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki [without examining…]
any adverse effects on the environment. The Court considered that the bombs were
comparable to the use of poison and poisonous gases […].” 2426 In this case, the Court
referred to the erga omnes, by noting that “[Atomic bombs dropping over Hiroshima and
Nagasaki] may be regarded as contrary to the fundamental principle of law of war which
prohibits the causing of unnecessary suffering.” 2427
2425
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Yet another example involves the potential liability of the present Israeli Prime
Minister, Ariel Sharon, for his role in the 1982 massacres which took place at two
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, Sabra and Shatila. 2428 An Israeli commission of
inquiry concluded under the international pressure on Israel, after the massacres, to held
Sharon responsible. 2429 Therefore, the commission found Sharon guilty of “indirect
responsibility” for the killings of civilian Palestinians and forced him to leave his position
as a former Army high official. 2430 Nevertheless, Sharon came later in a higher position,
as the Israeli Prime Minister, and he is continuing his stringent and tough policy against
the Palestinian people. 2431
Another example is found in the Kuwait Municipality and the Ministry of Public
Works, which disposes of domestic sewage directly into the Persian Gulf, causing
significant harm to the fragile marine environment in the Gulf. 2432 There is no national
law in Kuwait that criminalizes such acts. 2433 However, according to the international
principle of the prohibition of transboundary pollution, Kuwait should be held
responsible for the environmental damage effects that affected or may affected in the
future the neighboring States of the Persian Gulf. Under that principle of international
law, Kuwait authorities should prohibit releasing domestic sewage into the Gulf, and
intensify scientific research to treat and recycle such sewage. Moreover, cleanup
procedures should include both the affected areas on the Kuwaiti shores and the deep
waters of the Gulf.
In sum, even if the national law does not regulate or prohibit actions that have
severe impacts on human health, welfare or the environment, international law may do
so. When each nation acts independently and without any respect for the international
community, then there will be no world order, and the strong nation will prevail every
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time whether it acts legally or illegally. However, since no country can act independently
or without interaction with other countries, then respecting the international rules is a
duty, not merely a choice, for every single nation.

3. Past Actions which were not Crimes or Civil Wrongs when Committed, but are so
Under Revisions of National Law
As a rule, most criminal laws may not be applied retroactively. However, some
national laws criminalize past actions even though they were committed at a time when
such prohibition did not exist and were therefore considered to be legal acts. This
retroactive application may be particularly appropriate for acts that have significant
impact on human health and the environment, and that continue to cause damage. In such
situations, the actors may be held responsible for paying compensation and cleanup costs.
A significant example of this category can be found in the United States
environmental statutes. Under CERCLA, liability can be retroactive. Section 107 (a) of
CERCLA states that
[…] (1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such
hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who […] arranged for disposal or treatment […]
of hazardous substances […], and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration
vessels or sites selected by such person […] shall be liable for
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action […];
(B) any other necessary costs of response […];
(C) damage for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources […]; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study
[…].

It is clear that Section 107 (a) of CERCLA applies to any present or past owner
and operator of a facility of which any hazardous substance may be disposed, which
shows that CERCLA could be applied retroactively.
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In 1980, the United States faced a hazardous waste “crisis”, as a result of decades
of casual industrial waste management. 2434 The Congress enacted CERCLA to generate
revenue to clean up the waste. CERCLA gives the government the power to held parties
responsible for cleanup costs, even if their acts were legal when taken. 2435 CERCLA
cleanup process can be activated by any “release of a hazardous substance” 2436 into the
environment. It applies to federal hazardous waste sites as well as non-federal sites as
provided in Section 120 (a)(1) which states that “[e]ach department, agency, and
instrumentality of the United States shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in
the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity.”
Furthermore CERCLA provides for remediation. The statute authorizes the
government to pursue Potentially Responsible Parties (PRP) and to demand payment to
remediate. Under Section 120 of the Act, a PRP may be not only a present owner of a
facility, but a past owner as well. Thus, liability may be imposed even if the previous
owner violated no laws that were in existence at the time of his acts. The same can be
true even for a governmental actor. In a significant case, “the federal government was
held liable for cleanup costs at an [National Priority List (NPL)] site contaminated during
World War II by a company that manufactured rayon for the war efforts under close
government supervision.” 2437
A striking example of this kind of retroactive liability involves the Hudson River
in New York State. In 1984, a 200-mile stretch of the Hudson was declared a
“Superfund” site 2438 because of contamination by polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). 2439
The PCBs can “bio-accumulate” in fish and cause significant health problems, including
cancer, to people who eat fish. 2440 The PCBs were deposited over a 30-year period by
two General Electric factories located along the river. 2441 Even though this act was not
2434
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illegal at the time of disposal, because the danger of PCBs was not yet recognized,
CERCLA holds responsible parties liable for waste disposal that happened before
CERCLA was enacted. Thus, under that statute, the EPA ordered General Electric to
“dredg[e] an estimat 2.65 million cubic yards from 40-miles section of the river to
remove approximately 150 thousand pounds of PCBs.” 2442
Another civilian example is the Bhopal disaster. The city of Bhopal was the site
of part of “India’s Green Revolution” that aimed at increasing the productivity of
crops. 2443 In 1962, Union Carbide, an American company, established a small factory,
Union Carbide India Ltd. (UCIL) in Bhopal, the capital of Madhya Pradesh, to produce
pesticides. 2444 India owned 51% of the factory, and the American company owned the
rest, 49%, but the American company was operating the facility. In 1979, the plant started
to manufacture the pesticide Methyl Isocyanate (MIC). 2445 In 1984, a hazardous chemical
reaction took place when a large amount of water got into the MIC storage tank, and then,
“about 40 tons of [MIC] poured out of the tank […] and escaped into the air, spreading
eight kilometers downwind, over the city of nearly 900,000.” 2446 As a result, about 4,000
people were killed, about 4,000, and approximately 400,000 injured. 2447 The actions that
led to this tragedy were not specifically prohibited by Indian law. Nevertheless, the
Indian government successfully argued that the American parent company was
responsible, due to its failure to employ adequate safety measures or emergency
procedures. Although these failures were not specifically prohibited under Indian law, the
company was in effect held retroactively liable.
Although the Bhopal disaster resulted from civilian activities, the same reasoning
could be applied to activities on a military base or at a munitions factory.
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In Kuwait, the principle of non-retroactivity included in the Constitution of
1961 2448 prevents persons from being subject to any law that was codified after the
pollution occurred. Practically, it is difficult to modify this constitutional provision, as the
Kuwaiti Government does not favor or encourage any efforts to modify any constitutional
rule, since it may create a precedent to amend other constitutional rules that may interfere
with the Government’s interests.
However, in some cases, the retroactivity principle should be applied to correct
serious gaps in the law. Kuwait could follow the experience of other nations, such as the
United States, which imposed retroactive environmental liability under CERCLA and
other statutes to generate funds for expensive cleanup procedures. Similarly, Kuwait
should impose retroactive environmental liability to provide a stable source for cleanup
costs. For example, the Kuwaiti legal system lacks air pollution legislation, and has no
jurisdiction over cases of air pollution. In the absence of regulation, the petroleum
industry causes severe air pollution for the 10th district in Kuwait. 2449 However, the
Kuwaiti Parliament could enact a law to punish any person is polluting the air or who did
so in the past. Such a statute would be likely to encourage polluters to take actions to
remedy hazards, in order to avoid future sanctions.
Article 10 of the Kuwaiti Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) Law
provides a legal basis for actors against polluters. That Article provides that
[t]he Higher Council shall upon the proposal of the Board of
Directors and after notifying the official authority, decide to stop
work in any establishment or any activity or preventing use of
any instrument or material wholly or partially if the progress of
the work or the action results in pollution of the environment, the
cessation shall be for one week duration and might be extended
to another week. The administrative authorities and concerned
parties are obliged to execute the order of the suspension and the
Authority may request certain measures to be fulfilled during the
period of suspension […].
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The application of this Article is limited to acts taken after the law was enacted.
Again, however, Article 10 could be amended to have retroactive liability over acts
committed before its enactment, in order to provide for greater environmental protection.
Similarly, the Kuwaiti law regulating the use of the Ionizing Radiation imposes
liability for human casualties or environmental damage caused by activities involving
ionizing radiation equipments or substances, but only when those activities occur after
1977. For earlier acts, there is no liability, even if they caused lingering damage.
Finally, Kuwaiti Civil Law No. 67/1980 states that
every action which shall cause damage to others is subject to
compensation, whether this damage is direct or indirect, and
whether the wrongdoer is aware of his action or not. The
compensation is for the actual loss and for lost profit, and shall
cover the damage even if it is only moral. The claim of liability
shall be void three years after the harmed party has knowledge of
the damage and the party who caused it, or after fifteen years of
the occurrence of the illegal action, whichever is shorter, unless
the claim of liability is a result of a crime. Any agreements
releasing parties from liability prior to their occurrence are
considered illegal. 2450
This provision is general, and may cover any harmful activity to the environment,
whether committed by national or foreign, military or civil person. However, it imposes
only civil liability, which is considered the most important remedy for the environmental
rehabilitation, without any reference to criminal responsibility.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the Gulf region was also victimized by
the Iraqi acts. The wetland and marches are important for the ecology of the Gulf and the
Gulf natural resources. Therefore, when Saddam Hussein made the canals and drained all
the water out of these marshes, he destroyed the wetlands and damaged their nature.
Nevertheless, these wetlands can be restored and their ecological balance can be brought
back, but it takes a lot of work and money to be restored. Now if someone needs to bring
responsibility against Saddam Hussein for the destruction of the ecological balance of the
marshes, who might be this one, and under what mechanisms? Here, possibly the
fishermen who use the fish from the Gulf and can see that their home have been
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destroyed because their nurseries, the wetlands, were destroyed, therefore, these
fishermen lost their livelihood, and could bring a law suit under the Iraqi law against Iraq
as a State that sponsored the destruction of the marshes. However, the Iraqi law has to
authorize such kind of lawsuit. Or it could be argued that someday under a new Iraqi
Parliament there might be a law that says the marshes have to be restored because the
ecology of the nation needs to be brought back. Thus, everyone who does not follow this
law may be responsible and have to clean it up whether he is the owner, the State, or a
certain company or ministry. Moreover, any Gulf State that could be affected by what
Saddam did to the marshes of the Gulf can bring responsibility against him when he is no
longer in his position.

Part VI
The Recommendations
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That the legal system regarding environmental protection both in peacetime and
in times of armed conflicts needs to be re-evaluated and reinforced. It is necessary to
propose new ideas to address the inadequacies of the existing national and international
legal systems. This thesis proposes some new ideas, presented in the form of
recommendations to reduce or eliminate negative environmental impacts that result from
military operations in peacetime and in times of armed conflicts. Some of the
recommendations may seem unrealistic, but the international community is faced with the
choice of accepting new ideas or watching the continued degradation of our environment.
A number of key issues must be addressed by the international community in
order to protect the environment more effectively during armed conflicts. Moreover, each
nation has an obligation to take certain number of steps to protect its own environment
and other nations’ environment as well. Finally, Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) have a major role in reinforcing environmental protection worldwide. Therefore,
the recommendations will be classified as: recommendations addressed to the
international community, recommendations addressed to national societies, and
recommendations addressed to the NGOs.

A- Recommendations Addressed to the International Community
The international community is the strongest and the most powerful source of
environmental protection. Collectivelly, the nations of the world have the necessary tools
to modify the international legal system, and can persuade, and even force, individual
States to take action. The international community’s tools can be mandatory, such as
international conventions and Security Council resolutions, or they can be permissive,
such as international declarations and the General Assembly’s resolutions.
The next few pages propose number of recommendations that are necessary to
protect the environment from harmful activity during armed conflicts. The international
community should act, as soon as possible, to translate these recommendations into
positive instruments. Otherwise the international community will be responsible before
future generations for failing to prevent further environmental degradation.
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1. Improving International Environmental Dispute Resolution for Armed Conflict

Despite the experience that most international jurists have in the field of resolving
international conflicts, they still lack the necessary awareness in the environmental field,
since this field has its own characteristics and is a relatively new area of the law.
Therefore, a specialized judiciary committee to examine environmental conflicts is highly
recommended. Environmental cases require experience in both national and international
environmental laws, in addition to basic scientific knowledge. Most international judicial
bodies, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), possess no expertise in
environmental issues. 2451 However, according to Article 26 (1) of the ICJ Statute, the
Court may form a permanent chamber, composed of three or more judges, to deal only
with environmental cases. 2452 At present, ICJ has competence over conflicts when at least
one party is a State. NGO’s, or groups of individuals, have no right to invoke the
jurisdiction of the ICJ. International organizations have only the right to recur to the
interpretative competence of the Court, but have no right to complain directly to the ICJ.
Even when States are parties to a conflict, the ICJ has no compulsory jurisdiction. Thus,
the ICJ has jurisdiction only when a State expressly agrees to submit a dispute to it. 2453
This system can, and should be changed. The jurisdiction of the ICJ can, and
should, be expanded in environmental matters. Allowing member States, international
organizations, NGO’s and group of individuals to bring complaints for environmental
violations that cause widespread, long-lasting or severe environmental damage before the
ICJ, will better advance the cause of environmental protection. Furthermore, the ICJ
should have compulsory jurisdiction over environmental matters 2454 that have
widespread, long-lasting or severe impacts, even if the concerned party does not accept
the ICJ jurisdiction.
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The legal regime regarding environmental war crimes can also be strengthened
and improved. As discussed earlier, there have been few trials for war crimes of any kind,
and few of them involved crimes of environmental destruction. 2455
A court was established by the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982; however, it
has jurisdiction only over the marine environment 2456 and it excludes military operations
from its jurisdiction. 2457 The Statute of Rome, which has jurisdiction over war crimes,
does cover crimes that have widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment. 2458 However, the Statute of Rome threshold is too high, since it requires the
presence of all three elements before jurisdiction can be asserted.
Thus, it appears that it is necessary to establish an international judicial body to
specialize in examining international environmental cases. This body could be an
international environmental court of justice (IECJ) similar to the ICJ. Alternatively, an
environmental chamber of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) could be
established to settle environmental disputes resulting from armed conflict through
conciliation, mediation, good offices, commission of inquiry, and arbitration, based on
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration
Rules or Conciliation Rules. 2459 The PCA Working Group on Environmental Dispute
Resolution established a drafting committee of experts in environmental law and
arbitration, under the chairmanship of Professor Philippe Sands. 2460 The drafting
committee developed rules for arbitrating disputes relevant to the environment and/or
natural resources. The rules were adopted by consensus by the PCA Administrative
Council on June 19, 2001. 2461
The IECJ can be established in any State to examine all the environmental matters
and disputes. The idea of creating an international court that specializes in environmental
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cases goes back to 1988. 2462 A private initiative by a committee in Rome examined the
subject, and organized a conference in Rome from 21-24 April 1989, attended by experts
from thirty countries. 2463 The conference called for the creation of a permanent
international court at the U.N. level to be competent in all environmental matters. 2464
Moreover, in 1994, the Venice Declaration provided that “national governments should
[...] officially support the project of an International Court of the Environment.” 2465
Unlike the ICJ, the proposed court should have the right to decide environmental
disputes even if the concerned parties, according to their sovereignty rights, do not
express their acceptance of the jurisdiction of the IECJ. 2466 Moreover, international
persons other than the State should have the right to invoke IECJ jurisdiction over severe
environmental violations. For example, environmental organizations, whether NGOs or
intergovernmental organizations, should be able to present their complaints to the
IECJ. 2467 It would be also environmentally useful if groups of individuals could be given
the right to recur to the IECJ. 2468 Nevertheless, States may oppose such a proposal, as
they already rejected a resolution proposed by the planning committee of the United
Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) calling for the
creation of a new international environmental dispute resolution mechanism. 2469
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States prefer to settle their differences through arbitral bodies rather than the
international court of justice, 2470 since they can chose the arbitrators, and the arbitration
procedures usually take a short time. The IECJ could take those concerns into account.
The IECJ could function as follows: member States submit their questions to a
judiciary committee that is formed according to pre-established rules. States have no right
to interfere in the formulation of the judiciary committee or the law of ruling. 2471 The
IECJ could function not as a court, but as a chamber to receive applications of arbitrators
competent to settle environmental conflicts. Then, whenever an environmental dispute
took place, parties to the conflict could choose their judges from the list of arbitrators in
the chamber, and could specify which environmental laws those judges should apply.
Alternatively, the arbitrators could apply existing environmental law rules.
Finally, a new crime of “ecocide” 2472 should be recognized in the IHL
instruments, to prosecute any individual who commits, assists, or fails to prevent crime
against the environment. Even though the Statute of Rome criminalizes certain acts of
environmental damage, it does not establish the kind of broad prohibition necessary to
combat these serious crimes. Instruments that specifically target ecocide would do so. 2473

2. Creation of a U.N. Trusteeship System for States that Cause Unnecessary Severe
Environmental Damage
Even though the implementation of a trusteeship system is very unlikely, a
proposal for such a system could set to stage for other proposals to protect civilian
population, the global ecosystem, and plant and animal species.
In international law, areas incapable of internal or external self-determination 2474
can be placed under the administration of another State. As a result of World War II,
territories were placed under the supervision of some United Nations’ members to assist
them to develop and govern themselves. After World War I, the Mandate System of the
2470
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League of Nations appeared to control these cases, and it continued after World War II as
the Trusteeship of the United Nations. 2475
According to Article 77 (1) of the United Nations Charter, trusteeship is a system
created to administer territories detached from the enemies in World War II, territories
voluntarily placed under the system by the administration States, and territories held
under the League of Nations’ mandate system. 2476 The goals of the trusteeship system are

a. to further international peace and security; b. to promote the
political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the
inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive
development towards self-government or independence as may
be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory
and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the people
concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each
trusteeship agreement; c. to encourage respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of
the independence of the peoples of the world; and d. to ensure
treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all
Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also
equal treatment for the latter in the administration of
justice[...]. 2477
In order to achieve the above-mentioned goals, there should be a healthy
environment where people can live safely and securely since they are connected to their
environment. Therefore, the administration authority should, among other things,
maintain a healthy environment in the trust territories. If the inhabitants of the trust
territories are not capable of developing minimal environmental safeguards, the
trusteeship should operate to achieve that goal. And indeed, a trusteeship could be created
for that purpose in the first place, if conditions exist that may cause environmental harm
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to other nations’ environment through transboundary pollution. The administration
authority should be an environmentally friendly State, and should enhance the
environmental condition and awareness of that nation.
The United Nations has an active body, the Trusteeship Council, to supervise the
best application of the trusteeship system. By 1994, all the trust territories obtained their
complete right of self-governing, with Palau the last to be granted independence after
being administered by the United States. 2478 Accordingly, the United Nations’ General
Assembly decided to freeze the Trusteeship Council, until a new need requires its
reactivation. 2479 However, there is no legal obstacle for reactivating the Trusteeship
Council whenever needed.
Not all the environmental violations would be serious enough to invoke the
application of the United Nations trusteeship system. However, where environmental
violations may cause widespread, long lasting or severe environmental damage, a
trusteeship could be an appropriate solution. A modification in the United Nations
Charter would be required to allow a concerned State to bring the matter to the
Trusteeship Council in order to examine the situation and decide whether the
environmental violation is severe enough to place a country under trusteeship. Moreover,
Article 78 of the U.N. Charter, which prevents any member of the United Nations from
being subject to the trusteeship, would have to be abolished. 2480
The U.N. trusteeship system can provide help in preventing future environmental
destruction, and it could be used as a tool to threaten any nation that violates international
environmental standards and requirements. There should be substantial cooperation
between the Trusteeship Council and the environmental expertise organizations, such as
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), to examine any environmental violation
and decide whether it is serious enough to raise the possibility of a trusteeship. However,
to assure the neutrality of such procedures, the ICJ should have the last word on whether
the situation requires placing such country under the trusteeship system.
2477
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Moreover, to assure sound environmental development, the trusteeship system
should adopt the international accountability principle through sophisticated examination
of inhabitants’ petitions and regular visits to their territories. 2481
Subsequently, the Trusteeship Council should
a. consider reports submitted by the administering authority;
b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the
administering authority; c. provide for periodic visits to the
respective trust territories at time agreed upon with the
administering authority; and d. take these and other actions in
conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements. 2482
When the environmental remediation reaches a certain level, local authorities and
groups of individuals could submit petitions to the Trusteeship Council requesting the
suspension of the trusteeship over their territories. 2483 These petitions could be examined
by the Trusteeship Council, which could then submit recommendations to the General
Assembly of the United Nations, to decide whether to continue the trusteeship.
Practically, it does not matter how the United Nations’ Trusteeship System works, how
many petitions are heard, how many visiting missions are sent, or how hard the
administering authority defends its policies in the Trustee Council. What does and should
matter is whether the trusteeship system has achieved its goals. 2484
This recommendation is unlikely to be adopted, but even its proposal could
persuade local authorities to internally enforce the international environmental standards
to avoid being subject to the administration of another State.
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3. Creation of An International Fund to Rehabilitate Warfare Environmental
Damage

As a result of the environmental destruction in times of armed conflict,
responsible parties would be charged to pay the expenses of cleanup and rehabilitation of
the environment. However, States do not easily admit their responsibility for warfare
environmental damage. Usually, it takes long time, through the international legal
system, to attribute responsibility for warfare environmental damage to a certain State.
Assessing such responsibility might be more easily accomplished if it takes place
during or directly after the armed conflict. For example, protected areas could be
rehabilitated immediately after the armed conflict, when plants and animals have only
recently been disturbed.
Linking environmental rehabilitation to the recept of compensation from the
enemy could work against environmental cleanup by causing delay. Unfortunately, the
environmental compensation is often the last thing to be considered by belligerent States.
For instance, only after ten years following the cessation of hostilities in Gulf War II did
Kuwait receive a portion of its environmental compensation.
To assure effective environmental rehabilitation, an international fund should be
established to fill this gap. Professor Jeffrey Miller has proposed financing an
international fund by taxing States that export arms technology, such as the United States,
Russia, North Korea, South Africa, and Israel. 2485 He believes that as these States benefit
from selling arms and weapons, they should support the negative environmental effects
that may be caused by their technologies. 2486 This proposal makes a great deal of sense;
however, in order to calculate the arms tax, international cooperation is essential in order
to calculate the total amount of weapons sold by a certain State or an individual. The tax
should be assessed against the arms dealer and delivered to the international fund.
Until such a proposal is adopted, the fund should be financed through the United
Nations member States that have experienced the environmental effects of armed conflict
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and are financially capable, such as Japan, United Kingdom, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, and the
United States.
The incentive for contributing to such a fund can be found in the ill effects of not
doing so. For example, in Afghanistan, one result of the long war against the Soviets and
of the civil wars that followed was the environmental destruction of that country. The
inability of Afghanistan to recover from that environmental (and other) destruction
helped to create a great environment to host terrorist activities. An international effort to
rehabilitate the environment could have helped to prevent that situation. 2487
Finally, cleanup, rehabilitation and rebuilding the environment should be
regulated and organized by the United Nations. A set of rules should regulate the
percentage of contribution of each State to these efforts. These efforts should create a
program to study each case, determine the appropriate funding priorities, and supervise
these efforts until the job is completed.

4. The Need For International Environmental Assistance To Be Independent From
Political Disputes
In some cases and in certain times, some financial or technical support from one
country may avoid or prevent a substantial environmental harm in another nation.
However, some States refuse to provide such support because they object to the political,
economic, or military system in the recipient State. A number of developed countries
refrain from environmentally assisting countries they consider “outlaw States.”
Nonetheless, international organizations, as neutral bodies, do not link environmental
assistance to secure nature and natural resources to the political situation of a given
country.
For example, after NATO’s attacks against the former Yugoslavia, NATO’s
member States, including the U.S., announced that as long as Milosevic the former
Yugoslavian President was in power they would provide only humanitarian
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assistance. 2488 This statement did not in all cases preclude emergency cleanup or
environmental restoration when needed. 2489 Another example is Iraq, where the U.S.
refuse to provide material needed to improve the environmental situation in Iraq, such as
agricultural materials and equipment, that could be used for military purposes or to
produce herbicides. However, refusal to provide environmental assistance should not be
linked to the presence of Saddam Hussein, since he may disappear at anytime, but the
environment will last, and providing a healthy environment is not relevant to one person
but to the common globe.
The tension between States should not present an obstacle to securing the
environment. To assure that the environment is the only beneficiary from the assistance,
environmental organizations such as UNEP and IUCN may play a mediator role in such
cases. For instance, the assistance may be delivered, distributed and executed under the
supervision of these organizations.
5. Strengthen and Increase Individual Punishments in International Law 2490
Traditional international law addresses international persons, i.e., States and
international organizations. It “has no credible means to address individual [...]
accountability for even the most flagrant violations of law.” 2491 However, modern
international law, especially in the environmental field, concerns individuals as well as
international persons. Individuals can directly harm the environment and can also be held
responsible for such acts. Accordingly, international law should adopt the necessary
means to capture, prosecute and punish individuals suspected of committing
environmental crimes.
The absence of such rules was behind the escape of Iraqi criminals of war from
punishment for the horrible environmental crimes committed during the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in 1990. Unfortunately, “little has been done to hold Iraq or any Iraqi liable [for
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committing environmental] crimes.” 2492 The international community should adopt
means of punishing any individual who violates or provokes the violation of any
international environmental norm, since the threat of punishment is likely to induce
individuals to comply with international and national environmental rules. 2493 National
jurisdiction should not stand as an obstacle to prevent the international community from
imposing its rules. Local authorities should punish members of its own armed force who
fail to comply with environmental rules, just as they would seek the punishment of those
who belong to other nation’s armed forces. 2494
State sovereignty should not prevent the international community from
prosecuting criminals. Any encroachment on State sovereignty in order to capture and
prosecute environmental criminals is slight compared to the harm caused by those
criminals to the environment. Adopting such measures in a new international instrument
would relieve any harm to the State sovereignty. The U.S. intervention in Panama to
arrest General Manuel Noreiga,2495 and in Afghanistan to capture AlQaeda members, and
the NATO arrests of the former Yugoslavian President, Milosevic, provide examples of
an international force that arrested war criminals who violated international law rules,
without undermining the sovereignty of the States involved.

6. Extend IUCN’s Mission to Cover Armed Conflict
Since the International Union for the World Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources (IUCN) is one of the most active environmental organizations, it serves as a
useful case study as to how such organizations might advance the cause of international
law. For example, the IUCN supports studies on
[t]he role of military establishments in environmental protection
and re-generation, [...t]he interaction between armed conflict and
the environment [and i]dentifying means of strengthening the
current international legal system concerning environmental
protection during times of armed conflict. [...] IUCN should urge
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governments that are not already parties to relevant [to armed
conflict] international legal instruments to ratify these
instruments[,] IUCN should [prepare for regional and global]
diplomatic conferences [...] to reinforce [...] supplement [...the
actual] legal regimes for environmental protection in times of
armed conflicts [...]. 2496
Accordingly, the World Conservation Congress at its 2nd Session in Amman,
Jordan, 4-11 October 2000, considered “the effects of armed conflicts in natural areas of
national, regional and global importance, and on the indigenous peoples and local
communities that inhabit them” the Congress adopted Resolution No.CGR2.CNV016,
concerning Armed Conflicts in Natural Areas (Panama and Columbia), and requested that
the Director General seek to ensure that IUCN promotes cooperation and conservation
measures between Columbia and Panama in these and other natural areas endangered by
armed conflict.” 2497
The 1948 Statute of the IUCN was revised in Montreal on October 22, 1996.
According to this revision Part I Article 1 provides as follows: “The [IUCN] is
constituted in accordance with Article 60 of the Swiss Civil Code as an international
association of governmental and non-governmental members. Therefore, it has legal
personality and may perform any act in accordance with its objectives.” 2498 It seeks to
“influence, encourage and assist societies throughout the world to conserve the integrity
and diversity of nature and to ensure that any use of natural resources is equitable and
ecologically sustainable.” This statement makes clear the link between military activities,
which are often threatful to the environment, and the goal of the IUCN.
In addition to the goals of the IUCN, its composition is very helpful in providing a
connection with national authorities, especially the military, since
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IUCN is unique among international organizations in that it was
created with and has consistently possessed a membership of
sovereign States, 2499 governmental agencies of States, 2500 and both
international and national non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”), as well as non-voting Affiliate Members. 2501

This unique membership system will allow IUCN to be connected to
governmental and non-governmental bodies, within the limit of a State or among States.
The IUCN should benefit from this position and maintain relations with military forces in
member States, to provide the organization with the ability to intervene in military
operations, especially in times of armed conflict. In this regard it is important that Article
70 of the Additional Protocol I allows relief actions that are humanitarian in nature 2502 to
be taken in accordance with the acceptance of States parties to the conflict. 2503
Some may object to this idea because the ICRC seems to hold such a position in
the present time. However, the ICRC has not succeeded in preventing any attacks against
the environment, since its primary role is in protecting people and saving their lives. Its
focus is not environmental. The IUCN does focus directly on environmental issues.
Moreover, unlike the ICRC, the IUCN has States as members. Thus, the IUCN may be
able to generate more direct institutional support for its activities, in a way the ICRC
would not be able to.
As a first step, the IUCN should establish cooperation with the military authorities
in every member State. The IUCN may offer honorary membership to military
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commanders and invite them to participate in the IUCN congress meetings every three
years to increase their environmental awareness. Moreover, IUCN may play an important
educational role, by providing military authorities with materials regarding environmental
protection during armed conflicts, and by giving environmental lectures to military
personnel.
Additionally, the IUCN may establish environmental symbols to distinguish
environmental sites to be protected in case of military attacks during armed conflicts. For
example, a symbol of a leaf may designate a protected area or a forest, a UNESCO
symbol may indicate a historical site or a cultural monument, and a wave sign may
denote a dam, river or shore. These environmental signs could be approved by an
international conference and distributed to military authorities. Furthermore, IUCN may
cite the possible causes of irreparable environmental harm, such as the destruction of
endangered species habitats or the destruction of a historical site, and require military
authorities to increase the precautionary measures in these areas and to deter possible
actions. 2504 Finally, IUCN should also promote the creation of an international fund to
restore natural resources damaged by armed conflicts and to finance intervention in
environmental emergency cases. 2505

7. Improve Existing International Agreements

Most of the international instruments that were examined in Parts II, III, and IV of
this thesis were concluded in response to specific circumstances or dangers, and reflected
the concerns of those particular circumstances. However, following Gulf War II, there
was increased interest in addressing more universal or ongoing environmental threats.
Nations, organizations, and individuals showed a new interest in dealing with
environmental dangers that could result from any armed conflict. 2506 Commentators on
the issue were divided into two groups. The first group believes that existing
environmental law rules are sufficient to assure environmental protection during armed
2504
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conflict, and that the problem consist in guaranteeing adherence to the existing rules and
not in the rules themselves. 2507 Another group of commentators 2508 believes in the
necessity to enact new law to deal with environmental destruction during armed
conflicts. 2509 My view lies somewhere in between, i.e., that the existing system is not
completely capable of assuring the environmental protection during times of armed
conflicts. However, it is not necessary to enact new law; it would be sufficient if existing
international law instruments were modified or supplemented to respond to the present
environmental threats. Existing law provides a basic level of protection, and serves as a
starting point. We must start there, and seek to build upon that foundation.
Most of the IHL instruments would be improved if the principle of “military
necessity” is eliminated. Even if the principle of military necessity is not completely
eliminated, any attack based on that principle should not harm human lives or the
environment. Moreover, Articles 35 (3) and 55 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions should be modified to attenuate the condition of responsibility for
environmental damage. Instead of requiring all the three elements, 2510 i.e., widespread,
long-term and severe damage, it would be useful if, like the ENMOD, 2511 responsibility
were based on the occurrence of a single element. 2512 Damage that could be described in
terms of any one of those elements could present a real danger to the environment, and
should be treated as such. Moreover, Article 56 of the Additional Protocol I could be
modified to improve the environmental protection during armed conflict. The text of
Article 56 provides protection only to a certain number of installations, “dams, dikes, and
2507
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nuclear electrical generating stations.” 2513 In view of the Iraqi degradation of the
environment in Kuwait in 1991, when the Iraqi military burned oil wells and spilled
crude oil into the Gulf waters, it becomes essential to include oil facilities in the forecited
list. 2514 Including oil facilities in Article 56 would have two environmental advantages;
first, it would protect natural resources during times of armed conflict, and second, it
would avoid the requirements of Article 35 (3) and 55 that the environmental harm must
be widespread, long-term and severe. 2515 The Additional Protocol I environmental
standards should be extended to cover internal armed conflicts too, since there is no
reason to distinguish between the environmental destruction caused by international
armed conflict and that caused by non-international armed conflict. 2516
The Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention should also be modified, by
including provisions similar to Articles 35 (3) and 55 of the Additional Protocol I, if not
more stringent. 2517
The IUCN Amman Clause should be included in all instruments regulating
international and internal armed conflicts. The IUCN Amman Clause can fill any gap in
current environmental protection law. It states that
[u]ntil a more complete international code of environmental
protection has been adopted, in cases not covered by international
agreements and regulations, the biosphere and all its constituent
elements and processes remain under the protection and authority
of the principles of international law derived from established
customs, from dictates of the public conscience, and from the
principles and fundamental values of humanity acting as steward
for present and future generations. 2518
The Charter of the U.N. should be modified to charge the Security Council, along
with maintaining international peace and security, with the responsibility to intervene
whenever there is a threat of widespread long-lasting or severe environmental damage.
The General Assembly should also participate in criminalising any environmental
2512

Simonds, supra note (969) at 211.
Additional Protocol (I) , supra note (79) art. 56.
2514
Kelly, supra note (1817) at 946.
2515
Id., at 946-47.
2516
Simonds, supra note (969) at 213-14.
2517
Id., at 213.
2513

474

humiliation. 2519 This step on the part of the General Assembly would have a great
environmental effect, because, even if it was not adopted by unanimous vote, it could
establish a general principle of law acceptable among civilized nations, and would
require the minority to comply with it.
The importance of ENMOD requires a periodical update of the convention to
meet the needs of the environment and new threats to it. A State which experienced
catastrophic environmental destruction by other nation’s military forces, such as Kuwait,
should undertake to convince the majority of member States to ENMOD to approve a
periodical review conference perhaps every ten years, to improve the environmental
protection of ENMOD. 2520 Since ENMOD addresses offensive military activities, it
should be modified to extend its jurisdiction to cover defensive military activities as well.
ENMOD could also be strengthened by a provision that would allow for enforcement
even if the State causing damage did not admit a hostile intent behind its action, because
the effect on the environment should be considered and not the mindset of the State. 2521
Additionally, Article 1 of ENMOD, which currently provides protection against only
widespread, long lasting or severe damage, could be modified to include under its
jurisdiction any environmental harm.
Finally, ENMOD deals with military activities only in times of armed conflicts,
not in peacetime. Since such activities may have serious environmental impacts,
ENMOD should be modified to include military operations in peacetime, especially
activities that occurred on military bases abroad. The treaty should provide that any act,
direct or indirect, that causes damage to the environment even in times of peace, would
be considered as a crime against international law. 2522 The treaty should adopt a powerful
enforcement system to assure that military forces are not protected by their national
systems in cases of flagrant violations against the environment.
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8. Conclude New Treaties

Following the Gulf War II, there was some pressure on the international
community to conclude a treaty encompassing warfare environmental damage. An
academic conference reported in The Independent (London) on June 4, 1991 2523
reaffirmed that trend. The question of whether a new set of rules should be codified, or
whether the existing rules should be modified, was subject to a great discussion. 2524 As
stated earlier in this thesis, many good rules already exist, some others need to be
modified or supplemented, while some new laws need to be put in place. Customary law
and State practice supply some of the “missing” rules. 2525 However, a new
comprehensive treaty should concentrate on environmental protection and cover the gaps
in existing international environmental rules. For example, a new convention that
criminalizes damage to the environment during military operations whether in peacetime
or in times of armed conflict should be adopted.
Professor Richard Falk proposed the Ecocide Convention.2526 He was inspired by
the adoption of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, and compared the importance of the environmental protection to the
importance of the humans. 2527 According to Article I of the Draft Articles on the Crime
of Ecocide “ecocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime
under international law.” 2528 Article I requires member States to prevent and punish
crime of ecocide. 2529 Article I also criminalizes environmental degradation during
peacetime and times of war. However, it could be argued that using the term of “time of
war” instead of times of armed conflict might exclude internal armed conflicts from the
convention. Article II of the Draft defines as criminal acts done with an “intent to disrupt
2523
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or destroy” the environment. This requirement may exclude serious acts of environmental
destruction that may be committed as a result of mere negligence or disregard.
The Draft not only criminalizes completed crimes against the environment, but
also conspiracy and attempt to commit such crimes. 2530 This Draft goes beyond
criminalizing environmental destruction in peacetime and times of war, and requires the
U.N. to form a Commission for the investigation of ecocide crimes. 2531 Jurisdiction is
given either to an international environmental court or the judicial authority of the State
where the crime was committed. 2532
To facilitate the prosecution procedures, member States are required to cooperate
in extraditing criminals to the concerned authority, and such environmental crimes should
not be, under any circumstances, described as political crimes which may allow criminals
to escape extradition and prosecution.
As an alternative approach, several groups, including the United Nations, ICRC,
Greenpeace International and a number of jurists, 2533 proposed a fifth Geneva
Convention. 2534 The fifth Geneva Convention includes Marten’s Clause to cover all the
subjects not examined in the earlier Conventions. 2535 The application of the fifth Geneva
Convention is wider than the Ecocide Convention, since it covers all the environmental
destruction resulting from armed conflict, including internal armed conflicts under its
jurisdiction. However, it does not apply to peacetime environmental destruction. 2536 The
proposed fifth Geneva Convention requires member States to be cautious in military
activities that may harm neutral States, and should inform them about any harmful
conduct. 2537 It limits the applicability of the principle of military necessity, and states that
it shall “not automatically prevail over the principle of environmental protection.”2538
Like the Ecocide Convention, the fifth Geneva Convention requires a showing of intent
2530
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to harm the environment, but also considers the nature of the weapons or techniques used.
If the nature of those weapons is likely to cause environmental damage then the
Convention will be applied. 2539 Moreover, the proposed fifth Geneva Convention
requires member States to prohibit weapons and techniques that can be expected in all
circumstances to cause environmental damage. 2540 It further prohibits the use of certain
specific weapons and tactics already recognized to be harmful to the environment.2541
The Convention also seeks to exclude zones and areas containing ecosystems, species or
genetic materials of vital international importance from being subject to any attack, and
provides that they should be demilitarized. 2542 Beside State responsibility, 2543 individuals
can be prosecuted under the draft. 2544 Finally, the Convention assigns to the
environmental NGOs the task of applying the convention and safeguarding the
environment.
Both the Ecocide Convention and the fifth Geneva Convention are quite
advanced. Since States are usually cautious regarding any new international convention,
these proposals are unlikely to be adopted without considerable discussion and education
to lay a foundation for agreement.
Furthermore, a new comprehensive convention dealing with terrorism should be
adopted. This convention should provide a new definition of terrorism in view of the
developed techniques that terrorist groups are using nowadays. However, since
governments are not permanent, any conference that will call for the conclusion of a new
treaty on terrorism must assemble different nations, religions, and ethnic groups to ensure
a truly international effort. The representatives must have the opportunity to discuss and
negociate, in order to distinguish terrorism from legal acts of violence undertaken in the
name of self-determination. The Islamic nations already took this step and defined
terrorism when Muslim scholars discussed the matter during a conference in Makkah,
Saudi Arabia in 2002. According to the Islamic conference, terrorism means “all acts of
aggression unjustly committed by individuals, groups or States against human beings
2539
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including attacks on their religion, life, intellect, property or honor ...[d]amaging the
environment and public or private facilities and endangering natural resources” is equally
an act of terrorism. 2545 Since the Islamic nation did its part, other nations should do theirs
to approach different definitions and then reach a common one. The new treaty on
terrorism should include the common definition.
The new treaty on terrorism should focus on establishing effective cooperation
among nations in fighting terrorism. There should be a set of codified rules examining in
detail the duty of member States to extradite suspected terrorists, the neutral authority to
whom they should be delivered in case of disagreement, and the procedures of such
extradition or delivery.

9. Charge U.N. Peacekeeping Operations to Monitor Environmental Situations

The United Nations has the power to form and use small, multinational, and
lightly armed forces as a peacekeeping operation, 2546 to monitor cease-fires between
combatants. This same model may be used to assure the protection of the environment
and natural resources and to report any flagrant violation against them.
The U.N. resolution gives peacekeeping forces the right to access and monitor
situations within cease-fire areas. They might also be able to monitor environmental
destruction committed within areas under their surveillance, 2547 especially since the
environment has been used as a military target in recent wars. The peacekeeping forces
could not only monitor the violation of cease fires by use of traditional weapons, but
could also report any use of the environment as a weapon in the areas under their
surveillance. For example, peacekeeping forces can prevent a State’s armed forces from
dumping or releasing hazardous substances into the territories of other States. They can
also report to the U.N. Security Council any substantial environmental violation.
However, the U.N. peacekeeping forces cannot practice such environmental surveillance
without legal basis.
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Therefore, the U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the use of
peacekeeping operations should also charge them to fulfill certain missions including
monitoring the environmental situations within certain areas. Such operations could be
called “Greenkeeping.” 2548 The nature of the mission might affect the formation of the
peacekeeping forces. For example, a certain number of environmentalists could be
included in the peacekeeping forces to fulfill environmental missions; or military
personnel of the peacekeeping forces could be required to have a certain level of
environmental experience.
The United Nations forces should go beyond supervising and reporting
environmental degradation, which may do little for human well-being after violations are
committed. The United Nations may establish an “environmental task force” the goal of
which is to quickly respond to environmental emergency situations that may result from
armed conflict. 2549 When the U.N. Security Council decides to deploy armed forces
within certain country, it can deploy the environmental task force at the same time. The
“Greenkeeping” would then be in a position to assure the environmental protection, to
prevent any military action that might cause severe environmental harm, to secure
protected sites within the State, and to take immediate emergency environmental rescue
operations.
Attributing such a mission to armed forces under the authority of the U.N.
Security Council gives the environmental mission of these forces the necessary respect,
violators may be faced with stringent measures of the Security Council.

B) Recommendations Addressed to National Societies

The State is considered the intermediate body between the international
community and the people of a nation. The State may take part in the international
instruments and apply them within its jurisdiction. Moreover, a State may convey the
nation’s point of views to the international community during the consideration of any
international instrument.
2548
2549
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1. Revise Military Manuals, Based upon the Experiences of Germany, USA, and
Other Countries
Including environmentally friendly rules of law in the national military manuals
would contribute to the protection of the environment within the State’s jurisdiction and
would be reflected in the behavior of its armed forces abroad. For instance, when the
military manual prohibits any environmental destruction during peacetime and in times of
armed conflict, armed forces would comply with this requirement whether their
operations took place on their homeland or abroad. Moreover, environmentally friendly
practices may present a model which other nations military manuals may adopt. Any
armed forces should “deter, prevent, and punish unjustified environmental damage,” 2550
and to assure the best environmental protection, military manuals should incorporate the
environmental rules of International Humanitarian Law, 2551 Environmental Law Rules
and Enviro-humanitarian Law.
Governments may revise their existing military manuals by incorporating the
existing rules. 2552 Further, any military manual should at least include both Marten’s
Clause and the IUCN Amman Clause. For example, military manuals of the United
States, United Kingdom and Germany already include the Marten’s Clause, 2553 and
should be improved to include the IUCN Amman Clause regarding environmental
protection.
Improving military manuals can take place only by revising the existing military
manuals according to the procedures set forth in the legal system of each country.
Improving military manuals can be an easy task in a legal system such as Kuwait, where
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the Minister of Defense possesses extraordinary powers. 2554 However, in some other
legal systems, only the legislators can revise military manuals. But there exist other
mechanisms for including environmental law rules in military practices other than revised
military manuals. For example, in the United States, “in a February 1996 memo to senior
State Department, the former Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, laid out the policy
of the Clinton Administration on environmental security, placing the environment near
the top of U.S. national security interests,” 2555 which gave the environment a high
priority.
On the other hand, if a “model military manual” is internationally adopted and
imposed over national military forces of all countries, it would better advance
environmental protection. The ICRC’s efforts are focusing on encouraging States to
integrate environmental protection into military manuals. Until this model is enacted,
military forces should be subject to the existing manuals and the environmental laws and
regulations that are applicable to civil activities. For example, the U.S. armed forces are
subject to vast array of international, foreign, federal and State laws and regulations,
which obliged them to go “green.” 2556 The U.S. armed forces are providing a great
example that should be followed by other States’ armed forces. Furthermore, despite the
fact that the United States has not yet ratified the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions, the Army’s field manual, “The Law of Land Warfare,” uses language
identical to the Additional Protocol I in some of its provisions. For example, the language
of the manual’s definitions of the “permissible objects of attack” is identical to the
language of Article 52 (2) of the Additional Protocol I. The definition is limited to
“objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.” 2557

2554

Ghanoon Ragom 32 Lisanat 1967 Fy Sha’an Aljaysh [Law No. 32/1967 related to the Military] Jul. 12,
1967, art. 24.
2555
Thomas A. Lippman, On Amazon, Christopher Stands up for Environment, Wash. Post., Mar. 5,
1996, at A9.
2556
Parsons, supra note (2455) at 490.

482

2. Modernize Military Technology to Avoid Environmental Destruction
In the present time, most armed forces focus on militarizing their personnel with
the most destructive and harmful weapons and techniques. Such techniques do not always
achieve victory in battlefield. For instance, despite the Iraqi military capacity, it did not
achieve any victory against the allies in the Gulf War II. Moreover, such techniques can
also be particularly harmful to the environment. My strong view is that militaries should
focus on technologies, arms and techniques that avoid environmental destruction.
However, until an international legal rule adopts this view, environmental protection will
be less effective than it could be.
In the civilian context, governments have made use of “technology assessment,”
that is, “the systematic study of the effects on society that may occur when technology is
introduced, extended, or modified with special emphasis on the impacts that are
unintended, indirect and delayed.” 2558 For example, in the United States, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has a Municipal Technology Assessment
Program that provides alternative technology for municipal wastewater treatment
facilities. 2559 Technology assessment can also be used in the military context by
ministries of defense all over the world, in order to provide alternative technologies for
the weapons of mass destruction, or to mitigate the severe impacts of such weapons on
human population and the global ecosystems.
Some commentators criticize the idea of banning a category of weapons based on
their environmental effects because according to them, such a ban would be difficult to
define and expensive to implement. 2560 However, rehabilitating the environment could be
more difficult or even impossible, and more expensive. Moreover, although the
preliminary phases might be difficult and expensive, once these weapons are destroyed,
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States would avoid any future environmental harm or destruction without those additional
costs.
The armed forces are capable of playing a major part in environmental protection.
Existing military equipment and facilities may be used, not only to carry out military
operations, but also to serve in securing the environment. For example, military radar,
space bases, and intelligence gathering have great value as tools to prevent environmental
destruction, to identify existing threats, and to identify persons responsible from them. 2561
Moreover, military equipment and logistical support may be used to clean up
contaminated sites. 2562
With modern military technology, the duty of any State’s armed forces, is not
only to damage the enemy’s forces, but also to protect its own citizens. For instance, the
“Patriot,” an anti-missile, was used during the Gulf War II to destroy Iraqi missiles
directed against the American installations in the region. Armed forces could focus on
improving their defensive techniques rather than offensive ones, in order to protect the
environment as well. Doing so would tend to “green” the armed forces and prepare them
to deter any environmental destruction. 2563

3. Provide the Right of Access to Information and Environmental Justice
Military operations in peacetime and times of armed conflict often have
environmental consequences. Information about such environmental damage should not
be kept from the public. A system of sharing information should be established in every
nation, particularly developing countries, to allow the public and NGO’s to know the
environmental effects of every military operation. The European Community signed the
Åarhus Convention in 1998, adopting standards of public access to information which
became part of the national legal system of every member State. Article 1 of Åarhus
states that, “In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person of present
and future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and wellbeing, each Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation
2561
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in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters in accordance with the
provisions of this convention.” Other States should learn from the European experience
in this field and adopt similar systems.
In the United States, for example, the Emergency Planning and Community Right
to Know Act (EPCRA) of 1986 is concerned with gathering information and making
them available in a comprehensible form to the public.2564 The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) is charged with maintaining a publicly accessible computer database and
putting out information to the public. 2565 Moreover, State and local organizations must
make information reported under EPCRA available to the public. The information
reported under EPCRA is intended to allow the public “to identify environmental
concerns [and/or to outline] potential environmental justice concerns.” 2566
The definition of the “public” that has the right of access to information should
include specialized international organizations and NGOs. Specialized international
organizations and NGOs have the environmental experience that would reinforce the
public’s ability to face environmental threats.
Environmental damage usually has a specific character that distinguishes it from
other kinds of damage. Therefore, the public should have means of access to
environmental justice, and any person who is or was affected by the environmental
consequences of military operations should be able to sue the armed forces for the
damage that their operations caused to his health, welfare, or the environment in order to
compensate him and/or clean up the contaminated site. Public access to information and
environmental justice will have a positive effect on the environment by causing the
armed forces to think carefully before engaging in any activity that may harm human
health or the environment.
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4. Modify the Status of the Civil Ministries of the Environment and Create a New
Service within these Ministries to Deal with Environmental Emergency Responses
and Cleanup
Civil authorities are often unable legally to interfere with military operations,
even if such operations may cause severe environmental harm. The military often is the
only institution in a position to act. 2567 However, traditional military forces are not
capable of deterring, punishing and rehabilitating environmental damage that may result
from their operations. Two possible avenues could be used to fill this gap. First, civil
services could be established within the ministries of environment to address the
environmental damage caused by military activities whether in peacetime or in times of
armed conflicts. Practically, it would be very useful to the environment if a civil
authority held this task, because civil authorities are more likely to consider the
environment as a high priority and will provide for greater environmental protection. The
proposed civil service can be composed of environmental experts to examine
environmental emergencies arising from armed conflict. The team should have
extraordinary powers in times of environmental emergencies, so that its members have
unlimited access to sites and information, and have authority to direct the military to take
necessary measures to reduce and eliminate any environmental threat. To assure that the
team will be granted this kind of power, the highest authority in the country should form
this team and invest it with the forecited powers.
Until this proposal is being effective, a second scenario should be considered,
which is “greening” armed forces. 2568 Governments could create special environmental
brigades within the ministries of defense to examine environmental harm of peacetime
and times of armed conflicts. The members of the environmental brigade should be
highly trained in the environmental field, should not be subordinated to any military
authority, and should be empowered to enforce its recommendations. This
recommendation will assure the priority of environmental concerns over military
concerns.
2567
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In the United States, at the State level, national guard forces have sometimes been
used in emergency response to national disasters. The national guard serves as “an on-call
force for state governors in case of civil disorders and [natural] disasters.” 2569 In the
United States, the former President Clinton expanded the activities of the national guard
forces in areas such as “antiterrorism, the war on drugs, environmental emergencies, rural
health initiatives, and other domestic contingencies.” 2570 The national guard forces also
participate in community service projects. 2571 These forces could also be used during
armed conflicts to maintain and secure the environment, since environmental
emergencies during armed conflict are often much more severe than those which arise
during peacetime. India took a significant step in this area, by forming a green brigade
within its armed forces vested with securing and protecting the environment in peacetime
and in times of armed conflict.

5. Increase the Environmental Awareness Among People

Public awareness of environmental concerns is crucial to ensuring adequate
environmental protection. When environmental awareness reaches a certain level, the
military is much more likely to take such concerns into consideration before committing
serious environmental crimes. Moreover, even if a serious environmental crime took
place, an aware citizenry is more to exert pressure on the army to avoid such crimes in
the future and to clean up their site. Increasing public awareness was identified as an
important step by the Rio Declaration, which provides that “States shall facilitate and
encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely
available.” 2572 Increasing public awareness must occur before, during, and after armed
conflicts. Each of these phase presents its own challenges.

2569

Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The Last American Warrior Non-Traditional Missions and the Decline of the
U.S. Armed Forces, 18 Fletcher F. World’s Aff. 65, 76 (1994); see also, Jeff Bovarnick, Perpich
v. United States Dept. of Defense: Who’s in Charge of the National Guard? 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 453,
469 (1991).
2570
See, Clinton, “ROA National Security Report,” The Officer 42 (Oct. 1992) cited in Kathleen H.
Switzer, Benefits for reserve and National Guard Members Under the Soldiers’ and Soldiers’ Civil Relief
Act of 1940, 110 The Banking L. J. 517, 517 fn. 2 (1993).
2571
National Guard: State Emergency Missions, FV 1990, USA Today, Sept. 14-16, 1990, at A3.
2572
Rio Declaration, supra note (683) Principle 10.

487

First, before armed conflict, environmental awareness may be built by teaching
environmental values in schools, and particularly in the early school years; even, for
example, by encouraging kids to clean their environment by not disposing of trash on the
ground, and by recycling. NGO’s should play important role in this task, 2573 by providing
experts in the environmental field to teach, or to instruct teachers. Governments should
inform their armed forces about protected areas and World Heritage sites located in or
near local and foreign military operations. 2574 The military also should practice recycling
programs and undertake useful training exercises to avoid causing unnecessary
environmental harm. 2575
Second, during armed conflict, armed forces should be made aware of protected
areas, which should not be targeted during armed conflict. The public should be informed
about military sites, mine fields, and other environmental hazards. For example, in 2001,
the American army taught the Afghan civilians how to distinguish between the yellow
color of cluster bombs and the yellow color of food packages. 2576 Moreover, armed
forces may provide and build camps for refugees and prohibit them from sheltering into
or escaping through protected areas. And to reduce the environmental threat, military
commanders should comply with the laws of war, particularly the IHL rules, and take
those rules seriously in planning and executing their operations. 2577
Finally, after the end of the combat a well trained task force should know the
locations of fragile environmental areas. Some of them may demine mine fields, others
may water the plants and feed the animals. Armed forces could teach the population how
to recognize landmines and avoid their threat, as the United States did in January 2002 in
Afghanistan, by providing for “mines training awareness and exposure” to the
population. 2578
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6. Increase Possibility of Extradition of Criminals in Environmental Cases

National law enforcement should cooperate with other States to facilitate the
extradition of criminals indicted for committing acts of environmental destruction. Not
every environmental criminal should be subject to extradition, but those whose acts
violate the international standards by causing widespread, long lasting or severe
environmental damage should be. If the State where the environmental crime can prove
that such a level of environmental harm has occurred, then any State where the criminal
is found should extradite him to be presented to justice.
National laws should be enacted in every State to assure the applicability of this
principle. 2579 If such measures were adopted, they would make the international legal
system of extradition much more effective. The national and international systems could
work together, and in case of conflict, priority should be given to the system that provides
more environmental protection.

C- Recommendations Addressed to Non-Governmental Organizations
The existing system of international responsibility excludes NGOs from any
major role, and thus reduces the effectiveness of that system. The NGOs should be
granted the right to bring violations to the attention of the ICJ, the ad hoc Courts or even
to the International Criminal Court. For example, the ICRC should have the right to bring
flagrant violations of the IHL rules to the attention of the above-mentioned bodies.
Further recommendations to the NGOs follow.

1. Introduce Environmental Protection as a Goal of the ICRC
The ICRC’s primary mission has been a humanitarian one, and it has achieved
considerable success in protecting humanitarian rights. However, protecting the
environment is very much a secondary concern in the mission of the ICRC. The draft
2578
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protocol submitted by the ICRC to the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts (CDDH)
made no reference to environmental protection. Articles 35 (3) and 55 of the Additional
Protocol I, which are the environmental landmarks of the IHL, were introduced at the
Conference itself. 2580
Environmental concerns could be made a higher ICRC priority. Since the ICRC
delegates have the right of access to battlefields, they could monitor environmental
situations, gather information, and report them to the concerned authority. The ICRC
could create an internal team with environmental capabilities, since environmental
protection is directly tied to its humanitarian goals. For example, providing drinking
water for a refugee camp involves both a humanitarian mission and an environmental
one. Cooperation could be fostered between the ICRC and the IUCN. For example, IUCN
could create an Emergency Response Team to work with the ICRC in emergency
situations and cooperate with the ICRC delegates in working on the protection of human
health and lives. The Emergency Response Team can monitor violations of
environmental law rules, inspect and gather information about environmental
degradation, persuade parties to the conflict to cease environmental destruction, and
pursue cleanup and rehabilitation efforts.
2. NGOs Should Maintain Solid Relations With Internal Authorities in Each Nation
To assure their welcom during times of armed conflict, NGO’s should arrange for
periodic visits to every nation in peacetime, contribute to increasing environmental
awareness of the national level, and establish a national group of representatives in each
State to defend their interests. Thus, when a country suffers from a national tragedy,
NGO’s would be in a position to relieve humanitarian and environmental threats without
being rejected by civilian populations. NGO’s often have material and financial resources
to help in improving environmental conditions, but cannot act because of internal
political or military problems. However, if their presence was not limited to emergency
situations, they might be able to act more effectively. Similarly, authorities can enact
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laws and regulations but may not have the materials to enforce them. Therefore,
cooperation between NGO’s and internal authorities could ameliorate environmental
hazards. 2581
Among NGO’s, there can be one recognized Red Cross or Red Crescent Society
per nation, to focus on relief efforts during natural disasters in peacetime. 2582 Currently,
there exist 170 Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies around the world. 2583 These
societies can play a significant role in safeguarding the social and economic development
in each nation, and thus facilitate sound environmental practices. Local governments
should facilitate their mission and provide them with necessary materials. Moreover, to
provide greater environmental protection, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies
should expand their role to cover relief efforts during armed conflicts.
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Conclusion
International and internal armed conflicts have taken place all over the world.
Modern history is full of examples of environmental damage caused by warfare, much of
which has caused transboundary pollution that presents a serious threat to civilian
populations, the natural environment, and plant and animal species. Current international
environmental dispute mechanisms are inadequate to protect the rights of civilians or the
environment. This is so despite the fact that most international law instruments that call
for peaceful settlements of disputes urge nations to settle their differences peacefully and
to maintain peace and security in their relations, such as the United Nations Charter of
1945.
In 1992, the Rio Declaration was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the
U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council. Principle 26 of Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development provides that “States shall resolve all their environmental
disputes peacefully and by appropriate means in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations.” The peaceful settlement of disputes had been emphasized by the Rio
Declaration because it recognized that recourse to armed conflict as a method for settling
differences will undermine efforts to achieve sustainable development. The Rio
Declaration combines the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes with other
environmental values, by recognizing that nations should not only seek peaceful
settlements of their differences, but should also protect nature and natural resources as
well.
Principle 25 of the Rio Declaration provides that “[p]eace, development and
environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible.” This principle raises
concerns about peace, development and environmental protection, which cannot be
separated and all of which are threatened by armed conflict. Thus, in order to provide a
healthy and safe environment for human populations there should be peace, development
and environmental protection.
The Rio Declaration also directly addresses the problem of environmental damage
caused by armed conflict. Principle 23 limits the power of military forces in dealing with
the environment in an occupied territory, by providing that “[t]he environment and
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natural resources of people under oppression, domination and occupation shall be
protected.” This principle should be strongly applied to the West Bank and Gaza Strip
during the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where Israeli and Palestinian armed forces
should be subject to Principle 23 of the Rio Declaration and protect the nature and natural
resources in West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Principle 24 of the Rio Declaration goes beyond prohibiting any State’s armed
forces from destroying the environment of another State, by requiring that States shall
participate in developing the environment during armed conflicts. It provides that
“[w]arfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore
respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed
conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary.” This principle declares
that all armed conflicts are destructive of sustainable development. In light of Principle
24, it is evident that States must respect international law instruments that deal with
environmental protection in times of armed conflict, and must cooperate in the
progressive development of further international law to protect the environment. This
principle provides great environmental protection in times of armed conflicts, but it says
nothing about the mechanism and the rules that should be applied to avoid environmental
damage during armed conflict.
Thus, the States assembled in Rio De Janeiro in 1992 believed that the declaration
alone would not be effective without practical measures. Therefore, an action plan,
Agenda 21, was adopted to implement sustainable development. It addresses several
objectives and outlines certain steps for governments, international organizations, and
non-State actors to adopt in order to promote sustainable development. Nevertheless, the
subject of environmental impacts of armed conflict was totally ignored by Agenda 21.
Since armed conflict cannot only harm the environment, but also can prevent sustainable
development from taking place, an action plan is needed. Even with the adoption of the
Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 in 1992, armed conflicts still occur whether between
States, or within a State. Moreover, throughout the history of armed conflicts, the larger
the conflict, the greater the environmental threat becomes. Nations with huge and wellequipped armed forces are capable of attacking other countries and causing vast
environmental damage. Therefore, nations, particularly developed countries, should be
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urged to reduce their military capacity and budgets to the minimum level possible to
maintain their national security and should focus on how to implement sustainable
development in order to live in peaceful societies and to maintain the international order.
Principles 23, 24, and 25 of the Rio Declaration could be considered the legal
basis for environmental protection in times of armed conflict even though they say
nothing about the mechanisms to do so. Agenda 21 is a major action plan for
implementing sustainable development, but it does not mention warfare environmental
damage that will necessarily impact on sustainable development. Thus, there is an urgent
need for an environmental action plan to implement Principles 23, 24 and 25
This thesis has addressed the environmental impact of armed conflict and
identified specific steps for the international community as well as national governments
to take in furtherance of environmental protection and, therefore, sustainable
development. These steps are crucial in order to promote more effective environmental
protection. Even if armed conflict is not considered at the World Summit on Sustainable
Development (WSSD) in 2002 in Johannesburg, South Africa, 2584 marking the ten-year
anniversary of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED), at some point in time nations must consider practical means to protect the
environment in times of armed conflict. The recommendations in this thesis should be
adopted and more concern should be given to the environmental impacts of armed
conflicts.
In sum, although I have completed the writing of my thesis, work should be
accelerated to implement and adopt some, if not all, of the recommendations, in order to
better advance protection of the global ecosystem and to achieve the sustainable
development for the present and future generations. My thesis addresses not only civilian
populations, but also military personnel and decision-makers as well, since its main
objective is to persuade military personnel around the world to secure and protect
environmental values and to consider the environment as a high priority whether in their
peacetime operations or in the battlefields. My thesis also speaks for the interests of the
natural world, of which human society must learn to be a better guardian. We can no
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longer sacrifice nature during times of armed conflict, as nature can not sustain our social
and economic development if neglected. If my recommendation and analysis in some
way furthers the adoption of new measures to safeguard the environment in times of
armed conflict, then I shall be grateful for undertaking this research.
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U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989).
* The Declaration on the Rules of International Humanitarian Law Governing the
Conduct of Hostilities in Non-International Armed Conflicts, San Remo, Apr. 7, 1990,
available at <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1990a.htm>, (last visit Dec. 10,
2000).
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* The Bamako Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Jan. 29,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 773.
* The Convention on the Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context,
Feb. 25, 1991, 30 I.L. M. 800 (1991).
* The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991,
<http://www.acda.gov/treaties/start/starttex.htm>, (last visit Mar. 20, 2001).
* The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992,
U.N.Doc. A/CONF.151/26.
* Protocol to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
May 23, 1992, U.S.-Russia, Ukraine-Belarus-Kazakhstan, S. Treaty Doc. No. 32, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), available in <http://www.acda.gov/treaties/start/lisbon.htm>, (last
visit Aug. 15, 2001).
* Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
* Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted by the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 15/26,
vol. I (1992).
* Treaty on Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms, Jan. 3,
1993, U.S.-Rus. Fed., S. Treaty Doc. 1, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
* Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993).
* Protocol to the International Convention on the Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, Jan. 15, 1993, reprinted in Benedict on Admiralty (1993).
* Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment, June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1228 (1993).
* North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1482.
* Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, Nov. 5,
1993, UN-Rwanda, 1748 U.N.T.S.
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* Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, Dec. 15,
1993, UN-Leb., 1901 U.N.T.S.
* Cooperation in the Prevention of Pollution of the Environment in the Arctic, Dec. 16,
1994, U.S., Russian Federation, 1994 WL 761204.
* Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Haiti, Mar. 15,
1995, UN-Haiti, 1861 U.N.T.S. 249.
* Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Angola,
May 3, 1995, UN-Angola, 1864 U.N.T.S.
* Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of Croatia,
May 15, 1995, UN-Croatia, 1864 U.N.T.S.
* Treaty on an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Pelindaba Treaty), Sept. 13, 1995,
U.N. GAOR, G.A. Res. 426, 50th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc A/50/426.
* Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 639.
* Protocol on the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices, amended May 3, 1996, U.S. Treaty Doc. 105-1, 35 I.L.M. 1206.
* The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostage, Dec. 17, 1997, 1316
U.N.T.S. 205.
* Cairo Declaration concerning the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, Apr. 11, 1996,
avaialable at <http://www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/distreat/cairo.htm>, (last visit June 28,
2001).
* Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Future
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, modified as of May 21, 1996,
available at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start2/docs/start-95.htm>, (last visit Aug.
20, 2001).
* Declaration on Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 26, 1996, Nor., Russ.,
U.S., available at <https://denix.cecer.army.mil/denix/Public/Intl/AMEC/declar.html>,
(last visit Jan. 29, 2002).
* Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (1997).
* The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, April 22, 1998, Cairo, in
International Instruments Related to the Prevention and
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Suppression of International Terrorism (United Nations Publication,
2001) Sales No. E.01.V.3.
* Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998).
*Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making, and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, opened for signature June 25, 1998,
available at 1998 WL 750201.
* Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Mission in Western Sahara, Feb. 11,
1999, UN-Morocco.
* Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International
Terrorism, July 1, 1999, Ouagadougou, in International Instruments
Related to the Prevention and Suppression of International
Terrorism (United Nations Publication, 2001) Sales No. E.01.V.3.
* Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29,
2000, available at <http://www.biodiv.org/biosafe/Protocol/html/Biosafe-Prot.html>, (last
visit March 11, 2000).

International Law Cases
* S.S. Wimbledon (Brit., Fr., It., Jap., v. Ger)., 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.1.
* The War Risks Insurance Premium Claims, 7 Reps. Int’l Arb. Awards (1923).
* The United States-Mexican Mixed Claims Commission, available at 4 Reps. Int’l
Arb. Awards 110 (1926).
* Trail Smelter, (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911, 1965 (Apr. 16, 1938 & Mar. 11,
1941).
* United States v. List, XI Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals 757, 1295-97 (1946-49).
* United Nations War Crimes Commission, Case No. 7150 496 (1948).
* Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 182.
* Corfu Channel Case, UK v. Alb., April 9, 1949, General List No. 1, 1949 I.C.J. 4,
<http://www.icj-cij.org> (last visit June 21, 2001).
* Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1962 I.C.J.
151 (1962), 1962 WL 4 (ICJ).
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* Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (1971), 1971 WL 8 (I.C.J.).
* Nuclear Tests Case, Preliminary Objection, (Aust. & N.Z. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. 99.
* Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr), 1974 I.C.J. (Dec. 20 1974).
* Western Sahara Case, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16, 1975).
* Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
May 24, 1980, General List No. 64, 1980 I.C.J. 3.
* Ruling Pertaining to the Difference Between France and New Zealand Arising from the
Rainbow Warrior Affair, 26 I.L.M. 1349, 1349 (1987).
* Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. U.S.),
Apr. 9, 1989, Provisional Measures, 37 I.L.M. 810 (1998).
* Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures in the Case Concerning Questions
of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr. 41, 1992).
* Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.)
1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 1993).
* The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Oct. 2, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 32.
* The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgment of May 7, 1997, Trial Chamber II, IT-94-IT.
* Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, International Court of Justice,
Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996.
* Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7
(Sept. 25) General List No. 92.

National Law Cases
* Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
* Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281(1949).
* Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
* Citizens for Reid State Park v. Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al., 336 F.Supp.
783(D. Me. 1972).
* Wilderness Society v. Morton, 463F.2d 1261(D.C.Cir.1972).
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* People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F.Supp. 811 (D.Haw.1973).
* Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F.Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1979).
* Romero-Barcelo v. Brown., 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981).
* Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 578F. Supp. 1327, (W. D. Wis. 1984).
* Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745F.2d 412, (7th Cir. 1984).
* Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859, F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
* Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Department of Energy, Civil Action No.
89-1835 (D.C. 1989).
* Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Hawaii 1990).
* Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 122-125 (8th Cir.1990).
* Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244 (1991).
* Amlon Metals Inc., v. FMC Corp., 775 F.Supp. 668 S.D. New York (1991).
* Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
* FMC Corp. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 786 F. Supp. 471(E.D. Pa.1992), aff’d
1994 WL 314814 (3d Cir.)
* FMC Corp. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 786 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1992),
aff’d 1994 WL 314814 (3rd. Cir.)
* Environmental Defense Fund Inc., v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 529 (D.C. Cir.1993).
* Minors Oposa v. Secretary Of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.,
33 I.L.M. 173 (1994).
* FMC Corp. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).
* Citizen for a Better Environment v. The Steel Company., 90 F. 3d. 1237, 1239 (1996).
* Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. United States Dept. of the Army, 111 F.3d
1485 (10th Cir. 1997).
* Military Toxic Project v. EPA, 146 F.3d 948 (D.C.Cir. 1998).
* U.S.A. v. Omar Mohammed Ali Rezaq et al, 134 F. 3d 1121, C.A.D.C., 1998. Decided
Feb. 6, 1998.
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National Statutes and Regulations

Kuwait
* Mursoom Ameiry Biganoon Alaathar 11/1960 [Emery Decree Relevant to the
Monuments Law No 11/1960].
* Ganoon Ragom 12 Lisanat 1964 Bisha’an Man’a Talweeth Almiah Asalihah
Liulmilahah Bizait [Law No. 12/1964 Concerning the Prohibition of Navigable Water
Pollution by Oil].
* Ghanoon Ragom 32 Lisanat 1967 Fy Sha’an Aljaysh [Law No. 32/1967 related to the
Military] Jul. 12, 1967.
* Ghanon Ragom 18/1969 Fy Sa’an Tahdeed Amlak Adawlah Kharij Khat Atantheem
Ala’am, [Law No. 18/1969 Concerning the Indication of the State Properties beyond the
Public Organization Limit], May 7, 1969.
* Ghanoon Ragom 15/1972 Bisha’an Baladyat Alkuwait Wal’laeihah Adakhily’iah
Lilmajlis Albalady Wifghan Lita’adilat Allaty Odkhilat Alayha Hata Yoniou 1984 [Law
No 15/1972 Relating to the Kuwait Municipality and the Internal Regulations of
Municipal Council].
* Ghanoon Bisha’an Almohafadah ala Masadir Atharwah Alpetroliah 19/1973, [Law
Relative to the Conservation of Petroleum Resources No. 19/1973].
* Ghanoon Bisha’an Almohafadah ala Masadir Atharwah Alpetroliah 19/1973, [Law
Relative to the Conservation of Petroleum Resources No. 19/1973].
* Marsoom Biganoon Bisha’an Ehtyaty Alaj’yal Algadimah 106/1976[Law Decree
Relevant to the Future Generations Fund No. 106/1976].
* Marsoom Biganoon Bisha’an Tantheem Istikhdam Alashya’ah Almoai’yanah
Walwygayah Min Makhatirha 131/1977 [Law Decree Regulating the Usage of Ionizing
Radiation and Preventing its Hazards No 131/1977].
* Marsoom Bisha’an Wozarat Asih’ha Al’aamah 1979, [The Ministry of Public Health
Decree of 1979].
* Marsoom Byghanoon Ragom 21/1979 Fey Sha’an Adeifa’a Almadany [Law Decree
No. 21/1979 Relative the Civil Defense].
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* Garar Ragom 3367/1981 Bisha’an La’ihat Almahalat Alaamah Wal Mogligah Lilrahah
Wal Mothirah Bisyhah [Decision No 3367/1981 Relative to the Rules of Public Stores,
Annoying, and Harmful to the Health].
* Marsoom Biganoon Bisha’an Ba’ad Alafa’al Almodirah Benadafah Ala’ammah
Walmazroa’at 9/1987, [Law Decree No. 9/1987 relevant to the Interdiction of Public Acts
Hurtful to Public Cleanliness and Agriculture No. 9/1987].
* Marsoom Biganoon Bisha’an Ba’ad Alafa’al Almodirah Benadafah Ala’ammah
Walmazroa’at 9/1987, [Law Decree No. 9/1987 relative to the Interdiction of Certain
Acts Hurtful to Public Cleanliness and Agriculture No. 9/1987].
* Law No. 94/1983 Establishing the Public Authority for Agriculture and Fisheries
Patrimony Affairs, amended by the Law Decree No. 6/1988.
* Marssoom Bisha’an Wozarat Almowas’alat, July 18, 1988 [The Ministry of
Transportation Decree of June 18, 1988].
* Technical Affairs Department of Ministry of Oil, Rules of Petroleum Patrimony
Resources Conservation (1989).
* Gharar Bisha’an Tantheem Ijra’a Dirasat Almardood Albei’ey Lilmashroa’at
Alinshaeiah Wasina’eiah 9/1990 [Decision Regulating the Procedures of the
Environmental Impact Studies for Structural and Industrial Projects, No. 9/1990].
* Gharar Majlis Alwozara’a Ragom 906/1994 [Council of Ministries Decision No.
906/1994].
* Ghanoon Insha’a Alhaya’ah Alaamah Lilby’ah 21/1995-16/1996 [Law Establishing the
Environmental Public Authority No. 21/1995, modified by Law No. 16/1996] art 1 (6).
* Ghanoon Bisha’an Isdar Ghanoon asyna’ah 56/1996 [Law Relevant to the Adoption of
the Industry Law No. 56/1996].
* Baladiat AlKuwait I’alan Ragom 130/1998 [Kuwait Municipality Announcement
No.130/1998].
* Decree No. 190/1999 Forming the Higher Council of the Environmental Public
Authority, of August 15, 1999.
* Mashroa’a Ghanoon Bi’insha’a Watandeem Mahkamah Bi’iyyah [A Bill Establishing
and Regulating the Environmental Court], Approved by the Higher Council of EPA in its
Meeting No. 2/99 in Dec. 29, 1999.

553

The United States
* 40 United States Code Annotated, Public Buildings, Property, And Works (1940).
* U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, Law of Naval Warfare, NWIP (1955).
* Dep’t of the Army, the Law of Land Warfare, Field Manual No. 27-10 (1956).
* National Envionmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370 (1969).
* The Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act, Pub. L. 92-532 (1972), 86 Stat.
1052.
* Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1252-1387 (1972).
* Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1534 (1973).
* 38 Fed. Reg. 20553 (1973).
* U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, International Law - The Conduct of Armed Conflict and
Air Operations, AFP No. 110-31, (1976).
* Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (1976).
* Exec. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (1979).
* Department of Defense Directive 6050.7, (DoD) Final Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 21786
(1979).
* Comprehensive Environmental Redponse, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (1980).
* Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. 99499, 100 Stat.1615 (1986).
* Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations of Law of the United States (1987).
* Toxix Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2692 (1988).
* U.S. Department of the Navy, Annotated Supplement to the Commanders’ Handbook
on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10 (1989).
* Army Regulations G, H (1990).
* Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. 2701-2761 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
* The Abandoned Shipwreck Act, 55 Fed. Reg. 50, 125 (1990).
* Air Force Instruction 32-7006, Environmental Program in Foreign Countries, Civil
Engineering (1994).
* Air Force Directive 32-70, Environmental Quality, Civil Engineering (1994).
* Federal Facility Compliance Act, Pub. L. 102-386 Title I, Oct. 6, 1992, 106 Stat. 1505,
Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (y) (1994).

554

* War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104.
* Air Force Directive 32-70, Environmental Quality, Civil Engineering (1994).
* 60 Fed. Reg. 4607 (1995).
* U.S. Air Force Instruction 32-7045, Environmental Compliance Assessment and
Management Program, Civil Engineering (1998).
* Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112
Stat. 2681.
* 40 Code of Federal Regulations, Protection of Environment, Council on Environmental
Quality, revised as of Jul. 1, 2001.
* 32 Code of Federal Regulations, National Defense, revised as of Jul. 1, 2001.

Other Countries
* Israeli Civil Wrongs Law, 1952, available at
<wysiwyg://28http://www1.huji.ac.il/www_teva_law/b6.html>, (last visit February 24,
2001).
* Japanese Medical Assistance Legislation of 1957.
* United Kingdom Manual of Military Law, Part III, 173 (1958).
* United Kingdom War Office, The Law of War and Land, Being Part III of the Manual
of Military Law (1958).
* The Israeli Water Law of 1959, available at
<wysiwyg://41/http://www1.huji.ac.il/www_teva_law/fresh_water.html>, (last visit Feb.
24, 2001).
* The Singaporian Military Maneuvers Act, Cap. 182, 1985 Rev. Ed. (1963).
* Nigerian Oil in Navigable Water Act, Pace Law School Virtual Library, Oil in
Navigable Water Act, 1968, No. 34, available at
<http://www.law.pace.edu/env/nigerianlaw/oilwater/oilwater2.html>, (last visit Feb. 23,
2001).
* Nigerian Environmental Protection Agency Act, available at Pace Law School Virtual
Library, The Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act, 1988, No. 58, avaialble at
<http://www.law.pace.edu/env/nigerianlaw/epa/envpa2.html>, (last visit Feb. 23, 2001).
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* Nigerian Harmful Waste Act, Pace Law School Virtual Library, Nigerian Harmful
Waste Act, 1988 No. 42, available at
<http://www.law.pace.edu/env/nigerianlaw/waste/waste.html> (last visit Feb. 23, 2001).
* Law of Ukraine on Environmental Protection, No. 1264, June 25, 1991.
* German Federal Ministry of Defense, Humanitarian Lan in Armed Conflicts – Manual
(ZDv 15/2, 1992).
* Israeli Act of Prevention of Environmental Nuisance, 1992, availabele at
<wysiwyg://36/http://www1.huji.ac.il/www_teva_law/b12.html>, (last visit Feb. 24,
2001).
* Germany Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts Manual, para. 12M (1992).
* Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2551 (1994).
* Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Resolution No. 554 on List of Activities and Objects
which Constitute an Increased Ecological Hazard (July 27, 1995).
* The Federal Law on Protection of the Environment (No. 7-F2), adopted by Duma and
Council of the Federation (Dec. 2001), signed by President Putin (Jan. 2002).

Other National Materials
* Eisenhower, D.D. “The Chance for Peace,” Speech to the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, Apr. 16, 1953, Washington, D.C.
* Message from the former President of the United States of America John F. Kennedy to
the U.S. Senate Transmitting the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, in Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, Hearings before the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th
Congress, 1st Session, Executive M., Washington, 1963.
* Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Hearing before the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Foreign
Relations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Executive M., Washington, 1963.
* William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations for the
Department of State, Letter to Senator Henry M. Jackson, reprinted in S.Rep. No.296,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., App. (1969).
*46 Dept. State Bull. (1971).
* United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 92nd Congress-2nd Session
(1972).
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* Malik J., et al., Yields of the Bombs, the U.S.-Japan Joint Reassessment of Atomic
Bomb Radiation Dosimetry in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Final Report (Radiation Effects
Research Foundation, 1987).
* Letters to John Herrington, Secretary of Energy, from Dan W. Reicher, National
Resources Defense Council (December 14, 1988), and from Congressman Mike Synar
and other members of Congress (December 14, 1988).
* Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Chemical Stockpile Disposal
Program Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (1988).
* Global Narcotics Cooperation and Presidential Certification: Statement Before the
Subcomm. On Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Comm. Of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Dep’t St. Bull. 49 (Oct. 1989) (Statement of Ann B.
Wrobleski, Asst. Sec. For Int’l Narcotics Matters).
* DOE press release, January 12, 1990.
*137 CONG.REC. H.715 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1991).
* Memorandum from Colonel J.P. Terry, Deputy Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Environmental Destruction as a Weapon of War (June 11, 1991).
* H.R.REP. No. 57, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG.REC. 1824 (1991).
* U.S. Department of Defence, Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf
War -Appendix on the Law of War, April 10, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 612 (1992).
* Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress, Conflict Supplemental
Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991, Apr. 1992, Publ. L. No. 102-25.
* U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-92-51 Military Base Closures: U.S.
Financial Obligation in the Philippines (1992).
* Committee on Environmental and Public Pollution Task Force, The Environmental
Aftermath of the Gulf War (U.S. Government Printing Press, 1992).
* The Environmental Aftermath of the Gulf War, A Congressional Report prepared for
the Committee on Environment and Public Works, Gulf Pollution Task Force, 102d.
Congress, 2d Session. (Environment & Natural Resources Policy Division et al. Eds.,
1992).
* Department of Defense, Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document (1992).

557

* Mine Clearance Agency (MCA), National Survey of Mines Situation in Afghanistan
(1993).
* Reproductive Hazards and Military Service: What are the Risks of Radiation, Agent
Orange, and Gulf War Exposure? Hearing Before the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs,
United States Senate, 103rd Cong. 2nd Sess. (Aug. 1994).
* Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm.On Intelligence, 103d Cong. 76 (1994)
(Statement of R. James Woolsey, nominee for director of the Central Intelligence
Agency).
* Department of Energy, Implementation Plan Executive Summary (DoE/EIS02000)(1994).
* United States Army's Alternative Demilitarization Technology Report for Congress,
Executive Summary, Department of the Army Program Manager for Chemical
Demilitarization (1994).
* FM 20-32 Mine/Countermine Operations, Headquarters, Dep’t of the Army (1994).
* Defense Environmental Restoration Program, Words of The former President William
J. Clinton, in Foreword of Sherri W. Goodman, former Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense, 1996, available at
<http://www.dtic.mil/envirodod/derpreport96/vo11/foreword.html>, (last visit Jul. 20,
2001).
* Department of Energy, Fiscal year 2000 Stockpile Stewardship Plan Executive
Overview (1999).
* President George W. Bush, Statement before the Congress, Sept. 20, 2001.
* Monona Rossol, Downing From Disaster, A paper prepared by N.Y. Envt’l L. &
Just. Project in the occasion of Sept. 11, 2001 attacks against the United States,
Sept. 22, 2001.
* Department of Environmental Affairs in Kuwait Municipality, The Role of Kuwait
Municipality in the Environmental Protection, in files with the author.

Other International Materials
* First International Peace Conference, The Hague 1899, reprinted in 1 Am. J. Int’l L.
103 (Supp. 1907).

558

* The Second International Peace Conference, The Hague, 1907, reprinted in 2 Am. J.
Int’l L. 106 (Supp. 1908).
* Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Proceeding
(Vol.1), Nuremberg, 1947.
* Report of the United Nations International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 247 (1966), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1966.
* G.A. Res. 2444, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 18) U.N. Doc. A/7433(1968).
* Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran (Apr. 25- May 9
1968) Res. XXIII, A/CONF.32/41 (1968), U.N Sales No. E. 68.XIV.2.
* Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC), 240, March 18, 1969.
* G.A. Res. 2603A, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34), U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
* U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/11 (1969).
* Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Int’l L.
Comm’n, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1969).
* G.A.Res. 2840 (XXVI), U.N. GAOR 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 79, U.N. Doc, A/8429
(1971).
* Principles of International Co-operation in the Detention, Arrest, Extradition and
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes Against Humanity, G.A.Res. 3074
(XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc, A/9030 (1973).
* G.A. Res. 3263, U.N. GAOR First Comm., 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
* G.A. Res. 31/72, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 37, U.N.Doc. A/31/39
(1976).
* Madrid Resolution on the Protection of Water Resources and Water Installations in
Times of Armed Conflict, International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-Seventh
Conference, Madrid, 1976.
* The United Nations Conference on The Law of The Sea, Official Records, Vol. 6, U.N.
Sales No. E. 76.V.8 (1976).
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* G.A. Res. 32/84B on the Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New
Type of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New System of Such Weapons 32 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 45, U.N. Doc. A/32/45/ (1977).
* UNEP, Responsibility Pour Les Dommages Dus A La Pollution ou Autre Dommage
Ecologiques Et Leur Indemnisation, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG. 8/2 (1977).
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